Financial Services and Markets
Debate between Greg Clark and George Mudie(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Mr George Mudie (Leeds East) (Lab)
I rise to put two points to the House. First, I object to the statutory instrument on a matter of principle, which I will outline. Secondly, I want to ask the Minister why he included residential property among the first prudential tools. Some of the tools make sense—including commercial, and, obviously, investment and financial services—but the residential property one does not.
Specifically, I object to how we are dealing with discussion, debate and decisions on the macro-prudential tools. I have constantly raised the matter in the Treasury Committee and the Independent Commission on Banking, and I have raised it on the Floor of the House with the Chancellor. As my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) said, these can be seen as boring matters, but it is accepted that they could lead to decisions that affect the standard of living of many of our constituents; affect the future of industries such as the construction industry; and affect the economy. The decisions will be taken by non-elected individuals and tonight appears to be the House’s only opportunity to debate and challenge the measures.
The matter is being dealt with by statutory instrument. In other words, we have 90 minutes to discuss the measures and cannot amend them. We can only vote against the whole measure if we disagree with it or feel strongly about any part of it. The measures are proposed by the Government. If Opposition Members have strong feelings, they have only one chance to influence the decision, and they must turn down the whole order. That is a nonsensical procedure.
I have raised the matter with the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Chamber. He indicated that he understood the measure’s sensitivity and importance and that he had an open mind. He accepted that the usual channels would deal with it. I pay tribute to him for placing the order on the Chamber’s agenda rather than dealing with it upstairs in Committee in the normal way. That is a step forward. The FPC is made up of unelected individuals, but they set policy, so the statutory instrument is a pretty disgraceful way to deal with the matter. Statutory instruments and secondary legislation are not supposed to deal with policy or principle—they deal with measures that need to be adjusted as time passes. They are not a way to decide things of such importance.
The Treasury Committee raised the matter with the Minister when they discussed macro-economics. He seemed to accept what we said and I have a quote if he challenges me. However, his approach to the question—sadly, because he is a well regarded Minister—was this: “We’ve appointed these individuals and should not second-guess them.” That is a recipe for disaster.
The Treasury Committee yesterday heard evidence from the Monetary Policy Committee, including officers and non-executives from the Bank of England. It was a hairy meeting, because those individuals take decisions, but there was no sign that the battle of inflation is definitely winning the argument against the battle for growth. If we read the words of the former Chancellor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling), and see the present Chancellor, we can see the difficulty they have had in getting so-called independent bodies to accept the sensitivity of some of their decisions. It is an impossible task. The bodies shelter under their independence. Both Chancellors have experienced this, and if they want bodies to do something they feel is necessary, the issue of independence is thrown back in their face: “You gave us independence and therefore you should not interfere”. I am worried about this issue, which is why I am taking the opportunity to put it on the record.
On residential matters, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East referred, one of the macro-prudential tools discussed in the Financial Policy Committee and dropped was loan-to-value mortgages. Most of us were pleased when that was dropped, but it was a runner and was being discussed in Financial Services Authority circles for some 18 months. I am certain, from watching the industry, that that had a great effect on the industry’s decisions—it was trying to second-guess the FSA. The business of 90% and 80% mortgages had a devastating effect on individuals and couples who were trying to buy a house and begin family life. They were unable to take that step because the regulator was signalling to the regulated that they should be going in the direction of 90% and 80% at a time when the economy was dying for the construction industry to pick up and start building houses, which would have had a roll-on effect of people buying carpets, furniture, curtains and so on. The regulator was conditioning the decisions and behaviour of the regulated—it is that sensitive.
