Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords]

Emma Reynolds Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 22nd January 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Emma Reynolds)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

The Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill will enhance the UK’s resolution regime by giving the Bank of England a more flexible toolkit to respond to bank failures. The Bill creates a recapitalisation mechanism that ensures that certain costs of managing the failure of banking institutions do not fall to the taxpayer. It strengthens protections for public funds and financial stability, while supporting the competitiveness and growth of the UK financial sector by avoiding placing new up-front costs on the banking sector. It is therefore an important Bill that underpins this Government’s vision to promote growth and economic stability.

The policy in the Bill builds on the proposals set out in consultation by the previous Government. I thank the previous Government—I do not always do that, by the way—for the work they did with the Bank of England on the consultation and on the resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK, back in March 2023. The Bill provides the Bank of England with greater flexibility to manage the failure of small banks, and thereby embeds lessons learned from the volatility in the UK banking sector in 2023, notably that arising from the failure of SVB UK. I hope, given their origins, that these proposals will be welcomed by hon. Members from across the House.

The resolution regime was created by the Banking Act 2009 in the wake of the global financial crisis. It provides the Bank of England with a set of tools to manage the failure of financial institutions in a way that limits risks to financial stability, public funds and the UK economy. The regime was introduced in recognition of the global consensus that reforms were needed to end “too big to fail” and to ensure that, where necessary, financial institutions can be supported to fail in an orderly fashion. This regime has been developed and steadily added to by a series of successive governments over the past decade. That work has given the UK a robust regime that reflects relevant international standards and supports the UK’s role and reputation as a leader in financial regulation, enhancing confidence in our financial system and making the UK a more secure and attractive place in which to invest.

The resolution regime was last used to resolve Silicon Valley Bank UK, the UK subsidiary of the US firm that collapsed in March 2023. The Bank of England used its transfer powers under the Banking Act 2009 to effect the sale of Silicon Valley Bank UK to HSBC. That delivered good outcomes for financial stability, customers and taxpayers. All the bank’s customers were able to continue accessing their bank accounts and other facilities, and all deposits remained safe, secure and accessible. The Bank of England achieved the continuity of banking services, and maintained public confidence in the stability of the UK financial system.

The case of Silicon Valley Bank UK demonstrated the effectiveness and robustness of the resolution regime. However, as would be appropriate following any bank failure, the Treasury, the Bank of England and their international counterparts reflected carefully following this period of banking sector volatility, and following that reflection, the Government concluded that there was a case for a targeted enhancement to give the Bank of England greater flexibility to manage the failure of smaller banks such as Silicon Valley Bank UK.

At this point, I should explain that the Bank of England generally expects to place failing small banks into insolvency under the bank insolvency procedure, because their failures are not generally expected to meet the conditions that must be satisfied for the Bank of England to exercise its resolution powers. One of those conditions is that winding up the bank would not achieve the resolution objectives to the same extent as they would be achieved through the use of the resolution powers. Those objectives include protecting UK financial stability, covered depositors and public funds. When a failing firm enters insolvency, its eligible depositors are paid out up to £85,000 each within seven days by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, with higher limits for temporary high balances. This compensation is funded initially through a levy on the banking sector, and then, to the extent possible, recovered from the estate of the failed firm.

As was seen in the case of the Silicon Valley Bank, it is the Government’s view that in some cases of small bank failure, the public interest and resolution objectives are better served by the use of the resolution powers than by placing the firm into insolvency. Smaller banks are not required to hold additional funds and liabilities that could be bailed in during a resolution, so in a case in which a small bank does need to be resolved, additional capital may be required to support a successful resolution. For example, funds may be required for the bank in resolution to meet the minimum capital requirements for authorisation, or to sustain market confidence. At present, these recapitalisation costs have to be borne by public funds. The Government believe that that situation should be avoided to protect taxpayers from bearing those costs, and I hope that the Opposition agree; we shall see very shortly. To that end, the Bill aims to strengthen the protections for public funds when a small bank is placed into resolution.

Overall, this is a prudent set of reforms to ensure that the resolution regime continues to effectively limit risks to financial stability and, indeed, to taxpayers. The Bill does not make widespread changes to a regime that is working well, and it is important to emphasise that the bank insolvency procedure will continue to play an important role in managing the failure of small banks. That said, the Bill reflects the Government’s belief that a targeted set of changes is needed to ensure that, if necessary, existing resolution powers can be applied to small banks to achieve good outcomes for financial stability, while also protecting taxpayers. It achieves that by introducing a new recapitalisation mechanism, which allows the Bank of England to use funds provided by the banking sector to cover certain costs associated with resolving a failing banking institution.

