Crime and Policing Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Debate between Diana Johnson and Joe Robertson

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for setting out in detail the provisions for where crossbows are sold and the seller is not in the presence of the buyer. On providing identity documents and photographic evidence, is she concerned that the wording that she used is vague and that there is scope for providing false documents? Perhaps she could reassure me that, in some cases, copies would certified by a solicitor or someone of sufficient standing in the community—whatever the wording might be. I am concerned that false documents could be provided, but perhaps there is provision to stop that.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that point, and it is of concern to me as the Minister. We are introducing this new procedure because we think that the current legislation around buying and delivering is not strong enough. I take his point and I will reflect on it. It may be—I do need to think about it—that it would be onerous to have certified copies. We want to get this right, however, and ensure that accurate legal documents are used, so I will come back to that point.

I will return to the new clauses, so that the Committee is clear about what they will do. New clause 70 also provides for a new offence on the part of the courier or the person delivering on their behalf, equivalent to the new offence that I have described for the delivery of a knife. The courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier must provide the crossbow or parts of crossbows only into the hands of the actual buyer, and only at the address that the buyer provided at the outset. If the courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier fails to do that, they will commit a summary offence attracting a maximum penalty of an unlimited fine.

It will be a defence, however, for the courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier to show that they have checked an official identity document, and that the ID has the name of the person indicated by the seller, that it shows that the holder is over 18, and that as far as they can tell, the picture in the identity document is of the person at the doorstep. Where businesses hire out or let crossbows for corporate events or entertainment—something that I did not know happened, but apparently does—and do so online, the age-verification measures will apply to the hire and delivery of the crossbows where the hirer is an individual. New clause 71 also provides a power for the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance on the new offence under the Crossbows Act 1987.

Turning to the reportable sale of knives, new clause 68 introduces a requirement to report all sales of knives where they are made remotely, including online sales. That will help the police to tackle what is called the grey market—the resale of knives on social media. The police tell us that grey market sellers act irresponsibly. For example, they promote knives as weapons, which is unlawful, and they do not conduct age-verification checks. The new clause will give the police information that will enable them to act. Sellers who do not comply will be liable to a fine.

Sales are reportable where six knives or more, or two or more qualifying sets of knives such as a block of knives, or one or more qualifying set together with five or more knives, are sold remotely in one sale and are to be delivered to the same residential address in England or Wales. The reporting requirement is also triggered when multiple sales meeting those limits are made to the same person or the same residential address in England or Wales within a 30-day period.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Thank you, Mr Pritchard. I wanted to make it clear that the documents that are being talked about in relation to proving identity are passports and driving licences. I take the point that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised with me in his intervention, but those are the two documents that will be looked at and provided. We will want to make sure that this works, and in the future, other documents may well need to be added to that list. However, just to be clear, it is those two documents.

As I have also said, we would expect that a person who is delivering would look at those documents. I do not really want to get into how those documents can be forged, because that is obviously an issue that is on the hon. Gentleman’s mind, but at the moment those are the two documents, and we would expect them to be examined by a delivery driver or courier when the items are delivered.

[Joe Robertson]

I thank the Minister; that is helpful. Those documents are obviously very hard to forge, so I was not suggesting that they might be forged. My question was about was the possibility—I may simply be wrong here—of someone else presenting those documents. They are not forgeries; they are simply not the passport or driving licence of the buyer. Clearly, if the buyer has to be present when they present those documents to the person making the delivery, there is plainly not an issue, so I welcome that.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman is clear. As we have said, photographic identity has to be provided at the beginning of the process—at the point of sale—as well as the identity document, to ensure it matches up.

With that, I commend these measures to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 66 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 67

Delivery of knives etc

“(1) The Offensive Weapons Act 2019 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 39 insert—

‘39A Defences to offence under section 38: England and Wales

(1) It is a defence for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(2) of delivering a bladed product to residential premises to show that the delivery conditions were met.

(2) It is a defence for a person (“the seller”) charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(2) of arranging for the delivery of a bladed product to residential premises to show that—

(a) the arrangement required the person with whom it was made not to finally deliver the bladed product unless the delivery conditions were met, and

(b) the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the product would not be finally delivered unless the delivery conditions were met.

(3) It is a defence for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(3) to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid commission of the offence.

(4) The delivery conditions are that—

(a) the person (“P”) into whose hands the bladed product was finally delivered showed the person delivering it an identity document issued to P, and

(b) on the basis of that document a reasonable person would have been satisfied—

(i) that P was over 18, and

(ii) if the buyer was an individual, that P was the buyer.

(5) In subsection (4) “identity document” means—

(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;

(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));

(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38.’

(3) After section 40 insert—

‘40A Delivery of bladed products sold by UK seller to residential premises: England and Wales

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“the seller”) sells a bladed product to another person (“the buyer”),

(b) the seller and the buyer are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale and the seller is within the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale the seller entered into an arrangement with a person (“the courier”) by which the courier agreed to deliver bladed products for the seller,

(d) the courier was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of bladed products, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, the courier finally delivers the bladed product to residential premises in England or Wales.

(2) The courier commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the bladed product to residential premises in England and Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(3) A person finally delivering the bladed product to residential premises in England and Wales on behalf of the courier commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (2) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 39A(4)) were met.

(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 39A(4)) were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a bladed product.

(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(8) Section 39(2) to (5) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) and (e) as it applies for the purposes of section 39(1)(b) and (e).

(9) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under this section.’

(4) After section 42 insert—

‘42A Delivery of bladed articles sold by non-UK seller to premises: England and Wales

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“the seller”) sells a bladed article to another person (“the buyer”),

(b) the seller and the buyer are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale and the seller is outside the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale the seller entered into an arrangement with a person (“the courier”) by which the courier agreed to deliver bladed articles for the seller,

(d) the courier was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of bladed articles, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, the courier finally delivers the bladed article to premises in England or Wales.

(2) The courier commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the bladed article, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(3) A person finally delivering the bladed article on behalf of the courier commits an offence if, when they deliver the bladed article, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (2) to show that the delivery conditions were met.

(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a bladed article.

(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(8) Section 42(2) and (3) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) as it applies for the purposes of section 42(1)(b).

(9) In this section—

“bladed article” means an article to which section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies (as that section has effect in relation to England and Wales);

“delivery conditions” has the meaning given by section 39A(4), but reading the reference in that section to a bladed product as a reference to a bladed article.’

(5) In section 38(10) (offences) for “section” substitute “sections 39A and”.

(6) In section 39 (delivery of bladed products to persons under 18)—

(a) in the heading, at the end insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;

(b) in subsection (1)(e) after “premises” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(c) in subsection (7) omit paragraph (a).

(7) In section 40 (defences to delivery offences under sections 38 and 39)—

(a) in the heading, after “39” insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;

(b) in subsection (1) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(c) in subsection (2) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(d) in subsection (3) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(e) in subsection (4) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(f) in subsection (5) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(g) in subsection (6) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(h) in subsection (7), omit “England and Wales or”;

(i) in subsection (14), in the definition of “appropriate national authority” omit paragraph (a).

(8) In section 41 (meaning of “bladed product” in sections 38 to 40)—

(a) in the heading, for “40” substitute “40A”;

(b) in subsection (1) for “40” substitute “40A”;

(c) in subsection (2) for “40” substitute “40A”.

(9) In section 42 (delivery of knives etc pursuant to arrangement with seller outside UK)—

(a) in the heading, at the end insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;

(b) in subsection (1)(e), after “article” insert “to premises in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(c) in subsection (5) omit “England and Wales or”;

(d) omit subsection (10)(a);

(e) omit subsection (11)(a).

(10) In section 66(1)(j) (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc) for “42” substitute “42A”.

(11) In section 68 (regulations and orders)—

(a) in subsection (2) after “State” insert, “, except for regulations under section 39A(5)(d),”;

(b) after subsection (2) insert—

“(2A) A statutory instrument containing regulations under section 39A(5)(d) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes changes to the offences and defences relating to delivery of knives to premises in England and Wales following a remote sale.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 68

Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales

“(1) In the Criminal Justice Act 1988, after section 141C insert—

‘141D Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales

(1) A person (“the seller”) must, in accordance with requirements specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument, report to the person specified in the regulations any reportable sales the seller makes of bladed articles.

