Tomlinson Report

Glyn Davies Excerpts

Tuesday 17th December 2013 Westminster Hall

[Guto Bebb (Aberconwy) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Sir Roger.

I am pleased to have secured this debate on the Tomlinson report prior to the Christmas recess, because it is important and touches on a lot of my work on interest rate swap mis-selling. The report’s scope is wider than just the interest rate swap mis-selling scandal, and it looks at how a certain part of the Royal Bank of Scotland, namely the global restructuring group, has been operating in relation to small businesses. It is important to place on the record that Lawrence Tomlinson’s findings reflect what I have seen both as a constituency MP and in my work on interest rate swap mis-selling.

Prior to the report’s publication, Lawrence Tomlinson spoke to the all-party parliamentary group on interest rate swap mis-selling, and it is fair to say that many Members in that meeting were shocked by what they heard about banks’ behaviour. What should concern us more than the fact that Members were shocked by Mr Tomlinson’s comments is that many of them were not surprised. When some of the report’s findings were highlighted, it was concerning to see that such activity was recognised by Members from their constituency casework. If MPs are not surprised by allegations of behaviour that verges on the criminal, there is cause for significant concern about banks’ behaviour.

Since the publication of the report and its findings, there has been a certain degree of blow-back. Elements of the press have suggested that Mr Tomlinson might have a personal agenda or vendetta against RBS. I therefore want to place on the record that I have never banked or had any banking facilities with RBS, and have no vendetta whatever against it. My concern lies with the numerous constituents who have been treated in a manner that I find unacceptable. It is important to highlight what the report found and how it resonates with those of us who have dealt with businesses that have been badly treated by their banks.

The report was met with a significant degree of sympathy when originally published, but concerns have been highlighted since then. I want to examine three key issues of concern today; other Members may have different issues to discuss. First, I want to concentrate on the report’s findings in relation to whether the bank deliberately attempted to engineer situations in which businesses defaulted or breached their banking covenants. One of the report’s key claims is that businesses often found themselves in difficulties due to the bank’s deliberate efforts to ensure that that happened, including through revaluations. Once banking covenants were breached, businesses were placed in the so-called supporting hands of the global restructuring group.

The second question that deserves consideration is about the nature of the support that businesses receive once subjected to the support structure of the GRG. Is it really trying to get businesses back on track, or—as in many cases that I have seen, and in many cases highlighted by Lawrence Tomlinson—are businesses subject to unfair and penal rates of interest and charges, and often asked to pay for reports and valuations that are almost never in the businesses’ interests?

The third question is about the impartiality of the whole insolvency process. The report asks significant questions about whether the process and all the professionals involved actually operate in an independent manner. I have seen a number of cases of valuations changing dramatically because valuers have been instructed to undertake a second valuation by the bank. That raises significant concerns about the independence of those valuations. Consultants, solicitors and accountants have been asked to undertake work, paid for by the business, on the instruction of the banks. Time and again, that work has been less than helpful to the survival of the business.

When I conclude my remarks, I will touch on the selection of Clifford Chance to conduct an internal review of RBS. I have no doubt that Clifford Chance is a reputable firm of solicitors, but I have concerns about whether it will pass the smell test of being impartial enough to undertake such a review, given its links to RBS.

Have RBS and the global restructuring group been guilty of engineering a default or a breach of covenant? There are examples. A constituent of mine had a quarry with landfill rights that was valued at £9.5 million. The bank decided to enforce a revaluation of the asset, which came back at £2.5 million. As one can imagine, the impact of a £7 million reduction in value was an immediate breach of the banking covenant. After long and hard-fought efforts by the company, there was a final agreed valuation of £4.5 million. The company agreed to that simply because it was desperate and wanted to try to keep trading. How can a £7 million reduction in value occur when the company undertaking the revaluation was the same one that made the original valuation only a few months previously? That question needs to be answered. Also, why did the company have to pay £14,000 for a valuation that it successfully disputed?

I was contacted by a business yesterday with a large portfolio of flats, one of which was valued by the GRG at £100,000. A sale price of £145,000 was achieved yesterday, but the bank is still unwilling to make any compromise on the valuation of the entire portfolio. When one flat is sold for £45,000 in excess of the bank’s valuation, one must question why the whole portfolio is not re-examined from a banking perspective. The business is paying penal rates of interests on the basis that it breached its loan-to-value covenant, yet the one sale that has been achieved shows that the asset’s value was much higher than the value that the bank placed on it.

Another example, of a hotel in north Yorkshire, landed on my desk because the business has also been affected by interest rate swaps. The hotel was independently valued by Matthews & Goodman at £3.4 million, but the bank was clearly unhappy with that valuation, which gave the business a healthy loan-to-value position, so it instructed the business to get a second valuation within two months. The business was charged £3,500 for the privilege, and the second valuation came back at £1.65 million. The result was that the business was in breach of its banking covenants. It is unsurprising that the business feels hard done by: an independent valuation suggested a value of £3.4 million, but less than three months later, another valuation, done on the instructions of the bank but paid for by the business, was less than half that.

[Glyn Davies (Montgomeryshire) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend for allowing me to intervene. There is a similar example from my constituency. Does he agree that it is often the time scale in which the bank demands a response that kills a business completely? A business in my constituency was given 24 hours to resolve a position that was not a difficulty. The business was bankrupted and its principal has gone to work in the far east, where they have created many jobs and much good business. That has been taken away from mid-Wales.

[Guto Bebb]

That is a fair point about timing. Another of my constituents was told that his bank charges would be increased to a weekly fee of £4,000. The letter informing him of that arrived on 21 December, just before his business closed for Christmas, which I am sure was enjoyable because of that letter. There was nothing to be done until the new year, because the business was closed. There is an issue there. To go back to the hotel I was talking about, as a result of the lower valuation, the business can show on paper that its bank charges over the following six months were £250,000 higher than they had been in the previous six months.