The Bill does four main things. First, it expands the statutory functions of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, giving the Bank of England the power to require the FSCS to provide it with funds to be used to support the resolution of a failing bank. Secondly, it allows the FSCS to recover the funds provided to the Bank by charging levies on the banking sector. This mirrors the arrangements for funding payouts to covered depositors in insolvency, with the exception of the treatment of credit unions, to which I will return. Thirdly, the Bill gives the Bank of England an express ability to require a bank in resolution to issue new shares, facilitating the use of industry funds to meet a failing bank’s recapitalisation costs. Finally, following constructive debate in the other place, the Bill sets out a number of accountability measures that apply when the Bank of England uses the recapitalisation mechanism.

The Bill consists of eight clauses to deliver those key components. Clause 1 inserts a new section into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which introduces the new mechanism. It allows the Bank of England to require the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to provide the Bank with funds when using its resolution powers to transfer a failing firm to a private sector purchaser or bridge bank. It sets out what these funds can be used for, namely to cover the costs of recapitalising the firm and the expenses of the Bank of England or “relevant persons” in taking the resolution action. “Relevant persons”, for this purpose, means the Treasury, or a bridge bank or asset management vehicle operated by the Bank of England. The clause also allows the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to recover the funds provided through levies.

Clause 2 sets out the reporting requirements for the Bank of England when it uses the recapitalisation mechanism, added to the Bill by the Government in the other place. The Bank must report to the Chancellor on the use of the recapitalisation mechanism and the stabilisation option that it was used in connection with. The Treasury can specify the content and timing of these reports, although if a final report is not produced within three months, the Bank of England must produce an interim report within that three-month period. The Chancellor must lay all reports before Parliament, although the clause allows discretion to omit any information that it would not be in the public interest to publish.

Clause 3, added by the Government in the other place, requires the Bank of England to notify the Chairs of the relevant parliamentary Committees in this House and the other place—the Treasury Committee in the House of Commons, and the Financial Services Regulations Committee in the House of Lords—as soon as reasonably practicable after using the mechanism. Clause 4 requires the Bank of England to reimburse the Financial Services Compensation Scheme for any funds it provides that were not needed. Clause 5, also added by the Government in the other place, states that the Treasury must include guidance on the contents of reports on use of the mechanism in the code of practice, a statutory document that the Treasury must publish and to which the Bank of England must have regard, which explains how the resolution regime is intended to work in practice.

Clauses 6 and 7 make several consequential amendments to reflect the introduction of the new mechanism. Clause 6 primarily ensures that existing provisions relating to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme apply to the new mechanism in the same way. The most substantive provision specifies that the FSCS cannot levy credit unions to recoup funds provided under this mechanism, and was added to the Bill before its introduction to Parliament in response to valid concerns raised by industry. In clause 7, which contains mostly technical consequential amendments, the most substantive change gives the Bank of England the power to require a failing firm to issue new shares. That will make it easier for the Bank of England to use the funds provided by the FSCS to recapitalise the firm, by using the funds to buy the new shares. Clause 8 deals with procedural matters, including the provision that the Treasury may make regulations to commence the provisions in the Bill. I am grateful to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury for shepherding the Bill through its successful passage in the other place. As I have mentioned, the Government made a number of amendments to the Bill in the other place following constructive debate, feedback and engagement. They include the insertion of the requirements for the Bank of England to report to the Treasury and notify parliamentary committees. The Government also amended the Bill to ensure that there was clarity over whose expenses could be covered by funds provided through the mechanism. In addition, the Government published a number of important documents during the early stages of the Bill’s passage, including a draft update to their code of practice setting out how the mechanism is expected to be used in practice.