(2) A reportable sale of bladed articles occurs where the seller, in any of the ways set out in subsection (4), sells—

(a) six or more bladed articles, none of which form a qualifying set of bladed articles;

(b) two or more qualifying sets of bladed articles;

(c) one or more qualifying sets of bladed articles and five or more bladed articles that do not form a qualifying set.

(3) “Qualifying set of bladed articles” means three or more bladed articles packaged together for sale as a single item, where each bladed article is a different size or shape from the others.

(4) The ways are—

(a) in a single remote sale where the bladed articles are to be delivered to an address in England and Wales, or

(b) in two or more remote sales in any period of 30 days—

(i) to one person, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to one or more addresses in England and Wales, or

(ii) to two or more persons, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to the same residential premises in England and Wales.

(5) A sale of bladed articles is “remote” if the seller and the person to whom the bladed article is sold are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale.

(6) For the purposes of subsection (5) a person (“A”) is not in the presence of another person (“B”) at any time if—

(a) where A is an individual, A or a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time;

(b) where A is not an individual, a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time.

(7) A sale is not reportable if the person to whom the articles are sold (“the buyer”)—

(a) informs the seller that the buyer is carrying on a business, and

(b) is—

(i) registered for value added tax under the Value Added Tax Act 1994, or

(ii) registered as a company under the Companies Act 2006.

(8) A person who fails to comply with subsection (1) commits an offence.

(9) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (8) to show that the person took all reasonable precautions, and exercised all due diligence, to avoid commission of the offence.

(10) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(11) A person who commits an offence under subsection (8) is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(12) In this section—

“bladed article” means an article to which section 141A applies (as that section has effect in relation to England and Wales), other than a knife which does not have a sharp point and is designed for eating food;

“residential premises” means premises used for residential purposes (whether or not also used for other purposes).

(13) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under subsection (1) may in particular include requirements about—

(a) how reports are to be made,

(b) when reports to be made, and

(c) the information reports must include.

(14) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(15) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend—

(a) the number of bladed articles specified in subsection (2)(a);

(b) the number of qualifying sets specified in subsection (2)(b);

(c) the number of qualifying sets specified in subsection (2)(c);

(d) the number of bladed articles specified in subsection (2)(c);

(e) the period specified in subsection (4)(b).

(16) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (15) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.’

(2) In the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, in section 66(1) (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc) after paragraph (g) insert—

‘(ga) section 141D of that Act (duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales),’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause imposes a requirement on sellers of bladed articles to report bulk sales to a person specified in regulations.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 69

Remote sale and letting of crossbows

“(1) The Crossbows Act 1987 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 1 omit ‘unless he believes him to be eighteen years or older and has reasonable grounds for the belief’.

(3) After section 1A insert—

‘1B Defences to offence under section 1: England and Wales

(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1 to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.

(2) Subsection (3) applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) is charged with an offence under section 1, and

(b) A was not in the presence of the person (“B”) to whom the crossbow or part of a crossbow was sold or let on hire at the time of the sale or letting on hire.

(3) A is not to be regarded as having shown that A took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence unless, as a minimum, A shows that the following conditions are met.

(4) Condition 1 is that, before the sale or letting on hire—

(a) A obtained from B—

(i) a copy of an identity document issued to B, and

(ii) a photograph of B, and

(b) on the basis of the things obtained under paragraph (a), a reasonable person would have been satisfied that B was aged 18 or over.

(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) an “identity document” means—

(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;

(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));

(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(6) Condition 2 is that when the package containing the crossbow or part of the crossbow was dispatched by A, it was clearly marked to indicate—

(a) that it contained a crossbow or part of a crossbow, and

(b) that, when finally delivered, it should only be delivered into the hands of B.

(7) Condition 3 is that A took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that, when finally delivered, the package would be delivered into the hands of B.

(8) Condition 4 is that A did not deliver the package, or arrange for its delivery, to a locker.

(9) Where the crossbow or part of a crossbow was dispatched by A to a place from which it was to be collected by B, references in subsections (6) and (7) to its final delivery are to be read as its supply to B from that place.

(10) In subsection (8) “locker” means a lockable container to which the package is delivered with a view to its collection by B, or a person acting on behalf of B, in accordance with arrangements made between A and B.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes changes to the defences available to a person who sells crossbows etc to under 18s, in contravention of section 1 of the Crossbows Act 1987, where the sale is made remotely (e.g. online).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 70

Delivery of crossbows

“In the Crossbows Act 1987, after section 1B (inserted by section (Remote sale and letting of crossbows)) insert—

‘1C Offence of seller delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to residential premises in England or Wales

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets on hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”), and

(b) A and B are not in each other's presence at the time of the sale.

(2) A commits an offence if, for the purposes of supplying the crossbow or part of a crossbow to B, A—

(a) delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales, or

(b) arranges for its delivery to residential premises in England or Wales.

(3) A commits an offence if, for the purposes of supplying the crossbow or part of a crossbow to B, A—

(a) delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to a locker in England or Wales, or

(b) arranges for its delivery to a locker in England or Wales.

(4) In subsection (3) “locker” means a lockable container to which the crossbow or part of a crossbow is delivered with a view to its collection by B, or a person acting on behalf of B, in accordance with arrangements made between A and B.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).

(6) The “maximum term for summary offences”, in relation to an offence, means—

(a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, six months;

(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.

1D Defences to offences under section 1C

(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(2)(a) to show that the delivery conditions were met.

(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(2)(b) to show that—

(a) the arrangement required the person with whom it was made not to finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow unless the delivery conditions were met, and

(b) the person charged with the offence took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the crossbow or part of a crossbow would not be finally delivered unless the delivery conditions were met.

(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(3) to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.

(4) For the purposes of this section the delivery conditions are that—

(a) the person (“P”) into whose hands the crossbow or part of a crossbow was finally delivered showed the person delivering it an identity document issued to P, and

(b) on the basis of that document a reasonable person would have been satisfied—

(i) that P was over 18, and

(ii) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire was an individual, that P was that individual.

(5) “Identity document” has the same meaning as in section 1B(5).

(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under section 1C.

1E Offence of delivery business delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to residential premises in England and Wales on behalf of UK seller

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets for hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),

(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is within the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale or letting on hire A entered into an arrangement with a person (“C”) by which C agreed to deliver crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,

(d) C was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, C finally delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) a person other than an individual is within the United Kingdom at any time if the person carries on a business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time.

(3) C commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(4) A person finally delivering the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales on behalf of C commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met.

(6) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a crossbow or part of a crossbow.

(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under this section.

(8) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

1F Offence of delivery business delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to premises in England and Wales on behalf of non-UK seller

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets for hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),

(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is outside the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale or letting on hire A entered into an arrangement with a person (“C”) by which C agreed to deliver crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,

(d) C was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, C finally delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England and Wales.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) a person other than an individual is outside the United Kingdom at any time if the person does not carry on a business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time.

(3) C commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England or Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(4) Any person finally delivering the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England or Wales on behalf of C commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(6) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met.

(7) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a crossbow or part of a crossbow.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause creates offences relating to delivery of crossbows to premises following a remote sale equivalent to the offences relating to knives in sections 38 to 42 of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 71

Sale and delivery of crossbows: supplementary provision

“(1) After section 1F of the Crossbows Act 1987 (inserted by section (Delivery of crossbows)) insert—

‘1G Interpretation of sections 1B to 1F

(1) This section applies for the interpretation of sections 1B to 1F.

(2) A person (“A”) is not in the presence of another person (“B”) at any time if—

(a) where A is an individual, A or a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time;

(b) where A is not an individual, a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time.

(3) “Residential premises” means premises used solely for residential purposes.

(4) The circumstances where premises are not residential premises include, in particular, where a person carries on a business from the premises.

(5) A person charged with an offence is taken to have shown a matter if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.’

(2) After section 6 of the Crossbows Act 1987 insert—

‘6A Regulations

(1) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under this Act are to be made by statutory instrument.

