English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Baroness Scott of Bybrook Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 8th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as vice-president of the Local Government Association, and the National Association of Local Councils.

I hope the House will forgive me if I begin by noting a certain irony in the title of the Bill. It contains the words “community empowerment”, yet the measures before us would appear to do precisely the opposite, empowering the centre rather than the community. As we reflect on that, we cannot ignore the democratic chill cast by the Government’s decision to cancel the forthcoming local mayoral elections. When democratic participation is suspended for administrative convenience, it becomes difficult to sustain the claim that community consent lies at the heart of these reforms. Instead, what emerges is a model of compulsion over consent. These proposals risk leaving communities without a meaningful voice, enabling the Secretary of State to redraw local government boundaries, restructure authorities and compel mergers, against local wishes.

The introduction of sweeping powers under new Section 109B, and others, marks a striking departure from the voluntary, negotiated, deal-by-deal approach that has defined English devolution to date. That approach was rooted in respect for local identity, geography and choice. The Bill before us seems to move away from that principle with unsettling ease. Our discussions with colleagues and stakeholders underline something fundamental: that local consent is not an optional extra. It is the democratic foundation of any credible programme of localism, yet this Bill weakens that foundation at the very moment when it should be reinforced.

The Government claim that reforms empower localities, but too often we see the power devolved in name only, while genuine authority remains firmly centralised. Without clarity on what powers are truly being passed down, how responsibilities differ from those already held and how local leaders will be held to account, there is a real risk of creating an accountability gap at the very centre of the system.

These concerns are sharpened still further by the Bill’s uncertain financial implications. Community empowerment is impossible without financial empowerment. Local authorities cannot reasonably be asked to shoulder the burdens or the liabilities of their neighbours; nor can local taxpayers be expected to underwrite centrally imposed restructuring. Yet the Bill provides no assurance that council tax will not rise, no clarity on whether solvent councils may be required to absorb the debts of failing ones, and no explanation whatever of how these reforms will deliver value for money. Additionally, we are still in the dark as to how these new mayoralties will be paid for.

We hear much about synergies and efficiencies but nothing about what they are, how they will be realised, or what modelling, if any, underpins them. Rhetoric is not a substitute for a costed plan. The Government must commit to publishing a detailed cost-benefit assessment. Information available shows that the creation of more top-tier councils in place of the county councils may increase costs year on year, not reduce them. It reverses the economy of scale and offers no prospect of long-term savings.

Recent freedom of information disclosures reported by ITV Meridian indicate that the councils in Essex, Kent, Sussex, Surrey, Oxfordshire, Hampshire, and on the Isle of Wight have already set aside £11.22 million for 2025-26 to support this transition, with more than £1 million being spent in the current year alone. In Hampshire, over £500,000 has already been allocated to consultants for local government reorganisation. How can local taxpayers be assured that this represents value for money? Will there be a transparent framework, underpinned by evidence, to demonstrate whether these substantial outlays can genuinely be recovered through future efficiency gains?

This reorganisation will impose real costs on our constituents, at a time when many of them are already paying more in income tax and national insurance, whether through their earnings or their pension contributions, because of this Government’s choice to value welfare over work. We cannot in good conscience simply accept that reform must be expensive without being provided a credible vision for future savings and long-term fiscal stability.

Nowhere is that risk more acute than in social care. Adults’ and children’s social care are among the most vital, sensitive and fragile of all our local services, but the Bill is silent on how these functions will operate across new combined structures, how responsibilities will be shared and how accountability will be maintained. At a time when care systems are already stretched to their limit, reorganisation without clarity is not merely unwise but dangerous. Vulnerable people cannot be left to navigate the fog created by institutional reform.

This is not the only area where ambiguity prevails. The Bill creates new regulatory layers, including a local audit office, the relationship of which with existing bodies is left largely undefined in the Bill. We all agree on the importance of rigorous oversight, but the creation of new regulators must be justified by purpose, rather than just by preference. Likewise, spatial development strategies, critical tools for planning and housing, are referenced in a manner that leaves scope, governance and oversight uncertain. Without clarity, there is a real risk of slowing down the very growth and housebuilding the Government claim the Bill will accelerate.

I will touch on the significant alterations proposed to some of the Local Government Pension Scheme arrangements. When local government reorganisation occurs, and assets and liabilities are carved up, it is essential that independent assessments are undertaken, to allow proper oversight of what funds and actuaries in each region are doing. We must also explore the workability of the new duty requiring combined authorities to assist in identifying or developing LGPS investment opportunities. These are legitimate concerns that such a requirement will place authorities in direct conflict with the scheme managers’ fiduciary responsibilities, which must remain independent and focus solely on the interests of the scheme members.

Taken together, these examples illustrate a broad problem: the lack of clarity speaks to a wider issue in the Bill’s design. This is a substantial piece of legislation that is constitutionally significant in both scale and ambition, yet the Government have offered no clear explanation of what it is ultimately for. Is the goal efficiency, local empowerment, public service reform, fiscal consolidation, housebuilding or economic growth? A Bill of this breadth and consequence should be founded on a coherent purpose, yet the rationale before us is diffused, undefined and, at times, contradictory.

The Bill professes to empower communities but many of its consequences appear likely to impose costs on them instead. New mayoral precepts, expanding borrowing powers, increased parking charges and the creation of further layers of local bureaucracy, including mayoral commissioners, will all place additional burdens on our residents. If that is empowerment, it is of a kind that, we believe, comes with a higher council tax bill attached to it.

The House will recall that we have made the point previously that uncertainty, particularly in planning, is the enemy of delivery. If responsibilities for housing, infrastructure and spatial strategy are to shift, the transition must be clear, orderly and transparent. Developers, councils and communities need certainty, not disruption. Local authorities understand their housing needs, their land, their constraints and their potential better than anyone in Whitehall ever could; therefore, reform should strengthen that local knowledge, not sideline it, as the Bill does.

Consistent with that theme, I will address another important issue: local identity. Imposing reorganisation from above, drawing maps in Whitehall and instructing local people to accept new boundaries pose a genuine threat to the character and cohesion of the communities we represent. Local identity is the foundation on which trust, participation and civic pride are built. We must also reflect the role played by our town and parish councils. They should and could be custodians of our children’s parks, our green spaces and the amenities that give neighbourhoods their distinct character. If their powers are to be subsumed into larger unitaries, dominated by broader, macro-level concerns, how can we ensure that the priorities of those towns and parishes across our country will still be recognised and respected? These councils are not peripheral; they are central to the everyday life and well-being of our communities. In fact, we believe that we should be encouraging more towns and parish councils when representation is subsumed by a larger geographic area.

If the Bill is truly to live up to its title, it must move from the rhetoric of empowerment to the practice of it. It must restore local democracy, not dilute it. It must clarify responsibilities, not obscure them, and it must build trust, not central control. Communities do not require permission to have a voice; they require the power to use it. True devolution rests on partnership, consent and clarity, not on imposition or ambiguity.

In Committee, I will challenge the Government on whether the Bill meets that aim, not only in areas where reorganisation is already under way but in areas such as London and Greater Manchester, where devolution exists but we believe it could deliver better. If the Government wish to empower communities, let the Bill begin by listening to them; only then can they claim with any confidence to speak in their name. As drafted, the Bill takes power away, increases costs for working people and, most of all, leaves communities without a voice.

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[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I understand that there has been no agreement in the usual channels for the Bill to be committed to a Grand Committee. I put on record that it is very disappointing that the Government have tabled this Motion without the agreement of the usual channels.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend the Chief Whip consulted the usual channels in the usual manner. I am also aware that he spoke to some key Peers with an interest in the Bill.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Baroness Scott of Bybrook Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook]

1: Before Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Purpose of this ActThe purpose of this Act is to—(a) strengthen community empowerment,(b) secure sustainable council finances,(c) protect vital social care services and enhance local accountability in their delivery,(d) support local growth through devolved powers and locally led decision-making, and(e) enable flexible and locally driven housebuilding and planning to meet community needs.”Member’s explanatory statement
This clause sets out the overarching purpose of the Act, emphasising locally led, consent-based governance, sustainable council finances, and strong accountability for social care and growth. It also clarifies the Act’s intent to support flexible, community- driven planning and housebuilding.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, first, before I start, I wish a belated happy birthday for yesterday to the Minister. I hear it was a big one, and I hope she enjoyed it. Secondly, I declare my interests as a vice-president of the Local Government Association and a vice-president of the National Association of Local Councils.

I am pleased to open the debate today on the first amendment on the first day in Committee on a set of important principles that should guide the remainder of our debate on the Bill. I must also say, with respect, that the Title of the Bill still promises rather more than its text delivers. It speaks of devolution and community empowerment, yet too often it reads as central direction dressed up as local choice. We can and we should do better than that.

Amendment 1 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Jamieson goes back to first principles: the purpose of this Act. It asks the Government to be clear in the Bill that we will champion consent over compulsion, secure sustainable council finances without unfunded mandates, protect social care with stronger local accountability, support local growth through devolved powers, and enable flexible, locally driven housebuilding and planning. These are not abstract aspirations. They are the everyday tests by which our residents judge whether devolution is real and beneficial to their lives.

Proper devolution is built, not imposed. It is negotiated, not mandated. It respects identity, geography and local choice. That has been a consistent theme in the debate on this Bill: concern that the centre would gain broad powers to redraw local structures, create strategic authorities, consolidate councils and impose mayors without clear and explicit local consent. That is not empowerment; it is compulsion. At Second Reading, many noble Lords raised precisely this point, and we did so again when the Government proposed to commit this Bill, a constitutional Bill, to Grand Committee without the agreement of the usual channels. Process matters because it reveals intent.

Our amendment therefore states plainly that the Bill’s first purpose should be to strengthen community empowerment by championing consent over compulsion. Noble Lords might think that that should be a given in a Bill called the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill, but the detail of the Bill does not follow. It risks a power grab, enabling Ministers to force reorganisations and mayoralties on areas that have previously said no and even to postpone local elections to fit a central timetable. That is not how you build trust.

Local government cannot be rebuilt on financial quicksand. We all know how many councils have come to the brink. We have heard repeated warnings about local government reorganisations that promise continual savings but deliver costly transitions and do not make any of those savings into the future, and about new duties placed on councils, such as social care or regulation, but without the resources to meet them.

The second purpose listed in the amendment calls for a simple commitment: no unfunded mandates. If the Government wish to assign functions downwards, they should assign the means to discharge them as well; otherwise, we will set up local leaders to fail and then blame them for that failure. That is not partnership; it is abdication. Commons colleagues pressed this exact point at Second Reading and on Report: stop hoarding power in Whitehall while offloading pressures on to town halls. Put the principle of fiscal sustainability into law and plan reforms accordingly. If we do not do so, we risk even more tax rises through the back door.

Nowhere is the risk of failed devolution clearer than in adult and children’s social care. Every noble Lord who has served in local government, of whom there are many, understands the arithmetic, the demography, the demand and the duty. This does not change where local government is organised or reorganised. If we devolve responsibility with capacity, we will simply move waiting lists from one council to another and call it reform.

The amendment’s third principle seeks to

“protect vital social care services and enhance local accountability”

for outcomes, with transparent reporting to the people who depend on them. Reorganisation cannot become a distraction from stabilising the front line. We need to understand how this is going to work. Social care is perhaps the biggest responsibility of local government, yet the Bill does not even mention those words.

Growth is not ordained by Ministers; it is enabled by place and by leaders who know their patch and who can unlock a stalled site or knit together skills, transport and planning to make things happen. The Government’s own narrative for the Bill claims that it is the biggest transfer of power from Whitehall in a generation. If that is truly the case, the test is simple: will local leaders get the levers they need, or are we just creating authorities that must still ask for permission for every pilot, every power and every penny? Our amendment’s fourth principle states a purpose to

“support local growth through devolved powers and locally led decision-making”.

Finally, on housing, communities will support more houses when homes make sense: the right homes, in the right place, with the right infrastructure. That is achieved through locally driven planning that takes communities with it—not rigid national targets that ignore character, capacity or constraint. The Government speak about flexibility, but our amendment would require it. It would clarify that the Act’s intent is to

“enable flexible and locally driven housebuilding and planning to meet community needs”.

