Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 13th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Sir Jeffrey M. Donaldson]

I will come to the Good Friday agreement in my remarks, but I simply say to the hon. Member that there is a difference of view as to how we interpret what is required in terms of consent. Lord Trimble, as one of the key negotiators of the Belfast agreement, has stated very clearly that the principle of consent does not just apply to the final question as to whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom. The term “constitutional status” extends to these circumstances, where Northern Ireland’s constitutional relationship with the rest of the United Kingdom has been changed by virtue of the subjugation of the Acts of Union.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

The right hon. Gentleman knows with what affection I regard him, his party and Northern Ireland, having had the privilege of being Advocate General for Northern Ireland. What he is saying is a very good case for triggering article 16, which was the entire purpose of the inclusion of article 16 in the protocol. It is not necessarily a good reason, however, for changing the entire basis of the treaty, including writing out the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and so on. How do we get from a position where we have societal impacts, with which I am perfectly willing to agree, to a position where we virtually rewrite the terms of a treaty that we solemnly signed only two and a half years ago?

[Sir Jeffrey M. Donaldson]

I have great respect for the right hon. and learned Member, and I know of his affection for Northern Ireland. I think back to those very difficult and challenging days when this House was dealing with the pre-departure discussions about the laws that would have to be put in place around the treaty to leave the European Union. I thank him for the time that he took to understand the situation in regard to Northern Ireland.

I would say two things in response to the point that the right hon. and learned Member has, understandably, made. First, the Command Paper published by the UK Government one year ago last July set out the basis on which they believed that the conditions had been met for article 16 to be triggered. We have been very patient. We have waited and waited, and we allowed time for the negotiations with the European Union to go forward in the hope that the EU would show more flexibility. I do not doubt the integrity of Maroš Šefčovič as the lead negotiator, but the difficulty is that his negotiating remit is so constrained that his ability to deliver the change that is required to meet the need—to resolve the difficulties created by the protocol—is so limited that in the absence of a change of his remit, I do not think those negotiations will get anywhere.

Article 16 and the triggering thereof is a temporary measure; it is not a permanent solution. What I need, what Northern Ireland needs and, especially, what business in Northern Ireland needs is certainty. That is why we believe that the Government are right to bring forward proposals for a longer-term solution, and not just to go for the temporary fix—the sticking plaster—of article 16. That will create more uncertainty rather than giving us certainty, and it is certainty that we are looking for. That is why I think that what the Government have done is right in the circumstances.

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[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

How would the hon. Gentleman propose to negotiate to permit the voters of Northern Ireland to have a say in the laws that are being made for them?

[Peter Kyle]

It was a Labour Government who delivered the framework for the Good Friday agreement in the first place. We respect devolution to Northern Ireland. The key thing is that, yes, Northern Ireland has been suffering the existential challenges posed by the protocol, but, fundamentally, Northern Ireland has been suffering from neglect. When the Executive collapsed, there was no visit from the Prime Minister for five months; there were no multi-party talks, in Downing Street or in Belfast; there was no attempt at getting people around the table; and not a single statement was made to this House about Northern Ireland by the Northern Ireland Secretary at the time, the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary. Just imagine for one second what would happen if the Welsh Senedd or the Scottish Parliament collapsed and this House of Commons went five months before there was any action whatsoever. The only time the Prime Minister visited Northern Ireland was once the Assembly failed to be assembled, after the elections. At that point, when the difficulties in Northern Ireland became so deeply entrenched, the Prime Minister finally went over there for one quick, fleeting, in-and-out visit. That is not good enough. We know that Northern Ireland—all of Northern Ireland—deserves the full attention of the UK Government. It also needs the attention and engagement of this House, where Northern Ireland parties can have their say regularly, on an ongoing basis, not just once a month at oral questions.

[Peter Kyle]

I suggest that had the Prime Minister gone to live in Northern Ireland and gone to camp out there—bearing in mind that he is the person who went to Northern Ireland and promised that over his dead body would there be a border in the Irish sea, and bearing in mind what we now know he has been engaging in and the squalor with which he delivered the duties of his office, based on the resignation letters of members of his own Government—he is not the person who could ever have hoped to muster the statecraft to deliver the settlement that Northern Ireland needs.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

rose—

[Peter Kyle]

I am going to finish now, so that we can hear directly from Conservative Members. We have always to remember that the Conservative party was the one that enabled, delivered and sustained that Prime Minister in office, and all the time that was done, the politics of Northern Ireland did not just fail to move forward—it sank. So this Bill, from that Government, who their leadership candidates are only too happy to support, is an affront to the UK’s values and to our international interests, at home and abroad. This Bill will not deliver the progress that is needed in Northern Ireland and it will only harm our interests abroad.

