European Union Bill

Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne Excerpts

Monday 13th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, it would be possible to make a well founded and persuasive argument to get rid of all the provisions of Schedule 1. At this point, however, I will focus on one provision where there is an absolutely demonstrable, concrete, national, economic and industrial issue at stake. I hope I shall persuade the House, and indeed the Government, that there is more than good reason to think again about this element of Schedule 1. The House will be well aware that military equipment is one of the rare exceptions and exemptions from the single market. That is achieved by Article 346(1)(b) of the treaty, which states:

“any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes”.

That is an explicitly protectionist measure that allows individual member states to protect their own markets, as in generations gone by before the single market, or Common Market, were ever conceived of. It is an anomaly in what is otherwise a free market, and it is very difficult for some member states to give this up because they are protecting industries with considerable lobbying potential in their own countries.

I have no financial interest to declare in the British defence industry. When I became Defence Procurement Minister, I made sure that I had no shares in defence industries and that has remained the case. I have not developed any relationships with the defence industry since I left government. Indeed, it would have been impossible under the rules for me to have done so in the last year. I acknowledge an admiration for the British defence industry, which I was able in the course of my job to get to know extremely well. The technologies that it has developed over the years, many of which you cannot even talk about the existence of let alone describe the nature of, are extraordinary. We really are at the front line in this area of technology. It is not surprising, and a demonstrable fact, that the British defence industry is by far and away the largest in turnover in the European Union. In other words, we are the losers through this protectionism.

The EU market for defence procurement is roughly €70 billion, say £55 billion, or something of that order. Our own element in that is about £15 billion—say €18 billion—so we are talking about a potential market of some €50 billion to €55 billion. The French, who are very protectionist and make considerable use of Article 346, have about the same spend. The Germans and the Italians have rather less and are also very protectionist. Everyone else in the EU adds up to that sum. There is at stake a market for something like €55 billion, or £45 billion to £50 billion. Of its own nature and operating against the largest most productive sector in the EU, this protectionism deprives us of the opportunities for sales and therefore for employment and for investment, not least for sharing the considerable overheads of R&D with the Ministry of Defence, which is very much in the interests of this country—the interests of defence, the taxpayer and industry.

It might be thought—indeed, I hope it would be—that any rational Government, and I am sure that the coalition Government are in no sense irrational, would want to seize any opportunity that could be identified to deal with that anomaly in the single market. We have been pioneers in, first, opening the single market initiative under Margaret Thatcher and Lord Cockfield and, subsequently, in pushing through the opening of financial services, intellectual property and many other areas in which there was hesitation on the part of our partners in moving forward to implement the principles of the single market.

One would assume that it would be common ground between all the major political parties, in addressing the electorate in our own ways and in addressing the economic interests of the nation, to want to get rid of the protectionist barriers that face that particularly important industry. I think it would also be common ground to agree that the defence industry, perhaps after pharmaceuticals and biochemistry, is the area of manufacturing in which we have the greatest competitive technological advantages in the world market. It is very important, and we ought to be able to come, more or less, to a consensus on what should be done about it.

How do you generate an opportunity to get rid of a form of protectionism when certain member states find themselves subject to considerable pressures and lobbies and find it difficult to move? It is difficult for some of them to vote openly, clearly and decisively for the abolition of Article 346. As I said in Committee, and as all of us with experience of negotiations in any context will know, often the best way to solve a substantive problem or make progress on a substantive issue, especially in a complex negotiation where people have strong and differing interests at the outset, is by a procedural route. I gave the example of setting up a committee to solve the problem rather than taking a decision around the board table, the Council of Ministers, or whatever. The qualified majority voting system is undoubtedly a very useful weapon that has proved its worth over the past generation in achieving substantive progress through procedural routes.

I can see one or two noble Lords looking for the text of the provision in Schedule 1, so let me say that it is on page 14, the penultimate element in Schedule 1, and states:

“Article 346(2) (changes to list of military products exempt from internal market provisions)”.