This is perfectly compatible with ambition, but it rejects the idea that Whitehall always knows best.

This purpose clause would not blow the Bill off course but set its course. It states exactly what Ministers say they want to achieve: empowerment, sustainability, accountability, growth and locally led planning. If the Government mean what they say about handing power back to local people, they should welcome having this in the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, I declare at the outset that I have been a vice-president of the Local Government Association for a number of years. The noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Bybrook, said many things with which I agree. We are in a position where we are seeing the cumulative impact of many years of underfunding—serious underfunding of both local government and problems such as adult social care, to which the noble Baroness referred—for which a proper policy has never ever been devised.

I want to be clear that we are in favour of strategic authorities that can drive growth. I am, however, bothered about the potential for upwards mission creep, on which the electorate have no direct say other than via the election of a mayor every few years. So I see this Bill not as a destination but as a staging post towards something that genuinely devolves power.

I went first to the overview of the Bill, given that this amendment seeks to define the Bill’s purpose. In the Explanatory Notes, the Government have indeed done that. I shall read it out, if I may. It is very short:

“The purpose of the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill is to transfer power out of Whitehall, by giving local leaders the tools to deliver growth, fixing the foundations of local government, and empowering communities”.


There is great potential in the Bill for delivering growth. However, I do not think that it fixes the foundations of local government or that it empowers communities. As we go through the Committee stage, I hope that this will become clearer.

In Amendment 1, the purpose of the Bill has been redefined by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Bybrook. It has some things in it and other things are not in it. I hope that the Minister will try to explain in greater detail how the Bill does deliver devolution. There are two amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Pinnock. I should tell the Committee that I am standing here because my noble friend is not able to do so. We hope that she will, in the next two or three weeks, be walking much better than she has been able to and will return to your Lordships’ House. I send our very best wishes to her and I hope on behalf of the whole Committee, as I am sure that that is shared by everybody.

In Amendment 95, my noble friend has explained what she thinks the Secretary of State’s statutory duty should be in terms of strategic authorities. Amendment 95 is very important, because it specifies that the role of local government is to be

“the primary democratic institution responsible for the leadership, coordination and long-term stewardship of local areas”.

We have to be clear, and I hope that the Minister will confirm, that that is what the Government think. Secondly, it says:

“Arrangements for strategic authorities must be framed so as to enable constituent local authorities to … pursue a long-term vision for the … development of their areas”.


We need to be clear that they

“exercise convening and coordinating functions in relation to public, private, voluntary and community sector bodies”

and that it is their job to

“integrate the provision of local services with wider economic, social and environmental outcomes”.

The conclusion in proposed new subsection (3) is that, in discharging this duty,

“the Secretary of State must not treat local authorities solely as administrative or delivery bodies for national policy”.

This is a fundamental problem. It is not clear to me from reading and rereading the Bill that that is actually the situation, so I look to the Minister to say that the Government indeed agree with that. We should bear in mind that it was the 2007 Lyons Inquiry into Local Government, under a Labour Government, that clarified that the role of local government was to provide

“democratic, place-based leadership and long-term stewardship of local areas, rather than acting solely as a delivery arm of central government”.

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The Bill is also a landmark moment for our communities. It will hardwire community engagement into the way that local authorities work through the neighbourhood governance duty. It restores pride to our communities by helping to address the blight of vacant shops on our high streets, banning upwards-only rent reviews. The Government’s community right-to-buy policy puts more power into the hands of communities to protect their local assets. After these assurances, I hope that the noble Baronesses will feel able not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. Turning briefly to Amendments 95 and 266 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock—I wish her well; we are missing her already—I agree with the principle that this Bill should provide genuine devolution, with decision-making lying with local government and not dictated by central government. This was the guiding principle behind my amendment. I am especially grateful to those who recognise that this is not about trapping the Government but about anchoring their ambitions in the text of the Bill and I thank my noble friends Lady Eaton and Lord Norton of Louth for their support. I am looking forward to his Amendment 251, where we can discuss further the important issue that he is raising.

Ministers tell us that the amendment is unnecessary because these principles already guide the Government’s approach, but the evidence simply does not sustain that claim. I want to look at one relevant example—housebuilding. The facts are stark. England delivered 208,600 new additional dwellings in 2024-25, well below the Government’s implied benchmark of 300,000. In the first half of 2025, completions fell by 12.6% year on year. Some areas recorded extraordinary collapses. Labour-run Islington saw a 90.2% fall in completions. Even the OBR forecasts show housebuilding falling from 260,000 annually to just 215,000 by 2026-27. That is a 17% decline, moving us even further away from the trajectory and the numbers needed. New-build completions hit an eight-year low in 2025 at 190,600, again far below what is required.

We have heard warm words about empowerment, sustainability, local accountability, growth and locally led planning, but the real-world outcomes—the measures by which our residents judge us—tell a very different story. That is precisely why this purpose clause is needed. This amendment asks the Government only to put in the Bill what they say they believe—a very simple message on the front of this Bill, not in guidance on a large piece of paper, but a simple message that says that devolution should be consent led, that local finances must be sustainable, that social care must be accountable and must be protected, that local growth must be enabled through genuine local powers and that housebuilding must be locally driven and responsive. If the Government are confident that they will already be fulfilling these aims, enshrining them in a purpose clause should not be a burden but a reassurance to councils, to communities and to Parliament.

I hope that the Government have listened and will consider this amendment very carefully to align the Bill not just with the Government’s rhetoric but with the realities facing local government today. But at this point I would like to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I am sorry, but the Minister does not seem to have mentioned this: I think we are also probing where LRS would fit in and what level they would be if they are going to continue.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I will finish what I am saying, then I will see whether I can answer the noble Baroness’s question.

Including public safety within the areas of competence is important for several reasons. First, it enables devolution of further public safety functions. For example, consideration is currently being given to the role of strategic authorities in resilience as part of the post-implementation review of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, due to be completed by March next year.

Secondly, it allows mayors to delegate certain existing functions relating to public safety to a commissioner; where the mayor is responsible for policing, they must appoint a deputy mayor for policing to whom policing functions are delegated. Additionally, the inclusion of public safety within the areas of competence allows a mayor who is responsible for fire services, but not for policing, to delegate certain fire-related functions to a public safety commissioner.

Thirdly, it enables the mayor to convene local partners and collaborate with other mayors to tackle questions of public safety—something all residents would expect them to do. There is a wide range of activity in which we would expect mayors to participate.

Amendment 11, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, seeks to clarify how strategic authorities will seek and assume powers within their area of competence and then be held to account. One of the central aims of the Bill is to move away from the current patchwork of powers and piecemeal devolution of functions. To that end, the Government’s ambitious new devolution framework will set out a coherent and consistent set of functions.

Part 2 of the Bill sets out specific functions and the voting and governance arrangements that strategic authorities will automatically receive at each level of the devolution framework, categorised under the relevant area of competence. For example, the duty to produce a local growth plan is categorised under the “economic development and regeneration” area of competence. The Bill allows for new powers and duties to be added to the devolution framework over time, ensuring that it remains adaptive and responsive to future needs and policy developments. Mayors of established mayoral strategic authorities will also be able to request and pilot new functions so it will be possible to test and evaluate outcomes ahead of adding new functions to the framework.

Finally, I turn to accountability. Combined authorities and combined county authorities—

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[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, as I have attached my name to Amendment 7, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and tabled my own Amendment 129, I will briefly join this very rich debate in which the case for this group of amendments, which sit broadly together, has clearly been made.

I will make a couple of additional points. One was provoked by the historic reflections of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, about the foot and mouth epidemic. This struck me, because it is an area on which I do a great deal of work: I do not believe that there is anything in the Bill about biosecurity or animal security. Your Lordships are trying to strengthen the human health elements of the Bill, but I wonder whether the Minister—I understand if she wants to write to me later—could reflect on what role strategic authorities might have in biosecurity and animal or plant diseases. I am thinking now of the situation with the continuing crisis of highly pathogenic avian influenza, known as H5N1, which is still affecting many of our factory farms and is a significant issue in particular areas. Is that something in which the strategic authorities would have a role? That was a question that arose from the debate.

I spoke extensively in the previous group on food production, farming and supporting farmers, so I will not go over the same ground. That is obviously an important part of rural communities, although it is by no means the majority. If we are to get more farmers into local areas and grow the vegetables and fruit that we need, then affordable housing, as was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Best, is a crucial issue. Wales in particular has done some interesting work looking at ways in which to get producers back on to the land through specific arrangements for housing. There are some interesting areas on which strategic authorities might have the power to act if the Bill is written in the right way.

In essence, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, made the argument for my Amendment 129 entirely. As the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, set out, this is actually an amendment to her larger amendment; it inserts “public and active transport provision” into the duties to consider the needs of rural communities. The case has already been made; I would just add that we need to be a great deal more aspirational about the possibilities for public and active transport in rural areas.

One of the recent small but significant Green wins was in the bus Bill, when the Government conceded that they would review rural bus services in the coming years. Some have said, “Oh, it is a rural area; there are just no bus services”—that is not an acceptable position. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, said, many young people in rural areas do not have a licence or cannot afford a car. We also have ageing populations in which increasing numbers of residents are unable to use a car and they need public transport. We also need active transport provision because it is one of the things that will help people to stay healthy.

Thinking about the possibility of aspiration, I recently travelled back from Kyiv by road through Poland and I was astonished at its quality. It went through a deeply rural, farming area with small villages. Beside the main road, there was a brilliant, separated cycle route; it went on and on through this rural area. If Poland can do it, and its distances are greater than ours, surely we can manage that kind of provision, too.

Finally, on active transport, we are talking at the most basic level about making sure that people are able to walk around villages. Very early in my political career, I went to a council by-election in central Bedfordshire, and I was quite astonished coming out of London. It did not surprise me that cycling from the train station was a pretty hairy experience; what did surprise me was that, when I got to the village, I found there was not a single pavement—everyone in this village just had to walk on the road with the cars. It did not have to be that way; it could have been arranged differently. There were lots of old historic buildings, but there could have been provision. Historically, there were footpaths; that is how people used to get around. We should restore footpaths and improve the provision. We need to think about public and active transport being a standard part of provision in rural areas, not something that just cannot be done.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. I have found that some of my views have changed slightly as I have listened to noble Lords. The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall of Blaisdon, seeks to add rural affairs to the list of competences. Given the distinct challenges faced by rural communities, from connectivity to service provision and economic resilience, it is reasonable to ask whether the Bill adequately reflects the needs of communities.

While I was listening to the noble Baroness, I realised that I have concerns that in areas with large urban areas as well as rural areas, those urban areas could take out capacity and investment from the rural areas. When I go back into my history in local government, I remember the regional development agencies that did exactly that. I do not think that Wiltshire got a penny from the regional development agency; all of it went to Bristol and Bath. The Government should look at that to ensure that it does not happen now.

Amendments 52, 56 and 60, in the name of my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, relate to the appointment of a commissioner for rural affairs. I thank her for her extensive knowledge of this issue. She is right that rural affairs need to be at the forefront of policy-making, especially in authorities that may be predominantly rural but could be a mixture. However, I harbour some reservations about requiring mayors to appoint commissioners with competence for rural affairs. I believe that rural affairs should be a priority for the mayors themselves—the unitary authorities that make up the commission will, I assume, be both rural and urban—rather than delegating this responsibility to one commissioner.

We should remember that competences are not the same as powers or capabilities. Moreover, allowing mayors to make these appointments may result in the appointment of yes-men for the mayors, rather than individuals who could provide independent, robust scrutiny on behalf of rural communities. While I fully appreciate the intent behind these amendments, I am yet to be convinced that mayoral appointments of rural affairs commissioners will be the right mechanism to ensure that rural voices are heard.

Amendment 128 is also from the noble Baroness, Lady Royall of Blaisdon; I thank her for her continued commitment to rural issues. As I have said, it should be a fundamental priority for any authority covering rural areas to consider their particular needs, especially at a time when these communities are being required to absorb substantial housing targets and sprawling solar farms. They deserve a meaningful say if this Bill is really about community empowerment. As I have said, I have a real problem with the mixture of urban and rural, and the issue of the rural voice coming through.