On a higher level, we are going through this business with the Monetary Policy Committee. As someone said—maybe in a crowded House this might have an effect—when an individual or a couple cannot get a mortgage, they do not blame the building society. When the building societies say it is the Monetary Policy Committee, they come to see us and we say it is the Monetary Policy Committee. The ordinary person in the street will ask, “Who set up the Monetary Policy Committee? Who is it answerable to?” It is answerable to us, but it is not really answerable to us because there is no real opportunity to make things happen. A yearly remit from the Chancellor is hardly a procedure for democratic accountability, and we are prevented from dealing with these matters on the Floor of the House in order to indicate our displeasure and unhappiness. I see the Treasurer of Her Majesty’s Household, the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Mr Randall), a very prominent member of the usual channels sitting in the Chamber. I hope he is listening to this debate and gets people to think about it.
I want to ask the Minister why on earth residential property was placed in the initial order. This is 2013. The Minister is as anxious as I am—probably more than I am—to see houses being built and sold and the whole procedure started. There is no question of any systemic risk in the foreseeable future. Even when the problems were at their worst, there was no systemic risk, just an industry with problems. I accept that some banks that had over-extended on their loans had real problems. I accept the point about the commercial side and the likes of RBS and HBOS—it was on a greater scale and of greater concern than on the residential side—and the point about investment and financial houses. However, for the MPC to start worrying—in shades of the FSA—about systemic risk in the construction industry spreads unnecessary alarm.
Mr Mudie
I see the Minister nodding. I am sure that he will explain, but that is the sort of thing I am talking about. If the loan-to-value ratio had been in this statutory instrument—if the interim FPC had stuck at it—I think this place would have been full and the Minister would have had little choice but to allow the thing through. None of us could have tabled an amendment stating how important it was that the rest of it went through; as politicians and constituency MPs, we would have had to vote against the whole thing to prevent it from happening. I hope that the Minister will consider both those issues.
Greg Clark
Let me respond to the points made by the hon. Members for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) and for Leeds East (Mr Mudie). They made some thoughtful points about the House’s ability to scrutinise the powers that will be available to the FPC, particularly those relating to residential mortgages. Their comments went to the heart of the dilemma behind the setting up of these institutions and powers. The purpose of macro-prudential policy is—to adopt the analogy often used—to take the punch bowl away from the party just when the guests are getting over-exuberant. For the first time, there will be a group of people with the explicit task of monitoring conditions and taking a considered view of what is in the interests of financial stability but which might not be at the forefront of the minds of the people participating, either as practitioners, commercial players or politicians.
The hon. Member for Nottingham East acknowledged the consensus on the need to set up these institutions of macro-prudential policy, but that does not take away from the fact that their establishment is designed deliberately to introduce a necessary tension into the debates. The question arises, then, of whether these powers can be exercised appropriately—for example, whether the House has appropriate scrutiny and discretion over them.
One reason why we have initially given the FPC a minimal—I think he will agree—set of powers through a statutory instrument being debated on the Floor of the House is that these things should be properly scrutinised. We timed this debate so that it could follow the hearing of the Treasury Select Committee, of which the hon. Member for Leeds East is a member and which has considered this matter in recent days. Our intention is that these things should be properly scrutinised and well considered. It is for the Government to bring forward proposals about what the tools should be. Future proposals will be put before the House, and Ministers will be accountable to the Committee and the House. Indeed, the statutory instrument is available for debate. As the hon. Members would acknowledge, we have not loaded it with so many different provisions as to give the House a Hobson’s choice.
Mr Mudie
As a member of the Treasury Committee, I hear it said all the time that we have the ability to scrutinise, and that people are accountable to us. That carries little weight with me; it does not impress me. This is ultimately a question of who takes the decisions when a Minister or a Chancellor—such as the last Chancellor—going through a crisis meets an unelected Governor and asks him to do something in the interests of the economy and the future of the country, and the Governor says no. That is what we are talking about.
Greg Clark
Let me go on to describe some of the other elements involved. I said that we had committed to bringing to the House particular measures that could be debated. The hon. Gentleman has anticipated one such possibility. He was correct in suggesting that, if we had been proposing a power over the loan-to-value rate, the House would have been substantially more occupied than it is at the moment, that such a matter would engage Members and that there would have been a fuller debate on the matter. However, this is not the only mechanism by which scrutiny can take place.
