Care Bill [Lords]

Grahame Morris Excerpts

Tuesday 11th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Barbara Keeley]

In the concerns I am listing, I am not touching on the use of data in medical research. My concern is about the revelations we have had in recent weeks. I am citing commercial uses. Those data are being used on a chargeable basis and the companies involved seem to be crowing about it.

Can a project such as care.data guarantee that what patients sign up to now—or at any point in time—will not mean something different in future months when new datasets are gathered? The hon. Member for Totnes (Dr Wollaston) touched on some of the exciting possibilities for data, but new uses are being planned all the time. I mentioned systems in the US, but the Health Secretary recently signed a memorandum of understanding with the US Health Secretary for secondary uses sharing. The Minister last night said that he would not comment on a US system, but our hospital patient data is on those systems being used on a chargeable basis. Should patients have the right to withdraw their consent if new uses are developed that they do not approve of? The data have gone, and people are developing new uses for them, way beyond what any patient may have felt they consented to.

My right hon. Friend the shadow Health Secretary raised the issue of lack of transparency over the patient’s right to opt out. He asked about the junk mail leaflets— as they have been called—that were not even delivered to every household. What do Ministers propose to do to explain to all patients about the extraction of their identifiable personal data, and what precisely the dissent codes mean? We touched on this in our Health Committee inquiry sessions, and it was not clear, although some people thought they knew. It is a pity that Ministers have not taken the opportunity to answer the questions that were put to them in Health questions—the information changed on the HSCIC database on the very day we had Health questions in the morning.

We know that NHS England and the HSCIC can require GPs to upload patient data in an identifiable form from every GP practice in England, to be linked with the hospital episode statistics and other datasets. That is concerning enough, because it is a powerful new use of a lot of data, but the hon. Lady suggested that the HSCIC is talking about free text. That is a concern, because that is the place where people open up to their doctor and might give information that they do not want to be shared.

It is important that we know exactly how the HSCIC is funded. In the spirit of transparency, will Ministers request full disclosure of all funding sources of the HSCIC, including outside earnings from third parties for the use of data? I have talked about seeing our hospital data now being used on a chargeable basis by companies such as BT in the US. Who pays for the HSCIC’s staff? Are staff seconded to the HSCIC? Who pays the transaction costs? We have seen examples recently of networks of private organisations coming into NHS England to write and fund reports and lead consultations. Who pays for staffing and transaction costs, if it is third parties, is a key aspect of transparency.

The Health Committee has held an initial inquiry into care.data, and I and other Committee members expressed real concerns about the scheme and the impact it could have on the trust between patient and doctor. Our concerns have been compounded by news that commercial companies have been allowed to pay for NHS patient data, and use them for purposes unknown to the public. The use of our data has gone beyond our control, the data are in other countries and uploaded to cloud servers, and we do not know where they are.

[Grahame M. Morris (Easington) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is making pertinent and relevant points. Does she share my concern about the need to tighten up on section 251 exemptions? They allow the use of identifiable data for commissioning purposes. NHS England was granted a 251 exemption last April, and that may lead to identifiable data being used at a national level, a regional level, in the area teams and in the clinical commissioning groups. Is that something that the Government should address?

[Barbara Keeley]

Indeed it is. There is a question about why CCGs have to have identifiable patient data, and there is a lot of concern about that, which my hon. Friend is right to raise.

We expressed our concerns, but they have been compounded by reports of use of data unknown to the public. The Minister was unwilling to answer the point I wanted to put to him earlier in the debate about how the HSCIC will treat organisations such as BUPA, which are insurance providers as well as providers of health and care. I hope that he will answer that question when he winds up the debate. BUPA is one example, but there are other companies that have multiple functions—some of them are straightforwardly commercial and others involve health and social care—and there is scope for confusion if those firms apply for and obtain access to the data.

The revelations we have already had show that HSCIC does not have accountability, transparency or sufficient control over releases of patient data. In our Committee inquiry, it was put to HSCIC and to NHS England that one of the ways being recommended to ensure that escapes of patient data did not happen, and to allay the fears and concerns we have expressed, was for HSCIC to run on the basis that it kept the database intact and did not download datasets outside the information centre. What it did was take in research queries and ran them. That would be much safer and that is what is done on secure systems in other places. A mechanism has been suggested and I hope it is being considered.

