Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, this group of amendments illustrates exactly how sensitive and difficult these cases are, does it not? In some of the amendments, noble Lords are saying that firearms officers should be held to a different standard than the rest of the population, but, in the others, it is being argued that even a small additional protection for them and their families is too great a differential in treatment.

Against that background, I start with Amendments 393B to 393F, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I met the noble Lord, together with the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Black, and the News Media Association, and I thank them all for the interesting and constructive conversation that we had. The Government have considered the noble Lord’s amendments with great care. We understand, and entirely support, the principle of open justice and freedom of the press, but what is in issue here is trying to find the appropriate balance.

I am really sorry to have to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, whom I admire greatly, but the Government firmly believe that firearms officers face very real and specific risks from organised crime groups and violent offenders, and that this requires there should be a presumption that only their personal details should be withheld up until such time as they are convicted—and if they are acquitted, that their identity will remain protected.

In doing so, we recognise that firearms officers who are being prosecuted for discharging their firearm face a unique situation, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said. The threats they face before and after the trial are real and, unlike most defendants, if acquitted, they are simply unable to return to their old lives as innocent people. Firearms officers and their families have targets on their back, even if they are cleared of any wrongdoing.

This special set of circumstances requires a tailored response, and we believe that the Government’s proposals achieve the correct balance. Those who are opposed to establishing a presumption of anonymity until conviction have twin concerns: first, that there is insufficient evidence that this is necessary; and, secondly, that it represents the thin end of the wedge. I want to deal briefly with each argument in turn.

First, on the evidence that this is needed, there is no doubt that the threat faced by firearms officers is not theoretical. There are very real risks. As I set out in Committee, and will not repeat in detail, firearms officers can face serious death threats and other forms of intimidation, which also extend to their families. As evidence for the need, there is real concern that the revelation of the identity of police officers who are being prosecuted is having a negative effect on the recruitment and retention of these essential officers. I am not sure that these are exactly the same statistics that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has, but certainly those from the document on armed policing attrition and retention record that, since 2019, there has been a loss of 583 armed officers, or an 8.8% reduction. This is a very real concern.

What is important is that this measure does not force the courts to issue an anonymity order. It will not cause secret trials. Judges must still consider the interests of justice and they have an active duty to uphold open justice. Even if no party challenges the anonymity, they still must, in considering the interests of justice, assess whether a reporting direction is necessary and proportionate. Even when anonymity is granted, the proceedings will remain public and the evidence will be tested in open court.

I am afraid the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, is under a misapprehension about what this involves. The only restriction is removing the identity, so they will be referred to throughout all proceedings as Officer A. Everything else will be reported, and, in the event that they are convicted, anonymity will be rescinded and their identity will become known.

A further concern has been the ability of the media to challenge the making of such an order. The Government absolutely understand the point, and we offer the following reassurances. First, by virtue of Criminal Procedure Rule 6.2, courts must actively invite media representations whenever anonymity or reporting restrictions are under consideration, and the judge must create the opportunity for scrutiny.

Secondly, HMCTS has delivered a package of reforms to strengthen media access and support open justice in criminal courts. As part of this reform, every criminal court now has a new circulation list called the reporting restriction application notice list. This list includes contacts from the media distribution list who have specifically agreed to have their details shared with applicants for advance notice. They will be added as mandatory contacts to all reporting restriction application notice lists held by criminal courts to ensure service on their members. In addition, HMCTS has established a media engagement group to improve processes to better serve media professionals in criminal courts.

Thirdly, the law grants the media the right to appeal any decision to make a reporting direction or an anonymity order to the Court of Appeal. But here is one of the most important points: if a judge refuses to make an anonymity order, the prosecution and the defendant have no right of appeal. That is one of the reasons that the Government have decided that the starting point should be a presumption that anonymity is granted.

Would this be the thin end of the wedge? These are unique circumstances. The number of trials is tiny. In the past 10 years there have been two criminal trials for murder or manslaughter as a result of a fatal police shooting. By way of comparison, there have been 13 fatal police shootings since 2019-20. Clauses 168 to 171 have been carefully drafted to strike a lawful and proportionate balance between fundamental rights and the need to protect our firearms officers and their families.