The secondary objective of the Financial Policy Committee has been mentioned. Through the scrutiny of the House and of the hon. Gentleman’s Committee, that objective has been set up, and it means that the FPC’s duty to support the court of the Bank of England in achieving its financial stability objective is subject to supporting the policy of Her Majesty’s Government, including their objectives for growth and employment. That is significant. That power is there for a reason, and we expect it to be used. It requires the Chancellor of the day to write annually to the FPC to set out what he expects it to have regard to in making its decisions. The House will have the ability through that mechanism to scrutinise and take a view on whether Ministers—in this case, the Chancellor—are giving the right directions to the Committee in terms of what it should understand the Government’s economic objectives to be. I believe that the mention of growth and employment will address one of the concerns that has been raised.
It is worth noting that the measures we are talking about relate to peacetime; they are not for use in a crisis. The Chancellor will retain the ability to give directions to the Bank in a time of financial crisis, for example, when that is in the public interest. The measures before us are for use in the normal course of events.
There will also be a requirement on the FPC to account for its decisions. It will appear before the Treasury Committee after it has held its meetings and published its reports, and it will have to explain the basis of its recommendations and directions. It has made a commitment to setting out in advance the types of indicators that it will bring to bear on those questions, so there will be no arbitrary use of discretionary powers. The committee will seek to be predictable in regard to the types of instrument that it will use.
On the format of statutory instruments, the parliamentary Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee will take a view on whether the choice of procedure is appropriate. I think that the hon. Gentleman will approve of the fact that the affirmative resolution procedure is to be used in these circumstances.
Let me address the hon. Gentleman’s point about residential property, which is of course a matter of interest to our constituents. It has been pointed out that all these matters have a bearing on our constituents. I think he would acknowledge that any review of the recent financial crisis—and, indeed, of financial crises around the world—would note that housing bubbles are often associated with the kind of over-exuberance and excess that contributes to financial instability, which the arrangements that we have in place are designed to address. It is appropriate for the powers to be there. These sectors have been debated at the European level, and this is one of a limited number of sectors for which it is anticipated that the national regulators should have a sectoral power.
I think it important to note that the power to make recommendations and give directions is available to the FPC, but that there is no requirement that it should get in the business of micro-managing these sectors. It seems to make sense, on the basis of history, for this initial set of sectors to be included. The powers are there, as I say, but there has been some debate about whether they should be more specific in respect of loan-to-value powers, which is not part of the proposals. It is no part of the Government’s purpose, as the hon. Gentleman rightly anticipates, to prevent what we hope will be an increase in home ownership and house building as a result of the order.
Let me deal with some points raised by the hon. Member for Nottingham East. He forcefully made the point that we need an explanation from the Financial Policy Committee of why it is using its powers. This should not take place in a vacuum or in secret. I completely agree, and this is provided for in the Financial Services Act, as the hon. Gentleman, a veteran of the Committee, knows. Section 9S requires the FPC to give an explanation of the reasons for its use of direction powers, and the explanation needs to be published in the financial stability report and it needs to account to Parliament for its use of the powers.
Let me pick up one of the hon. Gentleman’s earlier points, which was not quite right. He mentioned credit card repayments, for example. The powers provided for in the statutory instrument do not go into that level of detail, and the FPC will not have those powers and they are certainly not in this order—and neither are the loan-to-value powers available.
The secondary objective addresses the hon. Gentleman’s point about the necessary symmetry of these arrangements. Macro-prudential regulation is certainly about damping down excessive exuberance when it takes place, but on the other side of the cycle, by retreating from some of the provisions by varying requirements downwards, it also has the power to reverse the dampening of those sectors.