I appreciate the comments made by my colleague, the hon. Member for Totnes about not opting out, but a recent survey of 400 GPs found that 40% intend to opt out of the scheme because of a lack of confidence in how the data will be shared.

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[Grahame M. Morris]

The hon. Lady is making a powerful case for the benefits of a system that would make it possible to identify hotspots of disease and carry out early interventions. I think that it could also be useful to studies of the long-term effects of medication. For instance, there was a long-term study of the link between the oral contraceptive and the incidence of particular forms of cancer. I think that such a database would be incredibly useful to studies of that kind, provided that there were the necessary safeguards in relation to privacy and access.

[Sarah Newton]

The hon. Gentleman has given yet another reason for the importance of collecting and sharing data in a way that helps to improve health outcomes. A further example is an inquiry into medical implants that was conducted by the Science and Technology Committee. Orthopaedic surgeons were able to keep a great many data relating to the types of implants used in, for instance, hip replacements, and to track, over time, the outcomes for the patients. As a result of that research, they were able to identify particularly problematic implants, and the information was shared among clinicians so that they could improve existing implants and develop new ones. Hip replacements have improved greatly as a result. It is vital that we establish frameworks that give confidence to patients and to medical practitioners, so that such information can be collected and used to improve patient outcomes.

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[Sarah Newton]

We could spend a great deal of time talking about different types of medical research that are enabling huge progress to be made with particular diseases. Given the time that is available to me, however, I now want to talk about another aspect of the importance of sharing medical data to improve patient outcomes—the integration of social care with NHS services. I am sure that everyone in the Chamber would say that that was a good thing. It is important for all the services in a community, whether provided by a local council or by primary or acute care authorities, to be joined up around patients and their families to ensure that patients receive the best possible care, whatever their long-term condition may be. That is a subject that we all discuss, and on which we largely agree. However, when it comes to practical implementation, what we hear in inquiry after inquiry is that the barrier that prevents the delivery of those joined-up, improved outcomes is a lack of ability to share data.

[Grahame M. Morris]

The hon. Lady is being extremely generous in taking so many interventions. I agree with her assessment of the value of integration and better collaboration, but does she agree with me that the most important way of getting primary care on board is winning the confidence of general practitioners? One suggestion from the British Medical Association is that the Department of Health should offer GPs an indemnity against the possibility of being sued by patients who feel that their data has been misused. Does the hon. Lady think that that would be a good way of rebuilding their trust?

[Sarah Newton]

I think that GPs are some of the most trusted people in our communities, and that the relationship between them and their patients is incredibly special and important. I certainly have not detected any lack of trust in GPs in the course of my constituency work.

Let me tell the hon. Gentleman about a wonderful initiative that is taking place in Cornwall as part of the Government’s pioneer programme. Many organisations in various parts of the United Kingdom applied to the Government to become integration pioneers, and 14 areas were chosen. I am very proud that Cornwall was one of them.

We are blessed with a unitary authority and a commissioning group of GPs, the Kernow commissioning group. They are full of great ideas about working in new and collaborative ways to improve health outcomes in Cornwall: they are truly dedicated individuals, with an inspiring programme of change. However, all that depends on data sharing. If patients in Cornwall are to be given the joined-up care that they need, general practices must be able to share patient information with other organisations in Cornwall—organisations such as Peninsula Community Health, a social enterprise that is delivering most of our community services alongside the acute hospital, Royal Cornwall hospital, and voluntary sector organisations. They are leading the way in our pioneer bid to enable patients to live independent, good-quality lives at home.

All that great work is underpinned by the need of all those people, working together to bring about health improvements in Cornwall, to share patient information. At present the Cornwall pilot is going very well, is growing, and is supported by both GPs and patients. That leads me to believe that the relationship between GPs and others is different from the relationship described by the hon. Gentleman, in that it is based on trust.

[Grahame M. Morris]

I apologise if I did not make my point very well. I was suggesting not that there had been a breakdown of trust between patients and GPs, but that there was a tension between GPs and the Department of Health—or, at least, NHS England—over the way in which the scheme was being administered, and that there was an opportunity for that to be corrected. That was my simple contention.

[Sarah Newton]

Again, I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention and I am sure we are going to hear more from the Minister, although we have already heard a great deal from him, about the sorts of reassurances GPs and other people have been seeking about how the data are going to be used.