[The Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. We had three hours for this debate. The first four speeches have taken more than two hours. We have about 55 minutes left and 10 people wish to speak. I do not have the power to put on a time limit, but you all have the power to act decently, and speak for four or five minutes and no longer. I hold you all to honour. You should take four to five minutes, otherwise you are preventing other people from speaking. I call Sir Geoffrey Cox.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I will be quick. I have listened with fascination to the contributions and speeches made this afternoon. If I thought that the Bill would produce a durable and permanent solution, I would support it, but I do not believe it will produce a durable and permanent solution. The fact is that we cannot impose on Northern Ireland, or on any other party to a treaty that we signed, unilaterally a political solution. A political solution has to be reached politically; it cannot be imposed by this House through legislation. The EU—like it or not—and the Irish Government are a party to these negotiations. Unless we are able to achieve assent to the arrangements that we propose, they will not last. It will have to be resolved ultimately by agreement. It is much the same as the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill—another attempt by the Government to impose a political solution on Northern Ireland, without first having reached the solution and then produced the legislation that works out and implements that solution. I do not believe that this legislation will produce a permanent solution.

We come to the question of necessity. I am not prepared to say that there is an impossibility that the basis of necessity could not justify the actions that the Government are taking. I have the gravest of misgivings about it, and the deepest of scepticism about whether or not it affords a proper legal basis as a matter of international law, but we have not seen the evidence. It is possible that the Government and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General have seen some evidence that we have not seen that could crystallise at least the plausible case that this action needs to be taken.

I support the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), but the fact of the matter is that even necessity is not a legal basis for a permanent solution. The doctrine of necessity in international law requires the measures that have been implemented as a necessity to answer the urgent and imminent peril to be removed as soon as the basis for taking action on the grounds of necessity has gone. Indeed, necessity does not even remove the breach; one is still in breach of the agreement. Necessity simply removes the wrongfulness, which further emphasises the fact that necessity cannot produce a permanent solution as a matter of international law. Only agreement—only the reaching of a political solution—can do so.

Nobody need tell me about the politically tone deaf intransigence of the European Union in negotiation. I recall vividly in my visits to Brussels in the early months of 2019, saying to Michel Barnier, “But do you not see, Michel, that this produces an anomalous situation? If a farmer in Northern Ireland wants to take up the issue of cattle tagging, to whom does he go? When the law is imposed by the European Union, the only place he can go is either to Brussels itself or to Dublin, and how will that feel for one whole section of the community of Northern Ireland?” I must tell the Committee that the European Union representatives reacted as if they had been stung by wasps. We have to understand that those at the European Union believe the protocol to be the very zenith of creative diplomacy. They cherish and prize it, as if it were their own child. But that does not mean that we do not need to engage in the patient effort—maybe it will take months, maybe years—gradually to make them see that this is an unsustainable situation.

What we should not do is reach immediately for a solution, over which there are the gravest doubts as to its efficacy as a matter of international law, over which there are the gravest doubts about the sincerity and good faith of the Government—for I take it that the Government have advanced their case on the basis of necessity sincerely. I assume that they must mean, and genuinely mean, that they genuinely believe that there is a respectable case on the basis of necessity. If they do, why should we not at least be told the evidence—the evidence! We can gist it, we can summarise it if it is security sensitive, but at least let this House acquit itself of the doubt that exists over its legal efficacy as a matter of international law. It is no light thing for this House to take a step—

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

No, I will not give way. Too many need to speak.

It is no light matter for this House to take a step that is in contravention of its international obligations. The dignity of this nation rests upon its word being seen to be implemented once it is given. Therefore, I think it a small thing—a reasonable thing—that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst has asked.

My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary talked about Members as patriots. I do not believe that there is a person in this House who is not a patriot, not a person in this House who does not believe—[Interruption.] There may be some exceptions on the Opposition Benches, but I certainly do not believe that of those on the Labour Benches. The fact is that I want to give credit and the benefit of the doubt to everybody, but patriotism can also be the belief that we should stand by our word and that we depart from it only if there is a proper legal basis for doing so.