(2) The Secretary of State may not make a statutory instrument containing (alone or with other provision) regulations under section 1D(6) or 1E(7) unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(3) Any other statutory instrument containing regulations made by the Secretary of State under this Act is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(3) In section 66(1) of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc), after paragraph (ga) (inserted by section (Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales) insert—

“(gb) any of sections 1 to 3 of the Crossbows Act 1987 (sale etc of crossbows) as they have effect in relation to England and Wales,”.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision about the interpretation of the new sections added to the Crossbows Act 1987 by NC69 and NC70 and extends the guidance-making power in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 to cover offences under the Crossbows Act 1987.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 72

“Relevant user-to-user services”, “relevant search services” and “service providers”

“(1) For the purposes of this Chapter—

(a) a ‘relevant search service’ is a search service other than an exempt service;

(b) a ‘relevant user-to-user service’ is a user-to-user service other than an exempt service.

(2) In subsection (1), ‘search service’ and ‘user-to-user service’ have the same meanings as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (the ‘2023 Act’) (see, in particular, section 3 of that Act).

(3) The following are exempt services for the purposes of subsection (1)—

(a) a service of a kind that is described in any of the following paragraphs of Schedule 1 to the 2023 Act (certain services exempt from regulation under that Act)—

(i) paragraph 1 or 2 (email, SMS and MMS services);

(ii) paragraph 3 (services offering one-to-one live aural communications);

(iii) paragraph 4 (limited functionality services);

(iv) paragraph 5 (services which enable combinations of user-generated content);

(v) paragraph 7 or 8 (internal business services);

(vi) paragraph 9 (services provided by public bodies);

(vii) paragraph 10 (services provided by persons providing education or childcare), or

(b) a service of a kind that is described in Schedule 2 to the 2023 Act (services that include regulated provider pornographic content).

(4) This Chapter does not apply in relation to a part of a relevant search service, or a part of a relevant user-to-user service, if the 2023 Act does not apply to that part of the service by virtue of section 5(1) or (2) of that Act.

(5) In this Chapter, ‘service provider’ means a provider of a relevant user-to-user service or a provider of a relevant search service.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause, which together with NC73, NC74, NC75, NC76, NC77, NC78, NC79, NC80, NC81, NC82, NC83, NC84, NC85, NC86 and NS1 are expected to form a new Chapter of Part 2 of the Bill, defines key terms used in the new Chapter.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 73

Coordinating officer

“(1) The Secretary of State must designate a member of a relevant police force or a National Crime Agency officer as the coordinating officer for the purposes of this Chapter.

(2) The coordinating officer may delegate any of the officer’s functions under this Chapter (to such extent as the officer may determine) to another member of a relevant police force or National Crime Agency officer.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to designate a “coordinating officer” to perform the functions conferred on that officer under the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 74

Notice requiring appointment of content manager

“(1) The coordinating officer may give a service provider a notice (an ‘appointment notice’) requiring the provider—

(a) either to—

(i) appoint an individual who meets the conditions in subsection (2) as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, or

(ii) if there is no such individual, confirm that is the case to the coordinating officer, and

(b) to provide the coordinating officer with the required information.

(2) The conditions are that the individual—

(a) plays a significant role in—

(i) the making of decisions about how a whole or substantial part of the service provider’s activities are to be managed or organised, or

(ii) the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities, and

(b) is habitually resident in the United Kingdom.

(3) ‘Required information’ means—

(a) the contact details of any content manager appointed;

(b) an email address, or details of another means of contacting the service provider rapidly which is readily available, that may be used for the purpose of giving the provider a notice under this Chapter;

(c) information identifying the relevant user-to-user services, or (as the case may be) the relevant search services, provided by the provider.

(4) An appointment notice must—

(a) specify the period before the end of which the service provider must comply with the notice, and

(b) explain the potential consequences of the service provider failing to do so (see section (Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty)).

(5) The period specified under subsection (4)(a) must be at least seven days beginning with the day on which the notice is given.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers a power on the coordinating officer to require a service provider to appoint a senior executive as their “content manager” for the purposes of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72 or to confirm that there is no-one who meets the appointment conditions.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 75

Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances

“(1) This section applies where—

(a) the coordinating officer has given a service provider an appointment notice,

(b) the provider has confirmed to the officer (in accordance with the appointment notice or under section (Replacement of content manager)(5)(b)), that there is no individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2), and

(c) at any time within the period of two years beginning with the day on which that confirmation was given, there is an individual who meets those conditions.

(2) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the first day on which there is an individual who meets those conditions—

(a) appoint such an individual as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, and

(b) provide the coordinating officer with the content manager’s contact details.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause requires a service provider that at any time could not appoint a senior executive as its content manager when required to do so (because there was no-one who met the appointment conditions) to make an appointment if, following a change in circumstances within 2 years, there is someone who meets the conditions.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 76

Replacement of content manager

“(1) This section applies where a service provider has appointed an individual as the provider’s content manager (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances) or this section).

(2) The service provider may replace the provider’s content manager by appointing another individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2) as the provider’s new content manager for the purposes of this Chapter.

(3) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which an appointment is made under subsection (2), provide the coordinating officer with the new content manager’s contact details.

(4) If the individual appointed as a service provider’s content manager ceases to meet any of the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2), the appointment ceases to have effect.

(5) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which an appointment ceases to have effect under subsection (4)—

(a) either—

(i) appoint another individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2) as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, and

(ii) provide the coordinating officer with the new content manager’s contact details, or

(b) if there is no longer such an individual, confirm that is the case to the coordinating officer.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision for the appointment by a service provider of a replacement content manager, including in a case where the original content manager ceases to meet the appointment conditions (and so that appointment ceases to have effect).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 77

Duty to notify changes in required information

“(1) This section applies where a service provider has, in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances)(2)(b) or (Replacement of content manager)(5)(a)(ii)provided the coordinating officer with required information.

(2) The service provider must give notice to the coordinating officer of any change in the required information.

(3) The notice must specify the date on which the change occurred.

(4) The notice must be given before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which the change occurred.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause requires a service provider that has given the coordinating officer required information (as defined in NC74) to inform the officer of any changes in that information.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 78

Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty

“(1) This section applies if the coordinating officer has given a service provider an appointment notice and—

(a) the period specified in the notice as mentioned in (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(4)(a) has expired without the provider having complied with the notice,

(b) the provider has failed to comply with a requirement under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances), (Replacement of content manager) or (Duty to notify changes in required information),

(c) the provider, in purported compliance with a requirement to provide, or give notice of a change in, required information (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances)(2)(b), (Replacement of content manager) or (Duty to notify changes in required information)(2)) makes a statement that is false in a material particular, or

(d) the provider makes a statement that is false in giving the confirmation mentioned in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(1)(a)(ii) or (Replacement of content manager)(5)(b).

(2) The coordinating officer may give the service provider a notice (a ‘penalty notice’) requiring the provider to pay a penalty of an amount not exceeding £60,000.

(3) In order to take account of changes in the value of money the Secretary of State may by regulations substitute another sum for the sum for the time being specified in subsection (2).

(4) Schedule (Civil penalties for service providers and content managers) makes further provision in connection with penalty notices given under this Chapter.” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers a power on the coordinating officer to impose a monetary penalty of up to £60,000 on a service provider that fails to comply with various requirements imposed by an appointment notice or under NC75, NC76 and NC77.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 79

Unlawful weapons content

“(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in England and Wales if it is content that constitutes—

(a) an offence under section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc a dangerous weapon),

(b) an offence under section 1 or 2 of the Knives Act 1997 (marketing of knives as suitable for combat etc and related publications), or

(c) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of England and Wales (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc an offensive weapon).

(2) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in Scotland if it is content that constitutes—

(a) an offence within subsection (1)(a) or (b), or

(b) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of Scotland.

(3) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in Northern Ireland if it is content that constitutes—

(a) an offence under Article 53 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160) (N.I. 24) (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc certain knives),

(b) an offence within subsection (1)(b), or

(c) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of Northern Ireland.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause defines “unlawful weapons content” for the purposes of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 80

Content removal notices

“(1) This section applies where an authorised officer is satisfied that content—

(a) present on a relevant user-to-user service, or

(b) which may be encountered in or via search results of a relevant search service;

is unlawful weapons content in a relevant part of the United Kingdom.

(2) The authorised officer may give a content removal notice to—

(a) the provider of the relevant user-to-user service, or

(b) the provider of the relevant search service.

(3) If the authorised officer gives a content removal notice to a service provider in a case where the coordinating officer has the contact details of the provider’s content manager, the authorised officer may also give the notice to that manager.