It is essential that we address the fears and concerns that have been so well raised today, particularly by my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Dr Wollaston), because it is vital that people do not opt out. For all the benefits we have heard about today in improving care in our country by integrating the NHS with social care and in making sure we get the benefits from our first-class medical research, we have to have a data capture and data sharing set of regulations and behaviours among the people who are making those decisions that gives us all confidence so that we truly do derive the benefits we have heard about today.

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[Mr Reed]

Absolutely. That is one of the real issues. As we have heard from Members on both sides of the House, absolute clarity is needed on such issues and on the data, which we as individuals own, from those who seek to provide that data to other people for other purposes. This goes to the heart of the matter, and the fundamental issue—that fundamental breach—is one of trust. My hon. Friend is absolutely right to raise that.

Trust can never be given with blind faith, but it can be built if it is based on accountability. That is what new clause 25 and amendment 29 seek to achieve. The new clause seeks to create a new, specific offence of the misuse of data provided by the HSCIC. Building on the schedule of offences in the Data Protection Act 1998, it makes it an offence to use data provided by the HSCIC for the purposes of re-identification. A person or organisation found guilty of that offence would be subject to an unlimited fine. In addition, it makes it a requirement for any organisation making applications for data from the HSCIC to disclose any previous convictions under the offence.

The purpose of the new clause is to help build public confidence in how individual patient data are used by ensuring that any person or entity who misuses the data is liable to significant criminal sanctions. Patients can then be assured that their privacy and the proper use of their medical data are of the utmost importance to Parliament, the judiciary and the NHS. The new clause would also place a duty on those convicted of misusing data to declare that conviction when reapplying for future data. In reality, barring some unforeseeable public interest, those guilty of misusing data once would be unlikely to gain access again.

In order to ensure a robust system, accountability for the use of the data must also cover those who grant permission for the data to be used. Clause 116 removes from the Secretary of State the duty to approve applications to use patient data for medical research. That is wholly and entirely wrong, and amendment 29 seeks to restore that duty.

In light of the letter from the Chair of the Health Committee to the Health Secretary, the emerging details of how patient data have been used and the rather strange pronouncement from the HSCIC that it will not say more about improper release of medical records until “later in the year”, the Secretary of State’s accountability for how patient data are used is absolutely critical. The use of patient data is a matter of huge import, and the issues surrounding it are enormous, too.

[Grahame M. Morris]

My hon. Friend is making important points and I hope that the Minister is taking note of them. Does my hon. Friend share my concern about the Minister’s assurances last night on the security of the data? The buck stops with the Health and Social Care Information Centre, not the Minister, but Ministers come and go, so it is easy to make assurances, as he might not be here next year.

[Mr Reed]

I absolutely share those concerns. We did not hear anything last night that reassured anybody who understands the Bill. Certainly, Government new clause 34 is not worth the paper that it was hastily written on, and I want to move on to that right now.

Surely it is not too much to expect the democratically elected politician who sits in Cabinet and is responsible for the national health service to be accountable for how the medical data that that service captures is used. Crucially, the Secretary of State for Health is accountable not only to this House but to the people of this country in a way that a quango cannot be and has never been. Such accountability can begin the process of building the trust necessary to ensure the success of projects such as care.data. Without that, QED, the Secretary of State is asking Parliament and the people of this country for permission to remove democratic accountability from how their confidential medical data are used. The implications for the use of patient data in any project are utterly toxic.

I said earlier that it would be tragic if the Government’s failings were to continue to contribute towards the erosion of trust in care.data. Sadly, the Bill provides scope for other regrets. Part 1 seeks to make worthwhile but modest improvements to our care system, falling a long way short of the concept of whole-person care articulated by Labour. The Government new clauses and amendments that we are now discussing, however, and clause 119—the hospital closure clause that we will discuss later—fundamentally disfigure what is without doubt a worthwhile Bill. Perhaps that shows us the two sides of the coalition in the ministerial team. We shall see. None the less, it is a cause for regret.

Trust is at the heart of Government new clause 34. Yesterday, the Minister tried to reassure the House that the new clause would provide the safeguards that people require for the protection of their confidential medical data. He demonstrably failed to do that. Challenged time and again to illustrate how his new clause would facilitate the claims he has made for it, or improve safeguards for patients, he could not do so. Next time, it might be a good idea if the Secretary of State could get the same person to write both the Government amendments and the Government press release, because the amendments and the new clause do not provide what the Government claim they will. Sadly, that erodes trust yet further.