There is plenty of precedent for the Attorney General coming to the House—I should know, I did it—to answer questions about the international law compatibility of a measure in this House. Indeed, it goes way back, I think, to either the Wilson Government or the Heath Government. Attorneys General would come to the House to answer questions on the compatibility of statutes with international law. I invite the Minister, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton North (Michael Ellis), to invite the Attorney General to come and answer those questions, because, in my judgment, it is an obligation to the House. The Attorney General has a residual duty to advise the House on matters such as this.

I say to my right hon. and learned Friend that I will not be able to support this Bill—that comes as no surprise—but I sympathise with the plight in which the Government find themselves. We should all be a lot better if we united in this House to besiege the European Union with requests so that it sees that it must effect real change in this protocol. That is why I asked the hon. Member for Hove (Peter Kyle) what is his solution to the democratic deficit of which my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) has properly and accurately spoken.

These are really intransigent, intractable problems. It is no use sitting, as the hon. Member for Hove does, attacking those of us on the Government Benches for not having solutions if he just talks more and does not propose constructive, new replacement agreements that might fulfil the legitimate wish of the Unionist community to feel that they are not separated and segregated from the rest of the kingdom, while doing justice to the European Union’s desire to protect its single market.

[Peter Kyle]

New Zealand has been able to negotiate quite diligently and swiftly a veterinary agreement with the European Union. Turkey has been able to agree a customs arrangement with the EU. There has been no law breaking, no storming out of negotiations; representatives sat round the table and got it done. Why does he think that this Government have failed where other Governments have succeeded?

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[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

Dame Eleanor, you rebuke me entirely justly. Let me see if I can answer the question. Yes, of course there are trade mitigations, and I had a sincere hope two and a half years ago that they would be resolved in the joint committee. They have not been resolved in the joint committee.

[Peter Kyle]

Why?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I do not know, but it is no use the hon. Gentleman’s using the tactic of deflection to try to put me off my question to him. The democratic problem is what I put to him, and Labour has no answer to that problem. If the party is to be taken seriously, it needs concrete proposals that might work. On that note, Dame Eleanor, I will conclude.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Committee stage & 3rd reading
Monday 13th September 2021 Commons Chamber

[Chloe Smith]

Thank you very much indeed, Dame Eleanor. I shall endeavour to do that, and I hope you will bear with me while I ensure that I cover all that material.

Let me begin at the beginning, with clause 1. There is consensus throughout the House that the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 has proven to be not fit for purpose and has been damaging to effective and accountable government. The experience of 2019 in particular showed us that the Act was flawed and ran counter to core constitutional principles, and was therefore damaging to the flexible functioning of our constitution. It was unique legislation and it did not work. We saw how, in 2017, a Government who commanded a majority in the House of Commons were able to call an early general election with ease, irrespective of the Act’s intentions.

The events of 2019 then demonstrated how the 2011 Act could obstruct democracy by making it harder to hold a necessary election. The Act’s prescriptive constraints, such as the threshold of a supermajority requirement for a general election and the statutory motions of no confidence, created an untenable situation in which the Government could neither pass vital legislation through Parliament nor call a new election. The result was parliamentary paralysis at a critical time for our Government. The introduction of bespoke primary legislation that circumvented the Act and let us hold a general election in 2019 was the final indictment of the Act.

The Bill therefore repeals the 2011 Act and returns us to the tried and tested system whereby Parliament will automatically dissolve after five years, if it has not been dissolved earlier by the sovereign exercising that prerogative power at the request of the Prime Minister. The key argument is that in doing so it will help to deliver increased legal, constitutional and political certainty around the process for the dissolving of Parliament. Clause 1 repeals the 2011 Act and in doing so delivers, as I have already mentioned, on both a Government manifesto commitment and a Labour manifesto commitment to do so. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 2 makes express provision to revive the prerogative powers that relate to the dissolution of Parliament and the calling of a new Parliament. That means that Parliament will, once more, be dissolved by the sovereign at the request of the Prime Minister. By doing this, the clause delivers on the Bill’s purpose, which is to reset the clock back to the pre-2011 position with as much clarity as possible. The clause is clear in its intention and in its effect. As the Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act put it, the drafting of clause 2 is

“sufficiently clear to give effect to the Government’s intention of returning to the constitutional position”

that existed prior to the passing of the 2011 Act.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend help the House in respect of whether the Government acknowledge the existence of the Lascelles principles? If they do, what is the impact of clause 2 on those principles?

