Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill Debate

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Department: Home Office

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Dominic Raab Excerpts
Tuesday 7th June 2011

(12 years, 11 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Dominic Raab Portrait Mr Dominic Raab (Esher and Walton) (Con)
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Like others, I would like to commend some previous speakers, particularly the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) and the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert).

Confronted by the terrorist challenge, the previous Government resorted to presenting a rather crude and blunt trade-off between freedom and security. Too often, it undermined Britain’s tradition of liberty without eliminating or even substantially reducing the threat to this country. In that context, I welcome the huge strides the Home Secretary and fellow Home Office Ministers have taken to defend and restore our freedoms by abolishing ID cards, halving pre-charge detention, tightening stop-and-search powers and the other measures they have taken in protection of freedoms legislation. I believe that Ministers have decisively reassessed how state power is used to protect us.

In many ways, if truth be told, the whole debate on control orders has been allowed to obscure the substantial progress made by this coalition and this Home Office. Nevertheless, the truth is that the control order regime presents a pernicious affront to our tradition of liberty. It undermines the most basic principle of British justice—of being innocent until proven guilty. Orders can be imposed on people who have not been found guilty of any criminal offence. That is wrong in principle, and control orders have proved to be an ineffective tool in practice. I shall come on to explain why I believe that to be the case.

In fairness, TPIMs are not as draconian as the old regime and again I want to recognise Ministers’ efforts to improve the conditions imposed by the Bill. In truth, however, TPIMs are only marginally less draconian and are certainly no more effective than their predecessor—and that is not much of a trade-off either. Liberty notes in its briefing that TPIMs

“mirror the most offensive elements”

of control orders. Under clause 3, the Home Secretary must demonstrate “reasonable belief” of involvement in terrorism as opposed to the old standard of “reasonable suspicion'”, but a criminal sanction of this severity should require proof of criminal conduct—not hunches, not opinions, but proof.

The potential restrictions on individuals set out in schedule 1 remain onerous—residency requirements, curfews, restrictions on communication and association, travel bans, electronic tagging and all the rest. Clause 5 appears to suggest a two-year limit for TPIMs, but they can be renewed if new terrorist activity is alleged. That is itself a worrying comment on the credibility of the new order as a counter-terrorism measure. Clause 21 retains the penalty of five years’ imprisonment for breach of an order.

In one important respect, which has already been mentioned today, the proposed regime is worse than its predecessor. Control orders had to be approved annually by Parliament in recognition of their exceptional nature and the urgency of the circumstances in which they were introduced, which ensured regular parliamentary oversight, but TPIMs will not be subject to such parliamentary reviews. A temporary emergency measure will thus become permanent and entrenched, and we will have crossed a line. It is worth our asking, with that in mind, what we will gain from such an affront to our tradition of liberty and justice. What will be the security dividend from this trade-off of our freedoms?

Of the 40 individuals formerly subject to control orders, seven absconded and five had their orders quashed by the courts. In 2009, each order cost the Home Office £135,000 to implement—quite apart from the costs of defending the orders from legal challenge and of policing. The number of control orders has halved in the last two years, from 20 to 10. Some will say that that shows that they are used only as a last resort, but in fact it demonstrates their irrelevance to the massive scale of the terrorist threat that we face. MI5 estimates that there are still about 4,000 terrorist suspects in the United Kingdom—10 controlees, 4,000 suspects. Let us not pretend that control orders have ever been anything more than the most flimsy and feeble of security safety nets.

Control orders are not just of dwindling relevance; they constitute a distraction from robust law enforcement and are actually a negative. That is why I welcome the Home Secretary's renewed focus on the Prevent strategy. I would welcome further still measures to strengthen our deportation capacity, which has been undermined by judicial legislation resulting from article 8 of the European convention on human rights, via the Human Rights Act 1998. The massively inflated rights to family life now allow the majority of deportation orders to be frustrated. That has nothing to do with article 3 torture grounds, which I would stand up for. More specifically, as Lord Macdonald stated in his report on the counter-terrorism review, control orders are an “impediment” to prosecution and conviction because

“controls may be imposed that precisely prevent those very activities that are apt to result in the discovery of evidence fit for prosecution, conviction and imprisonment”.

The wider evidence is stark and clear. This country now has a gaping prosecutorial deficit. The number of convictions for terrorist offences has fallen by 90% in the last four years, despite all the legislative hyperactivity of the previous Government, despite all the hubris, and despite the exponential rise in the terrorist threat, whose existence I think we all accept. Yet conviction in court and locking up terrorists constitute the only guaranteed way of protecting the public.

I find it worrying that we have heard so little about strengthening prosecution in real, core, concrete, tangible terms. We need a far more robust and proactive prosecution policy. We need to learn directly from experience abroad, particularly in Commonwealth countries such as the United States, Australia and Canada. We need much greater use of plea bargaining, although incidentally I do not see why the discount should be increased. I believe that if plea-bargaining were deployed effectively, it would almost certainly increase, not reduce, the number of dangerous people put behind bars. Indeed, that is the whole point of it.

As others have said, we must also overcome entrenched bureaucratic inertia and lift the ban on the use of intercept evidence in court, thus ending Britain’s virtual global isolation and giving prosecutors an invaluable tool with which to secure convictions. I know from my experience of working at the Foreign Office on information co-operation with international war crimes tribunals, along with all the Departments and agencies in the United Kingdom, what the limits are and how intercept evidence can be used discreetly, carefully and competently, and I am convinced that we can overcome the objections that have been presented.

The hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) said that if we were to ask anyone in the United States, such as the FBI or the Deputy Attorney-General—I myself have talked to the counter-terrorism adviser in the George Bush White House—they would be aghast at the idea that intercept evidence could not be used as a powerful weapon to put more terrorists behind bars. It is absolutely critical. It is a mystery to me that we in this country have allowed so much surveillance of the ordinary law-abiding citizen, yet we adamantly and trenchantly oppose using intercept evidence to target prosecution against those engaged in terror.

Lord Macdonald offered a very credible alternative to the control order regime, with restrictions linked to bail in the active pursuit of prosecution. I regret that his proposal was not taken up in place of the old regime, or, indeed, of the new one presented to us today.