New clause 34 has been made necessary due to the appalling handling of the care.data project by the Government and the resulting erosion of public trust. The truth is that the new clause was hastily tabled again just before the deadline for amendments because the original, botched new clause 14 did not do what the Government said it would. Guess what? New clause 34 does not do what they say it will either. Subsection (3) would amend section 261 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 to read:

“The Information Centre may disseminate (other than by way of publication), to any such persons and in such form and manner and at such times as it considers appropriate.

But the Information Centre may do so only if it considers that disseminating the information would be for the purposes of—

(a) the provision of health care or adult social care;

(b) the promotion of health.”

Yesterday, the Minister was given numerous opportunities to explain how this provision would prohibit private health insurance companies from gaining access to our data—he could not do so. The new clause provides for entirely elastic definitions that, in practice, will have a limitless application.

What happens when a private health insurance company requests information from the HSCIC on the basis that it was going to conduct specific controlled, randomised assessments of the impact of physical activity on various age groups in order to promote and recommend appropriate physical activity to its policyholders— perhaps with a view to reducing their premiums? That is clearly being used to promote health and well-being, so how would new clause 34 stop it? It would not—under the proposed wording, it would be facilitated. Once such a company has the data, what prevents it from using them for other means? Under our new clause 25, such use would be a clear offence, but sadly the Government have offered no such safeguards.

It is no wonder the public cannot trust Ministers. Just a few weeks ago, in Committee room 9, the Minister assured me and the rest of the Public Bill Committee:

“There are strict controls about the release of potentially identifiable information; for example, that type of information would only ever be released to approved organisations for approved purposes”.––[Official Report, Care Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2014; c. 516.]

Yet these strict controls fail to appear time and again. The only comfort offered to the public is that those issues will be resolved by regulations drafted by Ministers in whom confidence and trust has been lost—that is not good enough. With that in mind, can the Minister explain who signed off the release of data covering 47 million patients that were obtained by the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries? Such issues must be addressed, and it seems likely that when he eventually responds to the Chair of the Health Committee, the Secretary of State will give cause for yet further concern about how patient data are being used.

In responding to the news about that massive data breach, a Department of Health source stated:

“The rules changed last year so this would no longer be allowed. Information like this can only be accessed now if there is a clear benefit to improving health or health systems.”

It is chaos: if the rules have already been changed, the new clause tabled in haste by the Minister is full of superfluous subsections. Why does he need to change the rules again if they have already been changed?

We have a golden opportunity to get this right. The more that patients allow their data to be used, the greater the positive effects of care.data. These issues will not be resolved today and they will not be resolved by any of the Government proposals before us. If we want care.data and schemes like it to work in the future, we need to establish trust. Getting this right will save lives. Accountability is critical when accessing and using the most sensitive personal data, and the whole House can send a message to the people of this country—that we understand their concerns, that we are serious about safeguarding their most private data and that we are determined to continue to improve our health services—by voting for new clause 25 and amendment 29.

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[Dr Poulter]

As things stand at the moment, free text is not going to be used. That is the reassurance given by the HSCIC; it clearly does not envisage that text being used and it has given reassurances on that. That is reassuring for me and I hope it is reassuring to my hon. Friend. There are those additional safeguards in place, particularly for vulnerable patient groups, to make sure that more personal data about convictions, imprisonment and abuse by others will not be collected by the information centre.

[Grahame M. Morris]

rose—

[Dr Poulter]

I will deal first with the points made by the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South and then I will give way. I inferred from the hon. Lady’s remarks that she thought that GPs should be able to opt out for their patients. However, we have made it clear that it is a decision not for GPs to make on behalf of their patients but for the patients themselves. Furthermore, people can, at any time, object or change their mind, and the Health and Social Care Information Centre must respect their wishes and remove their data from records.

[Grahame M. Morris]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Will he clarify the point raised by the hon. Member for Totnes (Dr Wollaston) in relation to vulnerable patient groups? Does that include patients with very rare conditions who could be identified, even from anonymised data, because they are part of a relatively small group?

[Dr Poulter]

Of course strict criteria are in place under the 2012 Act about the use of data where a patient could be identified. The Health and Social Care Information Centre cannot randomly release data that would identify patients, except where there are specific public policy reasons for doing so, such as in the event of a flu pandemic or a public emergency. There are strong safeguards in place under that legislation to protect patient data. It would be wrong of the hon. Gentleman—I know he often inadvertently misleads himself in some of his conclusions and goes around in circles in his remarks—to confuse Members and to confuse the House. The legislation is clear. He has been in many debates on the matter over the past few weeks, and strong protections are in place to protect patient confidentiality and to prevent patients from being inappropriately identified.

