Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Friday 16th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 38 in my name. I have put my name to five other amendments in this group, all of which seek to ensure clarity on what in the Bill involves identifying vulnerability and providing protection for those who may be subject to coercion or who may be unaware of their rights.

I support Amendment 27 from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. The importance of this derives from the current structure of the Bill and the massive deficiency in the Bill’s provisions. As the DPRRC said, the Bill does not say how assisted death services are to be provided. This is a huge black hole in the middle of the Bill. It does not tell us where, when, by whom and how services are to be delivered, and is indicative of how unfit the Bill is.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, Clause 41 confers significant Henry VIII powers on the Secretary of State, requiring him to make provision to secure arrangements. Clause 42 permits Welsh Ministers to make provision, but there is no provision in the Bill that came from the Commons. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has not introduced any amendments to address this lacuna. Does the noble and learned Lord intend to do so?

Those who were meant to deliver this service have not been consulted. As the BMA said,

“our view is that assisted dying should not be part of the standard role of doctors or integrated into existing care pathways – it is not something that a doctor can just add to their usual role”.

In 2024, 45% of BMA members said that they were not prepared to actively participate in the process, while 19% were undecided. Where does the patient get neutral, unbiased information? Dr Mulholland, from the Royal College of General Practitioners, said:

“The shape of the service is not set out in the Bill … GPs need to have a space where they can step away from it: that is the key point that we want to get across. For those who want to take part, it may be that they decide to do it, but it would have to sit outside the core general medical services that we provide at the moment”.—[Official Report, Commons, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Committee, 30/1/25; col. 277.]


Chris Whitty said in oral evidence that Parliament should resolve this. How does the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, intend to resolve it?

As a consequence, a person, particularly one who—for a variety of possible reasons—has no family or friends who can support them, when advised by a doctor that voluntary assisted death could be provided to them because of their condition, is intensely vulnerable. This could happen even when they have made no request for such provision. It may come as a significant shock to them, on top of their existing vulnerability as a consequence of the diagnosis and prognosis that they have received. In such a situation, the patient—isolated, vulnerable and accustomed to believing that a doctor will always seek to help their recovery and do no harm, and possibly even thinking that assisted death means palliative care rather than death—will need some independent person to talk to, if only to try to ensure that they understand what they are committing to. As far as I can see, there is no such provision in the Bill.

The Bill does not even say that the person who makes the request to die, provided for in Clause 1, line 13, must be the person referred to in Clause 1. Relatives, friends, a professional adviser or indeed anyone else could initiate the process. Hence I have put my name to Amendment 31, which would add the words “their own” to the phrase “on request”. Further, since the Bill does not exclude Sections 9 and 11 of the Mental Capacity Act, someone with a lasting power of attorney under that Act could request assistance on behalf of the individual concerned. Once that request is made, the provisions follow. Amendment 68A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, is vital, because it ensures that someone with an LPA cannot assist the process. Does the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, accept that this is a very real gap that this amendment must fill? If he does not accept the amendment, can he tell the Committee how he intends to ensure a person’s voluntary wish to end their life in these circumstances?

Amendment 38 in my name excludes from eligibility those with serious mental health conditions. It concerns whether they wish to die as a symptom of a specific illness and applies to those with conditions

“known to cause episodic or chronic suicidal ideation, including but not limited to bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, major depressive disorder, or schizoaffective disorder”.

It seeks to distinguish between those who might seek an assisted death as an autonomous choice and those who are seeking suicide because of a serious history of mental health or disorder. Some mental health conditions have suicidality as a feature of the disorder. These people are, by very definition, at high risk of suicidality and self-harm. The intention of the Bill should not be to view these people as the same as those who have made a voluntary choice to end their own lives. Serious mental health conditions impair decision-making and affect a person’s ability to make the irreversible decision to die. The amendment is limited and mental health issues such as depression or anxiety would not be within its scope. Dr Annabel Price noted that around 20% of terminally ill patients have diagnostic depression and that

“around 10% will have a wish to hasten death”.—[Official Report, Commons, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Committee, 30/1/25; col. 270.]