There remains one area of the Bill that will require the attention of this House, namely the question of the scope of the mechanism—that is, which firms the Bank of England can use the mechanism on to support their failure. This was heavily debated in the other place, and reflects concerns about the risk of the mechanism being used on a wide range of firms, with the potential for large levies as a consequence. Those concerns led to an amendment to the Bill, intended to exclude from the scope of the mechanism those banks that already hold the full set of equity and debt resources—the so-called MREL, or minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities—necessary to manage their own failure. The intent was to limit the scope to banks that are not required to hold additional capital resources, or banks that have not yet raised the full amount of additional resources to fully support their own failure. As I have alluded to, the Government note and appreciate the concerns being raised on this point, but as the Financial Secretary to the Treasury made clear during the Bill’s passage in the other place, the Government are clear that this Bill is primarily intended for smaller banks. My predecessor made a written statement to the House on 15 October to reiterate this policy position.

However, after careful reflection, the Government continue to believe that some flexibility should remain in the legislation on this point, in order to avoid constraining the Bank of England’s ability to use the mechanism in a highly uncertain crisis scenario. Narrowing the scope would constrain the Bank of England’s optionality, particularly where it might be necessary to supplement the bail-in of a firm’s own resources with additional capital resources. I note that this is considered an unlikely outcome, rather than a central case. Nevertheless, the Government consider it important to avoid constraining that optionality, given that the alternative may be to use public funds. Ultimately, we want to protect the taxpayer. The Government will therefore table an amendment in Committee to remove the constraint on the scope of the application of the new mechanism.

More broadly, I want to express my gratitude to the banking sector, with which the Government have engaged proactively and constructively both before and since the Bill was introduced. The Government appreciate the feedback from industry, and we have reflected on it carefully to ensure that the Bill delivers a proportionate reform. As alluded to earlier, in response to feedback from industry, the Government carved out credit unions from levy contributions to recoup funds provided by the financial services compensation scheme under the recapitalisation mechanism. That was deemed appropriate because credit unions are out of scope of the resolution powers. It would therefore be disproportionate to require them to contribute towards costs under the mechanism.

The Government have also sought to provide reassurances to industry on the impact of this Bill. For example, by modelling the mechanism on the existing funding framework for depositor payouts, industry will be liable to pay levies only after the point of failure, avoiding new up-front costs to firms. Alongside the Bill, the Government also published a cost-benefit analysis that sets out our general expectation that lifetime costs for levy payers will generally be lower under the mechanism outlined in the Bill, compared with insolvency. I note again the draft updates to the code of practice, which the Government have published to provide additional transparency to industry and Parliament on how the mechanism is expected to be used in practice.

[Adam Jogee (Newcastle-under-Lyme) (Lab)]

I am enjoying listening to the Minister’s speech, and I am learning quite a lot. Will she do me and the House a favour by sharing her thoughts on how I can best describe the benefits of this Bill to the people of Newcastle-under-Lyme when I go home tonight? I am sure she knows far better than me.

[Emma Reynolds]

My hon. Friend flatters me. It is not that easy to explain in simple terms, but I will do my best. Essentially, if a small bank is in trouble, it is better for it not to go into insolvency but instead to go through resolution to protect its depositors. In the case of SVB, only 14% of deposits were covered by the financial services compensation scheme, because the scheme only covers deposits up to the £85,000 threshold. Had public funds been required to facilitate the sale of SVB to another purchaser—in this case it was HSBC, but it could have been another institution—it would have had recourse to public funds. We are seeking to avoid a situation in which taxpayers in all our constituencies are on the hook for the failures of small banks. Where a bank has high-quality assets, which was the case for SVB, we can avoid the insolvency situation and pay out to depositors who have deposits above the £85,000 threshold. That resolution would be funded by the financial services compensation scheme and ultimately the banks, which contribute to the scheme through a levy. I hope that answer helps my hon. Friend—I am sorry that it was a bit long.

Stability is at the heart of the Government’s agenda for economic growth, because when we do not have economic and financial stability, it is working people who pay the price. We have to bear in mind what we are seeking to do, which is ultimately to protect the interests of the taxpayer and to ensure that we do not have to have recourse to public funds.

[Sir Ashley Fox (Bridgwater) (Con)]

I welcome this Bill, but can the Minister assure the House that, at all times, the aim of the Government is to minimise the liability of the taxpayer? Where losses have to be sustained, they should be borne first by the shareholders, secondly by the bondholders and perhaps thirdly, and regretfully, by the deposit holders. That should be the order in which losses are sustained.

