Customs Miscellaneous Non-fiscal Provisions and Amendments etc. (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 Debate

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Department: Cabinet Office

Customs Miscellaneous Non-fiscal Provisions and Amendments etc. (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

Baroness Ludford Excerpts
Tuesday 19th January 2021

(3 years, 3 months ago)

Grand Committee
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Baroness Ludford Portrait Baroness Ludford (LD) [V]
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My Lords, I come to this subject with some degree of trepidation, because although I have focused for many years now on the overall shape of the UK-EU relationship, I am no expert on either trade processes or Northern Ireland. But I do know that there has been a great deception: the pretence that the EU ease-of-trade cake could be had as well as eaten, and the preposterous notion that leaving the single market and customs union meant a slashing of red tape. For here we are, facing reality—or rather, our benighted businesses face the reality of reams of form-filling, cost and delay. This reality is not “teething problems”; it is, as Michel Barnier reminded us, the new normal.

As my friend in the other place, Stephen Farry of the Alliance Party, said:

“Deeper challenges lie with Brexit itself and the nature of the UK-EU trade deal. They are being manifested across the UK. Northern Ireland is not alone in that respect.”


By that, of course, he means that Brexit entails friction across the UK; there is no escaping that fundamental truth. He went on to say:

“However, there are issues arising from the specific terms of and operational decisions around the Northern Ireland Protocol”,


because the protocol is a much blunter means to address the challenges of intra-UK trade post Brexit than the backstop.

The subject matter of this statutory instrument is paperwork for trade between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. People in Northern Ireland, both businesses and consumers, are suffering from what Ministers like to call “teething problems” but are in fact intrinsic to the arrangements that they have negotiated. Movement of goods across the Irish Sea is subject to red tape— customs safety and security procedures, including, in most circumstances, entry summary declarations, economic operator registration, enforcement powers and penalties for failure to comply—to address the different regimes applying in Northern Ireland and Great Britain. But the Government have behaved badly by not only stalling on a trade deal until 24 December for press management reasons, but denying for so long the reality of the fact that border controls had shifted to the Irish Sea. Because of those two factors, they failed to prepare properly.

Who can forget—the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, reminded us and I will do so again—that, in November 2019, the Prime Minister told businesses in Northern Ireland that they would “absolutely not” have to fill in extra forms, and that if any of them were asked to fill in such paperwork, they should telephone him

“and I will direct them to throw that form in the bin”.

I understand that, even today, Northern Ireland Secretary Brandon Lewis has claimed that empty shelves in Northern Ireland are due to coronavirus challenges, not Brexit. The continued tendency to bluster on this subject is deeply unhelpful. As my noble friend Lady Suttie said on 6 January in a debate on the Trade Bill:

“We are now beginning to see the realities of barriers to trade and of what the BBC has described as the ‘internal UK border’. We are also witnessing the consequences of doing a deal so much at the last minute that proper preparation for the business community in Northern Ireland was not really an option.”—[Official Report, 6/1/21; col. 173.]


The least the Government can do now is TO consult properly, actually listen, and be prepared to amend where they can if mistakes have been made—subject, of course, to the constraints of the withdrawal agreement and protocol and the trade and co-operation agreement.

I will say a brief word about timing. As the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, said, we are told in paragraph 3.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum:

“This instrument is being laid using the urgent procedure under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The regulations introduced by this instrument will come into force at the end of the transition period.”


Obviously, they have been in force now for 19 days, so this debate is—how shall I put it?—not before time. The regulations arise solely out of the withdrawal agreement and its protocol on Northern Ireland, but those were agreed almost 11 months before this draft was tabled on 22 December, so why did it take so long?

I want principally to ask about consultation. Section 10 of the Explanatory Memorandum has quite a lot of blurb on the subject, including this:

“Consultation on the practical implications of the Protocol has taken place with businesses. Throughout the transition period, the NI Stakeholder Engagement Team (NISET) have consulted with a wide range of businesses and representative bodies who would be impacted.”


The following paragraphs elaborate. This general assertion may well raise the eyebrows of parliamentarians in both Houses on relevant committees, all of whom have complained vocally about the paucity of consultation over the past year. However, paragraph 10.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum makes the astonishing statement:

“No formal consultation regarding this instrument has taken place.”


In other words, despite the somewhat diversionary wording of the rest of Section 10, the nub is that, on these nuts and bolts, there appears to have been no consultation. Can the Minister tell us why that is so, and what he defines as “formal” in this context? Are the Government in fact saying that no consultation took place at all on the specifics covered by this statutory instrument?

I am afraid that the Government’s attitude is revealed by Section 12 of the Explanatory Memorandum, as also quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, where it is claimed:

“There is no, or no significant impact on business… The provisions do not introduce any requirement beyond what has already been agreed, or is a necessary consequence of what has been agreed in the Protocol.”