[Chloe Smith]

Of course the Government and I acknowledge the existence of those principles; they are a historical fact in and of themselves. I refer my right hon. and learned Friend to the fact that we have said consistently throughout the Bill’s preparation and progress so far that we believe that now is the time for the underpinning conventions of the prerogative power to be debated and, indeed, restated. The Government have contributed to that by publishing some Dissolution principles at the beginning of the Bill’s journey. We think those principles form part of a dialogue that continues not only between the Government and Parliament but with the wider public as well. I hope that the work of this Committee today and the work in the other place will together form part of the continuation of that historical tradition of there being an understanding of the conventions that underpin the prerogative.

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[Brendan O'Hara]

I am sure I am not the only person in this House who can see the irony of how taking back control supposedly has led us to a position where Parliament is being neutered by the Executive, and the people who were most loudly proclaiming “Take back control” are the people holding the scissors and doing the neutering—if that is not too much of an image, Mr Evans.

If the Bill passes, as well as there being no parliamentary or legal scrutiny, an active debate will still rage about whether the monarch’s prerogative powers would return to exactly as they were in 2011. I notice that, in her letter to the Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, the Minister acknowledged that

“there remains a role for the sovereign in exceptional circumstances to refuse a Dissolution request.”

But the monarch’s prerogative powers are now being enshrined in statute, having been removed by statute; they are now being restored by statute. So what exactly are the exceptional circumstances in which the monarch can refuse a Dissolution request? How can the Lascelles principles, which we heard earlier were prerogative powers, now be statutory powers? I cannot see how this returns us to the position we were in in 2011.

Therefore, we have been and will continue to be extremely uneasy about the insertion of the ouster clause making the Government’s action in relation to the dissolution of Parliament non-justiciable. As I said, we share the concerns of many Members across the Chamber that the repeal of the Fixed-terms Parliaments Act would not automatically take us back to the position of 2012 and we need a lot more clarity about exactly what legal position we would be in.

The Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee pointed out in a letter to the Minister:

“The Fixed-terms Parliaments Act was passed and the consequences of this cannot simply be wished away.”

I note that, in her response to the Committee Chair, the Minister accepts that there is an academic debate about the issue, but she seems to believe the opinion of her academics that the courts

“will be required to act as if the Fixed-term Parliaments Act had never been enacted”

and that they will be

“required to pretend that it never happened.”

It is a ridiculous situation and an extremely unsatisfactory position in which we find ourselves. For years, as my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow East (David Linden) said, we have heard this Government talk about taking back control and the importance of parliamentary sovereignty. This is an early test of how this Parliament takes back that control, and the Executive are legislating to prevent it from happening. If the Bill is passed as it stands, Parliament and the judiciary, and arguably the monarch’s traditional role, will no longer be in play, and the decision to dissolve this place and call a general election will be entirely in the hands of the Prime Minister, who may call one when it is politically expedient so to do. That is not how a modern liberal democracy should function, and that is why we will not be supporting the Bill.

Back in January, both Lord Sumption and Baroness Hale were unequivocal in their evidence that the minimum safeguard required in the event of an ouster clause being put in place was the inclusion in the Bill of a time limit on the moving of writs for parliamentary elections. However, as it stands, there is no such provision in the Bill; six months on, the Government have not produced anything of the sort, and the original clause remains. In effect, that allows the Government to decide the length of a period of Prorogation, the gap between the Dissolution of Parliament and an election, and indeed the gap between an election and the first sitting of a Parliament. That is deeply worrying. The Government had an opportunity to take the advice of many learned people and improve the Bill. They refused to take that advice, and I fear that it is sinister and troubling that they did not.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

It is a great pleasure to follow so erudite and intelligible a speech from the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O'Hara).