This is strongly linked to feeling suicidal. Professor Owen gave evidence that even sub-clinical mood problems or anxiety can affect judgment.

As the Royal College of Psychiatrists said in evidence, as the voice of psychiatry and an organisation that has campaigned for decades to prevent people dying by suicide, it is important that we directly acknowledge that the passing of this legislation would result in amendments to the Suicide Act. What then would this mean for suicide prevention efforts among the terminally ill population in England and Wales? A duty of care is imposed on clinicians to protect the safety and well-being of their patients, including those who are at risk of self-harm or suicide by the Mental Health Act, the Mental Capacity Act and the Human Rights Act.

In 2011, the commission of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, resolved that doctors must be satisfied that there is no treatable mental condition contributing to the suicidal wish. Is the noble and learned Lord now satisfied that these serious mental conditions are irrelevant to doctor and panel approval? I hope he will indicate that he will accept this amendment, but, if not, what amendments could he offer to establish protections for these individuals?

I also support the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, on Amendment 28, which seeks to ensure that fast-track benefits are made to those who qualify, so that they do not end their lives for financial reasons. In so many cases, the availability of financial support that may be critical is not known about. When my brother died of cancer a couple of years ago, we had no knowledge that such support should have been made available to him. There are many others in similar circumstances who may opt for assisted death because their situation cannot be improved as it could be if the financial help that should be made available were to be made available.

I also support Amendment 39, which deals with the situation in which a person in care may be suffering from undiagnosed dementia and all that goes with that. It is important that there is a dementia assessment in the three months preceding an application for assisted death, given the Government’s figures on undiagnosed dementia, which range from 29% to 71% of cases in primary care. Many of us, sadly, have seen people we know and love in care homes, and our experience has told us that they are suffering from undiagnosed dementia. It can take time for a diagnosis to be reached, especially where an individual with dementia still understands the questions they may be asked and how to answer them, although they cannot remember whether they had a visitor to that day and do not even understand why they have to see a doctor.

People can be very convincing, even when suffering from fairly advanced dementia. A visiting doctor, one of two independent doctors, will not necessarily identify undiagnosed dementia in a single visit. Amendment 39, which would require a specific clinical assessment for dementia in care homes, is a very necessary safeguard. The question for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, must be: would it be satisfactory for a patient with undiagnosed dementia, deemed compliant by an overworked care home staff member, to be signed off by a doctor who has met them once—always remembering that the second doctor does not have to meet them at all?

Amendment 68 makes a categorical statement that nobody can take a decision on behalf of anyone else. Such clarity is very necessary, as I am sure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, will accept. If he does not accept this amendment, can he provide details of any amendments that he will table to ensure that nobody, other than as provided for in the Bill, can take a decision that someone else should be helped to die?

[Baroness Berger (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 31 in the name of my noble friend Lady Ritchie. It would clarify that the request for assistance to end one’s life must come from the terminally ill person, leaving no room for doubt over whether someone else is able to make the request for them. This may seem like a statement of the obvious, given that eligibility under the Bill depends on both a clear, settled and informed wish to die and an absence of coercion. But there are situations where it is possible to imagine the request being initiated by another person who claims to be speaking on the ill person’s behalf, and an assessing doctor being persuaded to go along with it.

The Bill contains a number of provisions that are designed to allow another person a substantive role in the process, from the independent advocate who helps a terminally ill person to engage with their options, to the proxy who can sign a first or second declaration on their behalf. It is not difficult to envision such a person taking it on themselves to tell a doctor that the ill person is interested in having a preliminary discussion under Clause 5, or being the one to make an appointment that they explicitly say is for the purposes of a first declaration under Clause 8. Neither scenario is explicitly ruled out by the Bill. Of course, there are no limits specified to the role of independent advocates in particular. This is just one example of the many things that are not in the Bill and are left to be decided through regulations later on. We might even imagine a partner, relative or friend purporting to speak on behalf of an ill person telling the doctor that he or she is shy, exhausted or overwhelmed, when in reality they are acting in their own interests.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate. I will deal first with what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said. Of course I have to listen and make changes; I am not Stonewall Jackson—a tactical genius who died at 39. I am a man trying to do his best aged 74, so I am in a completely different situation. However, the noble Lord makes an important point. I have to convince the House that I am listening and, if sensible proposals are put, I must deal with them. I believe that has been my attitude throughout.

