Independent Reviewer for National Security Arrangements: Report 2025

Hilary Benn Excerpts

Tuesday 14th April 2026 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Hilary Benn)]

The role of the independent reviewer of national security arrangements in Northern Ireland is to monitor compliance with annex E of the St Andrews Agreement 2006, reviewing the relationship between MI5 and the Police Service of Northern Ireland in handling national security matters.

Dr Jonny Byrne, the independent reviewer of national security arrangements in Northern Ireland, has sent me his report for 2025. Due to the classification of the report, I am unable to lay a copy in the Libraries of both Houses, but I am able to provide the House with a summary of its content. What follows is a summary of the main findings of the report covering the period from 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025. I am very grateful to Dr Byrne for his report.

Dr Byrne states:

“My role is to monitor compliance with Annex E of the St Andrews Agreement (2007) reviewing the relationship between MI5 and the PSNI in handling national security matters. The role seeks to provide assurance that MI5 and PSNI operate together within the letter and the spirit of the St Andrews agreement.

In order to meet the terms of reference I have reviewed documents, and had a series of meetings with senior members of the PSNI and MI5 along with political and policy-maker stakeholders.

There were no national security attacks in Northern Ireland in 2025. This is compared to none in 2024, and one in both 2023 and 2022. There were none in 2021 and 2020, five in 2019, one in 2018 and five in 2017. Although it is important to recognise that armed groups retain the intent and capability to conduct national security attacks.

Throughout 2025 there were no security related deaths, compared to one in 2024. There were 12 bombing incidents and nine shooting incidents in 2025, compared with six bombing and 17 shooting incidents in 2024. There were 21 casualties of paramilitary style assaults, compared with 23 in 2024. There were three casualties of paramilitary shootings, compared to five in 2024. There were 21 security related arrests under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000, with eight persons subsequently charged. This is compared to 67 arrested with nine charged in 2024.

On 6 March 2024 the Northern Ireland-related Terrorism (NIRT) threat level in Northern Ireland was lowered from SEVERE—an attack is highly likely—to SUBSTANTIAL—an attack is likely. Prior to this the threat level was SEVERE from September 2010 to March 2022, lowered to SUBSTANTIAL between March 2022 and March 2023, and then rose to SEVERE until March 2024.

Through my discussions and review of documents I would like to make the following observations.

For the reporting period I requested PSNI data relating to the use of schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, specifically relating to its use by PSNI Ports Examining Officers. The power allows an examining officer to stop, question, search and detain a person at a port or the border area in Northern Ireland for the purpose of determining whether the person appears to be someone who is, or has been, involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. It also allows for the examination of goods for the purpose of determining whether they have been used in the commission, preparation or instigation of the acts of terrorism. The data revealed that there had been 40 examinations and 51 detentions over the reporting period. These 91 examinations and detentions related variously to domestic extremism, NIRT, International Counter Terrorism, Crime and other (no clear ideology attributed to the usage of the schedule).

The data suggests that the PSNI are dealing with, and responding to, a range of threats, with only 34% of the power being used on those specific to Northern Ireland. However, I believe there remains a public view that National Security and terrorism more generally is a localised and narrow issue, similar to what people experienced throughout the Troubles.

Alongside this, on 16 October 2025 the Director General of MI5, Ken McCallum, in his annual threat update noted the following: ‘Finally on terrorism, Northern Ireland. Communities there are now living through the longest period without a national security attack since the start of the Troubles. We will continue, with the police, to bear down on residual threats and degrade terrorist capabilities.’

Furthermore, in December 2025, the PSNI in their written evidence to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, policing and Security Inquiry noted the following: ‘Any reduction in the threat is wholeheartedly welcomed by the PSNI but in practical terms, there is no difference in the operational policing response during periods of SEVERE or SUBSTANTIAL threat. It will take years of continued progress in driving down the threat and degrading terrorist capabilities before the threat reduces to an extent where the Police Service is able to make significant changes to how it operates to keep people in Northern Ireland safe’.

In May 2025, Deputy Chief Constable Singleton stated that ‘Northern Ireland is one of the safest places to live, work and raise a family’.

Why is all this relevant? There is a mixed, often contradictory narrative around Northern Ireland’s security status. There are two points worth making. Firstly, there is a lack of public debate or focus on what ‘normalisation’ is or how it should be measured. There is some optimism that the Northern Ireland threat level may be reduced to MODERATE at some point in the future. Inevitably, once sustained, this must have implications in terms of how the public view security alongside a reassessment of financial costs incurred to keep the public safe. However, there has been a distinct lack of debate and focus around what normal means in a society approaching the 30 year anniversary of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement (1998).

Secondly, the topic of national security is rarely discussed at a Northern Ireland political level and institutions such as the Northern Ireland Policing Board rarely (if at all) engage constructively with the subject. Overall, this is concerning. Threats and risks are constantly evolving and given Northern Ireland’s unique status in terms of borders there should be a more mature and transparent discussion around managing, preventing and addressing current and future national security issues.

Platforms for this conversation could involve the Northern Ireland Policing Board along with the Northern Ireland Justice Committee.

Annex E sets out five key principles identified as crucial to the effective operation of national security arrangements between PSNI and MI5. My conclusions in relation to these are as follows:

a. All Security Service intelligence relating to terrorism in Northern Ireland will be visible to the PSNI.

It is evident that the PSNI have sight and access to all Security Service intelligence relating to terrorism in Northern Ireland. It is clear that PSNI and MI5 value the relationship and recognise the importance of working collectively to achieve the same goals. There is compliance.

b. PSNI will be informed of all Security Service counter terrorist investigations and operations relating to Northern Ireland.

It was evident from the discussions that both operational and strategic approaches to security were underpinned by the need for joint-working arrangements and co-ordinated processes. There were no independent terrorism investigations taking place in Northern Ireland. There is compliance.

c. Security Service intelligence will be disseminated within PSNI according to the current PSNI dissemination policy, and using police procedures.

All Security Service intelligence is disseminated within PSNI according to the current PSNI dissemination policy, and using current police procedures. All of the material passes through the intelligence branch hub using PSNI grading and intelligence briefing documents. There is compliance.

d. The great majority of national security CHISs in Northern Ireland will continue to be run by PSNI officers under existing police handling protocols.

According to both PSNI and MI5 the majority of ‘national security Covert Human Intelligence Sources’ (CHISs) in Northern Ireland continue to be managed by PSNI under existing handling protocols. The PSNI is regularly audited by the Investigative Powers Commissioner’s Office around HUMINT compliance. There is compliance.

e. There will be no diminution of the PSNI's ability to comply with the HRA or the Policing Board’s ability to monitor said compliance.

There has been no diminution of the PSNI’s responsibility to comply with the Human Rights Act or the Policing Board’s ability to monitor said compliance throughout 2025. The PSNI ACC for Crime Operations meets regularly with the board and members have the opportunity (with support from the Board’s Human Rights Advisor) to probe, ask questions or seek clarification on police approaches, tactics, processes and operations relating to national security. There is compliance.



I wish to note the full co-operation extended to me by both MI5 and the PSNI and the support of the NIO in compiling this report.

It is my conclusion that there is full compliance with Annex E of the St Andrews Agreement between MI5 and PSNI.”

[HCWS1507]