I do not want to be drawn into individual cases, but the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South also raised the issue of the MedRed BT Health Cloud, which will provide public access in the United States to 50 million de-identified patient records from the Health and Social Care Information Centre in the UK. We have clarified the matter. The data referred to are not confidential, but are published anonymous data of the aggregate population—not at patient level. The data are available freely to any member of the public or organisation via data.gov.uk. There is no conspiracy about the data; they are freely available to any one of us in this Chamber or to any member of the public.

It is worth highlighting the powers of the Secretary of State, which the shadow Minister also raised in his comments. Let me reassure the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South in respect of the amendment that she has tabled today. Section 245 of the 2012 Act enables the Secretary of State to direct the Health and Social Care Information Centre to establish information systems—to collect data—including systems on how to carry out that collection.

The Secretary of State can also direct the Health and Social Care Information Centre to report on any matter about its functions. If concerns were raised about the issue of free text data, which my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes mentioned, the Secretary of State could pass on directions to the Health and Social Care Information Centre.

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[Andy Burnham]

The hon. Gentleman makes that argument as if there were no changes to hospitals under the previous Government. There was plenty of change, but there is a right way and a wrong way of doing things. I would argue, as I just have, that the previous way of doing things was a better way.

[Grahame M. Morris]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Andy Burnham]

In a moment.

The previous Government made changes to stroke services in London just before the last election. The number of units went down from 12 to eight. That was based on a clinical case for change. We took that argument to local people and said, “Look, it will save lives if this goes through.” That is how the Department can take people with it—by building a case for changing hospital services. Clause 119 threatens to set that back, because it puts finance in the driving seat. That risks losing public trust in the case for change. That is why what we are being asked to endorse today is, in my view, fundamentally wrong.

[Grahame M. Morris]

My right hon. Friend has made his point powerfully. I was going to ask him for an example of how it is possible to make a reconfiguration that is clinically driven. He has given the example of stroke services in London. Another example is coronary services in the north-east, where an overwhelming clinical case was made by clinicians and accepted by the general public.

[Andy Burnham]

The difficult thing for me is that when I think back to some of the processes I was involved with—stroke services in London, child care and maternity services in Greater Manchester, changes to A and E across the country, Chase Farm hospital, and other places—those issues were cynically used by those on the Government Benches when they were in opposition, and it was a bare-knuckle fight to save every hospital in the land. That is what they said, whereas we made the case for change because it would improve patient safety. I would not change my tune if I was in opposition; I still believe that hospitals need to carry on changing, but as I said, I will not do that by imposing changes on local people. The right way is to explain why, and take people with us.

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The core points made about the consequences when a trust special administrator is appointed are important, although, with respect to other Members, we must be clear that those consequences are very limited. We are talking about the consequences of appointing a TSA to a trust that is financially unsustainable. We are all agreed that if the trust is not financially unsustainable, a TSA will not be appointed. We all agree that reconfiguration is necessary. Of course it is better done in consultation with local communities and professional groups and through the normal reconfiguration process; everyone agrees about that. The question before the House in relation to clause 119 is what happens if those preferred options fail, the trust becomes financially unsustainable, and a TSA is appointed. It is a question of whether the TSA, in that narrow set of circumstances occurring twice in five years, is required to think only about the institution in isolation or should be looking at the interests of patients as a whole in the context of the health economy in the immediate and surrounding areas.

[Grahame M. Morris]

I hold the Chairman of the Select Committee in high regard for his expertise. Let me point out, though, that he analyses this on the basis of two cases in five years, but in fact the situation has changed rather dramatically. The information presented to our Committee is that about a third of NHS trusts are predicting deficits, and, as we heard earlier, 32 are in severe financial difficulty. Those may not be the exceptional circumstances that the Minister would have us believe, and that should be a cause for concern for Members on both sides of the House.

[Mr Dorrell]

Saying that a trust is in deficit is not the same as saying that it is heading into administration. It lies within the power of the commissioners and the trust management regime to avoid administration, which everyone in the House agrees is the preferred outcome. Indeed, it is striking that each of the Members from Lewisham and from Staffordshire identified the difficulties that the TSA regime creates and the difficult circumstances that arise when a TSA is appointed. Some Labour Members have suggested that this is a back-door means of driving change without consultation by appointing TSAs to trusts all around the country. If I thought that that was anywhere near to being anybody’s intention, I would oppose clause 119. However, the important point about clause 119 is that if it were the Government’s intention, which I do not remotely believe that it is, they could pursue that policy whichever way the Division goes.

