Official Secrets Act

Chris Philp Excerpts

Monday 15th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Chris Philp (Croydon South) (Con)]

Let me start by thanking the Security Minister for the briefing and information he provided ahead of his statement. Let me also join him in paying tribute to the officers in our police force and in the security service. They work so hard and take personal risks to keep us safe.

Let us start with Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee’s assessment of China, published a year or two ago. It found that China had penetrated every sector of our economy. When the Security Minister a moment ago said that China merely posed a “challenge”, he was wrong I think to use that word. China poses a threat. It poses a threat because it participates and organises systemic espionage into our public institutions, including Parliament. It purloins intellectual property from universities and from companies, particularly in the technology sectors, and it routinely spies on the UK as a state. They also engage in transnational repression of Chinese citizens here, for instance running secret, undeclared police stations and putting bounties on the heads of individuals. The word “challenge” is not strong enough; the state of China poses a threat.

The Security Minister said that the Government would “robustly challenge China”, but let me gently point to some of the decisions that the Government have taken in practice. We saw a signal back at the G7 last year, when the Prime Minister was, I am afraid to say, obsequious in dealing with President Xi, appearing to prioritise economic links above security considerations. We have not seen any decision to place China in the enhanced tier of the FIRS scheme, although that regime has been in place for several months, and the Government seem to be viewing with favour the application for a new super-embassy in London, to which our allies, including America, are urging us not to consent and which many of our intelligence services say will be used as a base for espionage activities. So the Government’s record on China causes deep concern, but of equal concern is this specific case—and, Mr Speaker, you explained why that is of particular concern to Parliament, given that the alleged espionage activities touch directly on Parliament and the way in which Members of Parliament do their duty.

I have in front of me a briefing provided to the press by the Crown Prosecution Service, dated 26 April 2024, when these charges were first laid. That briefing states that one of the subjects was commissioned over a period exceeding a year, between December 2021 and February 2023, by a Chinese intelligence asset. There are 34 reports on what this note describes as “very specific topics”, some of which relate directly and personally to Members of Parliament. One of the deputy national security advisers told the Crown Prosecution Service that he assessed this information to be “directly or indirectly, useful” to the Chinese state, and said that it was

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”

Given the gravity of that assessment, it is astonishing that these charges have now been withdrawn. The Crown Prosecution Service clearly assessed these allegations, and the evidence, against the law—against the 1911 Act —in 2024, and found the test to have been met; so why today, more than a year later, have we suddenly been told that the test is no longer met? My question to the Security Minister is a simple one: given the gravity of the charges that I have just read out, what has changed between last year and this year? Why has a case that met the threshold and met the test in April 2024 all of a sudden been determined not to do so?

May I ask specifically whether anyone in the Government put any pressure on the Crown Prosecution Service in relation to this case? Did the Government co-operate fully with the police, the security services and the CPS in providing the information required, including information relating to the definition of “an enemy”? Can the Security Minister give the House those express assurances? I certainly share your concern, Mr Speaker, and, I am sure, the concern of many others, that what appears to be extremely serious espionage, assessed as such in the written disclosure that I read out—assessed by the deputy national security adviser as being prejudicial to our national interests—has all of a sudden, and with no explanation, been dropped, even though previously, just a year and a bit ago, it was assessed that this case did meet the threshold. The House and the country need to know what exactly has changed.

[Dan Jarvis]

Let me seek to address the shadow Home Secretary’s points. He raised the question of whether China constitutes a threat or not. I think I was very clear in the language that I used. As the right hon. Gentleman will know, and as the Government set out in the strategic defence review, China presents a “sophisticated and persistent challenge”. The reality is that, in government, there is an absolute requirement to co-operate with nations all around the world. When there are areas in which we need to challenge China, of course we will do so. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman and other Opposition Members will completely understand that when there are areas, in terms of economic co-operation, in which we need to work closely with China, of course we will do so, because it is absolutely in our national interest.

I referenced the comments of the previous Foreign Secretary, and the shadow Home Secretary might want to look back at what was said following the China audit. The previous Foreign Secretary was absolutely crystal clear: we will take a long-term, strategic approach to China that is rooted in the UK’s national interest. I understand why the shadow Home Secretary wants to boil down such a complex bilateral relationship into a single word, but the reality is that it is neither helpful nor sensible to do so.

The shadow Home Secretary will not be surprised to hear that I do not agree with his characterisations of what he described as the “signals” that this Government have sent to China. In truth, I will not take any lessons from him on that, not least because—I have said this to him previously—it was not so long ago that a Conservative Prime Minister took the leader of China to the pub. When it comes to signals, I am not sure that the shadow Home Secretary speaks with a huge amount of authority.

The shadow Home Secretary spoke about FIRS. He knows that the Government’s position is that no decision has been taken with regard to the enhanced tier and China, and any decision taken by the Government will be announced in the normal way. FIRS is a crucial tool, and I am proud that this Government have got on and implemented it as of 1 July.

The shadow Home Secretary specifically raised the issue of the embassy in London, as I am sure other hon. Members will. He will know that China’s application to build a new embassy in London is going through an independent planning process. A final decision on planning permission will be made in due course by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, but I can be absolutely clear, in relation to FIRS, the nature of the threat and the embassy, that national security has been, and will continue to be, a core priority for this Government throughout the process.

The shadow Home Secretary asked about the CPS decision. I know that he understands that he is asking me about decisions made by the CPS that are entirely independent of Government. This was an independent decision made by the CPS, and it is not for any Government Minister to speculate on the reasons behind it. As I have said—I have been crystal clear—the Government are extremely disappointed with the outcome in this case, and we remain extremely concerned about the espionage threat posed to the United Kingdom.