Afghanistan and Pakistan

Debate between Denis MacShane and Thomas Docherty

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr MacShane]

Well, it is nice to have a true Scot here, rather than a nationalist.

I do not know of any recorded moment when any British general giving evidence to any parliamentary or public inquiry has admitted he got things wrong. It is in their contract that generals are always right. If they are let down, it is the fault of the politicians. Before the election we were told continually by Labour Members that it was the Prime Minister’s fault for not providing enough Chinook helicopters and reinforcements, and that Ministers were responsible for the fact that we were not succeeding in Afghanistan. It is a tribute to my colleagues on the Front Bench that they have not adopted those rather shoddy tactics—as some might have been tempted to do—in respect of the handling of the conflict since May last year.

[Thomas Docherty]

As a member of the Defence Committee and the Member for Dunfermline and West Fife, I can tell my right hon. Friend that when the Chief of the Defence Staff and Chief of the General Staff appeared before the Defence Committee, they did put their hands up and say mistakes had been made when going into Helmand. Perhaps that was the first time that that happened, but the Army has admitted it made mistakes.

[Mr MacShane]

I am glad to hear it, but frankly—I do not want to quote Bismarck and the Balkans and Pomeranian grenadiers—I weep every Wednesday when the poor Prime Minister has to come to the Dispatch Box and yet again read out the name, or perhaps names, of a dead British soldier, and for what? I cannot find an answer to that question.

To give the Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman, the hon. Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway), and his colleagues their due, they admit that, because one of their report’s key conclusions, on page 83, is that

“at a strategic level, we seriously question whether the efforts expended…have a direct connection to the UK’s core objective, namely the national security of the UK”.

That is absolutely right; the Select Committee Chairman has summed it up there—it is written down. It is a Foreign Affairs Committee conclusion, and it should be at the forefront of all of our discussions on Afghanistan. There is no longer any connection between UK national security and our men going out on patrol and being shot dead by the Taliban.

The Select Committee’s excellent and thorough report contains an account of a fine passage of questioning, which resulted in a most extraordinary confession by the Foreign Secretary. Committee members were trying to find out who is actually taking decisions on Afghanistan, and specifically in this instance the announcement to withdraw—or retreat—by 2015. Please can we avoid the absurd new euphemism of “draw-down”? It is a retreat and a withdrawal; that is what it is, so let us revert to plain English. The Foreign Secretary said that that decision was taken collectively in the National Security Council. My right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) asked whether the Defence Secretary had been consulted, and the Foreign Secretary replied:

“I am sure the Defence Secretary was consulted, but I cannot tell you when everybody was consulted. You would have to ask the Prime Minister.”

The Committee Chairman asked whether the Foreign Secretary could confirm

“that the decision wasn’t actually made in the Council.”

The Foreign Secretary said:

“It wasn’t a formal item in the National Security Council.”

This gives a fascinating insight into the mechanism of government. Where was the decision taken—by whom and how? We know it was no longer taken on a sofa, but we are none the wiser—[Interruption.] I have not been invited to No. 10 so I cannot check whether the sofa has gone. We do not know who took the decision and on what terms.

I would argue that we should be getting out a lot faster. Canada is out, the Netherlands is out, and Belgium is pulling out half of its men. The presence of international security assistance force-NATO allies in Afghanistan is now getting thinner and thinner, and, yes, it will be a withdrawal. No general wants to be the one who folds up the flag, climbs the ladder to the top of the embassy building and climbs in a helicopter and leaves, but stopping a war is, perhaps, as great a military art as starting one.

It would be fascinating to look at the official record of the Russian Duma for the 1980s, when the Russians were convinced that they were bringing a civilising mission to Afghanistan, to see whether debates such as this one were taking place. Then, of course, they faced the external foe of the Mujaheddin paid for by President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. There has been little reference to the fact that the Mujaheddin of the 1980s was a product of western foreign policy. We have heard in the past couple of days that Mr Reagan won the cold war, and part of that winning presumably included the driving of the Soviet Union and its troops out of Afghanistan. If that was the case, every Russian would wish that Mr Reagan had won it a lot earlier; they perhaps believe that the red army should never have gone into Afghanistan. However, the money sent by the west to create the Mujaheddin sowed dragons’ teeth that turned into dragons on 9/11 and 7/7, and it would be good if the people examining the history of that era had the honesty to say so.