[Emma Reynolds]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman, who puts it very well. He will know that there was a different order in the case of Credit Suisse, but the then Government said at the time that that would not be their order of priority. We are seeking to protect the taxpayer in this Bill, and he is right: had there been a cost associated with the transfer of SVB, it would have fallen first to those people before falling to the taxpayer. If we pass this legislation, for which I hope there is cross-party support, we will avoid that eventuality, because if we follow the order of priority and get to the financial services compensation scheme, the cost will be paid through a levy on the banks in that scheme. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question.

The resolution regime is a critical source of stability when banks fail, because it ensures that public funds and taxpayer money are protected. This Bill delivers a proportionate and targeted enhancement to the resolution regime to ensure that it continues to provide that important stability. As I said at the start of this debate, it is therefore an important Bill that underpins the Government’s vision for economic growth, and I commend it to the House.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)]

I draw attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I have no desire to detain the House for long, but I have some questions that I hope the Economic Secretary can address, continuing our conversation in the Delegated Legislation Committee earlier this week.

The Economic Secretary and I are both alumni of TheCityUK, so she will know that what financial services want most of all is certainty of regulation and decision making. They need to know that the playing field is level and predictable. While we are all patting ourselves on the back about Silicon Valley Bank, the consensus that everyone did a good job makes me slightly suspicious.

The Bank of England effectively made three decisions during the unravelling of Silicon Valley Bank that I want to put on the Economic Secretary’s desk for her to consider. Is more certainty required from the Bank of England on the triggering of those decisions?

First, the Bank of England denied Silicon Valley Bank short-term funding. SVB UK was solvent, as it would have to be as a UK subsidiary regulated by the Bank of England. It applied for £1.8 billion of short-term funding when it became clear that its parent company was in trouble. That funding was denied by the Bank of England, and I do not think there has ever been any significant examination of why the Bank took that decision.

Obviously, there was a run on Silicon Valley Bank, with depositors seeking to pull out their money, and the bank was unable to honour those withdrawals, which is why it applied for short-term funding. A possible alternative route could have been a temporary freeze on withdrawals and/or the provision of short-term funding, which could have allowed the bank to remain solvent in the UK. Understanding what triggered that decision, and how other banks in similar circumstances might be handled by the Bank of England in future, is key.

Secondly, as the shadow Minister said, the Bank of England initially decided to put Silicon Valley Bank UK into insolvency and rely on the £85,000 depositor guarantee and the £170,000 joint depositor guarantee. We do not know why the Bank changed its mind.

[Emma Reynolds]

I can tell I am going to enjoy discussing these matters with the right hon. Gentleman. I have looked into this since our exchange on Monday, and I want to clarify what happened on the Friday before the Monday in March 2023. The Bank of England issued a statement on the Friday evening saying that it intended to apply to the court to place SVB UK Ltd into a bank insolvency procedure, absent any meaningful further information. However, a buyer came forward over the weekend, which is what changed between the Friday and the Monday. It was judged to be both in the public interest and in the interest of SVB UK customers that this resolution on the Monday morning was preferable to the insolvency procedure that had been announced on the Friday.

[Kit Malthouse]

That is useful information about the Bank’s decision making. However, the Bank still decided to go for insolvency prior to a resolution mechanism. I find it hard to see that, within that 36-hour period, it had not canvassed whether there was a market for the bank. My point remains: if I were an investor or an overseas bank trying to establish and invest significant funds in a UK branch, I would like to understand why the Bank of England makes these decisions, and the criteria and parameters by which it is likely to make a decision either way. Then, of course, the final decision was taken to sell or transfer the bank to HSBC—for a minimal consideration, I think. I really want to understand what value was placed on that bank going to HSBC, as opposed to any of the other banks that might have been bidding for it.

At the heart of this is my worry about competition. When a bank is put in this resolution position, obviously it needs to move to another bank that has significant assets and can fulfil the rightful demands of its depositors to withdraw their funds. That will naturally be a bigger bank, and there is a possibility—although hopefully this will not happen, as we will not use resolution very often—that small, higher-risk challenger banks will find themselves unable to obtain short-term funding from the Bank of England because of their size, and will therefore be gobbled up by the leviathans of the banking system. Over time, there might be a natural move back towards where we were prior to all these challenger banks appearing—to having four or five massive banks that dominate the system in an uncompetitive way.