The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, raises the vital question of public and active transport provision in rural areas. Many of us who have been rural leaders over many years have struggled not just with providing that but with its cost and with making it the right type of transport for a particular area. The noble Baroness is absolutely right to highlight the need for infrastructure that is tailored to rural lifestyles and connectivity.

Since I am talking about connectivity, I will turn to another form: technology. When I go back to Norfolk, I can never get anything on my machine or any other machine. There is no IT and no phone connection whatever. Many of our rural areas are like that. There is a two-tier system in this country for technology, but that cannot go on.

Finally, Amendment 260, tabled by my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, underscores that the impact of the Bill on rural areas has not yet been fully thought-through. That is the big issue for me. It is entirely reasonable to expect the Government to be transparent about the costs and benefits for rural communities. They have to go back to the drawing board to look at how we can ensure that our rural communities have equal access to the capacity, capabilities and finances that the mayoral authorities will have and that the new unitary councils will be able to use.

I look forward to the Minister’s response on how the Bill can recognise and enshrine the needs of rural communities, which we have heard this evening. At the moment, rural communities are feeling a bit let down by the Government, and this is an absolutely key opportunity to change that.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Bybrook. What she said was very important: the Government have to go back to the drawing board on the issue of rural areas. I can imagine an argument that says that it is implicit in all the areas of competence that all those people will take responsibility for rural areas. However, it is my view that that will not be sufficient. In an earlier group, I discussed how the regional development agencies had a role in rural development. It is very important that the Government go back in order to get this right.

I agree with the noble Baroness when she said that it may not be a commissioner who would do this. In my view, doing that requires the knowledge of a council leader from a rural council, because the relevant immediate knowledge is needed. The noble Baroness was absolutely right to ask whether the Government would go back to the drawing board. I hope that, by Report, the list of areas of competence for strategic authorities is revised, so that rural areas are seen to be protected and developed by the structure. Otherwise, there will be public opposition to the strategic authority, for the reasons that the noble Baroness identified in relation to Wiltshire. I have heard that in most RDAs the money goes to the urban areas. That happens—it has often been the case—because the immediate growth can be delivered in an area of high population, whereas the long-term growth in a rural area can be delivered by financial support at a lower pace.

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[Baroness Thornhill (LD)]

My Lords, I acknowledge the constructive intention behind Amendment 12 from the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne. The desire to ensure that strategic authorities are properly equipped, financially sustainable and governed with integrity is entirely understandable. We have all seen, all too often, the consequences when structures are created without sufficient capacity or clarity of purpose. We do not want that to happen here, and this amendment seeks to guard against it. However—the noble Lord’s heart sinks—while I appreciate that instinct, we cannot support the amendment as drafted.

The noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, and I have different perspectives as we come from different backgrounds—him from No. 10 and me from more than 25 years in local government, 16 of them as a directly elected mayor. To us, the amendment seems to reintroduce a centralising veto at precisely the moment when the Bill is meant to be shifting power away from Whitehall. The Secretary of State would become the arbiter of whether an area is “capable”—a term left undefined, and thus open to subjective interpretation. What one Minister might judge as prudent due diligence, another might use as a brake on local ambition. That uncertainty does not sit comfortably with our belief in consent-based, locally driven governance.

We also have to be alive to the practical effects on the ground in the places about which we have spent many long hard hours talking—those most in need of levelling up. They are often those with a much weaker starting capacity. They could find themselves locked out by criteria that they are not yet able to meet, precisely because they have not been granted the devolution tools that would help them grow that capacity. We risk creating a circular trap: you cannot have the powers until you have the capacity, but you cannot build the capacity until you have the powers.

However, we recognise that strong oversight will be necessary with changes of this magnitude. Several amendments in the names of other noble Lords show a strong appetite across the Committee for rigorous oversight, but it must be oversight that does not stray into overprescription or paternalism. I understand why there may be concerns; the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, expressed them well. My spectacles are not rose-coloured—I acknowledge that local government has not always got it right and that there have been failures, some of them cataclysmic—but, with my tongue firmly in my cheek, I think that we could also say this about past Governments, Prime Ministers and initiatives.

That said, the amendment springs from a very real concern: the public must have confidence that new strategic authorities will function effectively from day one. On that point, I entirely agree with the noble Lord. There is space—and, indeed, a need—for transparency in how readiness is assessed in order to ensure that governance arrangements are fit for purpose and to avoid the creation of authorities that are destined to struggle. However, in our view, the answer is not to place broad, undefined tests solely in the gift of the Secretary of State. Instead, we might look to more balanced alternatives, such as clear statutory criteria developed with the sector rather than imposed on it. I am sure that the Local Government Association will be keen to work collaboratively on this; we could even look at greater parliamentary scrutiny rather than ministerial discretion. There is room for a serious discussion on this matter—I hope that we can hold that with the Minister.

The amendment addresses a genuine risk but, in our view, the mechanism it proposes risks undermining the very local autonomy that the Bill is meant to strengthen. We should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good by setting hurdles that, in some areas, those who would benefit the most will struggle to clear. I genuinely look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Gascoigne goes to the heart of what effective devolution requires: capability. As he set out so clearly, it is simply not enough to create new strategic or unitary authorities in the abstract and hope that they will succeed. We can and should look at the performance of existing local authorities—including their financial resilience, their workforce capacity, the pressures they face and the services they currently deliver—to understand whether the foundations are in place for a new body to take on, in some cases, even greater responsibilities.

My noble friend was right to say that this is not about criticising local government wholesale—many councils are doing extraordinary work under immense strain—but capability is not uniform across the country. The financial challenges facing local authorities are well known. Reorganisation carries costs, and there is a real debate around whether it always delivers the efficiencies or improvements that are promised.

Against that background, it is entirely reasonable that we should expect a clear and transparent test of readiness before new strategic authorities are created. That is precisely what Amendment 12 would provide. It proposes that, before any strategic authority or unitary authority is established, the Secretary of State “must be satisfied” that it has the governance, financial resilience, administrative capacity and accountability mechanisms that are necessary to exercise the functions conferred upon it. These are not burdensome hurdles; they are basic safeguards to ensure that a new authority is set up to succeed, not set up to struggle.

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[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, and I commend him on drafting what I think is a terribly important amendment, as he has just outlined.

The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, said this might sound revolutionary. Well, I think it is revolutionary, and it would mean reversing the entire direction of travel of English governance over the past decades, which has seen power and resources increasingly concentrated in the centre. I said in the earlier group how much that has disillusioned the public and left people feeling like they are not in control of their own communities and lives. This amendment could point the Bill in the direction it is supposed to be heading in, but it is not currently heading in that direction when you look at it.

I confess that this is at the absolute centre of green political philosophy and thinking. Decisions should be made at the most local level possible and referred upwards only when absolutely necessary. That is the foundation of green political thinking and, in my view, the foundation of democracy.

There is so much in this Bill that I was reflecting on when the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Bybrook, was talking about the problem with commissioners and appointed commissioners. Although I was arguing for a rural commissioner, if we are to have appointed commissioners, I entirely agree with the noble Baroness. There is a huge democratic deficit right across the Bill.

In many cases, we are talking about town and parish councils. We are in a situation where we need to think about creating more town and parish councils where they do not exist. Far too often, we see a traditional historic market town with a town or parish council, but also a big council estate on the edge of town which is not parochial. This is the kind of structure that we need to get power down to the people.

This amendment is really giving us a route forward in that sense. It is important to focus, crucially, on providing a direction to the strategic authorities. It returns to a point that we were discussing on a previous group about giving them direction, but is a direction to be democratic and that is something that I will absolutely defend. For instance, proposed new subsection (2)(a) has to

“consider whether any of its powers may be exercised at a more local level”,

and, where it considers that to be the case, it must act. That really is the crucial part of this Bill.

I note that the “Community Empowerment Plan” in proposed new subsection (4) of this amendment picks up what the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, was talking about in the second group. If there is one thing about this amendment, however, it is saying, “Do as I say, not as I do”. That is what Westminster would be saying by including this in the Bill, but this could be a model for Westminster to guide its own actions in future, as well as those of strategic local authorities.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for his amendment. For me, it is a little too revolutionary, but I think the idea behind it—to enable strategic authorities to further devolve any powers that they are given—is correct. I do not think they need any more powers to do that, but they do need encouragement. I believe the amendment is well intentioned, particularly in response to the Bill that seems to be doing the opposite, as the noble Lord said: it is moving all the powers up. I do, however, have concerns about the amendment and how it would work in practice.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for Amendment 13, which seeks to ensure that power is moved away from central government—we all agree with that—to strategic and local authorities. The amendment would place a new statutory duty on strategic and local authorities to

“consider whether any of its powers may be exercised at a more local level”

of government. Should the strategic authority or local authority believe that to be the case, they must

“act so as to enable such devolution”.

I am afraid that this amendment runs counter to the spirit and purpose of the Bill, and risks creating a patchwork of powers across England, with strategic authorities and local authorities holding different sets of powers depending on where they are in England. We believe that allowing different tiers and areas to hold different responsibilities would blur accountability, make it harder for the public to understand who is responsible for what, and weaken value-for-money assurance for investment by increasing duplication and misalignment. The amendment also risks devolving powers to bodies without the capacity to deliver them effectively—which is part of the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott; people need to be willing to accept the duties—and could impose disproportionate and impractical consultation burdens on strategic authorities.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I do not want to give the idea that the parish and town councils across this country would not be able to do it. Some will, but some will not. I know town councils and parishes that run better services than district councils ever did.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I was highlighting the fact that the noble Baroness spoke about the willingness to adopt services, which I believe is important.

The devolution framework is designed to eliminate risk by ensuring that mayors and strategic authorities are given a consistent and coherent set of functions, to ensure that strategic authorities can make strategic decisions and deliver policies that span multiple local authority areas. It is important that all tiers of local government work together in the interests of their local communities. That is why local authorities are embedded within the decision-making structures of combined authorities and combined county authorities as full constituent and voting members. A blanket requirement for a strategic authority to meet tiers of local government is a significant administrative burden; for example, in North Yorkshire alone, there are 412 parish and town councils. There is nothing wrong with expecting mayors and local authority leaders to communicate with them, but imposing that approach could place a considerable cost of consultation on them and potentially crowd out the time they need for their core strategic responsibilities.

I take the noble Baroness’s point about town and parish councils. We are introducing a system of neighbourhood governance, and it is important that we have our debates on that when the time comes. We will, I am sure, debate the role of town and parish councils, but including them in the Bill would have indicated to them that the Bill will have some impact on them that it is not intended for the Bill to have. I totally recognise the work that our town and parish councils do around the country: it is important and I know that we will have those discussions when we get to those elements of the Bill.

On Amendment 13, it is important that we do not interrupt the Government’s intention to give a consistent and coherent set of functions to strategic authorities and that their work dovetails with what our local authorities are doing. I hope that that has reassured the noble Lord and that he will withdraw his amendment.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Scott and Lady Janke, for their amendments on single foundation strategic authorities. Clause 3 provides a power for the Secretary State to designate a single unitary council or county council that is not covered by an existing strategic authority as a single foundation strategic authority. Any future designation of a single foundation strategic authority will be subject to the consent of the council involved. For this reason, the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Janke, is not a necessary requirement.

I appreciate the intention behind the proposal. However, it would not be proportionate to impose an additional requirement to consult every level of local government within the proposed area of the single foundation strategic authority. The principal body affected by the designation will be the old unitary county council and no designation can be made without the consent of the relevant council.

The amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, probes whether Clause 3 should be included in the Bill. Clause 3 is vital to ensuring that the Bill delivers on its ambition to ensure that everywhere in England can benefit from devolution. The Government recognise that non-mayoral devolution to single local authorities can serve as an important foundational step, allowing areas to see early benefits from devolution, while considering all options for unlocking deeper devolution by working with neighbouring local authorities in combined authorities and combined county authorities, over the longer term.