I have an experience that is very rare in my political career—a sense of complete vindication. I voted against the Fixed-term Parliaments Act in 2011, when it was brought in, and I seem to recall saying then what I hear the Minister saying from the Front Bench now: that it would not work and that it was an abominable intrusion and distortion of our constitution. I see this Bill as a welcome correction that brings our constitution back to the fundamental principle, which has existed for many years, that, with the important exception that the monarch has the right to speak his or her mind at the time the Prime Minister requests a Dissolution, and in the last resort even perhaps to decline it—although it would not be known for many years that he or she had—it should be the case that the Prime Minister can advise Her Majesty to dissolve the House. We are at last returning to sanity and, with the pardon of the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), to normality when it comes to the constitution.

However, I say to the Committee and the Minister that there is an issue that troubles me. It seems to me that, when we presented our manifesto to the country in 2019, we did not only promise that we would restore the balance of our constitution by repealing the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. We presented the country then with a constitutional programme, or at least the willingness to look fundamentally at our constitution and to consider deeply whether we should restore to a more Conservative and a more traditional basis other aspects of our constitution, too.

In welcoming this Bill, therefore, I say to my hon. Friend the Minister that I hope that it is not the last measure that we will introduce in the portfolio that she occupies. At the moment, I look at our offering and I see this Bill, which I fully support, I see the Elections Bill, which I also support, and I see the Judicial Review and Courts Bill. I hope we are not going to be quite so timid as to present that as our sole offering to the country. In 1997, the Labour party was elected. One thing one can say about that Government is that they came in with a coherent, radical plan for the constitution, and they then enacted it with complete ruthlessness, and with complete disregard for Opposition voices. I was in the House some years later, and I recall vividly how the Labour party steamrollered its constitutional changes, including the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, through this House with very little by way of consideration and regard for alternative voices.

We now have a majority comparable to that, and I hope that we will not squander that opportunity. There are important things that we should now be doing. I have some sympathy with the plea this afternoon by the hon. Member for Rhondda that we should be considering Prorogation. So we should. We should be considering whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller No. 2 should stand. We should be considering whether other decisions of the Supreme Court should be allowed to stand. There comes to mind, for example, the Adams case, in which Mr Gerry Adams was effectively acquitted of his convictions in 1975 because the Supreme Court held that the Carltona principle in effect did not apply to the decision then taken. That, in my view, is a matter that this House ought to be reviewing.

I say to right hon. and hon. Members and to my friends on the Government Benches that we must not regard the constitution as an area that is too complicated for us to go into. We must not accept the liberal consensus, as it is no doubt called, upon which the new Labour Government in ’97 traded. We must not accept that these things are permanent features of our constitution. They were not introduced with our consent, and we have every right, with the mandate from the people that we now have, to reconsider them.

I say to the Minister that I applaud this Bill, and I applaud her particularly. I was impressed, if I may say so, throughout the course of her presentation by how deeply competent and how completely on top of her brief she was. Thank heavens for such a Minister.

[The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Order. Sir Geoffrey, I have given a bit of latitude, but do you intend to speak to the clauses, new clauses or amendments?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

It is stand part that I am addressing, Mr Evans.

This Bill should warmly commend itself to those on both sides of the Committee. My only caution—my only plea—is: let this not be the last word we say upon the British constitution.

[Chris Bryant]

It is a delight to follow that Third Reading speech.

I have enjoyed today, not least because it is such a delight to be vindicated. I feel as if I have been saying the same things for 20 years. Some of what the Minister said today, if we put the word “not” in, was what she said 10 years ago, which is kind of entertaining but rather irritating.

I am not going to speak at length, but we have to go back to fundamental principles when we are talking about the constitution. I like Parliament sitting. It is good for Governments to face the scrutiny of the Commons elected. Long interruptions are a bad thing. We take a long time to get a Parliament going after a general election, and now, with a long general election, as the right hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) referred to, it can be several months that parliamentary scrutiny is effectively out of action, before Select Committees are fully set up and all the rest of it.

The Executive and the Parliament need to be in balance with one other. There is a real danger that we are moving in the direction of what I call an over-mighty Executive. The Leader of the House in particular has what I call a high theological understanding of government—the Government are always right, by definition. In our system, the Government have considerable power. That is why some have called it an elected dictatorship.

The constitution should always stand the test of time and the test of bad actors. We always presume we will have a good monarch. We have had bad monarchs in the past. We presume we will always have an honourable and good Prime Minister. We might have a bad Prime Minister, who might choose to—[Interruption.] I am being ironic here. We might have a Prime Minister who deliberately chose to subvert the constitution and use it to subvert democracy.