Peter Mandelson: Government Appointment

Carla Lockhart Excerpts

Tuesday 21st April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sir John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

This morning’s Foreign Affairs Committee session lasted for two-and-a-half hours. It was certainly one of the more remarkable sessions that I have attended, and I have been involved in a number of quite controversial Select Committee hearings over the years. It showed the Select Committee system at its best, and Members across the House worked together.

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger), a fellow member of the Committee who spoke earlier. I share his view that Sir Olly Robbins, who gave us evidence, put in an impressive performance. He is clearly angry at the way in which he is being treated; he has a distinguished career that has been brought to a premature end, and he is clearly very upset by that. In his evidence, he made some extraordinary revelations. He had given evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee in November last year, when, as the Chair of the Committee suggested in her introduction, we may have heard the truth and nothing but the truth, but probably not the whole truth.

This morning, we heard a lot more of the whole truth. What became absolutely clear, which had already been suggested in the previous hearing, was that No. 10 Downing Street was absolutely determined that Lord Mandelson should become the ambassador of his country to the United States. Sir Olly told us that his predecessor, Philip Barton, had strongly advised that that should not happen until after the developed vetting process had been completed. Despite that advice from the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, he was ignored—indeed, we are told that the Cabinet Office went on to suggest that developed vetting might not even be necessary.

This was not just a routine appointment, and it was not routine for two reasons. First, it was the appointment of probably the most important ambassadorial post that this country has. Secondly, and very unusually, it was a direct ministerial appointment. Most of the time, ambassadorial appointments are made from within the civil service, and people have already had the vetting procedure. This was somebody being brought in from the outside who had not been vetted and already had a track record of having had to resign from Government twice.

[Carla Lockhart (Upper Bann) (DUP)]

The role of Prime Minister is the highest honour in UK politics and demands sound judgment. The reality is that there was no sound judgment when the Prime Minister appointed Peter Mandelson—a disgraced individual who had two resignations and well-documented associations with a sex offender. What we are hearing from Members on the Labour Benches today is like hearing lambs to the slaughter. They are defending the indefensible, and the general public are hearing that and hearing how disgraced this place is by the decision of the Prime Minister to appoint Peter Mandelson.

[Sir John Whittingdale]

I completely agree with the hon. Lady. It is somehow being suggested by Labour Members that this was about people advising the Prime Minister—I think one speaker earlier said that the Prime Minister had been persuaded to appoint Peter Mandelson. Well, I worked for a Prime Minister, and she coined a phrase: “Advisers advise; Ministers decide.” In this case, as the hon. Lady says, it was the decision of the Prime Minister.

Sir Olly Robbins also pointed out that by the time he took up his position, he was essentially presented with a fait accompli. He set that out to us—he said that

“I took over as PUS on 20 January”,

and that due diligence had already been completed. We know that that process, which included an interview with Morgan McSweeney, had revealed the ongoing relationship between Lord Mandelson and Jeffrey Epstein, but that it was ignored. We were told that approval of the appointment had already been given by the King, it had been announced publicly to the press, and agrément had been given by the United States. Sir Olly Robbins made clear that agrément is not just a formality; it was a very significant development. Lord Mandelson had also been given access to the FCDO building and IT access, and finally, he was being granted access to highly classified briefings on a case-by-case basis. I asked Sir Olly Robbins whether, given that all that was already in place, it would damage our relationship with the United States of America if he were to have the appointment withdrawn. He replied very clearly, “Yes, it would.”

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Goole and Pocklington (David Davis) set out, we already had a very good ambassador in Washington, but Downing Street had nevertheless said to the US Administration that it wanted Lord Mandelson to be appointed, and the White House had given its agreement through the agrément procedure. For Sir Olly Robbins to then withdraw the appointment would have caused real damage to our foreign policy. One can argue that if Sir Olly Robbins were told that the UKSV process had resulted in a clear recommendation of denial, he might—or perhaps even should—still have done so, but he also told us this morning that he was not told that. We were told that he did not see the UKSV report, and that he did not even know that the report has a red box saying “deny” with a tick in it. He said that he had never seen those documents before, and that that would be normal, because access is very restricted for the reasons that the hon. Member for Halesowen set out.

All that Sir Olly Robbins was told was that there had been a leaning towards refusal, and that it was a borderline case. Whether or not that was an accurate reflection of what the report actually said is another matter, and we can perhaps debate at what stage, or how far, the message from Downing Street—“We want this person to be appointed”—had been transmitted, to try to make that appointment as possible as it was. However, we are told that after Sir Olly Robbins had arrived as permanent secretary, he was subjected to regular calls from No. 10 saying, “Get it done.” He also told us that the message was not, “Get it done subject to security clearance,” which in his view, it should have been. The press release announcing the appointment of Lord Mandelson did not say “subject to security clearance”—that was never mentioned. This was announced as a decision that had already been taken.

Why was the decision taken? That is a matter that is open to conjecture. There is a view among some Labour Members that it was somehow a reward for services given in getting the Prime Minister his job. The leader of the Liberal Democrats said that it might have been an attempt to cosy up to President Trump, although as my right hon. Friend the Member for Goole and Pocklington pointed out, our previous ambassador had done a really good job in representing this country to President Trump. We may never know, but what we do know is that the Prime Minister was absolutely determined that that appointment should be made.

Even after the appointment was made, when all of these things began to be revealed—in particular, the ongoing relationship between Lord Mandelson and Jeffrey Epstein, which the Prime Minister said he was unaware of the closeness of and he was very angry when he was told about—inquiries had already been made. Journalists had been ringing up No. 10 and saying, “We have been told that Lord Mandelson failed his security vetting,” and No. 10 put out a denial. With journalists calling up and asking, “Is it true that he did not pass the UKSV assessment, and it recommended denial of security vetting?” one would expect that before saying, “No, that’s complete rubbish,” No. 10 might actually begin to ask questions. People in No. 10 might say to the Prime Minister, “You should be aware that we’ve had an inquiry about this.” Apparently none of that happened, or if it did, it was simply swept under the carpet. The end result of this process is that for more than a year we had someone representing this country at the most senior level in America, which is our closest ally, who the security agencies had concluded was a security risk. We do not know the full extent of the damage that may have been done during that time.