Oral Answers to Questions

Derek Twigg Excerpts

Monday 13th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

The 2% commitment enables us to reconfirm the additional £1.8 billion for the reserves. All reservists today are routinely supplied with the same uniform and personal equipment as their regular counterparts, and last year we were able to bring forward earlier than expected £45 million of investment for dismounted close combat equipment. I am afraid that it is above my pay grade to answer my hon. Friend’s question about drones.

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

The Prime Minister has said today that he wants an increase in the number of special forces. Given our armed forces’ greater reliance on reservists, what are the Minister and the Government doing to ensure that we still have a good pool from which to pick our special forces?

[Mr Brazier]

As a former Defence Minister, the hon. Gentleman will know that Ministers of the Crown never talk about special forces in the Chamber. On his wider point about the size of the pool in the armed forces as a whole, our commitment, as shown most recently by the 2% announcement, is to outstanding armed forces in quality and equipment.

Britain and International Security

Derek Twigg Excerpts

Thursday 2nd July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It has been touching to receive so many messages of congratulations on my becoming Chair of the Defence Committee. It is a great responsibility and I will endeavour to live up to it. I pay tribute to the work of my predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), for the reports he produced in short order, some of which were slightly overshadowed by the advent of the election campaign and deserve further scrutiny. There was a lot of very interesting material in them.

If I may, I will begin by addressing the excellent interventions made by the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire (Ms Ahmed-Sheikh) and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray) relating to questions of terminology. In that connection, I pay tribute in his absence to my hon. Friend the Member for Gillingham and Rainham (Rehman Chishti) for his achievement. He attracted support from every part of the House—he gathered 125 right hon. and hon. Members’ signatures—and petitioned the BBC to stop playing the propaganda game of Daesh and to describe it correctly.

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

I am a former member of the Defence Committee. The right hon. Gentleman will recall a report from back in January that mentions the word “Daesh”. The Committee was ahead of its time.

[Dr Lewis]

I hope to be able to continue that degree of far-sightedness in future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

I intend to devote most of the time available to me to the situation in the middle east, but first I shall say a little about the general issue of defence expenditure. I strongly believe that our starting point should be what is in the best interests of our security and of the country. We should start with that and proceed from there, rather than the other way around.

A starting point of 2% is one thing, but I do not think that it is enough, and the Chair of the Defence Committee and others have said the same today. We must, for instance, retain and upgrade our nuclear deterrent. It is a dangerous world and we face many dangerous threats, including future threats we do not know about yet. It would be dangerous to let our expenditure fall below that level and not increase it. The SDSR and CSR will be very important in indicating which way the Government are going. Our first and foremost aim is to protect our country, and we must ensure we have enough resources for our armed forces—although this is also, of course, about diplomatic solutions, the Foreign Office and international development and integrating them better.

I want to concentrate on the middle east. It has been said that if we have air strikes on Iraq, we should by logic also have them on Syria, as Daesh moves across the border and has many people based in Syria. We must ask a number of questions before agreeing to that. I have real doubts about whether we have a proper, thought-through strategy for dealing with Daesh.

Those who are radicalised and recruited by Daesh see it as winning at the moment. They see it as being very successful—undefeated in the true sense—and that acts as a recruiting sergeant. Air strikes alone are not going to inflict serious damage on Daesh, and therefore will not be a solution on their own. There will have to be boots on the ground, and we will have to ponder where they will come from. It would be ideal if they came from Iraq and other middle east nations.

Last year the Defence Committee went to Jordan, which has an important role to play, and we should be giving it more support. We must develop a proper strategy and make sure the Arab nations are involved in putting boots on the ground to defeat Daesh.

We might need to put more resources on the ground ourselves, whether through special forces or specialist forces. We already support the Iraqi Government and the Kurds with training, but that is not enough. The question of whether the Kurds have enough arms to take on Daesh has been raised today.

Those of us who went on the Defence Committee trip to Iraq last year were struck by a number of things. There is still great concern among the Sunni community about their being kept out of the fight against Daesh and not being involved, and not being armed by the Iraqi Government. The Shi’a militias have driven Daesh out, but they have also caused death and destruction in their wake in other parts of Iraq.

We on the Select Committee trip met a large group of tribal leaders in Baghdad. They were crying out for Britain to support them, but they also wanted the Sunni tribes to be armed, to be able to defend themselves and take on Daesh. At present, Daesh is recruiting a lot of Sunnis, who see themselves as ostracised from the Iraqi nation and dominated by the Shi’a. This question has got to be answered.