Financial Services
Debate between Greg Clark and George Mudie(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Greg Clark
I do agree with that. The work that my hon. Friend’s commission is continuing to do on the culture of banking is important and will inform the further reforms that we need to make. I do not think that we should be shy of setting high standards in this country; in fact, it is necessary to do so. At a time when trust is in flight across the world, there is an opportunity for the City of London to establish itself as a haven of probity and safety in a volatile world. High standards, far from being a threat or a danger to our financial institutions, are necessary for their continued prosperity, which I and the whole House want to see flourish.
Mr George Mudie (Leeds East) (Lab)
The Minister has referred to a need for cultural change. One culture that it is necessary to change is the banks’ unwillingness to lend to small businesses. The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills has spoken today about RBS and the lack of lending to small businesses, even with the recent initiatives. Have the Government given any thought to using the 350 RBS branches that they have to dispose of for the business bank, thereby giving it a regional and local presence so that small businesses can go to it, discuss loans and hopefully agree them?
Greg Clark
I very much agree with the hon. Gentleman that we should have more local, business-focused banks in this country. I hope that we can recover the personal knowledge, service and understanding of the needs of business that branches used to have in abundance. RBS is not nationalised, so we cannot direct it in the way that he suggests. However, the reforms that we are making, particularly in the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill, emphasise the importance of increasing competition and of having new entrants. As he knows, some of the divestments that have been required recently have brought entrants into the market that have concentrated on lending to small and medium-sized businesses. That is a force for good, but we need—and I want to see—much more of it.
Financial Services Bill
Debate between Greg Clark and George Mudie(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Greg Clark
This has been a short but interesting debate, and I am grateful to the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) and to my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) for contributing to it. I think that my hon. Friend does himself a disservice. If anyone can follow, and indeed have imprinted in his mind, every clause of FSMA, and be able to relate it to any future amendment, I know that he is capable of it. Let me first respond to some of the points made in the debate, including his.
The Bank of England is obviously at the heart of the financial system, and the changes are among the important reforms of its powers in history, alongside nationalisation in 1946 and independence in matters of monetary policy in 1998. Notwithstanding the few remaining issues of debate, I think that the whole House would agree that the changes made in the Lords represent a significant improvement in this part of the Bill. The amendments will strengthen the governance and accountability of the Bank. They will give the Financial Policy Committee a more positive and proactive mandate around economic growth and shift its membership to reduce the influence of the Bank’s executives. In addition, there are clarifications to simplify the drafting and terminology, if perhaps not going as far as my hon. Friend would wish to go. The name “court” is retained, despite his preferences.
On the Opposition amendments, I do not think that there is, in practice, a huge degree of difference between us. As the hon. Member for Nottingham East said, amendment (a) to Lords amendment 1 would add the word “overseeing” to subsection (2) of new section 3A of the Bank of England Act 1998. That was well debated in the House of Lords, as he will know. Some clarity was achieved there, in that the kind of oversight in which the oversight committee is expected to engage is common to non-executive directors elsewhere. Baroness Noakes made particular reference to that. The opportunity to review decisions and to consider how they are made is well understood in the context of the term “oversight”. The hon. Gentleman is proposing something that goes beyond that: that oversight should contain a more real-time role as well as a backwards-looking role. That could involve second-guessing the Bank’s policy decisions while they are being taken, which would not be appropriate. Indeed, it would go against the recommendations of the Treasury Committee, which said in its report that it agreed with the Governor that the Bank’s governing body should place more emphasis on oversight and ex-post scrutiny that would not authorise it to become involved in second-guessing immediate policy decisions. That is the advice that we have taken.
Mr Mudie
That should be qualified by the fact that the current Governor of the Bank of England does not want to be second-guessed by anyone. In fact, he would suggest that the best decision-making process is himself sitting in a room taking the decisions, questioned by no one.