I cite by way of example the very sensible proposals made in relation to involving the multidisciplinary team looking after somebody and incorporating that into the Bill. I am working to try to achieve that. Proposals were made that people between 18 and 25 might be especially vulnerable and need extra protection; I have sought to develop proposals on that. Another example is where somebody has made an application that a person’s liberty be taken away because they are seriously mentally ill or lack capacity, or a person has actually been deprived of their liberty. Again, special provision should perhaps be made for them. I mention these points only to indicate that, far from being Stonewall Jackson, I am the House of Lords trying to do its best to make sure that we improve the workability of the Bill.

In that spirit, I turn to these amendments. My noble friend Lady Merron has gone through the technical problems with Amendment 27. For example, it refers to somebody being referred to an independent voluntary assisted dying service, which might or might not be sensible. I suspect that the later proposals from the noble Lord, Lord Birt, might relate to that. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was making the wider point, which she expressed very clearly, that you should not be making a decision about whether you want an assisted death until you have been fully informed about all the consequences and the processes. She referred to a number of issues, including diagnosis, prognosis and the effect of an assisted death in terms of the substance.

In my respectful submission, the Bill reflects exactly the points that she is making, namely that there needs to be proper information made available to the patient by statute. I draw noble Lords’ attention to Clause 5(5), on the preliminary discussion that has to be recorded. It says:

“If a registered medical practitioner conducts such a preliminary discussion with a person, the practitioner must explain to and discuss with that person—(a) the person’s diagnosis and prognosis; (b) any treatment available and the likely effect of it; (c) all appropriate palliative, hospice or other care, including symptom management and psychological support, and offer to refer them to a registered medical practitioner who specialises in such care for the purpose of further discussion”.


All of that has to be available at the preliminary discussion.

Then, noble Lords will remember that there are two doctors who have to look at it: the co-ordinating doctor and then the independent doctor. Both doctors must, pursuant to Clause 12(2)(c) of the Bill,

“explain to and discuss with the person being assessed—(i) the person’s diagnosis and prognosis; (ii) any treatment available and the likely effect of it; (iii) any available palliative, hospice or other care, including symptom management and psychological support; (iv) the nature of the substance that is to be provided to assist the person to end their own life (including how it will bring about death and how it will be administered)”.

The panel has to be satisfied that all these processes have been gone through. I completely agree with the underlying proposition of Amendment 27, which is that a person should be fully informed—though it is Amendment 42 that puts it in those terms. However, I believe that the Bill has both made provision for that and has the means of enforcing it through the panel.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way. Could he clarify what is meant by Clause 12(2)(c)(iii) when it refers to

“any available palliative, hospice or other care”?

We know that palliative and hospice care is available if you can travel to it or if you live in a particular area, but it is not available in a very significant number of areas. So what is meant by “available” in that context?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

“Available” in that context obviously means available in a practical sense for that particular patient. If you live in the western part of England and there is palliative care of a particular sort available in a place you cannot access, that would not be “available”.

My noble friend Lady Merron indicated what the effect of Amendment 28 is, which was again proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. The effect is that there are two additional requirements before you are eligible for an assisted death: first, that you are eligible for certain specific benefits available at end of life; and, secondly, that there has been a home visit by a GP to consider it.

Neither of those is appropriate for eligibility requirements for an assisted death. As my noble friend Lady Merron said, you might well not be eligible for particular benefits because, for example, they are means tested and you are above the means. It would be wholly wrong for that to prevent you getting an assisted death if you are otherwise entitled to it. Again, I do not think that the purpose of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, advancing that provision was to say, “You’ve got to satisfy these specific requirements”, with all the problems my noble friend Lady Merron indicated.

What I think she was getting at is that you have to be sure that financial circumstance—being short of money—is not a relevant reason for an assisted death. I put forward the Bill on the basis that choice is the key thing. Your financial position might be an element in what makes you reach a decision. From the way that the safeguards are put in the Bill, they are trying to ensure it is your decision, freely made.