I am asking the Minister not necessarily to change the legislation, but to consider setting out in a code of conduct what consideration the Bank of England has to give to the competitive landscape when it is resolving a bank. When it transfers one small bank to another small bank as part of a resolution, for example, that wheel might be oiled with a bit of short-term funding, in the interests of maintaining that competitive landscape. The cost of that should not fall on the taxpayer; effectively, it should be a loan for repayment. One of the benefits, if you like, of the 2007-08 crash—one of the silver linings of that cloud—is that we have a much more diverse banking landscape than before. There was recognition that having these huge organisations that crash the entire global economy if they fail was dangerous for the western economy, and that a much more diverse landscape was therefore desirable. The problem with that, obviously, is that there is more inherent risk in those smaller banks. If there is more inherent risk, we are likely to see more resolution, and in time we may end up back where we were.

I support the Bill. I think that resolution is exactly the right way to go, and we should obviate the risk to the taxpayer. There are also negatives to the system, though, so I hope that the Minister, who I am sure will do the job with aplomb, will think carefully about the impact on the world of the Bank of England’s decision making and predictability; about what the Bank can do to provide transparency, whether through a code of conduct or indicators of practice; and about the impact of resolution on competition.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords]

Emma Reynolds Excerpts

Report stage
Thursday 24th April 2025 Commons Chamber

[Clive Jones (Wokingham) (LD)]

The Liberal Democrats are supportive of the Bill, because the last thing taxpayers need to worry about are the consequences of an under-regulated banking sector. I have brought amendment 3 back from Committee, because the size of banks eligible for the new mechanism has been a key debate through the Bill’s passage.

The Minister has regularly set out that the Bill’s stated aim is to enhance the resolution regime, so that we can respond to the failure of small banks. However, the Bill does not restrict the regime to small or medium-sized banks. If applied to large banks, it would create high costs for banks and customers. The costs would persist for many years, adding a significant long-term burden on the banking sector and consumers. Amendment 3 would ensure that the Bill does not apply to banks that have reached the end-state minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities—put more simply, the largest UK banks. That would mean that only small and medium-sized banks could be supported by the mechanism. That would protect consumers and the banking sector from unnecessary financial burden.

Amendment 4 has also been brought back from Committee. It would place a further objective on the Bank of England to consider the competitiveness and growth of the market before directing the recapitalisation of a failing small bank through a levy on the banking sector. We believe that further consideration of the effect on the competitiveness and growth of the market is important before directing the recapitalisation of failing small banks.

To conclude, I would be grateful if the Minister could expand on the remarks made in Committee and explain how precisely the amendment would complicate the process of managing a bank failure.

[The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Emma Reynolds)]

It is always a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Cummins. I thank the hon. Members for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier) and for Wokingham (Clive Jones) for their amendments and their constructive engagement throughout the Bill’s passage. The Bill will ensure that the Bank of England remains equipped with the necessary tools to effectively manage bank failures in a way that minimises risk to the taxpayer and to UK financial stability, protecting the taxpayer.

While there may be some disagreements on the finer detail of the Bill, what we have heard today, and on Second Reading and in Committee, demonstrates that there is cross-party support for the principles and overall objectives of the Bill. I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest and the hon. Member for Wokingham for supporting those.

The amendments cover a broad range of issues, and I will explain the Government’s position on them in turn, but first I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (David Pinto-Duschinsky) for setting out his experience of the banking crisis and stressing that the mechanism we are seeking to provide through the Bill must allow the Bank of England, in close consultation with the Treasury and other financial services regulators, to act with speed and flexibility at times of crisis. There are hours, not days, in which to make decisions during crises, and at the forefront of our minds when discussing the Bill should be that they often happen over the weekend, as happened under the previous Government with Silicon Valley Bank. I will turn to that example shortly, but I wanted to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon for setting out his concerns about the amendments that would essentially stymie the effectiveness of the Bill.

