Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Monday 20th October 2025 Commons Chamber

We are seeing another page in the dramatic history of the Indian ocean. Surely we should recognise the human rights of the people who were so disgracefully treated by Britain—and by the United States, but principally by Britain. They, at last, will see some degree of justice and the ability to return to their islands. I hope, when the Minister replies, that he will be able to give me some hope and comfort on the question of access to Diego Garcia, and also explain why it is necessary to have these incredibly long leases for the US to continue its operations on Diego Garcia. It seems to me that we should be working towards the Indian ocean being an ocean of peace, not an ocean of conflict between rival powers.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

For no apparent reason, and in a crowded field, the Government have chosen the Chagos islands as one of the many hills they wish to die on. The surrender of the sovereignty of the Chagos islands has been a puzzling mis-step for months, with today’s votes the culmination of it.

There was a clumsy rush to try to force the deal through, first before the elections in Mauritius and then before the US elections, and there now appears to be an attempt to salvage some dignity, having seemingly surrendered

“meekly to a Mauritian shakedown”,

as my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) has put it, while trying to upsell the deal to a US Government that publicly backs it, given that it will not cost them a penny, but privately must have concerns over the impact of allowing Chinese encroachment in the region. With recent developments shifting the focus of US foreign policy to the Indo-Pacific, the Chagos islands deal surely takes on greater significance. The base is now more important to US policy, not less.

Last December, the previous Armed Forces Minister, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), who is in his place, announced that the deal

“secures the future of the UK-US base on Diego Garcia”,

and said that

“when everyone looks at the detail of the deal, they will back it”.—[Official Report, 2 December 2024; Vol. 758, c. 28.]

Indeed, the Minister for the Overseas Territories, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) confirmed to me that

“There has been no change to the substance of the deal”.—[Official Report, 5 February 2025; Vol. 761, c. 764.]

That is strange, because the new Prime Minister of Mauritius, Navin Ramgoolam, described the deal struck with the previous Mauritian Government as a “sell-out”, stating that the deal should be indexed to inflation, take exchange rates into account and fully recognise Mauritius’s ownership of the islands, which could affect the UK’s unilateral right to renew the lease. That was in mid-January. Less than a fortnight later, the Minister confirmed to me in a written answer that the UK would not have the unilateral ability to extend the agreement at the end of the lease. What changes were made to the original deal during discussions with the Government of Mauritius, and why have the Government gone on record as saying that the deal has not changed, in direct contradiction with the statements of the Prime Minister of Mauritius? Surely the Minister for the Overseas Territories is not suggesting that Prime Minister Ramgoolam is mistaken.

In January, when I asked the Prime Minister whether he had ever discussed the Chagos islands with Philippe Sands KC, his answer was a brusque, “No.” Brevity is key when trying not to give too much away. Philippe Sands has represented Mauritius at the International Court of Justice in multiple disputes over the Chagos islands. In 2022, Mr Sands published “The Last Colony: A Tale of Exile, Justice and Britain’s Colonial Legacy” about Chagos. It is worth highlighting that Philippe Sands and the Prime Minister have apparently been very good friends for several years; they even interviewed one another at the Hay festival.

Earlier this year, The Telegraph reported that the national security justification for surrendering the Chagos islands used by the Prime Minister came from Philippe Sands, who wrote about it in the 2023 book, “The International Legal Order in the 21st Century”. With Mr Sands apparently no longer representing Mauritius following the change in regime, it does make one wonder if that was the reason why there was such a rush to conclude the deal before the election, after which Mr Sands’ services were no longer required—did the Government lose their in?

I would be interested to know how the Government think the International Telecommunication Union would block our use of the electromagnetic spectrum. How would it block communications equipment on Diego Garcia without encroaching on our territory? What active blocking of electromagnetic frequencies is a UN agency capable of doing anyway? What steps would the ITU have taken to block the US military’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum had we not progressed this deal? The national security argument simply does not stack up.

New clause 6 would require the Secretary of State to report annually to Parliament on the impact of UNCLOS on the operation of the treaty. The Government have previously stated that it is ITLOS that would pose the greatest threat to the operation of Diego Garcia. It was cited specifically by the Defence Secretary for the first—and only—time on 22 May, when he said:

“There are a range of international legal challenges and rulings against us. The most proximate, and the most potentially serious, is the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.”—[Official Report, 22 May 2025; Vol. 767, c. 1291.]

In July, the Minister for the Overseas Territories referred to ITLOS for the first time since he was a shadow Minister for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, when, in December 2022, he had stated that the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

“did not have competence on territorial disputes”,

going on to say:

“It is a fact that China has made increasing encroachments into the territorial waters of its neighbours and vast claims in the South China sea while ignoring judgments against itself. That has been matched by a growing assertiveness, and even belligerence, towards some of our allies and partners in the region”.—[Official Report, 7 December 2022; Vol. 724, c. 162WH.]

He asked for assurances then. Now, nearly three years later, with a belligerent China flexing its naval muscle in the region and adopting a robust posture towards us over the delay to the decision on its London embassy and the obvious ongoing spy debacle, what assurances can the Government give the Committee that this opportunity will not be exploited by the Chinese Communist party?

As recently as August, the Mauritian Government referred to

“The strategic role of Mauritius as an investment gateway to Africa and a trusted partner for Chinese enterprises seeking to expand their footprint therein”.

Mauritius is committed to working closely with China—far closer, it would appear, than it is to working with us. Why are the Government prepared to embolden Chinese ambition in the Pacific? Why are they prepared to embolden Chinese spying in Parliament? Why are they prepared to allow the Chinese to build an embassy in London without absolute clarity on its structural plans? With all that in mind, why will the Government not include China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme? The shadow of Jonathan Powell looms large over this deal, as it has over every aspect of the Government’s dealings with the Chinese Communist party.

Across the globe, we are seeing changes in the rules-based order. We must navigate this better. My fear, which is shared by all on the Conservative Benches, is that this capitulation shows no understanding of the changes we are facing. We need to ensure that this great nation stands up for safety, freedom and security across an increasingly dangerous world, and this opaque and furtive deal puts that at unacceptable risk.

[Sammy Wilson]

A deal of such implication, one would have thought, would have been hotly debated in this House, yet as has been pointed out, there has been no attempt to defend it by the Government. In fact, one could hardly call this a debate—it has all been one-sided. In a debate, people usually argue in favour of whatever the proposal happens to be and listen to and rebut the arguments from the other side. We have had no rebuttal from the other side—the Government—today, despite the fact that this is such an important deal.

For some people outside the House, this deal might seem to be an unimportant issue—where are the Chagos islands, and why do they matter? However, even if the attitude taken by Government Members is to say, “Our constituents are not all that interested in the issues around the Chagos islands,” there are issues with this deal that have been raised this evening that should concern them all.

Let us look at the issues, because they are addressed by the amendments. The first is human rights—the human rights of the people who were displaced in the 1960s and who are ignored in this deal. Their rights to self-determination and to decide where they live are being ignored, yet we are not getting any response from the Government—the party that talks about human rights all the time. They say that we cannot leave the European convention on human rights because human rights are so important, but they are ignoring the human rights of the people who are affected by this deal.