The provision does exactly the opposite of what I suggest is the obvious thing to be done in the national interest. It makes it impossible for us to agree to, let alone to propose, QMV to decide the future of that derogation from the single market without a referendum. We are putting a ball around our own necks, we are shooting ourselves in the foot, with that provision. It makes no sense at all. Where we have an interest in liberalising trade—I think I would carry a number of people on the opposite side with me in saying that we surely do—and where that means might be the only way to make progress in the area, as has proved to be the case in other similarly difficult areas in the past, we are preventing ourselves from doing so.

We all know that if a British Minister is not allowed to agree and says, “Well, we've got to have a referendum beforehand”, that in effect denies us the chance to seize the opportunity rapidly. It might need to be seized there and then, because if it is not you have lost it. You have your interlocutors in a favourable frame of mind in a particular situation when they agree to resolve the question through QMV. That element in Schedule 1 is entirely perverse. It goes in exactly the opposite direction from that in which any responsible Government would want to go. It is contrary to rationality and good sense; it is directly contrary to the national interest.

The Government have been very statesmanlike in saying in the course of our debates that they will listen to new arguments, that their minds are not closed. Both noble Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Howell, have said that in answer to me and to other noble Lords. I am sure that that is true, because they are both sophisticated men of the world who know that one always needs to look carefully at these things. When you have a schedule of 56 items, it is almost certain that something somewhere will have crept through when it should not really be there, and it needs to be looked at again.

I claim no monopoly of wisdom in this matter, but I raise it because, as I said, I have a background in this subject and I was struck very forcibly on reading the text of the Bill. I hope that on the basis of the considerations that I have just set out there will be scope to reconsider this important matter. It is important for a major British industry which I think we all wish to support in every way we can. I beg to move.

[Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne]

In moving his amendment, the noble Lord has not explained to my satisfaction, or perhaps to the satisfaction of others, why the removal of these two lines from the text of the Bill, which would result in QMV rather than a veto on the protectionism of military products, would assist the development of the free market, as he and I wish to see. From my experience in Brussels, sometimes sitting in the chair on common security and defence policy debates, it was very clear that some member states—particularly some of the smaller and newer ones—wished to pursue protectionism to an extent that would have been extraordinarily unhelpful both to the defence of the European Union and to the wider defence policies of countries such as the United Kingdom. In other words, we need the veto and I cannot understand why the noble Lord wishes to remove it.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

Perhaps I may try to help the noble Baroness. Of course I did not suggest that adopting QMV in this case would guarantee that we would solve the problem. I said that the problem had not been solved until now but an opportunity might arise to solve it via QMV. Many problems that were solved by QMV did not prove to be solvable when each individual member state was put on the spot with a requirement that it make an explicit and public declaration and hold a public vote in favour of a change, particularly when the change was to remove protectionist support for a domestic industry. I am saying simply that it would be quite perverse to deny ourselves the opportunity of using QMV as an instrument. Of course, there is no guarantee that it would work, but that is no reason for not trying it or keeping it open as an instrument that we might need.

[Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne]

My point was purely that from my experience and that of others in Brussels, a number of member states wish to keep protectionism. As the noble Lord has already clearly indicated, it is in Britain’s interests to have an open system, and in the case of the defence of the European Union and beyond it is in all our interests to have an open system. I cannot see how QMV will assist an open system when Britain may need a veto.

Since the noble Lord was involved in the defence industry at an earlier stage in his political career, the European Union has widened immensely. Some of the newest member states have had a significant interest in keeping protectionism moving in the defence industry, with some of them having very large interests in it. The contracts are massive; the potential for dealings that are less than transparent is huge, as some of the biggest contracts on the globe are before individual member states; and one of the great strengths of the potential of the EU common security and defence policy is an open system of military equipment, which would stop the protectionism to which the noble Lord rightly refers. I have failed to be convinced so far by what the noble Lord has said about the loss of the veto and the introduction of QMV.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I think that the noble Baroness has the wrong end of the stick. I do not see how on earth Britain keeping a veto on a matter where there is no liberalisation will help us to achieve liberalisation. What are we going to veto—protectionist moves by other member states? This is absurd; it is another world. To do what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, suggests does not involve a decision to move to QMV. The noble Baroness implies that if we took the two lines out of the Bill, we would automatically and at that moment accept QMV. We are not doing that; we are simply making it possible, at a putative future moment and if we felt that it was to our advantage, to do so by means of simple legislation in Parliament without a referendum.

[Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne]

I accept that the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, wishes to exemplify the argument that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, has already put forward—in which case it must be rather weak. I cannot see why bringing in QMV is a better option than the veto, which I prefer. I cannot see how the proposal will strengthen the hand of the United Kingdom. Although I have a long and personal friendship—and indeed a good neighbourliness—with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, and a high regard for his massive intellect and his knowledge of the defence industry, none the less he has failed to convince me.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

Does my noble friend not feel that if the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, is so compelling, he would probably win it in a referendum?

[Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne]

I must admit that this is a very compelling argument from this side of the House. I am sure that the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Hannay, will attempt to knock it down, but I suspect that they will not succeed.

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, it may dismay the House, but I will pick up from the point where this argument has arrived. Like the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, when I looked at the proposal put forward by my noble friend Lord Davies of Stamford, it did not seem to me that the consequence of it was that there would be an immediate move without any further ado to qualified majority voting. Instead, there would be a very substantial process before anybody got there, even if they had the desire to get there. It seemed that whatever difficulties and barriers were raised by those who thought it best to have a closed-market system rather than an open-market system in the defence industry, it would be harder in the middle and long term for them to sustain the restriction on free markets were they to be deprived of the veto as the automatic response. In short, over a period of time—I am sure that it would be over a period of time if it happened at all—it might be possible through a different mechanism to change from this restriction to a free-market solution.

It may be thought curious that from this opposition Bench I argue trenchantly for free markets in Europe. However, it does not seem odd to me; I have held this view consistently for a very long time. Like my noble friend Lord Davies, it appears to me that when we take a serious and hard view of the areas in our manufacturing industry where we might be very successful, among them are the products of our defence industries. They are very fine industries; they are hallmarked by exceptional research and development; they are among the industries that co-operate most successfully and most frequently with the best of our university departments that are working in the same areas of research and development; they manage to do it on a large scale; and they manage to create extremely valuable intellectual properties of a kind that we cannot always achieve in many other parts of our manufacturing life.

As a former Minister responsible for intellectual property, I frequently came at this from a different ministerial portfolio from that of my noble friend Lord Davies, but none the less I was frequently full of admiration for the high quality of patents that were created in that industry and very well aware of the value that they could inject into free-market circumstances. It is very easy to see why, even when there is a concrete commercial rationale for this country, there will be others who will seek protectionism because they are fearful that their industries cannot compete in industries of this kind, particularly where those industries are so driven by outstanding research and development and by their links with the university research world. It is a tough environment to compete in—that is for sure—but that does not seem to me to be a reason to protect those kinds of industries in other countries any more than somebody could argue that we should simply protect them in our country from any difficult winds and buffeting of international competition in a fully commercial sense.

I can also understand the argument that some of those countries will be looking at industries—as we have in defence in the past—as being of considerable strategic importance and we have been cautious about whether that strategic importance should be so lightly set aside. Westland helicopters and so on have been examples of it. However, broadly speaking, we have been at our best as a country when we have been prepared in free markets to compete where we can and to achieve results on the basis of the excellence of what some of our manufacturing industries can do with freedom to operate properly in markets.

In summary, I return to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has made, that the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, was making and that I made at the beginning of my remarks. Nothing in this proposal moves us with any suddenness onto a different trajectory. I am loath to believe that the House and the general sentiment in this House would be against the possibility of the full operation of free markets and the benefit to United Kingdom industry of competition in a free market, especially where we believe that we can succeed way beyond many of our competitors in that market. It is a very strong argument and I hope that it will appeal to any free marketer looking at the benefits of the European Union in free market terms, which, many noble Lords have urged, were among the founding reasons that they could see for the rationale of the EU in the first place. I support this amendment and I believe that, on free market arguments alone, it should succeed.