Surely, however, when it comes to trade, the devil is in the detail—otherwise why would there have been such uproar in the last 19 days leading, in the case of Scottish fishermen, to lorries in Westminster? If we are not to end up with the Northern Ireland Secretary blaming Northern Irish businesses for not filling in the right forms, as the Prime Minister has done with regard to exporters from Great Britain, careful consultation is essential.

These regulations are about goods moved from Northern Ireland to Great Britain, but I hope the Minister can tell us how the Government intend to consult properly not only with Northern Irish businesses but with those GB businesses with whom they are trading, and to learn from all their experiences ahead of the end of the three-month grace period, which extends only until the end of March. While the subset of challenges arising from the operation of the protocol, rather than from Brexit itself, relates in large part to very tight timescales for implementation and poor information, there is also a problem of lack of engagement from companies based in Great Britain about trade with Northern Ireland. What preparations are the Government taking now to ensure that current issues and problems do not reoccur after 31 March?

Lastly, can Minister explain how businesses will feed into the complicated and not very transparent governance arrangements for both the protocol and the trade and co-operation agreement, for example in the specialised committee for SPS measures?

In conclusion, Northern Ireland has been described by Professor Katy Hayward of Queen’s University Belfast as,

“this small but fragile region on the periphery of both”,

the UK and the EU. It is incumbent on the Government, for not only economic but political reasons, to take the greatest care not to put any more strain than the act of Brexit already regrettably does on this “small but fragile region”. Given the failure to consult specifically on this instrument, I am not persuaded that the Government are acting accordingly.

I hope that the Minister can give an assurance that, when there are structural problems that can be addressed only through flexible solutions being agreed by the UK Government and EU institutions, the Government will not be shy of arguing for those flexibilities. That does not mean invoking Article 16 of the protocol. Those pushing for such a remedy are offering a populist, ineffective and false solution. No major business organisation in Northern Ireland or beyond is calling for Article 16 on safeguards to be invoked. Outside the protocol, much unfinished business is still to be done to maximise potential to the Northern Ireland economy. The list includes access to EU free-trade agreements, which is particularly important to the agri-food sector; transit from Great Britain to Northern Ireland via the Republic of Ireland; data adequacy; the future of the all-Ireland service sector; and many others. We in my party, with our Alliance friends, will continue to raise these issues.

Lord Tunnicliffe Portrait Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]
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My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing this instrument, and to other noble Lords who have participated in this debate. As has been noted, the instrument was made in December under the urgent procedure. That is rarely desirable but, as the Explanatory Memorandum notes, it could not be laid until after the Taxation (Post-transition Period) Bill had received Royal Assent. We were all somewhat surprised when the Government announced that Bill at short notice, in a manner that suggested that they had only realised its necessity at the last minute. I hope that the Minister can assure us that, with a UK-EU trade deal now provisionally applied, we will return to the normal ways of conducting business.

While not directly relevant to this SI, conversations with colleagues have alerted me to the laying of other made-affirmative EU exit instruments over the Christmas period. In some cases, they appeared despite strong assurances that the relevant departments had concluded all their so-called day-one critical business well in advance of the House rising. Again, we understand the need of recent times. Going forward, however, we can all agree that fast-tracked primary legislation and the use of made-affirmative instruments should be far rarer than we have become accustomed to. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on that.

Turning to the contents of the instrument, the Minister outlined the various changes introduced. They have, of course, now been in force for a little over two weeks. We would not have opposed this instrument had it been laid before Christmas and, given the legal chaos that would have resulted from this SI lapsing in February, we will certainly not do so today. I hope that the Minister can shed a little light on the operation of Regulation 5, which allows penalties to be applied if a business fails to comply with requirements in Regulations 3 and 4. Can he confirm the approach that the Government will take with such penalties? Given the lack of notice that many businesses have had, and the difficulties that some have experienced with the technological side of things, will there be a degree of leniency when determining whether to issue fines? If so, for how long? If not, will any special guidance be issued to those who consider appeals?

It may seem a minor point, but paragraph 3.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum notes that this instrument amends several small errors in the 2019 SI. On the one hand, we are glad that these errors were spotted and corrected before the end of the transition period. However, it is slightly concerning that such deficiencies still existed as late as 10 days before the end of the transition period. Is the Minister confident that the department’s chapter in the statute book is now as it should be, or can we expect further correcting SIs in the future?

While these provisions are not necessarily directly responsible, it is fair to say that certain aspects of trade between Great Britain and Northern Ireland have not operated as seamlessly as we had hoped. As my noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon noted during the repeat of an Urgent Question last week, the Government were warned well in advance of the potential for many of the difficulties that we have witnessed.

To put technical regulations in place is one thing—the sheer number of SI debates I have taken part in suggests that there is no shortage of technical regulations—but ensuring that IT systems work and that businesses are fully prepared for new ways of working amounts to a very different task. These are areas that we probed for many months, only to be told that we had no reason to worry. Regrettably, that complacency has resulted in difficulties for businesses on both sides of the Irish Sea. I end, therefore, by asking whether the Minister could use some of his speaking time to provide a general update on the situation regarding GB-NI trade.