(4) A content removal notice is a notice requiring the service provider and (if applicable) the provider’s content manager (each a ‘recipient’) to secure that—

(a) the content to which it relates is removed (see section (Interpretation of Chapter)(2)), and

(b) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.

(5) A content removal notice must—

(a) identify the content to which it relates;

(b) explain the authorised officer’s reasons for considering that the content is unlawful weapons content in the relevant part (or parts) of the United Kingdom;

(c) explain that the notice must be complied with before the end of the period of 48 hours beginning with the time the notice is given;

(d) explain that each recipient has the right to request a review of the decision to give the notice and how a request is to be made (see section (Content removal notices: review));

(e) set out the potential consequences of failure to comply with the notice;

(f) contain the authorised officer’s contact details;

(g) be in such form, and contain such further information, as the Secretary of State may by regulations prescribe.

(6) The authorised officer may withdraw a content removal notice from a recipient by notifying the recipient to that effect (but withdrawal of a notice does not prevent a further content removal notice from being given under this section, whether or not in relation to the same content as the withdrawn notice).

(7) In this section—

‘authorised officer’ means—

(a) a member of a relevant police force who is authorised for the purposes of this section by the chief officer of the force, or

(b) a National Crime Agency officer who is authorised for the purposes of this section by the Director General of the National Crime Agency;

‘relevant part of the United Kingdom’ means—

(a) where the authorised officer is a member of a relevant police force in England and Wales, England and Wales;

(b) where the authorised officer is a member of the Police Service of Scotland, Scotland;

(c) where the authorised officer is a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland;

(d) where the authorised officer is a member of the Ministry of Defence Police or a National Crime Agency officer, any part of the United Kingdom.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers power on the police or an officer of the National Crime Agency to give a service provider and (if there is one) the provider’s content manager a notice requiring them to remove unlawful weapons content from the services they provide.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 81

Content removal notices: review

“(1) A person who is given a content removal notice (a ‘recipient’) may, before the end of the initial 48-hour period, request a review of the decision to give the notice.

(2) A request under subsection (1) is to be made by the recipient giving—

(a) a notice (a ‘review notice’) to the authorised officer, and

(b) a copy of the review notice to the other recipient (if applicable).

(3) The grounds on which a recipient may request a review include, in particular, that—

(a) content to which the notice relates is not unlawful weapons content;

(b) content to which the notice relates is insufficiently identified for the recipient to be able to take the action required by the notice;

(c) the provider that received the notice is not, in fact, the provider of the relevant user-to-user service or relevant search service to which the notice relates;

(d) the individual who received the notice as the service provider’s content manager is not, in fact, that provider’s content manager;

(e) the notice was otherwise not given in accordance with this Chapter.

(4) On receipt of a review notice, a review of the decision to give the content removal notice must be carried out—

(a) if the authorised officer is a member of a relevant police force, by another member of that force who is of a higher rank;

(b) if the authorised officer is a National Crime Agency officer, by another officer who holds a more senior position in the Agency.

The individual carrying out the review is referred to in this section as ‘the reviewing officer’.

(6) On completing the review or (in a case where two review notices are given) both reviews the reviewing officer must, in respect of each recipient, either—

(a) confirm in full the decision to give the content removal notice,

(b) confirm the decision to give the notice, but in relation to only some of the content to which it relates, or

(c) withdraw the notice.

(7) The reviewing officer must give each recipient a notice (a ‘decision notice’)—

(a) setting out the outcome of the review or reviews, and

(b) giving reasons.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision for the police or the NCA to review the decision to give a service provider or their content manager a content removal notice under NC80 where the recipient of the notice requests a review.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 82

Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content

“(1) This section applies where the reviewing officer—

(a) has carried out a review or reviews under section (Content removal notices: review), and

(b) confirms the decision to give the content removal notice to the service provider, the provider’s content manager or both of them (in each case whether as mentioned in subsection (6)(a) or (b) of that section).

(2) If the reviewing officer confirms in full the decision to give the content removal notice, the decision notice must require its recipient to secure that—

(a) the content to which the content removal notice relates is removed, and

(b) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.

(3) If the officer confirms the decision to give the content removal notice but in relation to only some of the content to which it relates, the decision notice must—

(a) identify the content to which the confirmation relates (the ‘confirmed content’), and

(b) require its recipient to secure that—

(i) the confirmed content is removed, and

(ii) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.

(4) A decision notice within subsection (2) or (3) must specify the period before the end of which the notice must be complied with, and that period must be whichever of the following is the longest—

(a) the period of 24 hours beginning with the time the decision notice is given;

(b) the period—

(i) beginning with the time the review notice or, if there was more than one, the first review notice, was given under section (Content removal notices: review), and

(ii) ending with the end of the initial 48-hour period.

(5) In this section, ‘reviewing officer’ has the same meaning as in section (Content removal notices: review).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause provides for the police or NCA, following a review under NC81 which confirms (in full or in part) the decision to give a content removal notice, to give the service provider or content manager a decision notice requiring the removal of the unlawful weapons content concerned.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 83

Failure to comply with content removal notice or decision notice: civil penalties

“(1) Subsection (2) applies where—

(a) a content removal notice has been given to a service provider, or to both a service provider and the provider’s content manager, in accordance with section (Content removal notices), and

(b) the initial 48-hour period has expired without the notice having been complied with or a review notice having been given.

(2) A senior authorised officer of the issuing force may give a penalty notice—

(a) to the service provider, or

(b) if the provider’s content manager also received the content removal notice, to the content manager or to both of them.

(3) Subsection (4) applies where, following a review or reviews under section (Content removal notices: review)—

(a) a decision notice has been given to the service provider or to both the provider and the provider’s content manager in accordance with section (Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content)(2) or (3) confirming the decision to give the content removal notice, and

(b) the period specified in the decision notice under subsection (4) of that section has expired without that notice having been complied with.

(4) A senior authorised officer of the issuing force may give a penalty notice—

(a) to the service provider, or

(b) if the provider’s content manager also received the decision notice, to the content manager or to both of them.

(5) In this section a ‘penalty notice’ means a notice requiring its recipient to pay a penalty—

(a) where the recipient is a service provider, of an amount not exceeding £60,000;

(b) where the recipient is a service provider’s content manager, of an amount not exceeding £10,000.

(6) In order to take account of changes in the value of money the Secretary of State may by regulations substitute another sum for a sum for the time being specified in subsection (5).

(7) See Schedule (Civil penalties for service providers and content managers) for further provision in connection with penalty notices given under this section.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers a power on the police or NCA to impose a monetary penalty of up to £60,000 on a service provider or up to £10,000 on a content manager if they have failed to comply with a content removal notice or a decision notice.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 84

Guidance

“(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance to the persons mentioned in subsection (2) about the exercise of their functions under this Chapter.

(2) The persons are—

(a) the chief officer, and any other member, of a relevant police force;

(b) the Director General of the National Crime Agency and any other officer of the Agency.

(3) The Secretary of State may revise any guidance issued under this section.

(4) The Secretary of State must publish any guidance or revisions issued under this section.

(5) A person mentioned in subsection (2) must have regard to any guidance issued under this section when exercising a function under this Chapter.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers power on the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the police and the National Crime Agency about the exercise of their functions under the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 85

Notices

“(1) This section applies in relation to any notice that must or may be given to a person under this Chapter.

(2) A notice may be given to a person by—

(a) delivering it by hand to the person,

(b) leaving it at the person’s proper address,

(c) sending it by post to the person at that address, or

(d) sending it by email to the person’s email address.

(3) A notice to a body corporate may be given to any officer of that body.

(4) A notice to a partnership may be given to any partner or to a person who has the control or management of the partnership business.

(5) A notice sent by first class post to an address in the United Kingdom, is treated as given at noon on the second working day after the day of posting, unless the contrary is proved.

(6) A notice sent by email is treated as given at the time it is sent unless the contrary is proved.

(7) In this section—

‘director’ includes any person occupying the position of a director, by whatever name called;

‘email address’, in relation to a person, means—

(a) an email address provided by that person for the purposes of this Chapter, or

(b) any email address published for the time being by that person as an address for contacting that person;

‘officer’, in relation to an entity, includes a director, a manager, a partner, the secretary or, where the affairs of the entity are managed by its members, a member;

‘proper address’ means—

(a) in the case of an entity, the address of the entity’s registered office or principal office;

(b) in any other case, the person’s last known address;

‘working day’ means any day other than—

(a) a Saturday or Sunday, or

(b) a day that is a bank holiday in any part of the United Kingdom under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971.