What are we going to do about Libya? Camps are being set up there in the vast expanse of desert. Air strikes in Syria must be considered in the context of what we do in the rest of the middle east, because Daesh is already spreading its tentacles far and wide. There is a story by Mark Urban on the BBC website, which might feature on “Newsnight” tonight, about Daesh opening a front in Bosnia in the Balkans.

These are serious issues that the Government must address. We will need to know about their strategy to be able to decide whether it is the right one to take on Daesh and inflict serious damage, which is what we need to do. While it is seen to be winning—or at least holding its own—that will be a massive recruiting sergeant, encouraging a lot of people to join, having already been radicalised by it. We need to know what the Government’s strategy to deal with Daesh is. Air strikes into Syria alone will not be the answer. I want the Government to set out their strategy, along with our allies and others in the middle east, for defeating Daesh or at least pushing it back.

There are many threats facing us. We must have the armed forces, diplomatic services and intelligence on the ground to deal with them. We cannot do this on the cheap. The Government must think again about the resources they are putting into our armed forces.

Oral Answers to Questions

Derek Twigg Excerpts

Monday 8th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

I am always delighted to take a question from my right hon. Friend, whose illustrious grandfather was a long-serving member of the Territorial Army. He is quite right about the Royal Yeomanry’s achievements. I visited it twice in the past year, and in many ways it is a trailblazer. The key point that he makes about empowering units to do more to help themselves, including devolving some of the marketing budgets—something that we have begun to do—is very well taken.

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

What is the average age of recruits to the reserves?

[Mr Brazier]

I do not have the exact age of reservist recruits, but the current average of the Army Reserve is 37. If the hon. Gentleman is thinking of joining, I am sure we can put him in touch with somebody.

Falkland Islands Defence Review

Derek Twigg Excerpts

Tuesday 24th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I am grateful to the Chairman of the Defence Committee and I am particularly grateful to those two members of his Committee for undertaking that particular journey. It is not especially easy to visit the Falkland Islands at any time and it obviously involves a commitment of a number of days. We have, of course, reflected on the recommendations my hon. Friend set out in his letter to me.

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

I welcome the Secretary of State’s statement and his comments about the right to self-determination for the Falkland islanders. It is very important that we emphasise that. On the £180 million that will be spent, when will the refurbishment of the harbour start and finish?

[Michael Fallon]

The hon. Gentleman plays a key role on the all-party group on the Falkland Islands and I appreciate the welcome he has given to our findings. The overall programme of modernisation and improvements, which, as I have said, will cost £180 million, will take place over 10 years, but I will get back to the hon. Gentleman with the specific dates of the Mare harbour modernisation.

Defence Spending

Derek Twigg Excerpts

Thursday 12th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard) both for his service on the Defence Committee and for having set out very clearly the two central questions in the debate about defence spending: first, the focus on threat—what is the threat we face?—and secondly the fact that these threats are now concurrent.

The reason we need to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence is that the entire defence planning assumptions created in 1998 and in 2010—those in the national security strategy and strategic defence and security review, leading up to Future Force 2020—have been bypassed by events; they no longer hold. As the hon. Gentleman pointed out, the world has changed fundamentally, and those assumptions—this is why we cannot just tweak the NSS or be complacent about the SDSR—were essentially developed on two bases. The first was that the cold war had ended. The NSS stated again and again that the cold war had ended and that we needed to be much bolder about getting rid of cold war capacities.

The second assumption was that what we will be doing in the future is the same kind of things that were happening in 2010—primarily Afghanistan. Absolutely central to the SDSR was the idea that what we need is something called “enduring stabilisation operations”. That meant that we were planning to go into a single country—or, at most, in US planning, two countries at a time—for a very long time with a large number of troops. The concept was: Iraq and Afghanistan; 100,000 to 130,000 troops on the ground; Britain contributing 10,000 of those troops—or, in the latest Future Force 2020 structure, 6,600 troops. All our brigade structures were set up to sustain that. The idea was that we would have force structures to keep 6,600 troops on the ground for a decade.