The second amendment in the group, Amendment 15 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, probes whether the affirmative procedure is appropriate for the Secretary of State’s power to designate a council as a single foundation strategic authority. I should reassure the Committee that this is in line with the long-established practice whereby secondary legislation is used to establish new institutions and to implement agreed devolution agreements within areas.

In addition, the use of the affirmative procedure ensures that no designation can be made without the approval of both Houses. As I said, we want local authority designations to be done at the local level; that is the provision, I believe. However, the Government recognise that, in rare cases, non-mayoral devolution can serve as an important first step. To access further functions available at the mayoral tier, single councils will need to work across a wider geography.

I will let the noble Lord know about the issue of funding in due course in writing, if that is okay. Establishing those single foundation strategic authorities will accelerate the transfer of powers out of Whitehall to local government so that local leaders have a greater say over decisions in those areas.

With these reassurances, I ask the noble Baronesses, Lady Scott and Lady Janke, to withdraw or not press their amendments.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

The Minister said that the affirmative procedure had to go through both Houses; I understand that. We have set up unitary authorities through secondary legislation up until now, and this Bill has never been needed. However, I am not quite sure what happens with a local authority that does not want this. Is there a power through the affirmative procedure for the Secretary of State to insist that a local authority, which does not want to become a single foundation authority for whatever reason, will have to do it? Will that go through the affirmative procedure or not?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

The Government have made our intention very clear: we want to see unitary authorities established across the country. We want that initiative to come from local areas themselves. Some areas may be more comfortable going into the single foundation authority first, before they take the step to go into a combined authority; that is what the provision in the Bill is about. We want to make sure that there are unitary authorities across the country. In extreme circumstances, I believe, the Secretary of State has a power to make sure that it does happen, but that would be very much a power of last resort; we would not want to use it unless there could be no agreement any other way.

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[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

Before we move on, I note that the last group is quite a large one. We are due to finish in half an hour, so I would hate to think that we would have to break off half way through the group. I am in the noble Baroness’s hands—where would she like to go with it?

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

It looks like a huge group, but that is only because of the scheduling. Most of the amendments are about the first part of the schedule, so I think we should get it done.

Schedule 1: Establishment, expansion and functions of combined authorities and CCAs

Amendment 16

Moved by

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Baroness Scott of Bybrook Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook]

41: Clause 6, page 3, line 32, leave out from “CCA” to end of line 33
Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment seeks to explore the justification for providing the mayor with a veto over decisions of a Combined County Authority.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 41 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Jamieson is a probing amendment concerning why the Government wish to give mayors a veto over the decisions of a combined county authority.

If this Bill is truly about empowering local communities, decision-making power should be allocated equally between all elected councillors, not concentrated in the hands of one political party individual. This is not to say that the mayor should not have a vote, or perhaps even a casting vote, but we currently see no justification for giving mayors a veto over all decisions made by a majority of a community’s democratically elected representatives. This would not empower local government but would instead turn it into a kind of presidential system. That is not how we do things in this country, nor do we want to.

Amendments 42 and 44 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lansley seek to bring the Bill in line with past legislation. Amendment 42 is in relation to the voting powers of members of combined county authorities whereby the Secretary of State can make provision for different weights to be given to votes of different types of members, as set out in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. Amendment 44, on transport, seeks to bring the Bill in line with the arrangements set out in the Local Transport Act 2008 and the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009. These amendments seem entirely sensible—unless the Government have other reasons, and we would be grateful if they elaborated on those if they do.

Amendment 43, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Jamieson, again probes the Government as to why the decisions of a combined county authority must require the agreement of the mayor, rather than being determined by a simple majority of local councillors. We believe this would undermine local democracy, rather than empowering it. If decisions require the agreement of the mayor, a majority of councillors may be disregarded and the wishes of the people ignored. That is not democracy, nor have we heard any arguments as to why it is needed.

Finally, my noble friend Lord Jamieson and I oppose the Question that Clause 6 stand part of the Bill, since we do not see why the Government have deemed it necessary to amend the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 to replace the constitutional arrangement it sets out. I hope the Minister will explain why the Government hope to empower mayors over other local councillors, since this does not empower local democracy; rather, it empowers a select few individuals tasked with representing large geographical areas with different communities, who inevitably will have different needs.

As the Bill stands, this will not further localism; rather it will centralise power and take away the decision-making powers of local councillors. Not only does this fly in the face of the Bill’s title, but we have not been given any justification or reasoning for it. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend and speak to these amendments to Clause 6. The clause relates to decision-making in combined county authorities and combined authorities and its purpose is to provide for a default structure of voting in both kinds of strategic authorities. In particular, that default structure would provide that in mayoral authorities the majority in favour of a decision must include the mayor, thus in effect giving the mayor a veto over decisions, since the majority excluding the mayor would not be decisive.

Before I turn to my amendments, and apropos of the question of whether the clause stands part, I will ask a question. I refer noble Lords and the Minister to Section 13(2)(a) of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act. The section enables regulations to be made about members, and Section 13(2)(a) states that those regulations can include provision about

“cases in which a decision of a CCA requires a majority, or a particular kind of majority, of the votes of members of a particular kind”.

It seems to me that that paragraph of the levelling-up Act enables exactly what the Minister is setting out to do by statutory instrument rather than by primary legislation. Could she tell us why primary legislation is required to achieve this purpose? That might inform our deliberations on the stand part debate.

Amendments 42 and 44 are in my name. I do not share my noble friend’s desire, set out in her Amendments 41 and 43, to take out the mayoral veto from the clause. I have been a resident in the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough combined authority for however many years. When we had a mayor, the mayor found it very difficult to secure, for example, a non-statutory spatial strategy, not least because the mayor was often frustrated in getting a policy through due to the votes of one of the strategic authority’s constituent councils. In my view, if you elect a mayor and you want a mayor to exercise leadership in a strategic authority, it does not follow that the mayor will necessarily be able to get everything that the mayor wants, and the mayor will have to secure a majority to do so. It is very difficult for the mayor to carry on and provide that leadership if there is a majority that can carry proposals against his or her own policy.

This therefore forces the mayor to act in a certain way. I have seen that in Cambridgeshire, where the current mayor, Paul Bristow, is doing a very good job; he will be known to some of my noble friends. Partly because of this legislation, he is securing a majority in the combined authority, not least because there is an expectation that the strategic authority, when it gets these powers, will be able to make progress with the majority that includes him, and so he will not be able to be blocked by one constituent council.

I turn my focus to my Amendments 42 and 44. The former relates to combined county authorities. In this Committee, I am afraid that we are getting used to the fact that we have to do everything twice, because we have to legislate both for combined county authorities and for combined authorities; it will get a lot simpler when we have just one kind of strategic authority and when legislation for all strategic authorities is pretty much the same. Nevertheless, combined county authorities are governed by Section 10 of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, which enables the Secretary of State to set out their constitutional arrangements. Section 10(2)(b) includes

“the voting powers of members of the CCA (including provision for different weight to be given to the vote of different descriptions of member)”.

That is the existing legislation: it provides for different weights to be allocated to different members. The current situation is that the constitution of a combined county authority is not a “one member, one vote” arrangement—it can vary.

Clause 6 will insert new Section 13A into the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. It says that

“each voting member has one vote”.

So, what I am really asking by way of these two amendments—in this instance, for combined county authorities—is: does the primary legislation we are discussing now override, in effect, the existing potential for regulations to determine a different weight for different members for different decisions; or, because of this primary legislation, does it have to be “one member, one vote”?

There is a problem there. That problem was illustrated to me when we had a meeting just a few weeks back—my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook will recall it—about Suffolk. It was about unitaries, as it happened, but it also encompassed a discussion about the prospective Norfolk and Suffolk strategic authority, which is in the devolution priority programme. The leader of Suffolk County Council was asked, “Suffolk is a single unitary and Norfolk is three, maybe even four, unitaries. What happens if they come together into one strategic authority?”

The problem is easily illustrated: one constituent council and one vote equals perhaps three votes for Norfolk and one vote for Suffolk. The leader of Suffolk County Council said, “That’s not a problem because we’ll weight the votes”. This is exactly what one would do using existing legislation, but I am worried that the structure of the Bill’s drafting will take that discretion away. That is the purpose of my Amendment 42.

My Amendment 44 relates to combined authorities, not combined county authorities, but it runs to the exact same issue. Of course, combined authorities are governed not by the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act but by the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, Section 104 of which provides that the constitutional arrangements for combined authorities may, by order, be made according to the provisions of the Local Transport Act 2008. Section 84 of that latter Act relates to constitutional arrangements; subsection (2)(b) refers to

“the voting powers of members of the ITA”—

the integrated transport authority—

“(including provision for different weight to be given to the vote of different descriptions of member)”.

The Committee will recognise those exact same words, so we are dealing with exactly the same issue: is it different weights for different members, or is it to be overridden by “one member, one vote”?

I want, as the outcome of this debate, for us to be sure that this legislation continues to permit a constitution for a strategic authority that both allocates different weights to different members and enables voting power to reflect the wide range of circumstances of constituent councils and other voting members of strategic authorities.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (Baroness Taylor of Stevenage) (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for their scrutiny of the first clauses of the Bill last week. I have replied in writing to some of the questions noble Lords asked me last week, and I hope they have received those replies. I look forward to further scrutiny today.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for their amendments to Clause 6, on decision-making arrangements. The amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, probes whether Clause 6 is required. Clause 6 is central to the Bill’s core ambition of moving from devolution by deals to devolution by default. It creates a clear and consistent decision-making framework for combined authorities and combined county authorities. Current decision-making arrangements in combined authorities and combined county authorities are complex and vary widely, as noble Lords who have spoken have referred to. This confuses the public and makes accountability harder. For example, mayors are often seen by the public as the accountable person for their authority, but the Mayor of the West of England and the Mayor of the West Midlands are not allowed to vote on their combined authority’s budget.

Clause 6 introduces a simple majority voting system which makes decisions more transparent, creates a level playing field and provides more clarity for the public. For mayoral strategic authorities, the mayor must be in the majority for a vote to pass. This reflects their direct democratic mandate across the entire area. When he was referring to Cambridgeshire, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, spoke about the consequences if that is not in place. I think it is an important move. Collaboration remains important, and we are clear that we want to see mayors build a consensus, but one member should not be able to block decisions for an entire region. Removing Clause 6 would keep the current patchwork of governance rules, which slows decision-making down and can undermine accountability to the public, so we believe the clause is essential for strong, transparent governance and should remain in the Bill.

Amendments 41 and 43, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, seek to understand the justification for providing the mayor with a veto over decisions and why decisions must require the agreement of the mayor. The Government recognise the importance of strong collaboration with strategic authorities. That is exactly why the Bill requires both the mayor and the constituent members to work together. The standard voting arrangement in the Bill requires that a majority of members support a decision. We believe the provisions in the Bill strike the right balance between collective decision-making and clear leadership. Directly elected mayors have a unique democratic mandate. They are elected by the public to provide leadership and direction for their whole area. Requiring mayoral agreement on key decisions helps ensure clarity over who is accountable for outcomes. Without that clarity, responsibility risks becoming blurred. Removing the requirement for mayoral agreement would weaken the leadership model that underpins effective devolution. It would lead to slower decision-making, less coherent strategies and reduced accountability to the public.

Amendments 42 and 44 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, seek to provide that secondary legislation can be used to set voting arrangements for combined authorities and combined county authorities that differ from the standard arrangements set out in Clause 6. The Government agree that simple majority voting would not be appropriate for all situations. That is why Clause 6 already provides that voting arrangements set out in other enactments continue to apply. Therefore, these amendments are not necessary. For example, in non-mayoral areas the local transport plan must instead have the consent of all constituent councils in order to be adopted. In mayoral areas, the local transport plan remains a mayoral function, but it must be approved by a simple majority vote of the strategic authority. The existing powers for the Government to provide place-specific voting arrangements in secondary legislation, to which the amendments refer, will also apply.

Turning to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, about the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act, the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act—that is a snappy title—and Clause 6, the Bill does not disapply or override those Acts. Their relevant provisions continue to apply where appropriate, so restating them here does not add any new legal protection. Including additional statutory references risks creating confusion about which provisions apply in different circumstances and undermines the clarity of the governance framework the Bill is trying to apply.