(8) In the case of an entity registered or carrying on business outside the United Kingdom, or with offices outside the United Kingdom, the reference in subsection (7), in the definition of ‘proper address’, to the entity’s principal office includes—

(a) its principal office in the United Kingdom, or

(b) if the entity has no office in the United Kingdom, any place in the United Kingdom at which the person giving the notice believes, on reasonable grounds, that the notice will come to the attention of any director or other officer of that entity.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision about the ways in which a notice can be given, and the time at which a notice is to be treated as given, under the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 86

Interpretation of Chapter

“(1) In this Chapter—

‘appointment notice’ has the meaning given by section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(1);

‘authorised officer’ in relation to a content removal notice, means the member of a relevant police force, or officer of the National Crime Agency, who gave the notice;

‘chief officer’—

(a) in relation to a police force in England and Wales, means the chief officer of police of the force;

(b) in relation to any other relevant police force, means the chief constable of that force;

‘contact details’, in relation to an individual, means the individual’s—

(a) full name;

(b) telephone number;

(c) email address;

(d) residential address, or other service address, in the United Kingdom;

‘content’ has the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (see section 236(1) of that Act);

‘content manager’, in relation to a service provider, means the individual for the time being appointed as the content manager of the provider (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances) or (Replacement of content manager));

‘content removal notice’ has the meaning given by section (Content removal notices)(4);

‘coordinating officer’ means the individual designated as such under section (Coordinating officer)(1);

‘decision notice’ means a notice given under section (Content removal notices: review)(7);

‘encounter’, in relation to content, has the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (see section 236(1) of that Act);

‘entity’ has the same meaning as in that Act (see section 236(1) of that Act);

‘initial 48-hour period’, in relation to a content removal notice, means the 48-hour period specified in the notice as mentioned in section (Content removal notices)(5)(c);

‘issuing force’—

(a) in relation to a content removal notice given by a member of a relevant police force, means that force;

(b) in relation to a content removal notice given by a National Crime Agency officer, means the National Crime Agency;

‘relevant police force’—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, means—

(i) a police force in England and Wales, or

(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;

(b) in relation to Scotland, means—

(i) the Police Service of Scotland, or

(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;

(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, means—

(i) the Police Service of Northern Ireland, or

(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;

‘relevant search service’ and

‘relevant user-to-user service’ have the meanings given by section (‘Relevant user-to-user services’, ‘relevant search services’ and ‘service providers’);

‘required information’ has the meaning given by section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(3);

‘review notice’ has the meaning given by section (Content removal notices: review)(2)(a);

‘search content’ and ‘search results’ have the meanings given by section 57 of the Online Safety Act 2023;

‘senior authorised officer’, in relation to a relevant police force, means—

(a) the chief officer of the relevant police force, or

(b) a member of the relevant police force of at least the rank of inspector authorised for the purposes of this Chapter by the chief officer;

‘senior authorised officer’, in relation to the National Crime Agency, means—

(a) the Director General of the National Crime Agency, or

(b) an officer of the Agency who—

(i) holds a position in the Agency the seniority of which is at least equivalent to that of the rank of inspector in a relevant police force, and

(ii) is authorised for the purposes of this Chapter by the Director General;

‘service address’ has the same meaning as in the Companies Acts (see section 1141 of the Companies Act 2006);

‘service provider’ has the meaning given by section (‘Relevant user-to-user services’, ‘relevant search services’ and ‘service providers’).

(2) For the purposes of this Chapter, a reference to ‘removing’ content—

(a) in relation to content present on a relevant user-to-user service, is a reference to any action that results in the content being removed from the service, or being permanently hidden, so users of the service in any part of the United Kingdom in which the content is unlawful weapons content cannot encounter it;

(b) in relation to content which may be encountered in or via search results of a relevant search service, is a reference to taking measures designed to secure, so far as possible, that the content is no longer included in the search content of the service that is available in any part of the United Kingdom in which the content is unlawful weapons content;

and related expressions are to be read accordingly.

(3) The following provisions of the Online Safety Act 2023 apply for the purposes of this Chapter as they apply for the purposes of that Act—

(a) section 226 (determining who is the provider of a particular user-to-user service or search service);

(b) section 236(5) and (6) (references to content being present).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause contains definitions of terms used in the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 87

Dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling

“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as set out in subsections (2) to (6).

(2) Before section 28 (dangerous cycling) insert—

‘27A Causing death by dangerous cycling

A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.

27B Causing serious injury by dangerous cycling

(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.

(2) In this section “serious injury” means—

(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and

(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.’

(3) In section 28—

(a) in subsection (1) for ‘on a road dangerously’ substitute ‘dangerously on a road or other public place’;

(b) omit subsections (2) and (3).

(4) After section 28 insert—

‘28A Meaning of “dangerous cycling”

(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 27A, 27B and 28.

(2) A person is to be regarded as riding dangerously if (and only if) the condition in subsection (3) or (4) is met.

(3) The condition in this subsection is met if—

(a) the way that the person rides falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist, and

(b) it would be obvious to a competent and careful cyclist that riding in that way would be dangerous.

(4) The condition in this subsection is met if it would be obvious to a competent and careful cyclist that riding the cycle in its current state would be dangerous.

(5) In determining the state of a cycle for the purposes of subsection (4), regard may be had (among other things) to—

(a) whether the cycle is equipped and maintained in accordance with regulations under section 81 (regulation of brakes, bells etc, on pedal cycles);

(b) anything attached to or carried on the cycle and the manner in which it is attached or carried.

(6) In determining what would be expected of, or obvious to, a competent and careful cyclist in a particular case, regard is to be had both to—

(a) the circumstances of which the person could be expected to be aware (taking account of, if relevant to the case, the age of the accused), and

(b) the circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused.

(7) References in this section to something being “dangerous” are references to it resulting in danger of—

(a) injury to any person, or

(b) serious damage to property.

28B Causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling

A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.

28C Causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling

(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.

(2) In this section ‘serious injury’ means—

(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and

(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.’

(5) In section 29 (careless, and inconsiderate, cycling)—

(a) after ‘a road’ insert ‘or other public place’;

(b) after ‘the road’ insert ‘or place’.

(6) After section 29 insert—

‘29A Meaning of careless, or inconsiderate, cycling

(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 28B, 28C and 29.

(2) A person is to be regarded as cycling without due care and attention if (and only if) the way the person cycles falls below what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist.

(3) In determining what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist in a particular case, regard is to be had both to—

(a) the circumstances of which the person could be expected to be aware (taking account of, if relevant to the case, the age of the accused), and

(b) the circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused.

(4) A person (A) is to be regarded as cycling without reasonable consideration for other persons only if those persons are inconvenienced by A’s cycling.’

(7) The table in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (prosecution and punishment of offences) is amended as follows.

(8) After the entry relating to ‘RTA section 27’ insert in columns 1 to 4—

Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Diana Johnson and Joe Robertson

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I support the clauses, which outlaw the use of SIM farms and the supply of SIM farms to others.

It is a defence for a person to show that they have “good reason” to use a SIM farm. Examples are given in the Bill, including providing broadcasting services, operating or maintaining a public transport service and tracking freight. I do not suggest that amendments are necessary, but I wonder whether the Minister can help us understand the provisions. What are examples of legitimate use in broadcasting services or tracking freight? These are areas of legitimate commercial activity that lay people are not particularly familiar with. I would be interested to know why a company would want to use multiple SIMs and phone numbers to track freight, for example. It is not meant to be a complex question.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am glad that there is cross-party support for these measures. The clauses were, on the whole, included in the Criminal Justice Bill introduced by the previous Government.

Fighting fraud is a top priority for this Government and tackling it is really important not only for our safer streets mission but for our growth agenda. We want to address the full range of fraud threats that occur. We want to close the systemic enablers that criminals are able to exploit to operate at scale and without detection, such as SIM farms.

The hon. Member for Stockton West is right that such a provision was included in the Criminal Justice Bill, but we have updated the definition of SIM farm to reflect newly emerging use cases. In response to feedback from stakeholders, we are creating an additional offence for the possession and supply of additional technologies, to be specified in the future, with appropriate exceptions to avoid unnecessary restrictions on legitimate businesses and professionals. I hope that goes some way to reassuring the hon. Member about why we are trying to future-proof these clauses. On the issue of review, the provisions will be reviewed two years after commencement.