I note that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, raised a number of issues on new clause 3, on the Bill’s impact on credit unions. Some were not strictly relevant to the Bill, but I will come on to them. As he noted, the Government absolutely support credit unions. They play a vital role in providing saving products and affordable credit in local communities across the country. However, they are not in scope of the resolution regime that we are discussing, and therefore not in scope of the new recapitalisation payment mechanism introduced by the Bill. That is a benefit to the credit union sector. Indeed, it asked the Government to ensure that it was not included in the payment mechanism. Credit unions will therefore not be liable to pay towards the cost of a failure where the mechanism is used.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I support wholeheartedly what the Minister has said about credit unions, because credit unions have a big role to play in Northern Ireland, as they do in other parts of the United Kingdom. My concern when it comes to crises in banks is that credit unions belong to their members, but banks have a different hierarchy—they have chief executives and directors to pay. I believe it is unfair for bankers to retain their bonuses while the pensioner who has saved his pennies all his life suffers. No matter what the crisis is, the executives still get their dividends and bonuses. I have a simple question: within this legislation and the rules we have here, can we be assured that the bankers—the ones at the top who may be responsible for the banks, or certainly act responsible for them—will find that their bonuses are not delivered to them?

[Emma Reynolds]

The hon. Gentleman draws me on something that is not pertinent to the amendments, but I understand why he has asked the question. When a bank fails, there is a hierarchy of creditors. I can write to him with that hierarchy, as I do not have it in my head at the moment. The hierarchy ensures that if, for example, the bank is bailed in, those who have already invested in the bank become stakeholders, although it depends on the resolution scenario and where they are in that process. The people who have deposits in the bank—in more simple language, people who have bank accounts—are protected up to £85,000. Soon that will increase in the way that the shadow Minister suggested.

Amendments 1 and 3 in the names of shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, and the hon. Member for Wokingham respectively both relate to the scope of the Bill, which has been discussed at length during the Bill’s passage through this House and in the other place. The Government’s position remains that the mechanism in the Bill is not intended to support the resolution of the largest banks. The hon. Member for Wyre Forest set that out in his speech, as did the hon. Member for Wokingham. The largest banks will continue to be required to hold MREL to self-insure against their own failure. For banks that are required to hold MREL, the Bank of England should in the first instance use those resources to recapitalise such a firm in resolution rather than resorting to the new mechanism in the Bill. It is right that shareholders and investors in the firm should bear losses before anyone else, which goes to the point made by the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon).

I return to the primary purpose of the Bill, which is to protect the taxpayer. Bank failures are by their nature highly unpredictable, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon said. In the unlikely circumstances where a top-up is needed to resolve a bank once all its MREL resources have been used, hon. Members must consider whether they want those costs to be borne by the taxpayer. It is the Government’s belief that the taxpayer should not be on the hook for those costs.

I made the point in Committee, and do so again today, that safeguards are in place to prevent inappropriate use of the mechanism. The Treasury, for example, is involved in the exercise of any resolution powers through being consulted about whether conditions for resolution have been met. It would also need to approve any resolution action with implications for public funds. If the Bank of England requested a large sum from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme that the scheme could not provide through its own resources, additional amounts would need to be borrowed from the Treasury and would therefore require the Treasury’s approval. Therefore, in practice, Treasury consent would be required if the Bank of England had requested a large sum.

The shadow Minister attempted to draw me into many different subjects related to MREL. You rightly reminded him, Madam Deputy Speaker, of the scope of the Bill and the amendments under discussion. I will always be happy to have those discussions with him—as he knows, the Bank of England recently consulted on the thresholds—and I note what he said before he was called to order. He also tried to draw me into questions about the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, which are also for a different day; as he said, there will soon be increases.

[Matt Rodda (Reading Central) (Lab)]

I appreciate that the Bill’s scope is limited, and the Minister is making an excellent case for the Government. I realise that bank collapses are unusual and that the Government take a range of steps to try to protect the interests of consumers, but could she write to reassure me on the related point of bank branches there were a bank collapse?

[Emma Reynolds]

Perhaps my hon. Friend and I could have a discussion outside the Chamber so that I can better understand his question. The mechanism in the Bill is about what happens when the resolution regime is triggered. Four different conditions have to be met for that to happen. The Bill seeks to continue the work that the Opposition started to take forward when they were in government before the election about what we do in cases like that of Silicon Valley Bank. In that case, there was not any recourse to public funds, but this is about how we protect the taxpayer in a scenario where there is. Perhaps we can have a discussion about bank branch closures, which is obviously of great concern to Members across the House.

I appreciate that amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Wokingham, aims to introduce an additional safeguard by permitting the Bank of England to use its new power on the largest banks only if the Treasury permits that through regulations. He talked about that in his speech. However, there may be risks associated with that approach, particularly if the Bank of England needed to take a decision at pace in a crisis. Indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon was in the Treasury when many such situations arose. [Interruption.] Well, let us not rake over the history. We discussed some of these issues in Committee.