We recognise that some parts of the country have unique technical circumstances that require small changes to this consistent approach, such as to reflect arrangements relating to the management of trams or local bus companies. We have undertaken extensive engagement with existing combined authorities and combined county authorities over the past 12 months on this issue to agree a limited set of bespoke voting arrangements that met this high bar. Should any future strategic authority seek bespoke arrangements, the Government would need to consider them on a case-by-case basis. However, we are clear that any changes to the standard voting arrangements would be by exception and subject to a very high bar.

The Government will maintain some of the place-specific voting arrangements. For example, Lancashire combined authority has bespoke voting arrangements in relation to its budget, which reflects its governance structure. In response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about weighted voting, the existing powers for the Government to provide place-specific voting arrangements will continue to apply, so that will be for Suffolk and Norfolk to determine as we go forward. For the reasons that I have set out, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister and to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. As I said, the issues raised today go to the heart of how we structure local democracy and ensure that the voices of all our communities are fairly and effectively represented. That is why we brought forward these probing amendments.

A consistent concern has emerged that the balance of power proposed in the Bill risks concentrating authority in the hands of the one single officeholder rather than empowering the broad and diverse range of locally elected councillors who best understand the communities that they serve. I have not heard a lot today that puts my mind at rest, but I will read Hansard tomorrow and look further at it. I was pleased that the Minister said that places such as Norfolk and Suffolk, quite close to my heart now, will have that flexibility to deal with local problems—but I have to say that they might argue about it. Who knows? Let us hope that there are two single authorities and we do not have any problems.

We all agree that effective local leadership is vital, but leadership does not mean overriding democratic deliberations; it means working with those local representatives, ensuring accountability and respecting the mandate of those who have been elected by their communities. When decision-making structures are distorted in favour of one individual, however capable, they operate not as a system of local democracy but, as I said, as a presidential model, which sits uneasily with the traditions of government in this country.

My noble friend Lord Lansley’s amendment rightly seeks to bring the Bill back into alignment with those frameworks established in previous legislation. I will read this back, but it sounds as if that is happening, although I am not quite sure how. If there are any further questions, I am sure that we will talk to the Minister about them. I am happy with that.

In relation to Clause 6, we have urged the Government to reconsider whether rewriting the constitutional arrangements of the Act was necessary or justified. It looks to me as if we are perhaps not rewriting as much as we feared was being rewritten—but, as I said, we will look at that in detail when Hansard comes out.

We still believe that, if the Government truly wish to empower our local authorities, they must demonstrate it by upholding democratic balance, trusting councillors and ensuring that all voices, not just one, carry the appropriate weight in the decisions that shape our counties and regions. But at this time, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 41 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their amendments on mayoral commissioners and for the wide-ranging debate that we have had on the subject.

Before I respond to any individual amendments, I want to reiterate why the Government are introducing commissioners. I completely understand the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, on title and definition. I must say, I asked myself the same question on the potential confusion around commissioners who are sent to do a job when an authority is failing and these types of commissioners; we have to think carefully about that.

As I have set out, the Bill will empower our mayors with wide-ranging new powers over transport planning and local growth, so they can drive growth across their region, and powers over health and public safety, so that they can deliver the public service reform that the public expect to see. These are critical functions, and it is not reasonable to expect a mayor to do all of them. That is why we have introduced commissioners—an optional appointment to whom mayors can delegate functions to support them in their work. Mayors will be able to appoint up to seven commissioners, aligned to the areas of competence and reflecting areas of responsibility. As the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, said, mayors can also appoint members of the combined county authority or combined authority as portfolio holders, of course; they will also have officials to support their work, such as finance officials, legal officials and so on.

Let me be clear: this is not about inviting a proliferation of appointments. Rather, it is about mayors having capacity to deliver against the full range of their functions and giving them flexibility in how they deliver for their area. Local authority leaders who are on the combined authority will be able to support the mayor as portfolio holders; do not forget, though, that it is important to remember that they will have their own authorities to lead as well, so they will be working in their own authority at the same time.

On Amendments 51A and 52A, I reiterate that commissioners are an optional appointment: they are designed to increase capacity and give mayors more flexibility in how they choose to deliver for their areas. These amendments, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Willis, would remove that optionality, effectively introducing seven new statutory roles in the combined authority or combined county authority. We have set out the competency, for example on the environment and climate change, in the Bill itself, but mayors are best placed to determine whether they need additional support on this based on the needs of their local area.

While we have set out in the competencies what we think mayors should be doing, it cannot be right that we make the choice for them about how they do that. Therefore, it is for mayors to decide. I know this can be difficult for us in the political process when a mayor may put an emphasis on an area that would be less important to us than something else, but I am afraid that is part of the democratic process that we live with all the time; it is not that different.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I just do not understand this. If I am a leader of a local authority and I have a specific need for a competence, I employ an official or an officer. I interview a large range of them; I do not go to one of my mates and ask if they would like to be a commissioner. I do not understand why that should be any different in a mayoral office. If they are doing work that demands somebody extremely well-qualified in a specific arts project, they can employ an officer or official. It does not need to be a commissioner who has a connotation of being politically motivated, as well as being possibly qualified in that area.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I will come on to that in a moment, if that is okay. If I do not answer the noble Baroness’s question, I will come back to it.

Amendments 50A, 51B and 53A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bassam, seek to remove the statutory cap on the number of commissioners that may be appointed by the mayor. It is important that mayors have the support they need from specialists to deliver for their constituents. However, we believe the Bill strikes the right balance, ensuring that mayors have the capacity to deliver without inviting a proliferation of appointments.

For this reason, I am afraid I cannot support the Amendment 196A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bassam. This amendment would enable mayors to appoint mayoral special advisers and would include provisions regarding their appointment, function and code of conduct. It would also exempt these advisers from holding a politically restricted post under a local authority for the purposes of Part 1 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989. I agree that mayors can benefit from advice that they trust aligns with their politics. Political advisers bring important expertise that helps mayors formulate their strategy, policy decisions and communications approach. That is why mayors can already appoint a political adviser, and our current position is to provide new mayoralties with that option too.

However, these advisers will be subject to political restrictions in the same way existing advisers are. Accountability in public office is of paramount importance, which is why we have existing guardrails in place. The cap ensures that spending remains proportionate to the institution and prevents a proliferation of political appointments. On my noble friend Lord Bassam’s point on the code of conduct, mayors’ special advisers, where appointed, are employees of the strategic authority, and therefore they would be covered by the strategic authority’s code of conduct.

Amendments 54, 55, 58, 59, 57 and 61, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bach, seek to enable commissioners’ work or the delegation of function to relate to more than one area of competence. The amendments also seek to allow two or more commissioners to relate to the same area of competence. I thank my noble friend for these amendments, and I reassure him that the mayor will already have the flexibility to consider local circumstances when considering a commissioner’s exact brief and any delegated functions relating to the area of competence.

The Bill states that a commissioner’s work or functions can relate to other areas of competence and matters outside of them where it is incidental to the work in their special area of competence. For example, a commissioner focused on economic development and regeneration could lead on a growth strategy that included elements related to housing, skills and transport.

Amendment 171, also in the name of my noble friend Lord Bach, seeks to ensure that, where a mayor is responsible for more than one police force, they would have the flexibility to appoint a single deputy mayor or separate deputy mayors for each police force. As I have set out, the Bill already ensures that the mayor has support in exercising police governance functions in each of the police forces for which they have responsibility, and it recognises that these forces remain distinct and separate entities. The provisions in the Bill will prevent the same person from being appointed to more than one deputy mayor for police and crime positions, ensuring that there is a dedicated lead for the day-to-day oversight of policing in each force area.

My noble friend will know that I worked in policing for many years, and I am very aware of the different policing challenges that can occur even in neighbouring forces: the balance of different types of crime—rural and urban—and some of the more internal issues around different IT systems, and so on. That seems appropriate at the moment. Our right honourable friend the Home Secretary spoke very powerfully about her view that there needs to be further reorganisation of policing, and we should of course work across government as we move forward with the Bill to work with her to identify her ideas and how that might be implemented in this. But I appreciate that she was talking about some of this being implemented some way off, as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said.

For the moment, this amendment would impact the direct line of accountability the mayor is able to provide to voters regarding the police forces which they are required to hold to account. I will reflect on his call for flexibility around this, and I think we need to have further discussions with the Home Office about how this will work moving forward.

Amendment 221, tabled by my noble friend Lady Griffin of Princethorpe, would enable a mayor of a combined authority to appoint any councillor of a constituent council in a combined authority area as deputy mayor. I want to clarify with her that I have understood her amendment properly, because I think she said something slightly different from what is in the amendment itself. The mayor can appoint members of the constituent authorities who sit on the combined authority in portfolio holder roles, but they cannot appoint any member of the constituent authority. I just clarify that.

The position of deputy mayor is a significant responsibility, which could involve stepping in to chair the authority and undertaking mayoral functions. That is why, currently, only those constituent councillors who have been appointed as a member of the combined authority may be appointed as a deputy mayor. These members have been appointed by the council to the authority in the knowledge that this may involve taking on the deputy mayor role, so they have the legitimacy to perform it if called upon. It is important that we keep measures in place to ensure that a deputy mayor is a legitimate appointment, best prepared for the demands they will face should they have to step in as mayor. Because this amendment applies only to combined authorities, technically it would create a divergence between the requirements imposed on them, versus combined county authorities.

The remaining amendments in this group, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, seek to remove Clause 9 and Schedule 3. This would eliminate the role of commissioners from the Bill, preventing their appointment by mayors. As I have stated, commissioners are intended to increase mayors capacity and give them more flexibility in how they deliver for their area. These authorities will have critical new functions to undertake, requiring representation on national bodies, joint working with partners and access to the expertise they need. It is simply not realistic to expect a mayor to do all this on their own. These appointments will be a local decision, and no additional funding will be provided.

I will now cover some of the questions that have been asked by noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, the noble Lords, Lord Jamieson and Lord Shipley, the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and others. Starting with the question about commissioners being simply devolution to unelected officials, commissioners are optional and can be appointed only by the mayor, who determines their terms and conditions. They will work in lockstep with the mayor to drive forward the policy agenda for a specific function, such as transport or public health. This will be particularly effective where a commissioner has specialist knowledge and expertise that can help deliver the mayor’s vision for local people. There is a real difference here between employed officials of a local council, for example, and what these commissioners will do. The best example I can give is the way that these positions work in London, where the mayor has a number of deputy mayors, as they are called, who act for the mayor in certain policy areas.

The mayor, the combined county authority and the overview and scrutiny committee will each play a role in the commissioner’s appointment and/or the termination of their appointment. We will set out guidance, following Royal Assent, on recruitment and job descriptions. Responding to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, I say that these commissioners will be subject to the Nolan principles, as employees of strategic authorities. Commissioners will also fall under the strengthened accountability system for devolution, which will confirm further details in due course; we are likely to have further discussions about that later this evening.

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Moved by

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook]

62: Clause 10, page 12, line 34, at end insert—
“(3A) Any report produced under subsection (3) must be produced annually and published on the website of the Combined County Authority.”

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 263 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Jamieson. If there is one theme that runs consistently through today’s debates, it is the need for transparency, certainty and a clear understanding of the Government’s plans for governance structures, from Whitehall’s right down to local government. Clause 10 establishes the core reporting obligations for combined county authorities. These obligations are the foundations of accountability. As we reorganise who holds which competences, what powers are exercised at what level and who has the ability to pull levers to make things happen, it is essential that those exercising powers are clearly and robustly accounted for. These reporting requirements enable Parliament, constituency councils and, indeed, the public to understand how devolved powers are being exercised, how public money is being spent and whether these new authorities are delivering what was promised when the powers were devolved. Yet as the Bill currently stands, the substance of those obligations is left to guidance, and that has not yet been published. We are, in effect, being asked to approve a statutory framework without knowing how one of its central accountability mechanisms will operate in practice. Our amendment simply provides that Clause 10 should not come into force until that guidance is available and has been laid before Parliament. This is a modest but important safeguard. It ensures that combined county authorities are not placed under statutory duties that they cannot yet fully understand and that the accountability framework underpinning devolution is complete, transparent and subject to parliamentary scrutiny from the outset.