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The question of motivation matters if the Bill really is, as its proponents say, about dealing only with those people with a prognosis of six months, but even that is very uncertain. There are many cases of people living much longer than a six-month prognosis. If this really is about people with a terminal illness, what is wrong? What is the objection to asking people why they wish for an assisted death? If it is because they are afraid of pain, they do not think that they can get assistance, or that those things could not be dealt with, we should surely have in place arrangements that allow for people to have those conversations. At the moment, none of that is in the Bill. The motivations might not be simply about autonomy but about constraint. Not everyone has the privileges that many Members of your Lordships’ House have in being able to say that any choice they might make is unconstrained. We need to legislate for those people for whom many choices are profoundly constrained.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Baronesses, Lady Grey-Thompson and Lady Campbell, who articulated for us the suddenness with which those with a disability can move into the category of those for whom death is imminent. It can happen very suddenly, without warning. Their contributions were enormously important to us as we contemplate this.

There is in the Bill nothing that, at present, would make doctors determine that they are able to identify real coercive threats, particularly where the ill person is being subjected to pressure that may be concealed on all occasions where medical and social care staff are available, but the person is afraid to speak because of those pressures. Making a person feel like a burden is abusive, but it is very hard to detect. There is no provision requiring doctors to inquire about those internal pressures. We have heard a lot about them: feeling a burden, financial pressure and lack of adequate NHS resources. Those are pressures that can lead to an inability to conceive of solutions that may exist or to access them. If the Bill is to provide for them, it must state what motivations are acceptable for the state to help someone to end their own life.

I wish to echo the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, because I asked the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, what was meant by saying that a doctor must discuss with someone seeking assisted death the availability of palliative care. I understood him to say that if it is not available, it cannot be discussed and it is not a matter. But why? Why does somebody in that situation, for whom palliative care would provide an answer, not have access to palliative care simply because of where they are? I have to ask the Committee whether it is happy, or even content, that that is a standard which we should accept.

In debating his own Bill on this topic in 2014 and looking at the issue of burden, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said that he opposed someone choosing assisted death for feeling like a burden. I therefore ask him today: does he oppose making explicit what he has agreed is implicit in this type of Bill? If not, will he accept these amendments?

[Baroness Cass (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with everyone who has said that we must ask the question: what is the motivation for that individual? I submit that, unless a doctor can ask that question, they are not able to discharge their duties in two ways. First, they cannot assess the capacity of the individual to make that decision unless they hear the decision articulated in the individual’s own words. Secondly, if the doctor is going to offer them all the options that may help to address their fears or the issues, they cannot do that unless they know what the motivation is.

In this House and in broader society, there will be a spectrum of what anyone feels is acceptable in an assisted death. For some people, there is the absolute clarity that an assisted death is never acceptable under any circumstances. For those of us who feel that an assisted death is acceptable, we will have different cut-offs: for some it will be because they do not want their children to be financially disadvantaged by their illness; for others it will be that intolerable suffering is the only acceptable rationale.

I would guess that, across most of society, the main line that they have been given for this is that it should be related to suffering. On that spectrum—we could all line ourselves up along it—is there any practical way of determining where that cut-off should be? If we go back to the long discussions we had about coercion on the first day in Committee, it became clear, as it has during the course of this debate, that it is impossible to determine coercion driven internally—namely, the feeling of being a burden—from coercion driven externally in subtle or less subtle ways. It is very hard to determine that if you live with the family and know them well, let alone if you have one or two contacts.

It is easier to make an objective assessment of whether what the patient describes to you as their personal distress makes sense in the context of the illness that they are discussing. That may be being incontinent, losing independence or unmanageable pain. If we are asking the doctors involved in this to assess for coercion, we are giving them an impossible task. If we are asking them to determine whether the person has a source of distress that will only get better and cannot get worse because of the terminal illness, that is a much more tangible form of assessment. Therefore, I suggest that that suffering related to the illness itself, however the sufferer describes it, is the only way to distinguish objectively those who are being coerced from those who have an internally driven reason for seeking an assisted death.