As the shadow Minister suggested, we are trying to avoid a window of uncertainty during which a statutory instrument would be laid. The Bank of England, working in close partnership and consultation with the Treasury and the other financial services regulators, needs to be able to act swiftly and decisively—often over the weekend. I ask hon. Members, and the hon. Member for Wokingham in particular, to cast our minds back to the weekend when Silicon Valley Bank UK was failing. The Bill derives from the lessons learned from that event.

What we saw from that incident is how quickly the authorities—the Bank of England in consultation with the Treasury, the PRA and the FCA—must move to find a solution before markets open and resolve a failing firm in a way that protects financial stability, depositors and the taxpayer. That has to be at the forefront of our minds when we are thinking about the amendments.

Amendment 3 could add a further stage to that process, whereby the Treasury must lay regulations to enable the Bank of England to act. That may well—it is most likely that it would—hamper those efforts to implement a solution swiftly to achieve those objectives. Had Silicon Valley Bank UK been caught by such requirements, that certainly would have made achieving the solution by Monday morning, before the markets opened, much more challenging. Again, the priority is to protect the depositors and to protect financial stability.

Overall, the Government firmly believe that it is better to leave flexibility for the Bank, noting the safeguards in place that I have already mentioned. On the basis of those points, I hope that hon. Members will be persuaded to support the Government’s position on this matter; I know that it is an issue of some contention.

Amendment 4, also in the name of the hon. Member for Wokingham, is on whether the Bank of England should have a growth and competitiveness objective when exercising its new power—another topic that we have discussed previously during the Bill’s passage. Growth and competitiveness are fundamental priorities for the Government, and as I stated in Committee, a disorderly bank failure could pose a serious risk to the growth and competitiveness of the sector and to the UK economy. The Bill seeks to mitigate that risk.

Bearing that in mind, the Government do not believe that they should impose a requirement on the Bank of England to consider growth and competitiveness when it is taking urgent crisis management action in relation to an individual distressed or failing firm. At such a time, the situation that it would have to manage would be challenging enough without an additional broad objective of that kind. The resolution objectives set out in the Banking Act 2009 already provide a solid basis on which it must make its decisions, including protecting financial stability, protecting covered depositors and protecting the taxpayer. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon reminded us, the Bank of England, in close partnership with the Treasury and the other financial services regulators, needs to act with speed and flexibility to maintain financial stability. Those considerations are very different from those that the PRA and the FCA make in their policymaking roles. The Government strongly support the existence of their secondary objective on facilitating growth and competitiveness.

I note and accept that there is a broader question about how the Bank of England can support growth and competitiveness, but this is a complex matter, and one that is well beyond the scope of the Bill. We will be resisting the amendment for those reasons.

Finally—[Interruption.] I see that our debate has attracted quite a lot of discussion around the edges; if I could hear myself think, it would be nice. I turn briefly to amendment 2, tabled by the shadow Minister. First, I reiterate that the Government have made clear their strong commitment to support the mutual sector, and I reassure him that we take our commitment in the manifesto to double the size of the mutual and co-operative sector very seriously. Many hon. Members on the Government Benches who serve as Labour and Co-operative MPs have a great interest in this matter, as has been demonstrated.

I also direct the shadow Minister—to be fair, he referred to a couple of them—to the package of measures that the Chancellor set out at Mansion House, which included the consultation on the potential to reform common bonds for credit unions in Great Britain. The Chancellor asked the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority to produce a report on the mutuals landscape by the end of the year. She also welcomed the establishment of an industry-led mutual and co-operative business council, the first meeting of which I attended earlier this year.

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[Gareth Snell (Stoke-on-Trent Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Emma Reynolds]

I am afraid I am being urged to wrap up. I remind Members that the Bill is fundamentally about protecting the taxpayer—

[Gareth Snell]

We have Third Reading—it’s fine.

[Emma Reynolds]

We have not come to that yet; my hon. Friend can intervene on Third Reading. [Laughter.]

Taking what I was saying into account, although the Government appreciate the point raised by the sector and by the shadow Minister, we do not believe it is necessary to hardwire in legislation a requirement to update the code of practice on this matter. I understand, however, that the mutual sector feels strongly about this issue, and my officials and I will continue to engage with the sector on it. I commend to the House our position on the new clauses and amendments, which is to resist them.