I will therefore probe the Government on a few points. First, why has the guidance not been published alongside the Bill, given that these reporting duties are so central to its operation? Secondly, what assurance can Ministers give the Committee that the guidance will not materially shape or, indeed, constrain the scope of parliamentary oversight once the Bill is enacted? Thirdly, what would be lost in practical terms by accepting a provision that simply requires Parliament to see and consider this guidance before the relevant section is commenced?

This amendment does not seek to delay devolution for its own sake; nor does it introduce unnecessary bureaucracy. It simply asks that transparency comes before implementation and that accountability is designed in rather than bolted on later. To us, that seems a pretty sensible position; I will, of course, listen carefully to what the Minister has to say in response.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for her amendments relating to providing allowances for combined county authority members with special responsibilities.

Amendments 62 and 236 would make it mandatory for the Secretary of State to issue guidance before Clause 10 comes into effect, and would require a combined county authority to publish an annual report on its webpage outlining the allowances that have been paid to members with special responsibilities. I welcome the commitment from the noble Baroness to ensuring transparency in local government—a matter of paramount importance to this Government.

As a former council leader, the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, will know, as I do, that allowances probably attract more debate and discussion, from both Members and the public, than much of the other policy that we debate. That is why we will issue statutory guidance on complying with the duty under Clause 10 to produce and publish reports. The guidance will allow the Secretary of State to set clear expectations—for example, regarding the frequency of such reports and where they are published—to support combined authorities and combined county authorities in this area. In the event that further clarification is needed, the power to issue guidance provides flexibility for the Government to update their position.

I would also add that, because this amendment applies to combined county authorities only, it would create a divergence in law between the requirements imposed on them versus combined authorities. That would be inconsistent; it would not be right to treat the two types of authority differently on that basis. My understanding is that this statutory guidance will be published on Royal Assent. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I thank the Minister but we are back where we started, really, in that we would like to see the guidance before Report so that we can see whether the guidance is correct or whether it could include something else. I currently do not know this, and we will not know. So I thank the Minister for her answers, but we should try to get the guidance before Report; if we do not, we are going to be asking more and more questions on this in Committee.

I accept what the Minister says about combined authorities and county combined authorities. I will look at that again and, if we do not get this guidance, I will retable it on Report. At this point, I say to the Minister that this is an important issue, and it would be better if we could scrutinise it properly, at least on Report, but at this point I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 62 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook]

63: Clause 11, page 14, line 33, leave out subsection (1)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to probe why the Government propose to change the precept arrangements as set out in the LURA 2023.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 63 and 64 in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, both relate to Clause 11 and the proposed changes to the mayoral precept arrangements. They are intended to elicit from the Government a clearer explanation of both the necessity and the principle behind the changes proposed in this clause. We want to see the prevention of uncontrolled mayoral precepts, the avoidance of tax rises through the backdoor and fiscal parity with existing local authorities. That is more important now, having heard some of the debates today.

Amendment 63 seeks to probe why the Government believe it necessary to revisit the precept arrangements that were set out only recently in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. They were presented as part of a carefully planned settlement between central government, local authorities and the public, particularly in relation to accountability and transparency around local taxation. Those arrangements were debated at length in this House by noble Lords on all Benches, as the Minister and I know only too well, given the many hours we spent debating it.

Against that background, it is not immediately clear why the Government now feel the need to depart from that framework so soon after it was enacted. What has changed and what problems have arisen that they are now seeking to address? I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could first explain what evidence the Government have had that existing arrangements are no longer fit for purpose; secondly, whether local councils or mayoral combined authorities have themselves asked for these changes; and thirdly, what outcomes for precepts they are expecting or seeking to facilitate through these changes. It is right to be cautious about reopening settlements that have barely had time to bed in, and I hope the Minister can reassure us that this is not just change for change’s sake.

Amendment 64 addresses a related but distinct, significant concern: why mayors should be treated differently from other local authorities when it comes to limits on precept increases. As things stand, other types of local authority are subject to clear principles set out annually by the Secretary of State, which limit the extent to which they may increase their council tax without triggering additional scrutiny or consent. The amendment simply proposes that mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities should operate within the same principles. Therefore, my question for the Government is very simple: what is the justification for the differential treatments?

Mayors exercise significant powers and command substantial budgets with high public profile. It is only right that those powers come with the same fiscal discipline and protections for taxpayers that apply to other tiers of local government. Without parity, there is a risk that mayoral precepts become a means of raising revenue, perhaps even for vanity projects or unfunded responsibilities, without the safeguards that residents elsewhere quite rightly expect.

This leads me to a broader concern that underpins both of the amendments in this group. Too often, we see responsibilities devolved without sufficient or sustainable funding attached. While devolution can and should empower local decision-making, it should not become a mechanism by which central government passes financial pressures down the line and leaves local leaders, and therefore local taxpayers, to pick up the bill.

If mayors are given additional duties without adequate funding, the inevitable consequence is pressure to raise their precept. From a Government who have sought to raise punitive taxes at every opportunity, this sounds very much like another tax rise through the back door. I do not believe that is what the public would understand as devolution or community empowerment. It is not consistent with the principles of transparency and accountability that we all should stand for.

The last two questions I have for the Minister are: for what reason do precept arrangements in the LURA need to be reopened, and why should mayors not be subject to the same precept arrangements as other local authorities? I hope the Minister will be able to reassure me on both points, and I beg to move.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for her amendments on precepts.

Amendment 63 probes why the Government are changing precept arrangements, and I completely understand why she would do that. The changes to existing powers will allow mayors to precept for all an authority’s functions, giving mayors more flexibility about how they fund mayoral priorities.

I remind noble Lords that the ability to issue a mayoral precept has existed in law since 2017, but it remains at the discretion of mayors how to use it. However, as it stands, mayors who choose to use the precept can spend it only on mayoral functions rather than on all the authority’s functions. This limitation is arbitrary and unnecessary. It could mean, for example, permitting spending on transport but not on health.

We want to give mayors the tools to tackle the obstacles to growth and improve the lives of people in their area, and to do this effectively, mayors must be able to spend across all an authority’s functions.

Amendment 64 would impose council tax principles automatically on strategic authorities. The Secretary of State can already set referendum principles on strategic authorities should they choose to do so. However, where used, mayoral precept rates are proportionately a small amount. Imposing a limit on how much they can rise in line with councils would mean that, in almost all areas, the value would remain insignificant and be ineffective for investing in local priorities.

The Government have made it clear that any increases to the mayoral precept should be fair and proportionate, but aligning maximum mayoral precept rate rises with other council tax rises reduces local agency, which runs contrary to the spirit of the Bill and of devolution. We want to see mayors who are empowered to invest in their communities, creating better public services and driving economic growth.

I took a quick look at some of the rates of mayoral precepts that are levied. It was interesting for me to see that in Liverpool in 2025-26, residents of band D properties were charged £24 extra for the mayoral precept per year. In Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, the figure was £36. It is a bit unfair to compare some of the other authorities because they deliver police services and they precept for those as well. But then I looked at some of the town and parish council figures, and the average parish band D precept is £92.22, which was a percentage change of 9.4% in the last year. So, the mayoral precept feels proportionate to me.

The Government consult on the local government finance settlement each year. That is the established and appropriate way of considering what is best for authorities and taxpayers each year, and we will continue to do so. I therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for her responses and for trying to assure me about those amendments. However, she will understand that concerns raised in the short debate between us are not about opposing devolution nor about questioning the role of mayors but about ensuring that changes to local taxation powers are justified and consistent.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, Clause 13 will allow combined authorities and combined county authorities to make a transport levy on their constituent councils to cover any transport costs not met by grants or other revenue streams. Previously, the powers to charge a transport levy have been provided through varied and disparate regulations and orders. The Bill standardises and makes consistent the ability for combined authorities and combined county authorities to charge a transport levy. These minor and technical amendments correct new sections and amend cross references to protect the regulation-making powers for levies. I beg to move.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, as the Minister said, these are technical and consequential amendments to the levies section of the Bill. It has been a long enough day, and I have already made my position on mayoral precepts and council tax very clear in the previous two groups, so I will not repeat myself.

Amendment 65 agreed.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Baroness Scott of Bybrook Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 29th January 2026 Grand Committee

This is to probe why additional powers for the Mayor of London may be conferred by secondary legislation.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased to begin the third day of Committee with this group of amendments, starting with the proposition in my name that Clause 15 not stand part, as we see no justification or real purpose for it. It is not clear why the Government seek to confer yet more powers on the Mayor of London by secondary legislation. I hope other parties will join me in my concern about this clause.

The noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, pointed out at Second Reading that the Mayor of London has already been given more and more areas to oversee and a budget of approximately £21 billion. I ask the Minister: what more powers does he need? What is more, rather than giving the London Assembly more powers to represent and scrutinise on behalf of the whole community, Clause 15 will give powers specifically to the mayor. This is not community empowerment but instead gives the Government a mechanism to empower an already powerful individual, without any explanation as to why. Surely this Bill’s priority should be empowering local communities to scrutinise and ensure that services are being delivered effectively and funds used efficiently by those at the top. Can the Minister explain what consultation took place to inform this clause, and with whom?

Clause 15 is further evidence that the real purpose of this Bill has not been made clear. If it is about genuine community empowerment for all England then allowing the Secretary of State to confer further powers on the Mayor of London is hardly a priority. We do not see why London should be put on an ever-higher pedestal. The Committee deserves to know the Government’s exact reasoning behind this clause.

Amendment 70, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, seeks to insert a new clause extending the category of people whom the London Assembly can require to attend its meetings or produce documents. You cannot have effective meetings if the necessary people are not there. We on these Benches welcome Amendment 71, also tabled by the noble Baroness, which would replace the current two-thirds majority required to change the Greater London Authority’s consolidated council tax requirement with a simple majority. This is entirely sensible. It would improve decision-making and may make better budget-making in London.

Amendments 72, 73, 74, 96 and 182, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, seek to establish a London local authorities joint committee. We are hesitant about creating more committees, but I look forward to his contribution and explanation of this matter.

Amendment 75, from my noble friend Lady O’Neill of Bexley, asks us to go back to basics and initiate a review of the London governance model, covering its effectiveness, accountability and, in particular, outcomes. If the Government want to reorganise local government across the country, why not bring London in line as well? This is a perfect opportunity to cut costs and strengthen local democracy in our capital city.

The Government must come clean about their intentions for London. If reforms are made, let them strengthen local democracy and cut bureaucracy, not empower an already powerful mayor. I beg to move.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, in speaking to this group of London-related amendments, I should declare my former roles as a London borough leader, a member of the London Assembly and a founding chair of what is now London Councils—indeed, I am one of its current co-presidents.

Before I speak to the six amendments in my name in this group—together, they seek to address a long-standing anomaly in London’s governance arrangements—I want to say a brief word about the other amendments in the group, drawing on my previous experience. In particular, I wish to comment on the interesting remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, who seems affronted at the idea that the Mayor of London and the whole GLA network are somehow trying to accrue on to themselves—or the Government are trying to give them—more and more powers. I respectfully remind your Lordships’ Committee that London is the engine of the UK economy, that without London the UK’s economy would founder, and that it is therefore very important that London retains its status as one of the few great world cities. For that purpose, having strong and effective mayoral and governance arrangements in the capital city is crucial.

I was involved in the discussions with the then Government around the creation of a mayor and assembly for London, and then in the passage of the Greater London Authority Bill when it was in your Lordships’ House. The London devolution settlement was carefully devised by Nick Raynsford, the then Minister for London, and was the first of its type. That settlement has remained largely unchanged for over a quarter of a century.

I have some sympathy, therefore, with Amendment 75, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, which suggests that there should be a review of that settlement. However, I have reservations about her amendment, as I do not see why it should be a requirement of legislation. My noble friend the Minister could simply announce today that it is going to happen. Given that extensive consultations and discussions would be needed as part of a review, a year is too short a timescale. In doing such a review, one should look at the role and number of London boroughs. Does having 32 of them, plus the corporation, really make sense more than 60 years on from their creation?