I turn to Amendment 394, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and spoken to powerfully also by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. It is one of two amendments that take the opposite view to that advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

While we acknowledge, once again, the importance of firearms officers and the debt that we owe them, the Government are unable to support this amendment, for these reasons. It would fundamentally alter the basis upon which prosecutorial decisions are taken by introducing a statutory presumption against prosecution for a particular group of citizens, who in this case happen to be police officers. Without doubt, this would create a two-tier approach to prosecutions in the criminal justice system. All public prosecutorial decisions, as we have heard frequently this evening, are made in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, which has statutory force. Its two-stage test has stood the test of time.

The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, suggests that the CPS is getting the decisions wrong because of the number of acquittals. With respect to the noble Lord, that rather misses the point. The CPS test is not to decide whether it prosecutes somebody who is guilty. If we knew they were guilty, we would not need the jury. The test is whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction. That is an exercise of judgment as to whether it is more likely than not that there will be a conviction. If so, and if the public interest stage is satisfied, the case is put before a jury, who decide whether or not they are actually guilty.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I thank the Minister for giving way. I understand and accept the distinction that she makes. Over the past 20 or 30 years, the concern for the police officers involved is that, on every occasion that the decision has been made, it has been wrong so far as the jury is concerned. It has left the officers believing, sometimes, that the way that the CPS has discharged its problem—with a public outcry about the shooting—has been to test it in a court, rather than making its own decision for which it should be accountable. I understand the distinction that the Minister makes, therefore, but it is spooky that on every occasion the CPS has got it wrong so far as juries are concerned.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, again, that is a fundamental misunderstanding. If the CPS had got it wrong, the judge would have withdrawn it at half-time. It would never have got as far as a jury. The two things —one of them being the fact that the jury has acquitted—simply do not correlate.

The noble Lord’s amendment gives no indication as to how this proposed test would fit with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, save that we would then have a two-tier system, with one rule for the police and another for the citizens they police. It is hard to see how such a situation could command public confidence.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, the unique position of firearms officers will be taken into consideration at both stages of the full code test. In cases involving fatal police shootings, the Crown Prosecution Service already considers whether the officer’s actions were necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, as the officer honestly believed them to be, recognising how difficult it can be to make fine decisions in the heat of the moment. It is the same law that applies to every citizen. Prosecutions in these cases are very rare, reflecting the high threshold already applied; an additional statutory presumption is neither necessary nor appropriate.

Lastly, I turn to Amendment 403 from the noble Lord, Lord Carter, which was, as ever, attractively advanced by him. The Government’s position remains as it was in Committee: there cannot be a separate criminal law for police officers in homicide cases. The current legal framework already offers robust protection for those who act under a genuine and honest belief, even if that belief later proves to be mistaken. In any event, the Law Commission is considering the offence of homicide, and the Government will consider its report carefully in due course.

I am grateful for the debate that we have had today. It is clear that there are strongly held views on both sides, but the Government believe that they have struck the right balance to protect our highly valued armed police officers while not standing in the way of the principles of open justice and a single-tier justice system. For that reason, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by placing on record my gratitude to all the noble Lords who have led the campaign on this important issue, none more so than the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who has so ably championed this cause. I think it self-evident that we all acknowledge the harms that phones and social media are doing to our youth. I speak as a father of teenage children who are grappling with these very issues day to day.

This is most tragically brought to the fore when phones and social media lead to the death of children. Parents who face this unimaginable tragedy should be able to know what their child was accessing, and the evidence from these awful incidents should prove to the general public that steps have to be taken. I see no argument for why the police should not be required to collect evidence relating to potential digital harm, as indeed they are required to do for general causes of death. Similarly, if social media has in part led to the death of a child, the bare minimum that providers should do is to retain the data relating to the victim.

I too express gratitude to the Minister for considering the arguments raised in Committee and acting upon this. I understand that many in your Lordships’ House believe that Amendment 429A does not go far enough and that it does not place the desired duties on police forces. However, I welcome at least the start that this represents.

There is a tension, I fear, between what the Government are doing in your Lordships’ House—rightly, making concessions on the issue—and, at the same time, in the other place voting against further protections from online harms. The Minister’s amendment today places duties on providers. It is a short step from mandating data retention to enforcing age limits. This is not the time for that debate in its entirety, but it is worth putting it on the record. I reiterate my gratitude to all Members of your Lordships’ House who have campaigned on this important matter.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government remain grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and to the bereaved families who have raised concerns about the effectiveness of the existing framework for the preservation of online material that may be relevant to understanding a child’s death. I reiterate what I said in Committee: the loss of any child is a profound tragedy, and the Government are clear that we must take every possible step to safeguard children online.