The world has changed completely, however, and as the hon. Gentleman pointed out, it has changed in two ways. First, we have a return to a threat from a conventional state with an advanced military capacity—Russia. That is a major change: it reshapes the entire assumptions from 1998 to 2010. Secondly, as the hon. Gentleman also pointed out, we now have concurrent threats that are not just happening in one state at a time. General Sir Peter Wall pointed out that the basic assumption of the SDSR was for a benign security environment. We had come out of Afghanistan, and we assumed that there would not be anything looking like Afghanistan again very soon. Of course, if we look around the world, we see developments—I shall deal with them in greater detail later—in Yemen, Libya, Syria, to some extent in South Sudan and certainly in western Iraq and still in Afghanistan. We are seeing exactly the same threats, but they now happening in half a dozen countries at one time.

Let me deal briefly with this threat assumption. We need more defence spending because we need to deal with those two things: the conventional threat from Russia and the concurrent threats from all the fragile states that are currently harbouring Islamist groups, terrorist groups—groups that appear to threaten the west. Dealing with this requires imagination, new force structures and spending.

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

Is not part of the problem of dealing with these threats having a strategy in the first place? There has been an absence of a real strategy.

[Rory Stewart]

That is a fundamental point, so let me deal with it briefly. We need to work from the assumption of three things. First, we must agree that these things are threats. There is a huge debate within the civil service, where some people are beginning to say, “Perhaps failed states and terrorist groups are not really threats at all; perhaps everything we have done in Afghanistan and Iraq was mistaken, and we do not need to worry about what is happening in Libya, Iraq and Syria.” Secondly, we need to assume that Britain wants to do something and actually wishes to be a global power. There is another danger in this whole debate, with people in Whitehall saying, “Perhaps this is none of our business; perhaps these things are threats, but somebody else such as the United States will deal with those threats for us”—a freeloader problem. Thirdly and most importantly—this comes to the centre of the strategy—we need to believe that we have a doctrine that can deal with these things. We need to believe that we can deal with them and that we have the capability to engage.

I shall deal with resources needs separately. First, the threat posed by Russia’s recent actions requires serious imagination. We have had “reassurance measures”—the grisly jargon we produced in Wales, essentially to talk about setting up a high-readiness joint taskforce, about exercising in NATO at a divisional level and about air policing operations. Those things need to be resourced. It will be surprisingly difficult in practice to have that very high-readiness joint taskforce, with all its enablers in place and functioning, particularly when some of the framework nations are still insisting that they can take their forces out of that very high-readiness joint taskforce and deploy them somewhere else such as in the Central African Republic.

It is much more than that, however. This House will have heard that we need to invest. Here, however, the idea that flat real plus 1% is somehow going to be enough cannot be the case if we are serious about the threats. Let me run through some of the requirements. Maritime surveillance is an obvious one, so there is no point debating it here today. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capacity is another. Any Members present who were in the armed forces will remember training, walking around in NBC suits and thinking about how to deal with that kind of threat. All that capacity has gone out the window. We do not do that anymore, because we have been fighting for nearly 15 years against lightly-armed insurgents, and most of our planning was based on counter-insurgency warfare operations that did not require that kind of training.

Ballistic missile defence is a third requirement. If we are serious about taking on a country such as Russia, which has tactical nuclear weapons as part of its normal operational doctrine, we need ballistic missile defence. That will probably mean—I do not want to pre-empt procurement decisions made by the Ministry—finding some way of buying into an existing US system and persuading the US to locate it not just in continental Europe, but in the United Kingdom.

If we look at our Navy, we find that it is currently down to 19 frigates and destroyers. That is pretty radical. What we have heard in the other place from Lord Astor is that our attrition calculations are currently zero. That means that we function on the assumption that we are not going to lose any of these frigates or destroyers. Lord Astor said that we have not lost any of those things since the Falklands war, so we do not need to worry about that. Of course, the Falklands war was the last time that we were fighting a navy, so it does not provide a basis for making this sort of calculation if we are thinking about taking on Russia.

It is the same for the Royal Air Force. As we move down to just seven squadrons, our attrition calculations are again pretty close to zero. If we are serious about carriers, we need to realise that they cost a lot of money. If we are to put one carrier at sea, we need to think about how to resupply it and how to get the fuel and weapons to it. The fuel and weaponry supply vessels will be moving along at 9 knots, which poses a huge challenge to us. We need to work out where to get the money to buy the planes to put on that carrier. How can we have a comprehensive carrier strike capacity? We have not yet paid for it.

Then there is the Army. If we are thinking about manoeuvre warfare again, it amounts to a huge spending commitment. It means thinking about heavy armour and whether we want to relocate the Royal Air Force at an Army headquarters level rather than two levels up. It means wide water bridging capacity and all the things that any Members present who operated during the NATO era will be able to think of much better than me.