[Mark Garnier]

With the leave of the House, I wish to address one or two of the points made in the debate. The hon. Member for Hendon (David Pinto-Duschinsky) is an incredibly valuable contributor to the debate because of his experience back in the days of the 2008 financial crisis. If I remember correctly, that was largely a result of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which almost compounded the problem by having a tripartite regime that looked after the banking sector at the time. If I remember rightly, the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time found it so scary that his eyebrows nearly turned white. One of the surprising things about that crisis was that just 10 years earlier we had seen the Asian banking crisis, which basically laid the groundwork for what subsequently happened in the west. Perhaps we in the west were too arrogant to believe that it could happen to us, yet it sure did.

In my role as a member of the Treasury Committee from 2010 to 2016, and on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, I looked at all these issues very extensively. It is incredibly important that we resolve the issue. As it has turned out, the Financial Services Act 2012 and the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 have worked well in respect of some of this resolution.

On the point about LDIs and the financial crisis as a result of the Budget, we dealt with the problem pretty swiftly and pretty brutally. When one of our leaders gets it wrong, we get rid of them fairly quickly. I suggest to the Labour party that if Government Front Benchers get things wrong, it is worth cauterising the problem and moving on.

On credit unions and mutuals, we absolutely recognise the point about the mutual sector. We are not asking for demutualisation to be ruled out; we are asking for the prospect of avoiding demutualisation to be part of that very swift process. That is why we will press amendment 2 to a Division. I met the credit unions yesterday, and they are keen that the principle of new clause 3 is voted on, so we will press that as well.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

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[Emma Reynolds]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

We can hopefully do Third Reading in a more relaxed fashion. As we have discussed through the Bill’s passage, the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill will strengthen the UK’s bank resolution regime by providing the Bank of England with a more flexible toolkit for responding to the failure of banking institutions.

As volatility over recent weeks has shown, global uncertainty can have a real impact on financial markets across the world. That is why it is important that the UK remains equipped with an effective financial stability toolkit. The primary objective of the recapitalisation mechanism introduced by the Bill is to protect the taxpayer; it will provide more comprehensive protection for public funds when banks fail. I think both sides of the House can agree that this is of vital importance to ensure that our constituents are not left on the hook when a bank collapses. The Bill achieves that without placing new up-front costs on the banking sector, and therefore strikes the right balance between protecting financial stability and supporting the Government’s No. 1 priority of driving economic growth.

I would like to thank all those in this House and the other place who have contributed to the scrutiny of the Bill. In particular, I would like to thank the Opposition for their constructive engagement. As I said on Report, there is broad agreement on the primary objectives and principles of the Bill, but differing views have been expressed on the scope of the mechanism and certain finer details. I reiterate the Government’s position: it is important to learn the lessons from the case of Silicon Valley Bank UK, which demonstrates that the implications of a firm’s failure cannot always be anticipated, and things move very quickly. It is important that the legislation avoids overly restricting the Bank of England’s ability to use the mechanism in unpredictable and fast-moving failure scenarios, and can achieve its primary objective of protecting the taxpayer. I hope that those in the other place will agree with the Government’s position when the Bill returns there for their consideration.

I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), the hon. Members for Dorking and Horley (Chris Coghlan) and for Wokingham (Clive Jones), and others who were on the Committee. I thank the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), and the hon. Members for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) and for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox), for their contributions on Second Reading. I thank the Minister with responsibility for pensions, my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea West (Torsten Bell), who assisted me on Second Reading, and my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Adam Jogee) for his input. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (David Pinto-Duschinsky) for his speech on Report.

I would like to extend my gratitude to my officials in the Treasury for their hard work in developing this highly technical Bill, which could not easily be rushed, and for supporting me throughout the Bill’s passage. I am also grateful to the House staff, parliamentary counsel and all other officials involved in the passage of the Bill.

This Bill supports the UK economy’s resilience to the risks posed by bank failures. We all remember the damage caused by the financial crisis, and the Bill, alongside other measures that allow failures to be managed in an orderly way, upholds the economic and financial stability that will deliver on the Government’s growth mission. I am pleased that the Bill has received broad cross-party support in this House and the other place, and I look forward to its enactment. I commend it to the House.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

I call the shadow Minister.