Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

David Rutley Excerpts

Tuesday 9th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[David Rutley (Macclesfield) (Con)]

I was not able to participate in the Public Bill Committee or the parliamentary commission, but I have followed their work from a distance. We must recognise the important progress that has been made over recent weeks and months.

I praise my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), Chairman of the Treasury Committee and of the parliamentary commission. He has taught me a lot during my time in Parliament. Tim Knox, the director of the Centre for Policy Studies, has said of my hon. Friend that

“he’s quite prepared to argue half the night over whether a comma should be a semi-colon—which is reflective of the seriousness with which he takes his work.”

My hon. Friend is prepared to do a lot more than that. He is prepared to debate and work tirelessly for months on end with colleagues on both sides of the House and with Ministers to move matters forward.

The huge progress that has been made in recent months on this important subject is also a credit to the Minister and his colleagues on the Front Bench. The Government’s response, which was published yesterday, moved the debate forward. On page 22, it summarises the failure that took place at HBOS. I worked at HBOS from 2005 to 2007 and saw at first hand the problems with the federal structure at the bank. I hasten to add that I worked in the general insurance side of the business, which was performing particularly well. It was clear that there was a problem with managing risk across the entire business. It was also clear from my interactions with the Financial Services Authority that it did not have a grip on the regulation of the smaller parts of the business or the business as a whole. It was clear that my business friends in Yorkshire who worked outside the bank recognised that the bank was involved in very racy deals. They kept asking me how the bank could support them. The FSA clearly was not paying sufficient attention to what was going on.

The Bill is vital. It is critical to bringing about the individual accountability that many of us want to see across our financial services sector, with the tough senior persons regime, reversing the burden of proof and criminal sanctions for reckless misconduct. All those steps are vital, as is the ring fence and the attempts to electrify it. They will bring about a meaningful distinction between what goes on in retail banks, which are vital for individuals and small businesses, and more risky investment banking. In my interaction with other banks, such as HBOS and Barclays, it was clear that they had very different cultures and needed to be brought under control. The ring fence will help to do that.

It is important to bring about enhanced competition. I helped to launch Asda’s introduction to financial services, and other retail brands have moved into financial services too. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Guy Opperman) said, we need new entrants. That will encourage greater competition and help us in our task of building trust in our financial services sector. It is good to see, in recommendation 4.22, that the Government will be initiating an independent study into the feasibility of the costs and benefits of full account portability. Bold, radical steps are required to move things forward and build the trust we want to see in our financial services sector. I commend the work of the parliamentary commission and the Government in taking these steps forward.

[John Mann (Bassetlaw) (Lab)]

A vast amount of hard work has been diligently done for such a puny and inadequate set of proposals. Where does it leave us, if we look at the big picture? There is a debate about the Government’s failure to electrify the ring fence, although as I recall, the financial crisis started with Northern Rock and Lehman Brothers, where the ring fence would have made no difference whatever. What are we trying to address?

We have two banks in state ownership that are still in crisis. Clearly, the Government have no idea what to do with RBS, from who is running it and the Government’s cack-handed handling of Mr Hester’s departure, to what its role should be. Should RBS exist? Should it be broken up? How should it be broken up? Can it be broken up? How could competition emanate from breaking it up? We hear the word competition all the time. I was a signatory to the extremely modest bank account portability amendment that, rightly, was tabled. The structure of banking, however, remains pretty much as was. There is significantly less competition than there was 10 years ago. Building societies have been consolidated and about a third have vanished.

Where is the international level? This was not a British crisis, but today, as a consequence of the British LIBOR scandal, we have lost out to New York, which has played its political hand far more astutely than the Government and has grabbed business from this country. Frankfurt and Paris will be lining up to do the same. We are dealing with international banks, and the Government’s insular look at what should be done, presuming that British solutions will add to British competition, is a misnomer. We face problems with transparency in the UK dependencies, which, unlike any other country, we can influence. They remain totally opaque, specifically in relation to banking and subsidiaries—there is nothing there. On international banking agreements, the Government are hiding even from the modest proposals emanating from Brussels, of all places. This is not going to solve our problems. Competition has not moved forward, and there is no evidence that it will. The Government have an aspiration, but no strategy, for competition, so we remain with none. The problem of oligarchies running investment banking worldwide has not changed either; it remains as was—a fundamental weakness in the banking stranglehold over the rest of the economy—and totally unaddressed.

The fundamental issue that some posed at the beginning will remain the Achilles heel of all politicians and whoever is in government in this country from now on: if there is a further banking crisis and individuals—known as voters—are in a panic over their savings, there is no politician in any Government who would not bail out those accounts. No Government, whatever their colour, whatever the economic situation, would survive grabbing the electorate’s savings.

Most fundamentally, we have failed to create a concept of tiered risk for consumers to give them a choice. It has worked before. The classic example is a simple one, but a real one: the premium bond. When the premium bond was introduced, people knew that it was totally guaranteed; they knew it was not the best way of investing, but they bought them because they were absolutely guaranteed. We do not do that with our savings now. We have not created the options that would let our constituents say, “We’ll put X amount in here, knowing we’ll get a lower return than elsewhere, because the Government will give an absolute guarantee. And we can put Y amount in a middle-risk option, where there are some guarantees to certain levels, and we’ll put Z amount into something with great returns, but explicitly no Government guarantee.”

Our failure to create those options has created a fundamental weakness. I would not even describe that as radical; I would call it a rather conservative, with a small c, and moderate proposal, giving choice, creating markets and trusting people. We have not done that. At some stage, a future Government—not this one or the next one, I hope, or one in our lifetime—will face the dilemma again and will be forced to bail out a bank. There is the danger, however, that it might come more suddenly than that.

[David Rutley]

Does the hon. Gentleman not recognise that there are options for fully guaranteed savings with National Savings & Investment as well as the £85,000 protection? There are those opportunities for people.

[John Mann]

I sit on the Treasury Select Committee; the hon. Gentleman served on it, so we have a modicum more information on these matters, as do other hon. Members, than our constituents. Nothing has changed for them, however. Fundamentally, there has been no segmentation of the market, which is why the new challenger banks are getting no further. Only a tiny, tiny proportion of business is going to them. We have not restructured, even though in RBS and Lloyds TSB we have the perfect opportunity, owing to the crisis, to restructure. Across the world, we see vast numbers of people suffering and Governments of every political persuasion being voted out because of the financial crisis and the decisions they have made. This Government might face the same dilemma. I am not commenting on whether the decisions on the deficit and debt are right or wrong economically, politically or socially—that is a critical debate, but it is a different debate—but the fact that we are in this situation and we are not addressing it for the future in anything but the most micro-management way is part of that weakness.

The Government might want to give themselves plaudits and say, “Well, perhaps we’re doing a little better than the Government of Greece or Spain,” or whichever Government it is. The Americans can slap themselves on the back and say, “Unlike the Brits, we’ve got our act together. We’ve targeted their banks. We’ve portrayed them as the wrongdoers. We’ve managed to shift some of the powers to ourselves,” which is precisely what is going on among the political, banking and business classes in Washington and New York. They are winning that battle.

I will end on this point. This is a world crisis. My research document proves that every one of the top 50 banks in the world, without exception, have been involved in criminality in recent times. That is staggering for any industry. For us to hold that industry together with sticking tape, not even with the most damaged and shattered elements, including those that have had to be nationalised, such as Lloyds TSB—