Then there is ambiguous warfare. If we are thinking about dealing with Russia, we are going to have to think about what to do on cyber, information operations, strategic communications; and we will need to think about whether we have the special forces capacity right the way around the edge of Russia to deal with the phenomenon of these “green men” in these insurgency operations. We need the knowledge of places such as Narva in Estonia.

That is the easy stuff. That is before we get on to the concurrent threats, mentioned by the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney. If we in this country take seriously the idea that we care about threats from failed states, terrorists and Islamist groups, we are going to have to think about northern Nigeria, Libya and Yemen, and we are going to have to think much more seriously about Syria and Iraq. We are going to have to think about continuing to support Afghanistan and, potentially, Pakistan, and if we do not do something about these places now as a coalition, it is just going to get worse. We will be reporting back to the House in two years’ time, and the Nigerian problem will have spread into Chad and Niger; the Libyan problem will have re-exploded back into Mali; Syria and Iraq will be destabilising Lebanon and Jordan even more profoundly than they are now.

Unfortunately, in dealing with these problems, we cannot base what we do on the Future Force 2020 structure. That was about the enduring stabilisation operations and heavy investment in counter-insurgency operations, with 100,000 people retained for a decade or more. That works if we have only one of these problems, but it simply does not work if we are dealing with a dozen of them at one time. So we need a much lighter, smarter approach to dealing with these countries. That will mean moving out of the world view of “one at a time” and not losing confidence. That is central; it cannot be about despair. It is about recognising that in Bosnia and Sierra Leone, we did these things quite well, but that if we are serious about them, we are going to have to upgrade our special forces and potentially look at—again, these are just ideas—type 2 special forces of the “green beret” type that they have in the United States. We may need to develop the idea of the Chief of the General Staff on defence engagement, but much more ambitiously, much more imaginatively and much more aggressively, including pre-posting officers into a dozen countries. We may be talking about 50 or 100 officers at a time, not about just one defence attaché covering three Baltic countries, and we may need to rethink the whole force structure that lies behind that.

I have run out of time, so let me say a few things in conclusion. I have sketched out a world which, as was made clear by the hon. Gentleman, is very different now. It is different in terms of the conventional threat, but—and this is something that we have only touched on so far—it is, above all, different in terms of the concurrent threats that are emerging from all the fragile states. We have not begun to think those through. We have not begun to consider the deep implications of the skills set, the force structures and the capacity that we would need in order to deal with those states simultaneously.

The 2% of GDP matters for several reasons. First, we can deal with these problems only as a coalition, because they are beyond the sort of problems that Britain can deal with on its own. The 2% matters because it is a way of raising the commitment of more than 20 NATO countries to matching that expenditure themselves. It is essential to keep the United States bound into the system, because it is currently spending 70% of the NATO money. The President, the chief of the United States army, and the United States ambassador to the United Nations have all made it clear that they view the 2% as a sign of seriousness and of Britain’s commitment to keep the United States involved. Above all, however, the 2% is needed because the threats are real. The world is genuinely becoming more dangerous, and Britain cannot be a freeloader.

One of the sad aspects of what I feel is happening is our growing obsession with kit. People stand up and list all the different bits of kit that we have bought, but they do not intend ever to use it. They are freeloading on the idea that Britain will never act alone, that the United States will somehow fill in all the gaps, and that therefore we do not need to be serious about what we are actually doing in countries such as Libya. The challenge to Ministers should be, “Explain how we are to deal with a situation like the one in Libya. Explain what we are going to do in Yemen and northern Nigeria. Explain how this kit will really prevent us from letting the Russians into Mariupol.” Do we care about those issues, or are we creating an isolationist world view?

That 2% of GDP will return confidence to the military. It is an increasing budget, so the military will have £1 billion a year more every year to finance imaginative ideas. They will be able to restructure our forces, invest in defence engagement rather than scrimping and saving around the edges, and give us back the confidence that we need as a nation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Hendrick]

I was not aware of that fact, but I totally concur with the idea of spending anything up to 5%. As I said, 2% should be considered the floor. I am very concerned that some of our NATO and European partners are not getting anywhere near that figure. How can it be argued that we should shut our doors to Europe and, at the same time, commit to working closer with European nations if we cannot work together to reach at least that 2% figure?