I pay tribute to all the campaigners on this issue. Of course, I would be delighted to see Ellen Roome. I had the opportunity to meet her briefly; she was introduced to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Shawcross-Wolfson, outside the Chamber. It would be good to organise something formally and to include the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Barran. I will do what I can to find out what is happening with the inquest. Obviously, I cannot commit my noble and learned friend the Attorney-General to anything, but I will do what I can to find out what is happening.

I promised in Committee that the Government would consider how that framework could be amended to ensure that data preservation is applied consistently and as quickly as possible. We have done that: we listened and we have acted. I am delighted today to bring forward government Amendments 429A, 454A and 467AB, which require speedy data preservation in every case involving the death of a child aged five or above. The only exceptions to that will be where the child’s online activity is clearly irrelevant to their death or an investigation is plainly not necessary.

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her constructive engagement on the development of this provision. Our most recent meeting was this afternoon, where we did our best to move things forward; I will return to that in a moment. As I have emphasised to her, the Government’s firm intention is that a DPN request becomes the default and should be made in every case, unless the coroner is very clear from the outset that online data is not relevant to a child’s death. We will ensure that this expectation is clearly set out in the Explanatory Notes to the new provision. I will write to the Chief Coroner, asking her to consider issuing guidance for coroners on the application of the mandatory requirement and, crucially, the circumstances in which an exception may be appropriate.

The Government thought we had done enough and that we had done what was wanted of us, because we all agreed with the objectives. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has reservations, and I understand them. I hope that we can continue to discuss this, so that we can reach a position where everybody is happy that we are doing what we have set out to do.

On the time limit, this now mandatory policy will entail the preservation of a much greater volume of data, including that of third parties, than at present. As it preserves the data relating to the dead child, it will also sweep up those on the other end of the interaction—the third parties are the issue here. To ensure that it is proportionate, we are therefore reducing the initial retention period—not the overall retention period—to six months, which, in the majority of cases, should provide sufficient time for the coroner to decide whether the online evidence is relevant. It is not related to when the inquest takes place, because the coroners all start working on this long before the inquest actually opens. It is simply putting it in place so that they have time to make the decision. There is a provision to extend it. The coroner does not have to apply to extend it; it is much simpler than that—they simply have to decide to extend it. Therefore, more time can be secured by the coroner if it is not yet clear.

We will work with the Chief Coroner and operational partners to ensure that coroners are clear that a positive decision is needed at the six-month point on whether or not to extend a DPN. If there is any doubt, the default position should be to extend the DPN to ensure that the data is preserved until the inquest.

These amendments will make a minor change to the existing regulation-making power in Section 101 of the Online Safety Act, so that regulations setting out the kinds of services that will automatically receive a DPN can refer to ongoing research. That means they will remain current and will capture any new and emerging services that become popular with children.

Amendments 431 and 432, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would, as we are all aware, basically give effect to the same issue as the government amendments, but they include preserving data where online activity is not relevant to a child’s death. The reason for the difference is that the government amendments carve this out to reduce delay and diverting resources away from relevant cases. For that reason, we cannot accept the noble Baroness’s Amendments 431 and 432, as they would require a disproportionate retention of third-party data, which would risk breaching Article 8.

Finally, on Amendment 404 and the consequential Amendment 405, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, we agree that it is essential that the police both understand the powers available to them and can use those powers consistently to access all relevant information when investigating these cases, including digital material or content held on social media platforms. As the noble Baroness knows, the National Police Chiefs’ Council is developing guidance to improve awareness and to promote uniform use of these powers, and the Home Office is committed to working with the police on this issue.

I know how concerned your Lordships’ House is about the pace of change in some of these newer technologies. That is exactly why, for guidance to remain practical and effective, it must be able to evolve alongside the fast-changing technological developments and legal frameworks. That is why it is preferable not to set this guidance or its detail in primary legislation but instead to continue working with the police to ensure that this guidance is delivered soon and to a high standard.

For the reasons I have set out, I ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendments. I thank her again and thank all other noble Lords who have spoken for their collaboration and engagement on this important issue.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I thank all noble Lords who have supported this, not just tonight but on previous occasions, and I thank the Minister. Earlier this afternoon, we were looking for the perfect words. When she stood up, she said “clearly irrelevant” to the death of a child, and that would have been the perfect phrase to have in the Bill. I say it on the record. Maybe she can come back with a surprise at Third Reading.

I very much appreciate the work of the department and where the Government have met us, and I accept the point about the police. I say for one final time that, unfortunately, we have been round this three times. If this does not work, we will be back again with fury. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.