On the point about legitimate activity, as I said, the list in the Bill is not exhaustive; it gives some indication of legitimate reasons why a business or organisation might have a SIM farm in its possession. Whether a reason is reasonable and stands up to scrutiny will obviously be a matter for the court to decide. The list is not exhaustive, in order to provide flexibility; as I said, this area is changing rapidly. In the coming weeks, months and years there may be new legitimate reasons for businesses to possess a SIM farm to assist them in providing a service or selling something. The clauses are constructed as they are in order to allow that flexibility.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 80 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 81 and 82 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 10 agreed to.

Clauses 83 to 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 86

Offence of concealing identity at protests

Crime and Policing Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Diana Johnson and Joe Robertson

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Joe Robertson]

I thank the Minister for that clear explanation in response to both my queries. I say again that it would be usual in drafting to say, “include, but are not limited to”, just to make it absolutely clear to legal practitioners that it is not an exhaustive list, so I put that on the record again. I am sure the Minister’s officials are listening, and I would be pleased if she could perhaps go away and think about a small amendment there.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is trying to help the Government to ensure that this legislation is as good as it can be, so we will reflect on what he says.

I want to make some general observations and comments on this grouping. Clauses 32 to 34 and schedule 5 provide for the new offence of controlling another’s home for criminal purposes, commonly known as cuckooing. As I am sure we all agree, cuckooing is a truly abhorrent practice whereby criminals target and take over the homes of vulnerable people for the purposes of illegal activity. It is often associated with antisocial behaviour and the exploitation of children and vulnerable people used by criminal gangs inside properties.

Currently, a range of offences can be used to prosecute criminal activity commonly associated with cuckooing. For example, the inchoate offences under sections 44 to 46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 may apply where cuckooing amounts to an act of

“encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence”.

Any criminal activity carried out from the cuckooed property would also already be an offence. For example, where a cuckooed property is used to supply illegal drugs, offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 may apply.

It is the Government’s view, however, that the existing legal framework does not reflect the harm caused to victims when their home—a place where they should feel safe—is taken over by criminals. I know that this view is shared by many parliamentarians from across the House. I pay particular tribute to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), who has championed the issue of cuckooing for some years. I also pay tribute to the organisation Justice and Care for all the work that it has done to highlight this particular issue, and recognise our former colleague Holly Lynch, who campaigned on this issue when she was a Member of the House.

Children in particular are often exploited by criminals. By introducing the offence of cuckooing, alongside the new offence of child criminal exploitation, our aim is to improve identification of such children and to strengthen the response for both adult and child victims of exploitation. I want to make clear that we expect the cuckooing offence to be used to pursue the criminals orchestrating the cuckooing, and that the victims of exploitation, including children and vulnerable people, found in properties should be safeguarded—I will say a little more about the role of children in a moment.

Clause 32 outlines that it will be an offence to control a person’s dwelling in connection with specified criminal activity without that person’s consent. The specified criminal activity is set out in schedule 5 to the Bill, reflecting the types of criminal activity that cuckooing is typically used to facilitate, as we were just discussing—for example, drugs offences, sexual offences and offensive weapons offences, among others. The offence will carry a maximum penalty on conviction on indictment of five years’ imprisonment, a fine or both.

Clause 33 provides interpretation of the terms used in clause 32 to clarify what is meant by “dwelling”, “control” and “consent”. Clause 33 also provides examples of how an individual may exercise control over another’s dwelling, including controlling who is able to enter, leave or occupy the dwelling, the delivery of things to the dwelling and the purposes for which the dwelling is used. It should be noted that the person exercising the control does not need to be present in the dwelling, thereby enabling prosecution of gang leaders who are directing the cuckooing from afar.

Clause 33 also sets out that a person cannot consent to control of their dwelling if they are under 18 years old, they do not have the capacity to give consent, they have not been given sufficient information to enable them to make an informed decision, they have not given consent freely or they have withdrawn their consent. The consent of an occupant may not freely be given where it is obtained by coercion, manipulation, deception or other forms of abusive behaviour, taking into account the vulnerability of an individual.

We recognise that criminal gangs may adapt cuckooing to other crime types. Therefore, as I said, clause 34 provides that power for the Home Secretary and for the relevant Ministers in Scotland and Northern Ireland to amend the list of specified offences in schedule 5 to future-proof the offence. Such regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, which may help with scrutiny, as mentioned by the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan.

I will say a few words about the issue of children and cuckooing. Police and stakeholders tell us that children, in particular those exploited by county lines gangs, are used as runners, to deliver drugs to cuckooed properties, and sometimes as sitters, to sell drugs from the properties. It is absolutely right that children who have been exploited and groomed into criminality should be treated first and foremost as victims, as I said a few moments ago. That does not in itself override the age of criminal responsibility, where the law holds children over a certain age to be responsible for their actions. I believe that allowing those two principles to exist alongside each other will provide the best protection and outcomes for vulnerable victims of this terrible crime.

The non-consensual control of someone’s home, the place in which they deserve to feel completely safe and secure, is a cruel and harmful violation. Therefore, where there is evidence that a child has been involved in an offence against, for example, a vulnerable or elderly person, and it is evident that they have chosen to do so and have not been manipulated or coerced, it is right that the police should be able to take action. That does not mean, however, that the police will seek charges against under-18s irrespective of any history of exploitation. I am clear that decisions as to whether to charge someone should be taken on a case-by-case basis. As with all offences, the police have operational discretion, and the Crown Prosecution Service’s public interest test will apply.

We will also issue guidance to support implementation of the cuckooing offence, including on how police should respond and identify exploitation when children are found in connection with cuckooing. As we have previously debated, the Bill provides for the new offence of child criminal exploitation to strengthen the response to perpetrators who groom children into criminality. It is intended to improve identification of, and access to support for, victims.

Amendment 5, which the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset spoke to, seeks to further define “capacity to consent” as set out in clause 33(5)(b). The amendment would set out that a person lacks capacity to consent to the control of their dwelling for a criminal purpose if they either lack capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 or are in circumstances that

“significantly impair their ability to protect themselves from exploitation.”

I agree it is important that the offence can be used to prosecute perpetrators who have preyed on those who, due to a health condition or wider vulnerabilities, do not have the capacity to provide valid consent. However, I want to clarify that we have intentionally avoided using references to the Mental Capacity Act 2005. We believe that may cause confusion in this context, as that Act is designed to apply in a civil law context and has a central purpose of empowering people whose capacity is called into question, rather than identifying those who lack capacity.

Furthermore, the formulation of the amendment starts from the presumption that a person lacks capacity to consent if they are in circumstances that significantly impair their ability to protect themselves. That may imply that vulnerable people inherently lack capacity, which we think would set an unhelpful precedent. I reassure the Committee that the clause as drafted already allows for a broad interpretation of capacity. Our intention is to provide flexibility for the court to interpret capacity as relating to any impairment that may impact the person’s ability to consent. That could include circumstances where a person is unable to consent to the control of their dwelling for a criminal purpose due to disability, illness and/or the effects of substance misuse. That applies to both permanent and short-term lack of capacity.

Where a person has been subjected to coercion, deception or manipulation and is as a result less able to protect themselves against cuckooing, that is already covered by the definition of consent under clause 33(5), which provides that consent is valid only if freely given and sufficiently informed. As I have already stated, we intend to issue guidance to support the implementation of the offence and will ensure that it covers the issue of consent to assist police in identifying victims and the type of evidence that points towards ability to consent. I hope that, with those reassurances, the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset will be content not to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Clauses 33 and 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35

Protections for witnesses, and lifestyle offences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Crime and Policing Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Diana Johnson and Joe Robertson

Committee stage
Thursday 3rd April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West, for his extensive speech in this short debate, setting out in great detail the background and history of how we have reached the position that we are in today. I feel that with some of the contributions we visited every retail outlet in the country. As the shadow Minister asked me a number of questions, I will deal with those at the outset. It is a shame that, despite what he said, the fact is that in 14 years the previous Government did not deliver on introducing this provision.