I have some sympathy with Amendments 70 and 71, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon. As a member of the first London Assembly, I always felt that the role of AMs was not sufficiently defined or purposeful enough. Strengthening and widening the scrutiny role of the assembly makes a lot of sense, as does changing the two-thirds requirement for amending the mayor’s budget—a threshold that has never been passed, although I gather that the London Assembly is considering the mayor’s budget today, so perhaps something surprising will happen. However, changing that requirement might oblige the mayor to work more closely with AMs—something that has not always been evident over the first three mayoralties. Such a power might be usefully extended to assembly consideration of mayoral strategies. Such a change would, however, alter the balance of the existing governance model in London. Rather than being done in a piecemeal fashion, it should be considered as part of the putative review suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill.

I turn now to Amendments 72, 73, 74, 96, 182 and 183 in my name. They seek to address an anomaly—an omission in the original Greater London Authority Act. My understanding is that they have the support of all three parties on London councils, as well as that of the mayor’s office. At their heart, these amendments are about addressing a simple but persistent problem: that the collective body of London’s boroughs is not recognised in statute and is unable, as things stand, to receive government funding directly.

London boroughs work together extensively. Through London Councils, they co-ordinate delivery, share expertise and engage with government on issues ranging from transport and housing to retrofitting and the charging of electric vehicles. In many of these areas, boroughs are the primary delivery agency of policies that sit squarely within the devolution agenda. Despite this, London Councils lacks a clear statutory footing. As a result, it cannot receive Section 31 grants directly from national government. Instead, funding must be routed through a nominated lead authority and then passed on—an arrangement that is administratively cumbersome, slower than it needs to be, and inefficient for both local and national government.

These amendments would provide a straightforward solution. They seek to establish a statutory joint committee, made up of London’s borough leaders and the City of London, enabling London Councils to receive and distribute funding directly and ensuring that London boroughs are properly consulted where legislation envisages consultation with local government bodies. Crucially, these changes would allow resources to flow more efficiently to the boroughs that are responsible for delivery, reducing unnecessary bureaucracy and making better use of the collective capacity that already exists within the London system. They would strengthen the clarity of consultation arrangements, ensuring that London borough voices are heard in a coherent and structured way.

I should be clear that these proposals are entirely complementary to the role of the Greater London Authority. They would not impinge on or duplicate the powers or strategic status of the mayor, the GLA or the London Assembly. Rather, they would strengthen the overall London governance system by clarifying the collective role of the boroughs within it. That is why I am pleased that the GLA is supportive of London Councils becoming a statutory joint committee, recognising that this change would improve co-ordination, efficiency and the effective delivery of devolved priorities across London.

In short, these amendments are firmly aligned with the Bill’s broader aims of empowering local government and improving the effectiveness of devolution. They would correct an anomaly that has been recognised for some time and replace it with a solution that is sensible, efficient and long overdue.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I was referring to the difference between the combined authorities and the combined county authorities, which are made up of the constituent members from the local area. The GLA does not work like that, as we all know. It is not a body that represents the London boroughs; it is a different, directly elected body and it has a different scrutiny function. I was not trying to engage in sleight of hand; I was just pointing out the difference between the two bodies.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, I have listened carefully to noble Lords’ contributions, for which I am very grateful. It is so refreshing to hear about London local authorities. I have talked for a number of years in both Chambers about local government, but we very rarely have a proper debate on London governance. It is very refreshing and I thank noble Lords who have, it seems to me, hundreds of years of experience in the great city’s governance. It is seriously refreshing.

To the noble Lord, Lord Harris, I say that of course I understand the role of our great capital city and its importance in the economy of our country, but I do not think that that means that we cannot at times challenge it and scrutinise it from here, and I think that that is what we are doing. It is our genuine desire to ensure that community empowerment, efficiency and localism should apply to London as well when we are looking at the rest of the country.

Clause 15 remains wholly unclear, both in its purpose and its intention. Empowering one individual further without compelling justification or evidence is not the right direction of travel in our opinion. It may be that we need to review London before we give these further powers, as we are doing for the rest of the country. Are we giving these powers to an authority that is as efficient as it can be in governance, just as the rest of the country is being challenged to be before it gets those powers?

If there is a case for expanding the powers in London, I suggest that the Government look at that governance before they make that decision, which is why the amendment was tabled. If such a case exists, I believe that it should be laid before Parliament transparently rather than delivered through secondary legislation at a later stage in a way that limits our scrutiny and public understanding, which is important.

Equally, amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, and the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, have highlighted a real concern about the existing governance arrangements and structures, although I remain unconvinced that more layers of committees are the answer. None the less, not only are the Government taking, in our opinion, the wrong direction of travel, but they are also missing a great opportunity in this primary legislation. The proposal to reduce the two-thirds majority to a simple majority, as we have heard, for changes to the GLA council tax requirement would empower councillors, as we are trying to do in this Bill. My understanding is that, when the budget is debated, many of the issues in the budget are voted down by the GLA but, when it gets to the budget decision, that decision is lost. That does not seem right and the Government need to seriously look at this again.

The amendment tabled by my noble friend Lady O’Neill of Bexley—I thank her for all her work in the London boroughs—would give us exactly the opportunity that we want in order to assess what currently works, what does not work and where genuine reform, rooted in efficiency, transparency and local empowerment, might be needed.

I suggest that the Government are not listening to what we are saying. It seemed to me that, at different levels, there was pretty much cross-party agreement. I believe that they must explain with much more clarity why Clause 15 is necessary without some sort of review of London, who it benefits and what problems it seeks to solve. We all want a London that works for Londoners, for the people who come here to enjoy our wonderful capital city and for the economy that it feeds in this country.

I also believe that the Government’s arrangements for our city should be proportionate to those for the rest of the country. Further empowering an already powerful mayor without a real, robust rationale does not achieve that. I urge the Minister to reflect carefully between now and Report. In the meantime, I will withdraw my stand part notice but will be considering what we bring forward on Report.

Clause 15 agreed.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Gascoigne and Lord Fuller, for their amendments, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, for moving the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, on members of legislatures disqualified for being a mayor of a strategic authority, and for probing whether Clause 16 is needed.

It is not the job of this Committee to debate the Labour Party rulebook or decisions of its national executive committee. Your Lordships must trust me that they do not want that job. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for their interventions on that issue.

Clause 16 will prevent individuals being a Member of Parliament, or of the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and a mayor at the same time. This is an important clause for two reasons. First and most critically, the post of mayor is a vital role at the forefront of delivering change—whether that is economic growth, public services, planning for the strategic area, transport or many other issues—and its responsibilities will only increase with this Bill. The role must demand a person’s full attention as a full-time post, rather than being a part-time position done alongside another vital public service role.

Secondly, elected members and mayors have a duty to represent the constituents who elected them. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, raised the potential issue of having different constituencies. Fulfilling two different roles on behalf of different geographical areas could lead to conflicts of interest or undesirable trade-offs. This is absolutely not party political; it is common sense. Indeed, it is now the case that those mayors who are also police and crime commissioners—Andy Burnham and Tracy Brabin—cannot be Members of a UK legislature at the same time.

I know that this House operates on a slightly different basis, but when I joined it, I was still leader of my council. As a Minister you cannot do both jobs at the same time, but even before I was a Minister, I would not have dreamed of trying to do so. They are different jobs; both carry a heavy level of responsibility, and it was important to me to focus on one.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

Can the Minister clarify that what she just said about PCCs and Members of the legislature concerns the elected Members? We have to be very careful here; we are part of the legislature.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I apologise; I could have been clearer on that. The noble Baroness is quite right: it is the elected legislature. In view of my comments, I ask that noble Lords do not press their amendments.

Government Amendments 77, 80, 82, 85 and 90 will modify Clause 16 to introduce a grace period in which a mayor can hold office and simultaneously be a Member of a UK elected legislature without being disqualified. The period will be eight days. To answer the question from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, the eight days enables the Chiltern Hundreds process to happen—that is the period required for going from being an MP to being a mayor. To go from being a mayor to being an MP, it enables the mayor to put their affairs in order before they take up their post as an MP. In the event that a mayor is running to be a Member of a UK legislature, it will be eight days beginning on the day when they are elected to that legislature.

I will write to the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, as I do not know the answer to his question. It is important that Members are given reasonable time to get their affairs in order and to ensure their resignation from the respective legislature. These amendments address concerns raised in the other place about ensuring that an orderly transition can occur in the event that an MP is appointed as a mayor. Similarly, mayors running to be a Member of a UK legislature would otherwise be disqualified immediately on election. Introducing the grace period provides a period of transition for the outgoing mayor to get their affairs in order. I commend these government amendments to the Committee.

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Moved by

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook]

93: Clause 19, page 23, line 6, at end insert—
“(f) the progress of housebuilding as a consequence of devolution, including whether housing targets are being met and whether the right types of housing are being delivered to meet local needs,(g) the rate and distribution of economic growth in devolved areas, with particular reference to the impact of newly devolved powers,(h) any tax changes made within devolved areas under the powers conferred by this Act, including analysis of their fiscal impact and effect on local services, and(i) changes to the organisation, delivery, and funding of social care in devolved areas, including an assessment of outcomes for service users.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment expands the reporting requirements placed on the Secretary of State. It seeks to probe how the Government will assess the wider consequences of devolution, including the impact on housebuilding and whether local housing targets are being met; the effect of devolved powers on economic growth; the fiscal implications of tax changes introduced by devolved authorities; and the consequences of devolution for the delivery, funding, and outcomes of social care services.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, let me make it clear from the outset that, with Amendment 93, we are not asking for a new bureaucratic hurdle in yet another review, but a few additional report considerations. Amendment 93 in my name would expand the reporting requirements placed on the Secretary of State. It seeks to understand how the Government intend to assess the wider consequences of devolution, including: its impact on housebuilding and the delivery of housing targets; its effect on economic growth; the fiscal implications of tax changes introduced by devolved authorities; and the consequences for the organisation, funding and outcomes of social care services.

I will take each proposed new paragraph of this amendment in turn, beginning with paragraph (f). This asks the Secretary of State to consider the progress of housebuilding as a consequence of devolution, including whether housing targets are being met and whether the right types of housing are being delivered to meet local needs. We have consistently made it clear that we support new homes. The Conservative Party is pro development. However, we are equally clear that local voices must be taken along this journey and that local consent must remain front and centre. Only then can we ensure that the right homes are built in the right places, meeting the genuine needs of local communities. Devolution, if done well, has the potential to unlock more housing delivery. This amendment simply asks how we will measure progress against that ambition.

Proposed new paragraph (g) concerns the rate and distribution of economic growth in devolved areas, with particular reference to the impact of newly devolved powers. Devolution has long been argued as a means of restoring local growth. George Osborne, as Chancellor of the Exchequer between 2010 and 2016, was the principal architect of the metro mayor model, advancing it as the cornerstone of the northern powerhouse agenda. The argument was clear that empowering city regions with elected local leadership could help rebalance an economy overly concentrated in London, drawing on the well-established economic case for productivity growth in cities. This amendment simply asks how the Government intend to judge whether these devolved powers are, in practice, delivering that promise and whether growth is being spread more evenly across regions. I hope the Minister will agree that this is a sensible extension to the Minister’s report requirements.

Proposed new paragraph (h) relates to

“tax changes made within devolved areas under the powers conferred by this Act, including analysis of their fiscal impact and effect on local services”.

Tax policy shapes behaviour, incentives and market signals. Changes to local taxation will inevitably affect residents, businesses and the funding of public services. Local people have a right to understand how such decisions affect them and how the revenues raised are being translated into outcomes. How do the Government propose to analyse the behavioural and fiscal consequences of devolved tax decisions? What mechanisms will ensure transparency and accountability to Parliament, but mainly to local residents, for the impact of those choices on services?

