Independent Reviewer for National Security Arrangements: Report

Hilary Benn Excerpts

Tuesday 8th July 2025 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Hilary Benn)]

The role of the Independent Reviewer of National Security Arrangements in Northern Ireland is to monitor compliance with annex E of the St Andrews agreement 2006, reviewing the relationship between MI5 and PSNI in handling national security matters.

Dr Jonny Byrne, the Independent Reviewer of National Security Arrangements in Northern Ireland, has sent me his report for 2024. Due to the classification of the report, I am unable to deposit a copy in the Libraries of both Houses, but I am able to provide the House with a summary of its content. What follows is a summary of the main findings of the report covering the period from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024.

Dr Byrne states:

“My role is to monitor compliance with Annex E of the St Andrews Agreement (2006) reviewing the relationship between MI5 and PSNI in handling national security matters. The role seeks to provide assurance that MI5 and PSNI operate together within the letter and spirit of the St Andrews Agreement. In order to meet the Terms of Reference, I reviewed documents and had a series of meetings with senior members of the PSNI and MI5 along with political and policy stakeholders.

There were no national security attacks in Northern Ireland in 2024. This is compared to one in both 2023 and 2022. There were none in 2021 and 2020, five in 2019, one in 2018 and five in 2017.

In 2024 there was one security-related death (the murder of Kevin Conway), compared to none in 2023. There were six bombing incidents and seventeen shooting incidents in 2024, compared with eight bombing and thirty-three shooting incidents in 2023. There were twenty-three casualties of paramilitary style assaults (seven in Belfast), compared to thirty-one in 2023. There were five casualties of paramilitary style shootings, compared to nineteen which occurred in 2023. There were sixty-seven security related arrests under Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000, with nine persons subsequently charged. This is compared to one hundred and four arrested in 2023 with twenty-one charged.

On 6 March 2024 and for the remainder of the year, Northern Ireland-related Terrorism (NIRT) threat level in Northern Ireland was lowered from SEVERE (an attack is highly likely) to SUBSTANTIAL (an attack is likely). It is important to note that from the first time a NIRT-specific threat level was published in September 2010 to March 2022 the threat level remained at SEVERE, it was lowered to SUBSTANTIAL between March 2022 and March 2023, and then increased to SEVERE until March 2024.

It is apparent that security statistics along with the approach to measuring the threat level, fails to adequately capture the transformation Northern Ireland has gone through since 1998. Since 2010, the threat level has fluctuated (in a small part) between SEVERE and SUBSTANTIAL yet the policing and security landscape in 2024 is very different and significantly closer to one envisaged through the peace process. There is a risk that Northern Ireland is solely defined through these indicators and that they have a significant influence on current and future security-related policy.

There is a lack of agreement among politicians, policy-makers and the community as to what constitutes a ‘national security issue’. There is also a reluctance to engage on the issue in a public way as most people align it with the conflict and part of our past. As a result, there are limited discussions about national security within the context of public health, the economy, climate change and the environment, migration and immigration, cyber threats and extremism.

In 2019 MI5 in oral evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament responded to a question about the security environment by saying “do not proceed with an assumption that we (MI5) can continue to drive (NIRT attacks) down to zero. That looks to us to be an undeliverable goal, albeit one we should always strive towards.” If this is the case then there should be focused discussion as to what normalisation looks like and what security indicators are best placed to measure it and reflect the situation. My concern is that we use the current security indicators and threat level to justify why we cannot ‘move on’, which makes any further move to normalisation challenging.

During the November 2024 public session of the Northern Ireland Policing Board the PSNI Chief Constable indicated that due to changes to historical arrangements for assigning Close Protection (namely the dissolution of the Northern Ireland Committee on Protection, NICOP), that the organisation was required to develop a policy to govern the assessment and delivery of such protection. The media interpreted this as the PSNI significantly reducing the level of close protection they provide for members of the judiciary because the degree of terrorist threat had diminished. If this were to happen it may have implications around the justification and rationale for additional funding for security related issues. It may also engineer a more public debate around vulnerability, harm, threats and national security.

Annex E sets out five key principles identified as crucial to the effective operation of national security arrangements between PSNI and MI5. My conclusions in relation to these are as follows:

a) All Security Service intelligence relating to terrorism in Northern Ireland will be visible to the PSNI.

It is evident that the PSNI have sight and access to all Security Service Intelligence relating to terrorism in Northern Ireland. There is compliance.

b) PSNI will be informed of all Security Service counter terrorist investigations and operations relating to Northern Ireland.

There are a number of processes and protocols in place to ensure that PSNI will be informed of all Security Service counter-terrorist activities relating to NI. There is compliance.

c) Security Service intelligence will be disseminated within PSNI according to the current PSNI dissemination policy, and using police procedures.

All Security Service intelligence is disseminated within PSNI according to the current PSNI dissemination policy, and using current police procedures. There is compliance.

d) The great majority of national security CHISs in Northern Ireland will continue to be run by PSNI officers under existing police handling protocols.

It is apparent that the overwhelming number of what are considered national security Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHISs)in Northern Ireland continue to be run by PSNI officers under existing handling protocols. There is compliance.

e) There will be no diminution of the PSNI’s ability to comply with the HRA or the Policing Board’s ability to monitor said compliance.

It is evident that there has been no diminution of the PSNI’s responsibility to comply with the Human Rights Act or the Policing Board’s ability to monitor said compliance throughout 2024. There is compliance.

I wish to note the full co-operation extended to me by both MI5 and the PSNI and the support of the NIO in compiling the report.

It is my conclusion that there is full compliance with Annex E of the St Andrews Agreement between MI5 and PSNI.”

[HCWS789]