On what the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East said, the reason I pointed out that this was a manifesto commitment was to show that this Government, in our first Home Office Bill, are actually delivering on what we said we would do. I will go on to deal with some of the points that he and other hon. Members raised.

[Joe Robertson]

I wish to clarify for the Minister that I am criticising not the Government’s commitment to bring forward the Bill but the suggestion that something cannot go into the Bill because it was not in the Labour manifesto. I am sure that she is about to address that point.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

The hon. Member is right that I will address that point in due course.

The shadow Minister referred to live facial recognition, but there are some provisions on that—new clauses 19 and 29—which I think will provide the best opportunity to discuss those points. He will know of my commitment to using live facial recognition where appropriate, with the necessary policing safeguards.

In response to the remarks about the offence set out in Scottish legislation on abuse, threats and aggravating factors, it is fair to say that, as the Minister, I am looking carefully at what other countries have legislated for. I keep that under review and will continue to do so throughout the course of the Bill’s passage.

Crime and Policing Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Diana Johnson and Joe Robertson

Committee stage
Thursday 3rd April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Joe Robertson]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. Speaking to the last clause we debated, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice talked about the deterrent value of making the offence triable either way. A significant part of the amendment is about the deterrent value of the length of prison sentence available for someone convicted of child criminal exploitation—a horrendous crime. The adult involved uses and exploits the child, and also exploits the way the police operate by putting the criminal activity in the child’s hands. Time and again, the criminals use this as a way to avoid arrests for moving drugs around the countryside or a town, because they believe the police will not arrest a child who is perpetrating the criminal activity because they are being instructed to do so. This activity has increased in recent years—so far it has not been a criminal offence—and helps the movement of drugs. Not only does it have an impact on the children involved, but it means that drug use and drug dealing proliferates in hotspots and more generally. It can also include the movement of offensive weapons, which is another area where activity in certain hotspots has got worse.

If the new provision, which I support, is to have the added desired weight and deterrent effect to stop people engaging in child criminal exploitation, it needs the amendment that the hon. Member for Neath and Swansea East tabled to increase the length of sentencing. Only then will the police feel emboldened to go after those horrendous criminals who exploit children. I urge the Minister to consider the amendment, which would have the biggest possible deterrent effect, and use the arguments of her hon. Friend to ensure that the provisions are as strong as possible.

[The Minister for Policing, Fire and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

Good afternoon, Sir Roger. Looking at amendment 1 before we go on to discuss clause stand part—

Crime and Policing Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Diana Johnson and Joe Robertson

Committee stage
Tuesday 1st April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Joe Robertson]

I think we will have to leave the debate about which Government have the solutions to another day, but I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention.

I repeat my point, which I do not think is controversial and would hope is accepted: the Labour party will have to pay extra attention to court backlogs when provisions such as this, which I support, are introduced.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

We have had a wide-ranging debate on clause 1, moving from the specifics of the respect order through to policing numbers. I am very proud that we will have 13,000 additional police officers and PCSOs by the end of this Parliament. I have to say that the idea that there was the largest prison-building scheme since the Victorian times under the previous Conservative Government is utter bunkum—they built 500 places. That is why we are in the position we are in at the moment. I know that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East is a new Member, but those of us who have been in the House a little while remember what 14 years of Conservative government have delivered for this country. That is why this Government are determined to start to deal with some of the problems around antisocial behaviour, crime and the fact that we do not have enough prison places.

Getting back to clause 1 of this important Bill, I am pleased that there is acceptance across the House of the need for respect orders and a general welcoming of them. The shadow Minister asked some very detailed questions, which I will come to in a moment, but I want to comment on the speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead. The horrific case in his constituency of a child who cannot go out to play and the stress that antisocial behaviour puts on the family is clearly totally unacceptable. That is why respect orders will play their part, along with the housing civil injunctions, in tackling some of these problems.

My hon. Friend the Member for Leigh and Atherton made an important point about individuals with addiction problems and how it is absolutely vital that respect orders deal with the requirements to get to grips with antisocial behaviour and whether an addiction issue is driving it. I was pleased that the hon. Member for Windsor talked about the antisocial behaviour that occurs even in some of the more prosperous areas of the country—he talked about Eton. My hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh made an important point about prevention, the work around youth hubs and the prevention partnerships that we will be introducing.

At the very start of the debate on the amendments, the shadow Minister asked whether respect orders would interfere with individuals’ work commitments. I can reassure him that it will be for the court, which is judicially independent, to set the conditions of a respect order. Courts are well practised in navigating types of circumstances, such as where a person works or lives, and we expect the courts to consider those issues when making respect orders. For example, a court is unlikely to prevent the respondent from entering a defined area if they need to access it to attend work.

The shadow Minister asked how the Environment Agency will use respect orders. The Environment Agency can play a role, particularly where an environmental ASB offence is committed, for example vandalism of local open spaces or parks, or things like that.

The shadow Minister was particularly concerned about without-notice applications for respect orders. We know that courts can issue without-notice respect orders when the matter is urgent—the shadow Minister referred to that. Courts are familiar with doing that and have done it for a very long time with civil injunctions.

The shadow Minister also asked about the burden of proof required for the courts to approve a respect order and how much police will work with communities to ensure that repeated reporting and gathering of evidence has the desired effect. The court must be satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, the respondent has engaged in, or threatened to engage in, conduct that has or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. The court must also be satisfied that it is just and convenient to grant the respect order for the purposes of preventing the respondent from engaging in antisocial behaviour. That is the same legal test as for the current injunction.

I was pleased that the shadow Minister welcomed the fact that housing bodies will be able to seek orders from the courts; I think that is welcome across the House. Police are just one of the number of agencies, including councils and housing authorities, that can apply for respect orders. It is expected that a multi-agency approach will be taken when applying for respect orders. We are also introducing mandatory checklists for the relevant agency to complete prior to applying for a respect order, to ensure proportionate use.

Crime and Policing Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Diana Johnson and Joe Robertson

Committee stage
Tuesday 1st April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Joe Robertson]

A lot of good comments have been made on this provision in the Bill, which I do not wish to repeat. I note the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Gordon and Buchan about consistency with the devolved nations and how people seeking to dump do not recognise borders. I can probably assure her that fly-tippers on the Isle of Wight are not likely to reach her constituency in order to perpetrate their dumping, but if the law in Scotland is not equally as strong, who knows what lengths people will go to? I want to reinforce that point, and I hope that the Government will be prepared to accept this amendment to make the guidance as strong as possible around the fly-tipper being the payer. Clearly, we are all victims of fly-tipping, but the landowner in particular is a victim. It is completely unacceptable to any right-minded individual that the landowner should pay the costs of being a victim of a crime. I urge the Government to accept amendment 35 and make the guidance as strong as possible on that point.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

This has been an interesting debate. We have been up mountain passes, we have been on the Isle of Wight and we have had the shadow Minister out with the Thornaby litter pickers. This debate has been very visual. Fly-tipping is a really serious crime that is blighting communities. It is placing a huge burden on taxpayers and businesses, and it harms the environment. Unfortunately, it is all too common, with local councils reporting 1.15 million incidents in 2023-24.

I want to address the issue of what we are doing in rural areas and on private land. Through the National Fly-Tipping Prevention Group, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs is working with the National Farmers’ Union, the Country Land and Business Association, the Countryside Alliance and local authorities to share good practice on tackling fly-tipping on private land. Where there is sufficient evidence, councils can prosecute fly-tippers.

In relation to the issue of serious and organised waste crime, the Environment Agency hosts the joint unit for waste crime, which is a multi-agency taskforce that brings together His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the National Crime Agency, the police, waste regulators from across the UK and other operational partners to share intelligence and disrupt and prevent serious organised waste crime. Since 2020, the joint unit for waste crime has worked with over 130 partner organisations, and led or attended 324 multi-agency days of action resulting in 177 associated arrests.

On the issue that was raised by the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan, we have engaged closely with the devolved Government across the Bill. As she will know, fly-tipping is a devolved matter in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, so accordingly this provision applies only in England.

We want to see consistent and effective enforcement action at the centre of local efforts to combat the issue of fly-tipping. That will ensure not only that those who dump rubbish in our communities face the consequences, but that would-be perpetrators are deterred. Councils currently have a range of enforcement powers. Those include prosecution, which can lead to a significant fine, community sentences, or even imprisonment. They can also issue fixed penalty notices of up to £1,000 and seize the vehicles suspected of being used for fly-tipping.