The recent report by the Royal United Services Institute says that the strength of our Army, Navy and Air Force could fall from 145,000 to 115,000 by 2020, which is a 26% decline. If we follow that trajectory, we could face a situation in which our armed forces numbers drop below 100,000. If we consider that Wembley stadium can accommodate 90,000 people, our entire armed forces might soon be able to fit into the stadium, which does not bear thinking about. There are also around 92,000 people currently in prison in Britain. We could well end up with more people incarcerated than in our armed forces.

This country has always had a powerful air force. We have always built and supplied the best military aircraft in the world, from the Harrier to the Typhoon. Yet air support today accounts for only £13.8 billion of our £162.9 billion defence budget, which is 8.8%. The numbers of RAF servicemen have been continually cut over the past few years. There are 8,810 fewer servicemen in the RAF in 2015 than there were in 2010, which is a decline of nearly 25%. That is despite the fact that limited military intervention via the deployment of aircraft for bombing campaigns has once again become the norm. We saw that in Libya and we now see it in Iraq where Tornadoes and Reaper drones have flown 374 missions and released 206 weapons against ISIL targets.

[Derek Twigg]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point about the continual use of the Air Force. That pressure on the Air Force coupled with the cuts that are taking place means that we will not be able to sustain that sort of use in the long term.

[Mark Hendrick]

That is the point I am making. As I have said, we may soon be in a position where all our defence forces will fit into a football stadium and where our prison population will outnumber our military personnel.

The technological edge that we have in military aerospace has created huge dividends for our economy and is an indispensable part of our economic infrastructure. That is particularly evident in my region in the north-west of England where BAE Systems employs around 15,000 people at sites in Lancashire, Cumbria and Cheshire. Some 10,000 people, including many of my constituents, make military jets at Samlesbury and Warton just outside Preston, which means a great deal for the local economy. BAE Systems currently trains 264 apprentices across those sites and young people are trained to use the high-technology equipment and to develop engineering skills that will secure them permanent jobs into the future.

To maintain our existing military air superiority, our priority is twofold: the upgrading of the existing Typhoon fleet and the purchasing of the F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighters. The upgrading of our Typhoon fleet has to be of the upmost importance. Our RAF pilots currently rely on our ageing fleet of Tornado GR4 bombers to conduct missions against ISIL positions in Iraq. That is because of delays to the RAF's upgrade programme for the Typhoon fleet, principally caused by the lack of funding available for the new equipment.

The next UK Government will decide the size of our new fleet of F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighters. So far, the Government have approved the purchase of 14 aircraft to provide the first operational squadron, plus four aircraft for testing and training. The current cost of their development is more than £5 billion and their completion is vital for our economy and the future of our security. The next Government must commit to offering clarity over the size of our F-35 fleet and a timetable for its completion.

There can be no doubt that the future security of Europe should be our main priority. Irrespective of whether we are in the EU, Britain will always be a European power and an internationally strong mid-league military power. The threats to European security are threats to Britain’s security. We must maintain our technological edge. Technological advancements and investment in skills not only have a direct spin off into other industries in our economy, but support thousands of independent small to medium-sized businesses in the supply chain.

The key to security for the future is our mastery of technology and our ability to stay one step ahead. We see that now with the development of unmanned aerial vehicles. We are leading the way with projects such as BAE Systems Taranis stealth attack drone, which is part of an Anglo-French project to develop unmanned capability by pooling technology from each nation’s work so far. In November 2014, a £120 million contract was awarded to six industry partners across the UK and France to invest in the development of future unmanned combat aerial vehicle technology.

A commitment from the next Government in the strategic defence spending review for the next generation of drones would reinvigorate our domestic aerospace industry. Without it, says one BAE senior executive, there will be no UK aerospace industry to speak of in the future. Our military aerospace industry is a source of jobs, skills and pride for many in this country. It is an area where, technologically, we are leading the way. I fear that, if our spending commitment falls below 2%, we could put many of these skills and jobs in jeopardy, not to mention our national security. Therefore, I strongly believe that the next Government, whichever colour they are, should commit to meeting that target and going beyond it. We cannot put too high a price on our security. Our security must come first.

Service Personnel (Ukraine)

Derek Twigg Excerpts

Wednesday 25th February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I do not think it is right for other countries to get involved in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. On the contrary, Russia should now be withdrawing its heavy weapons from eastern Ukraine and be putting pressure on the separatists to lay down their arms. On the location of the training, we are not putting combat troops anywhere near the front line. The training we have been providing to the peshmerga in northern Iraq has, as my hon. Friend says, been well away from the front line. We have trained more than 1,000 peshmerga as well as supplying them with machine guns and ammunition.