The point about clause 119 is that it raises an extremely narrow question: should the TSA take into consideration only the institution that has been demonstrated historically to be unsustainable, or should the TSA look outside that immediate health economy for solutions that will better serve the needs of patients in that area? It seems to me that we need only pose the question in that precise and, I believe, accurate way for it to be seen to be a rhetorical question.

[Mr Dorrell]

I do not always agree with every word my hon. Friend says, but I agree with everything he said in that intervention, so I am delighted that I gave way to him. His argument is that commissioners and the trust management should get ahead of the trust administrator. Nobody should sit around waiting for an administrator to be appointed; the objective should be to avoid trust administration along precisely the lines identified by my hon. Friend.

[Grahame M. Morris]

I want to make a few points in support of amendment 30, which would delete clause 119 on the basis that the TSA was never designed to deal with reconfigurations across an entire region. Despite the assurances given by the right hon. Member for Charnwood (Mr Dorrell) and Government Front Benchers, the potential remains for this mechanism to be used as a back-door route to making changes and closures at hospitals.

I also declare my support for new clause 16. However, although it would ameliorate the worst parts of clause 119 by ensuring that local commissioners in non-failing areas had a veto over any decisions affecting their trust, it is not, as colleagues have said, a perfect solution.

Clause 19—or, as 38 Degrees and other campaigning groups refer to it, the hospital closure clause—should not stand part of the Bill. I had the honour to serve on the Bill Committee for what is now the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and I attended 39 out of 40 sittings. I missed one because I attended a Health Committee sitting at which the then Health Secretary was giving evidence about NHS England, which was previously called the NHS Commissioning Board, and I did not want to miss that.

I sat through that Bill Committee and listened to the Government’s reasons for their reorganisation. We were told that it would deliver a decentralised service and put power in the hands of clinicians. To be frank, clause 119 makes a mockery of that claim. Far from delivering a decentralised service that puts power in the hands of clinicians, the Secretary of State seems to be seeking to take power away from GPs and local communities in order to further reconfigure the NHS for purely financial reasons.

To suggest that the trust special administrator regime is a natural extension of the existing legislation is a gross distortion. The TSA process was never intended to be used as a back-door way to make unpopular reconfigurations. Potentially, clause 119 could take control of every NHS trust and foundation trust away from the public, leaving no hospital bed in the country safe. It should not stand part of the Bill.

If the Bill is enacted, clause 119 will mean that the NHS in England will face further wholesale, top-down reorganisations. The clause could be used as a method to achieve that. I do not think that anyone in this House wishes that to happen. I am sure that, in their hearts, some Government Members do not want that, and certainly no one in the country voted for it. Our problem is that there would be virtually no accountability to local people.

The successful legal challenge brought by the London borough of Lewisham and the Save Lewisham Hospital umbrella campaign—I pay tribute to their efforts, which have brought about this situation—showed conclusively that the Secretary of State did not have the power to axe Lewisham’s accident and emergency and maternity wards as a solution to problems in the neighbouring South London Healthcare NHS Trust.

Clause 119 is designed to allow the Secretary of State to do what he failed to do in Lewisham—to close down thriving and financially sustainable hospitals on a whim, without full and proper consultation. To suggest, as was said in Committee, that a tokenistic meeting with a local authority overview and scrutiny committee would assuage public concerns does not hold water. We must rebuild trust: we need full and proper consultation with patients and the public, and we need agreements with clinical commissioning groups. I am somewhat surprised at the willingness of Government Members, who have championed the cause of GP-led commissioning, to subvert the role of CCGs in that respect.

[Liz Kendall]

As a fellow member of the Health and Social Care Bill Committee, does my hon. Friend remember that we warned the Government that although there were clearly problems with strategic health authorities, those bodies could take a wider view of the health economy, and that having very new, young and small clinical commissioning groups that are all separate meant that it would be very hard to take such wider views? Does he remember that we warned the Government in those debates, and does he agree that they are doing this top-down reorganisation now precisely because there is no mechanism for delivering wider health views?