Greg Clark
The hon. Gentleman has more experience of questioning the Governor than I have. The Joint Committee on the draft Financial Services Bill, of which he was a member, volunteered to agree with the Governor on that assessment, at least. We followed the Committee’s advice on that, as was recognised in the other place.
Greg Clark
I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s clarification. We should bear it in mind that the Bill requires the Treasury to lay the MOU before Parliament and to publish it. It will be subject to full transparency. For example, I would be very surprised if my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester did not call the Chancellor or the Governor to explain it. The oversight committee will be responsible for overseeing the Bank’s performance and, clearly, the MOU is a key part of its work in bringing to bear the Bank’s financial stability work. The committee will, therefore, consider from time to time whether it is working well and Parliament will itself have every opportunity to address the issue.
Amendment (a) to Lords amendment 16 would require the Financial Policy Committee to produce explanations of its decisions to exercise its recommendation and direction powers. Proposed new section 9QA(1) of the Bank of England Act makes it clear that the FPC’s explanations must set out how its decisions are compatible with its objectives, including the new objective to support the Government’s objectives for growth. It is clear that it has an explicit responsibility to do that. The FPC’s explanations will have to set out publicly how it has considered the impact on economic growth when deciding to take action and its reasons for believing that the action is compatible with its obligations in relation to economic growth.
Lords amendment 16—specifically subsection (3) of proposed new section 9QA of the 1998 Act—already requires the FPC to produce estimates of the costs and benefits of the decisions, including those areas to which the hon. Member for Leeds East (Mr Mudie) has referred. This will cover the impact on financial stability, both directly and indirectly, and the impact, both positive and negative, on economic growth.
I reassure the House that the FPC is giving considerable care and thought to the impact of these tools. The Bill requires the committee to produce and maintain policy statements for its direction tools. The statements will discuss the likely impact on both financial stability and economic growth. The Bank is preparing a draft of the statements, to be published early next year, so that they can be considered alongside the secondary legislation that will set out the FPC’s direction powers. We do not, therefore, think that amendment (a) to Lords amendment 16 is necessary.
Mr Mudie
Both the Treasury Committee and the Joint Committee on the draft Financial Services Bill were concerned about the important parts of the Bill that will be delivered through statutory instruments. That means a discussion in Committee for an hour and a half, with no provision for amendment. We would either have to accept the whole instrument or vote against it, and we would not have a majority on such a Committee. We pressed the Chancellor for a different, more flexible structure of decision making on secondary legislation so that the House or the Treasury Committee could debate it with the prospect of convincing the Chancellor, at some stage, to amend his direction of travel.
Greg Clark
I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s point. I am not able to produce a novel parliamentary procedure, but I can certainly tell him and the Chairman of the Treasury Committee that when the time comes to publish the statutory instruments, if they or their Committee would like to consider and advise on the discharge of the commitments, I would be happy to engage with them in good faith and take on board any suggestions.
Greg Clark
I give the hon. Gentleman an inch and he takes a mile. I will not commit to a different procedure but, as I have said, I will certainly commit, in good faith, to considering personally any points that are made. [Interruption.]
Greg Clark
They may be fresh instructions, but I have decided not to read them. I may be countermanded, but I will not retract my statement.
I will conclude by addressing what the Chairman of the Treasury Committee has said. I am reliably informed by my predecessors that this Bill, though complex and voluminous, has been well considered in numerous Committee sittings in this House, and I think that most people will conclude that their lordships have done a good job in their scrutiny. The Bill is important and it is right that it has been scrutinised to the extent that I think it now commands the broad support of the House, as evidenced by the relatively few amendments that have been tabled to their lordships’ amendments.
As I said in response to an earlier intervention, opportunities will be presented to the House in the years ahead—new Bills are already gathering speed on the runway—to accommodate further changes, should they be necessary. If so, I am sure we will have further conversations about them.
My hon. Friend the Member for Chichester issued me a challenge to rewrite the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and anticipated that I would be besieged by objections from officials and others.