The use of those powers, however, varies significantly across the country, with some councils taking little or no enforcement action at all. Indeed, just two councils—West Northamptonshire and Kingston upon Thames —accounted for the majority of vehicles seized in 2023-24. DEFRA also regularly receives reports of local authorities exercising their enforcement powers inappropriately, for example against householders who leave reusable items at the edge of their property for others to take for free. Through the Bill we intend to enable the Secretary of State to issue fly-tipping enforcement guidance that councils must have regard to.

I want to be clear that the guidance is not about setting top-down targets. We want to empower councils to respond to fly-tipping in ways that work for their communities, while making Government expectations crystal clear. The guidance, which must be subject to consultation, will likely cover areas such as policy and financial objectives of enforcement, how to operate a professional service, the use of private enforcement firms, and advice on how to respond in certain circumstances. Local authorities will, of course, be key stakeholders in the development of the guidance; after all, they are on the frontline in the fight against fly-tipping, and we want to ensure that the guidance provides them with the advice that they will find most helpful.

Amendment 35 aims to ensure that the person responsible for fly-tipping, rather than the landowner, is liable for the costs of cleaning up. I recognise the significant burden that clearing fly-tipped waste places on landowners. It is already the case that, where a local authority prosecutes a fly-tipper and secures a conviction, the court can make a cost order so that a landowner’s costs can be recovered from the perpetrator. That is made clear in section 33B of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, although sentencing is of course a matter for the courts. Guidance on presenting court cases produced by the national fly-tipping prevention group, which the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs chairs, explains that prosecutors should consider applying for compensation for the removal of waste. We will consider building on that advice in the statutory guidance issued under clause 9. We also committed, in our manifesto, to forcing fly-tippers and vandals to clean up the mess that they create. DEFRA will provide further details on that commitment in due course.

Amendment 4 would introduce a requirement for any fly-tipping guidance issued under clause 9 to be subject to parliamentary approval. I do not believe that there is any need for such guidance to be subject to any parliamentary procedure beyond a requirement to lay the guidance before Parliament. That is because the guidance will provide technical and practical advice to local authorities on how to conduct enforcement against fly-tipping and breaches of the household waste duty of care. The guidance will not conflict with, or alter the scope of, the enforcement powers, so I do not believe that it requires parliamentary oversight.

The requirement to lay the guidance before Parliament, without any further parliamentary procedure, is consistent with the position taken with the analogous power in section 88B of the 1990 Act and the recommendation of the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its report on the then Environment Bill in the 2021-22 Session. We will, of course, consider carefully any recommendations by that Committee in relation to this clause.

New clause 24 seeks to add three penalty points to the driving licence of a person convicted of a fly-tipping offence. As I have said, fly-tipping is a disgraceful act and those who dump rubbish in our communities should face the full force of the law, which could include spot fines of up to £1,000, prosecution or vehicle seizure. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West, will appreciate that sentencing is a matter for the courts and that to direct them to place penalty points on the driving licence of a convicted fly-tipper would undermine their ability to hand down a sentence proportionate to the offence, but I will ask my DEFRA counterpart who is responsible for policy on fly-tipping to consider the benefits of enabling endorsement with penalty points for fly-tippers.

I also stress that there is an existing power for local councils to seize a vehicle suspected of being used for fly-tipping. If a council prosecutes, the court can order the transferral to the council of the ownership rights to the vehicle, under which the council can keep, sell or dispose of it.

I hope that, in the light of my explanations, the hon. Members for Stockton West and for Sutton and Cheam will be content to withdraw their amendments and to support clause 9.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I agree with both those points. It is appalling that we are in that situation, but I pay tribute to St John’s Ambulance for its amazing work, and appreciate that young people want to engage and help to protect life.

The hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset asked about young people who feel they might keep themselves safe by carrying a knife. That is clearly not the case: if they carry a knife, they are more likely to be involved in a knife attack. We need to get the message out that it will not protect them.

The hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan referred to early intervention. We want to get in early and do all the preventive work that has, sadly, not happened over the past 14 years. We want to invest in youth hubs, reach young people, give them meaningful activities and instil in them key messages about how to keep safe and what good relationships look like. As the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley will know, there is more to do on tackling violence against women and girls, because we want to halve that in a decade as well. We have lots of messages and work that we need to do with young people.

On the issue of young people getting involved in knife crime, the prevention partnerships will identify young people who are at risk of getting involved in crime or carrying a knife and try to work intensively with them. Early intervention to divert them from carrying a knife is important. We also have a manifesto commitment to ensure that any young person caught with a knife will be referred to a youth offending team, and there will be a plan of action for how to support them. No more will a young person caught with a knife just get a slap on the wrist and be sent on their way. We will get alongside them and deal with it; otherwise, it could turn into something really dreadful.

I am happy to look at the issue of catapults, which a number of hon. Members raised. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean who, as usual, gave very wise counsel about his experience as a former police officer and how important preventive work is.

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for setting out clearly amendment 39 and new clause 44. As he said, they draw on a recommendation by Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, following his review of the appalling attack in Southport. Like all Members, I express my condolences to the families who lost their beautiful little girls, and to all those who were injured and affected by those events.

Before I respond to the amendment and new clause, let me explain the rationale for clause 10, which introduces a new offence of being in possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon with the intention to use unlawful violence. As I said, the Government are determined to halve knife crime in the next decade. Legislation has to play a part in delivering for our safer streets mission, ensuring that the criminal law and police powers are fit for purpose. This work sits alongside what I just said about the coalition for tackling knife crime holding the Government to account, and the ban on zombie knives. The hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan was right that the previous Government brought in that provision, but we have actually made it happen. We will bring in a ban on ninja knives too, as part of Ronan’s law.

On the issue of kitchen knives, I take the hon. Lady’s point that in every house there is a drawer containing knives. There are now calls for us to consider whether in the domestic setting we should have knives that have a round rather than pointed tip. I have certainly been willing to consider that and look at the evidence. It is something we would have to do in consultation with the manufacturers of domestic knives. The Government are open to looking at anything that will start to tackle the problems with knife crime.

It may be helpful if I briefly outline the existing legislation in relation to the possession of offensive weapons. It is currently an offence to be in possession of a bladed article in public without good reason or lawful authority. It is also an offence to be in possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon and to threaten somebody, either in public or private. All those offences are serious. This new office will close a gap in legislation. The provision will equip the police with the power to address situations in which unlawful violence has not yet happened but where there is an intent to use unlawful violence, an intent to cause someone to believe unlawful violence would be used against them, or an intent to cause serious unlawful damage to property, as well as in situations in which a person enables someone else to do any of those things.

The offence may be committed in either a public place or a private place. There will be situations in which the police come across individuals with a knife or offensive weapon on the street and there is evidence that there is an intent to the weapon for unlawful violence. For instance, were an intelligence-led operation conducted on a motorbike ridden by two males in an urban area, who attempted to escape but were stopped, and both were detained, arrested and searched, and both were found to be in possession in public of a knife, the only offence available to the police would be possession in public of a knife or an offensive weapon. We do not believe that would reflect the seriousness of the offending behaviour and their intention.

The proposed new offence is necessary to bridge the gap between possession in public or private and the intention to threaten another person. We also believe that such serious offending behaviour needs to be reflected better in the offence that individuals are charged with, so that a successful prosecution attracts a sentence that more closely aligns with the violent intent and facts of the case. The offence will carry a maximum penalty of four years’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine, or both.

[Joe Robertson]

I thank the Minister for setting out her position. Does she not accept, however, that without amendment 39 the maximum sentence of four years for carrying a knife with intent is a serious mismatch with the sentence had the knife been used and somebody was severely injured? That mismatch means that the only way of getting someone sentenced appropriately is to have an injured person at the end. That cannot be right. If someone is carrying a knife, they intend to seriously injure someone. It should matter not whether they have actually done it. The court’s sentencing powers need to be greater than four years in some circumstances.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am going to come on to amendment 39 which, as the hon. Gentleman says, seeks to increase the maximum sentence for the offence to 14 years’ imprisonment. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West for his excellent contribution, which explained the background. The intention of the amendment is to implement the recommendations from the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation following the horrific attack in Southport. I fear that, as my hon. Friend said so eloquently, amendment 39 takes aspects of Jonathan Hall’s report out of context.