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

We know for a fact that the Russians are supplying lethal weapons to the rebels. NATO’s response has been pretty woeful, but may I ask a specific question about what the Secretary of State said? I am sure that he mentioned that he was considering what else can be done about further requests, so will he enlighten the House on what more might be being considered to be put in place in the future?

[Michael Fallon]

We have had a series of requests from the Ukrainian Government, including lists of equipment of all kinds. I do not want to give too many details, but we are looking at these shortfalls in their capacity and at what further training we might be able to provide in addition to the infantry training, logistics and medical and intelligence capacity-building training I described.

Al-Sweady Inquiry Report

Derek Twigg Excerpts

Wednesday 17th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

Obviously we should all support our armed forces, and I welcome what the Secretary of State said in his statement. We have very courageous, professional and decent armed forces who have to perform in some terrible and traumatic circumstances, and we have seen yet again that they are forces of whom we should all be proud. May I ask, however, whether the Secretary of State feels that improvements could be made in the chain of command to enable situations such as this to be dealt with properly in the first place, rather than developing to such an extent that an inquiry is necessary?

[Michael Fallon]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his opening remarks. He speaks with particular authority as a former defence Minister, and I will consider what he has said about the chain of command. As we heard from his right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), a number of interlocking issues were involved. There was the judicial review and the public inquiry, and so on. However, I think that we would all want to avoid putting members of our armed forces through this process, given the time and cost that were involved in exposing an allegation—the major allegation—that turned out to be completely untrue.

Corporal Stewart McLaughlin

Derek Twigg Excerpts

Tuesday 18th November 2014 Westminster Hall

[Dan Jarvis]

rose—

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Anna Soubry]

Quickly, but the hon. Gentleman must remember that I have a matter of minutes left, and I want to read out a letter.

[Derek Twigg]

I am not sure whether I have to declare an interest, but I am an honorary member of the South Atlantic Medal Association.

If the Minister believes an injustice has been done, will she say she believes an injustice has been done? Clearly, she has the power to do something about that. Let us take an example. The advice was very clear that the Bomber Command medal and the Arctic medal could not be awarded so long after the event. Why can the Minister not take action now to ensure that this wrong is put right and that this injustice is dealt with?

[Anna Soubry]

For the very same reasons that no Government of any colour over the last decades has changed the system: we recognise the danger. Actually, awards for gallantry and bravery are different from service medals, if I may say so. However, the issue is the passage of time; it is the 30 years. It is also the fact that there is that five-year gap during which exactly such representations can be made by comrades—by senior officers. In this case, that did not happen. Those who serve and who know about the system say that it is not right and that it would not be fair, given the long passage of time—

Reserve Recruitment

Derek Twigg Excerpts

Monday 17th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. It is a 60% increase over six months, and as the bulk of that occurred during the most recent quarter, it is almost a doubling in that period. He is absolutely right. It is a tremendous turnaround after years of decline under the previous Government.

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for reversing the daft proposal to close the TA centre in Widnes following my representations. Does he have any concerns about how Capita is working? For example, a constituent of mine has applied to join the regulars but has been given four separate dates verbally and has still not been able to join the Army. Is not the problem with Capita as well?

[Mr Brazier]

Will the hon. Gentleman, for whom I have the greatest respect, write to me so that I can look into that individual case? We have had a number of delays in the system. We are sorting those out, and the process is now working much faster for both regulars and reservists, but I would be grateful for a letter.

Oral Answers to Questions

Derek Twigg Excerpts

Monday 14th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

It is important to note that the failure of the Iraqi security forces was a failure of political coherence, not a failure in combat. Where they engaged in combat, they performed adequately. It was where they failed to engage at all that the problem arose. We expect to have far better situational awareness in Afghanistan, because of the continuing engagement through Operation Resolute Support in that country.

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

The Secretary of State will be aware of recent reports that areas such as Sangin, Now Zad and Musa Qala have fallen into the hands of the Taliban or the insurgents. Are those reports correct?

[Mr Hammond]

I think I said to the hon. Gentleman the other day that there has been combat in that area of northern Helmand and that the Taliban did take some ground from the Afghan national security forces. However, the ANSF rapidly regrouped, and almost without any support from the international security assistance force retook the towns in question. The ANSF are now in effective control of those towns on the ground. The Taliban attack has been defeated. That is not to say that the ANSF are not prepared for a further assault by the Taliban. This area of Helmand is by far the most kinetic in Afghanistan. It is a very dangerous area still, and it will be for the foreseeable future.