Finally, proposed new paragraph (i) concerns changes to the organisation, delivery and funding of social care in devolved areas, including assessment of outcomes for service users. Social care is among the most vital and sensitive of the public services we provide. It also represents a substantial and growing call on public finances. Devolution may bring opportunities for innovation and better integration with local health services. However, it also carries the risk of variation in provision and outcomes. With this in mind, how will the Government ensure that devolved arrangements protect service users and maintain consistent standards of care? What measures will be used to assess whether outcomes are improving for those who rely on social care, rather than simply shifting responsibilities between tiers of government? This amendment reflects a desire to ensure that devolution works as intended, delivering growth, homes and better services while remaining transparent, accountable and focused on outcomes. I hope the Minister can provide reassurance on how the Government intend to monitor and report these important issues.

An extension of the reporting requirements in Clause 19 seems a sensible and proportionate addition. It does not seek to constrain Ministers or to prescribe outcomes, but rather to ensure that Parliament and the public can properly understand how these significant powers are being used in practice.

I anticipate that the Minister may say that such a requirement is unnecessary and that existing reporting mechanisms are sufficient. However, devolution should ultimately be judged against its ambitions. If we are serious about empowering local areas to deliver more homes, stronger growth and better public services, it follows that we must also be serious about measuring whether those ambitions are being met. Local people must be able to see the effects of devolution in their communities and Parliament must be able to hold both central and local government to account for the outcomes it produces. For those reasons, I hope the Government will reflect carefully on whether modest additional reporting could strengthen rather than hinder the success of this agenda. I beg to move.

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[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

There is a duty to provide that kind of governance in the Bill. All I am trying to say is that there are various kinds of capacity in the 10,000 parish councils and they are not all the same. We cannot approach them in the same way. We know some of them have problems. I come from a shire county in the north-east of England so I know the capacity of parish councils and town councils to do certain jobs. We are well aware of that, and it is something that we obviously want to try and improve, and work with these parish and town councils into the future.

Amendment 252 concerns the powers available to local and combined authorities to promote local economic growth through banking and credit provision. Banking regulation is of systemic national interest. Its implementation must be consistent in applying technical standards, ensuring financial stability and protecting taxpayers. As such, it remains important that banking regulation continues to be considered at the national level as a reserved matter. Local and community banking is already possible within the existing framework, and the UK has a strong record of enabling new entrants to support access to finance. Mutuals, including building societies and credit unions, play a key role in supporting local economic growth. The Government are committed to doubling the size of the mutuals sector, with reforms already under way to help mutuals grow and raise capital. Further, through our financial inclusion strategy, the Government are improving access to affordable credit and strengthening community finance partnerships to support people and local economies. As such, the objectives of the proposed review are already addressed by existing initiatives, and I ask noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 93 in my name is about understanding whether devolution is delivering what it promises, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, for his support. The Bill places significant powers in the hands of devolved authorities, which is welcome, but with these powers must come clear and transparent assessment of their impact, not only on governance structures but on outcomes that matter to people’s daily lives.

The amendment seeks to expand the Secretary of State’s reporting requirements to cover four key areas, as I have said: housebuilding, economic growth, fiscal change and social care. These are central tests of success. Are housing targets being met? Are the right homes being delivered in the right places? Is devolution driving growth, et cetera? These are not unreasonable questions; they are essential if Parliament is to judge whether devolution is improving outcomes or delivering value for money and reducing inequalities between different places across our country.

This amendment would not prescribe policy but simply ask the Government to measure, report and be transparent about the consequences of their choice. I have listened to the Minister’s response, but he will not be surprised that I am disappointed. I do not think that using the existing reporting system will necessarily cover things and give us answers on whether these very major changes to local government are a success or whether they need some change. We need to look at this further before Report.

I have not done as much work as I should on parish and town councils, because I know that they will come up in future groupings. However, the one thing that came out of this debate for me, and from one or two of the Government’s responses on different groupings, is that town and parish councils are enshrined in legislation; they have rules. I cannot see anything further in this Bill that would put another type of very local responsible organisation in primary legislation. I would be very worried if there were. These neighbourhood arrangements are not going to be legislative arrangements; they will just be local groupings.

I have seen a lot of how this works in Wiltshire. When we went unitary, we were totally parished; we set up the city of Salisbury as a parish council. However, we also had area boards, which were within our council’s gift. They were where local councillors, police and fire representatives and local council officers got together to discuss local issues. Those boards had small budgets as well. They are very different things, however. I would also suggest that parish councils would work in cities and towns—they do work in some. They work very well in neighbourhoods and, in new developments where there are a large number of houses, they can work, but they want the support of government to work, and some small changes in government policy to make them work. I am not sure that having a parallel neighbourhood arrangement is the correct way to go.

The detail of that is for another debate before this Bill finishes Committee. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment and, as I said, we will consider this further and possibly bring something back on Report.

Amendment 93 withdrawn.

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[Lord Mawson (CB)]

My Lords, I support this amendment because it opens up some interesting thoughts. Some years ago, I worked in east London on what had been for many years a dysfunctional housing estate in Tower Hamlets. As some noble Lords will know, Tower Hamlets has, over many years, experienced the dysfunction of local government and services. My work began in a place where nothing was working properly and a small group of us in a local church decided we wanted to be practical and do something about it. We have gained competence in delivering projects, having delivered 1,000 projects over the years. With local residents, we have built our own housing company, which now has 10,000 properties, owns 34% of the land in Poplar and has about a £2 billion regeneration programme in play. But it did not start like that; it started very small, in a housing estate, where, behind our buildings, there was a local authority park where children were injecting on a night.

At that point, we must have worked through 14 Governments but then the Liberals—not the Liberal Democrats—were running the local authority, and they began to realise that, as a local community group and charity, we had competence in delivering things when so much did not seem to work. All the policies and everything were in place, but things did not work. They started to have a conversation with us—our first small project—about whether we would like to run the local park behind our buildings where children were injecting at night. What happened to us at the other end of the telescope was that we spent six months with the chief executive of the local authority putting together a proper plan, in great detail, for the management of that park, getting to know each other and building relationships, and we got it to a place where we were ready to start.

There was then a council election. At that point, the Liberals had created seven neighbourhoods. They lost the election; the Labour Party won, and it then created seven committees. All the work we had been doing for quite some time was completely lost. It was not the Labour Party’s or anyone else’s fault but, for those of us trying to do something about that park, it was another example of local structures and processes creating massive dysfunction for local people. The terms “community reality” and “place-based knowledge” really matter, and we should not just assume that councillors and others have all the knowledge of such realities.

I have one thought for the Government. There is a real opportunity in this legislation, and I am pleased that they are thinking about this; I am encouraging the process. I gave the officials a document we wrote for Demos during the previous Labour Administration about our work in east London, called Communities in Business. I have had no reply from any of the civil servants about it, but it sets out in some detail some of the work we have done and the thinking behind it. We are not the only people doing this. I now operate across the country and there are other really interesting examples that are led not by councillors or parish councils but by groups of people who come together, put a business logic behind something and deliver a very different kind of culture.

This amendment, and the discussion we had earlier, opens up the opportunity to start to think differently about this stuff and what community empowerment might really mean. Of course it needs to involve government and councillors, but I suggest that it is not just about them; it is about the people in these real places who are often grappling with the machinery of the state, certainly in places such as Tower Hamlets, which has not worked for many years.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Janke, for her Amendment 95A, which is modest but important. It does not seek to block devolution or slow it down unnecessarily. Instead, it asks for two simple safeguards when new strategic authorities are created or altered: transparency and consent. The amendment seeks to strengthen rather than weaken the devolution framework in the Bill and attempt to ensure that strategic authorities are rooted in local identity, coherent service delivery and democratic agreement. For those reasons, I hope the Government will give it serious consideration.

[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Janke, for her amendment and noble Lords for their contributions to the debate. This amendment concerns the powers in this Bill for the Secretary of State to direct the establishment or expansion of a combined authority and to designate single foundational strategic authorities and established mayoral strategic authorities.

The amendment would require the publication of a statement assessing the impact on community identity and public service boundaries when these powers are used, as well as requiring consent from the affected area. I am pleased to say that the Bill already contains safeguards to address these issues. For example, before conferring functions on a single foundational strategic authority or unitary authority, the Secretary of State must consider the effective exercise of functions for a local area. In addition, local consent is required prior to designation as a single foundational strategic authority.

The Secretary of State may designate an established mayoral strategic authority only if the authority submits a written proposal asking to be so designated. The authority’s consent is an inherent part of the process, as no authority can be designated unless it actively applies. Also, the criteria outlined in the English devolution White Paper are clear about the eligibility requirements for a mayoral strategic authority seeking to be designated as established. These criteria are designed to ensure the effective exercise of functions across a local area.

Finally, on the establishment or expansion of combined authorities, the Government have been clear that it is our strong preference and practice to work in partnership with local areas to develop proposals for devolution that carry the broad support of local leaders and the local area. The power to direct the establishment or expansion of a combined authority would only ever be used as a last resort where a local area has not brought forward its own viable proposal. This will ensure that all areas across England are able to benefit from devolution and that no area is left behind.

On the establishment or expansion of combined authorities more generally, the Bill already includes the necessary safeguards, including a statutory test to ensure effective and convenient local government across the areas of competence. Furthermore, where the geographical expansion of a combined authority area could affect the exercise of its functions, the Secretary of State must consider this before making an order to expand the authority.

I hope that, with this response, the noble Baroness is able to withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I would like to give an alternative view from that of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, on Amendment 241C. First, though, I say this to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam: I spent 10 and a half years representing Great Bentley in the European Parliament—not all of its residents, but the greater group in the area—and it was a great privilege to represent that part of Essex.

I pay tribute to the work of the North York Moors National Park Authority. Let me say a word about how dramatic its work has been, with the wildfires last summer and the potential prosect of further wildfires ahead. It has done a sterling job. Obviously, at one stage, it looked as though livelihoods and livestock might be imperilled and lost with the wildfire at Fylingdales, which was in my constituency for the last five years of my time in the other place; it came perilously close to many farms. I pay tribute to the work that the authority did.

I apologise that I did not realise that I should have spoken before the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, in order to understand more about the background to what he is seeking to do. I would like just to place on the record that, to my certain knowledge, the powers that the North York Moors National Park Authority already has—as well as the powers under the Bill—are received very warmly. It is already working quite hard, I think, and devoting a large amount of time to consulting as widely as it possibly can. I am slightly concerned that Amendment 241C could introduce an extra burden that it would be very hard pressed to meet.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, we on these Benches welcome Amendment 97 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, to whom I am grateful.

Parish councils are the most local level of government. They were based on one of the most ancient forms of local administration in England, namely the parish system, which is still rightly maintained by the established Church of this country. Any Bill that wants to reflect the movement towards localism and protect local geographical identity must, in our opinion, have provisions to empower parishes. Parish councils are often the best places to truly understand local views on issues that face local people, providing insights on planning and enhancing both community well-being and quality of life, with the protection of things such as green spaces, playing fields and allotments. They can pay attention to the little things that matter but from which larger bodies are too distant—or in which they are disinterested.

The National Association of Local Councils, of which I am a vice-president, has highlighted that town and parish councils raise more than £900 million in precepts each year and invest more than £2 billion in communities. I thank all of the approximately 10,000 of these councils in England for the volunteering that they do, their time and their energy; indeed, they put some 14 million hours a year into serving their communities. They deserve more of a place in this Bill. Can the Minister explain, therefore, why the Government are not protecting and strengthening such councils’ roles in this Bill?

On Amendment 241C, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for raising this issue. Clearly, there is a problem, in that some communities that border or surround the national parks have less of a say because they are currently not consulted on matters that affect them. However, I remain somewhat hesitant about how this amendment might work in practice. I will talk to the noble Lord because I would like some further clarification on, for example, how a consultation taking place for the communities in the Peak District might have to involve, say, the city of Sheffield. How large or close would a community have to be in order to be consulted, in other words?

In addition, we would also like to understand, as my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering mentioned, the implications on any authority’s resources and capacity. I am interested in the views of the Minister on that amendment as well. We strongly support giving local people more of a voice, which is what this Bill says it should be doing. But we strongly believe in the role of town and parish councils as a way to get really local voices into local services delivery. I urge the Government to look further at the role of town and parish councils in the new local government model for this country.