[Grahame M. Morris]

I do remember those debates, some of which were very long and acrimonious. I still have the scars on my back. They are a badge of honour, and I am proud to have been in the trenches with hon. Members fighting to preserve our NHS and to save it from the Trojan horse of privatisation.

To return to the matter in hand, the trust special administration process will bring drastic changes to hospital configurations. It represents a move away from the principle of reconfiguration of services on the basis of clinical need in favour of doing so solely on the basis of financial considerations. The justification process starts with the need to save money.

There have been attempts to reassure hon. Members and the general public that the trust special administration process would be enacted only in exceptional circumstances. As in our earlier exchanges about clause 119, hon. Members need to be alive to the situation confronting many NHS trusts, including the fact that about 30 trusts have been identified as being in particular financial difficulties. Those circumstances are not exceptional: come the end of the year and next year, there is a very clear and present danger that they will be not exceptional but normal.

In this situation, the NHS and foundation trusts are struggling, for a variety of reasons, to do more with less. I accept that the burden of the private finance initiative is one of those reasons, but there are others. There have been problems where walk-in treatment centres have closed. NHS spending has fallen in real terms. Almost a third of NHS trusts in England now forecast a deficit at the end of the financial year. There is growing pessimism about the financial health of the NHS, and figures suggest that the number of trusts undergoing the trust special administration regime will grow. As I have said, some 30 trusts have been identified as at risk of closure were clause 119 to be enacted as part of the Bill. Under this Government, it seems that the exceptional circumstances that would trigger the trust special administration process would no longer be exceptional.

I advise hon. Members who want to avoid soon having to take part in campaigns to save accident and emergency or maternity wards in their own constituencies —as has been done by my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Dame Joan Ruddock), my hon. Friends the Members for Lewisham West and Penge (Jim Dowd) and for Lewisham East (Heidi Alexander), and the hon. Member for Stafford (Jeremy Lefroy)—to support Labour’s amendment 30.

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[Andy Burnham]

Given that clause 119 is a dramatic extension of the Secretary of State’s powers, as my hon. Friend is rightly saying, does he agree that it is astonishing that the Secretary of State is not in the House this afternoon to make the case in person, to ask for the powers and to justify the idea that we should entrust the future of our hospitals to him?

[Grahame M. Morris]

I am absolutely amazed. I share my right hon. Friend’s incredulity that the Secretary of State is not here. In my view, clause 119 is one power too many for a Secretary of State who apparently believes the NHS to be a 60-year-old mistake. [Interruption.] That is a direct quotation from the Secretary of State before he took office.

The Secretary of State’s increased power and Monitor’s expanded role directly contradict the Government’s earlier promise that local commissioners would no longer be subject to central diktat. That represents a reversal of the vision that was presented during the consideration of the Health and Social Care Act 2012. Clause 119 supports none of the preconditions for a legitimate reorganisation of a local health economy and will allow trust special administrators to overrule any concerned parties.

If clause 119 becomes law, the Secretary of State will be granted the power to issue directions to require foundation trusts and clinical commissioning groups to take steps that they do not want to take. Any Member who wants to prevent the Secretary of State’s axe from falling arbitrarily on their own hospitals without clinical justification should seek to remove the clause from the Bill. I therefore urge right hon. and hon. Members to support Labour’s amendment 30 and new clause 16, which is a compromise measure to ameliorate the worst aspects of clause 119.

[Steve Baker]

I have listened with quiet astonishment as Opposition Members have suggested that the NHS previously offered meaningful accountability and public control.

In the manner in which the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) spoke to amendment 30, he viciously punched a raw and delicate bruise in Wycombe. As I indicated in my intervention, it was under the last Government that we lost A and E services, maternity services and paediatrics. Years later, all that people want is to have those services back. They want an emergency unit that is capable of accepting whoever turns up. To use the jargon, they want the treatment of undifferentiated emergency patients. The NHS should not be offering constant excuses for why that cannot be provided. God knows, we pay enough in tax and in salaries that people ought to be creative enough to figure out how to offer the treatment of undifferentiated emergency patients at local hospitals like the one in Wycombe. There is a proposal to do so, which I will return to another day,

I have found myself listening to some sort of exposition of a democratic utopia that has never existed. When considering how this has been positioned—the idea that it is about reconfiguration rather than urgent procedures when a trust is in extreme difficulty—will the Minister reassure me that the Government did not establish clinical commissioning groups and health and wellbeing boards, and the rest, just so that they could use this clause and power to override everything else they have put in place?