China Spying Case

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Tuesday 28th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Alex Burghart]

I think there are basically two possible answers to my hon. Friend’s question. The first is that the Government cannot tell their elbow from their posterior; the second is that they do not want this House to know the truth. Either way, on a matter as serious as this, it is incredibly important that we get to the truth. Tonight’s motion presents the Government with an opportunity to be entirely transparent with us and set out the facts of the case as they were at the time—particularly on 1 October, when this all-important meeting took place.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I just want to clear up one small point. When the CPS originally decided to prosecute back in 2024, it was convinced on the basis of the then-required evidence that was in front of it that in this case, China was responsible, and therefore it posed a threat. What changed was the Roussev case, which redefined what the CPS needed to be able to say in order to go ahead with any further prosecution. It was made clear that all that needed to be done was to make the clear point that China was a persistent, continuous threat to the UK’s strategic interests. The reason why the CPS needed to make that statement had nothing to do with what had happened before; it was all about what resulted from the Roussev case. That was the key.

[Alex Burghart]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely correct, and the Director of Public Prosecutions has been very clear and consistent on that point.

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[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

It is a particular pleasure that you should be in the Chair for this debate, Madam Deputy Speaker, because like me and the others, some of whom have been named, you are sanctioned by a brutal Chinese Government. I think it is excellent that you are here to invigilate this debate and to keep us on track—forgive me if I go over. [Laughter.]

I am not going to take the blandishments of the hon. Member for Rugby (John Slinger) who told us to look in the mirror. I stopped looking in the mirror a long, long time ago. In fact, when I was elected in 1992 I was told by a journalist at the Express that I could look in the mirror and see my career behind me. I feel like I have been walking backwards ever since.

Can I just say, I think the whole principle that underlies all this is the Government’s behaviour over this decision? I will come to the decision in a second, but I want to address how the Government dealt with the decision—and how they have publicly dealt with it, which is really rather peculiar. It has been almost impossible throughout this to drag information out of the Government about why the DNSA took the decisions he took, where the Government were in this and when meetings took place. Denials slid towards acceptances that dates were in fact as they stood. As I understand it, it was even exclaimed by the Prime Minister that The Sunday Times was lying when it raised the idea of there being a meeting on 1 September containing all the various individuals, including the DNSA.

It has been a sort of meticulous nonsense. Dodge, duck, dive, dip, and dodge—the five Ds of dodgeball, or in this case the five Ds of dodge the spying case. Getting to the truth of this has been painful, and if it is painful for the Government, they have only themselves to blame. Had they come out straightaway at the beginning and been clear about all this, instead of hiding behind the DNSA, they might have found it easier.

I find ridiculous the position that the DNSA stated yesterday—that he was bound to reflect the position of the Government. The DNSA is not bound to reflect the position of the Government. He was asked by the DPP—and therefore bound to respond to the DPP—whether or not he said that China was an active security threat. What I do not understand is how the then DNSA, both at the time and again when giving evidence yesterday, was able to say that China posed a range of threats—just as the Minister said—on different areas all across the board, from sanctions right the way through to espionage. I do not understand the difference between posing a series of significant threats to our national security in different areas across the board and being a threat to our national security. It is impossible to even conceive that we could define this so narrowly that we are unable to come out with the very simple statement: “They pose a threat to our national security.”

From my standpoint, I face a threat. I have been chased and regularly followed by wolf warriors, which are low-level intelligence operatives of China. They have impersonated me abroad and spread lies about what I have said, and those of us who have been sanctioned have been spied on. I know what a threat looks like. It looks like that. It is not a duck; it is a threat. There is no reason why any self-respecting Government could not have said that. The DNSA should have said that straight off—not go out and tell us that the police asked him to introduce what had been in the manifesto of the Labour party in the last election and then say that he knew nothing at all about it previously but had to put this in context. He was not asked to put it in context. The DSNA was asked to state clearly, from what he sees and the evidence he has taken, whether China poses an active security threat.

At the nub of this is another particularly important point. The 1 September meeting is critical in all this, because we have been given assurances throughout this—by the Prime Minister, for example, at Prime Minister’s questions on 15 October. He said:

“There was no further submission of evidence, one way or the other, after any discussion in September.”—[Official Report, 15 October 2025; Vol. 773, c. 368.]

Yet we know that now not to be the case. Why was the Prime Minister making such a fundamental statement at Prime Minister’s questions trying to shut this down? Did nobody bother to tell him that this had gone to a meeting? By the way, we were told that at no stage was the National Security Adviser or any other appointed individual at any meetings with or in contact with the DNSA throughout the submission of evidence. That is utterly untrue. We know that the DNSA was at the meeting chaired by the National Security Adviser on 1 September. What did they discuss? Was it football scores or what was right in front of them there and then: the still-unfinished business of whether or not the DNSA was going to comply with the DPP’s requirement for a very clear statement? It is that bit of subterfuge, with dipping and dodging throughout, that is really quite peculiar.

I have respect for the Minister. When he gets to his feet, can we not have this ridiculous game of “You did this” and “You said that”? I would simply like him to recognise that China poses a national security threat. Let us deal with that threat and take clear action, and not play games with terminological inexactitudes about what happened at what meeting.

We now know that the DNSA met all those characters —we do not know who they are—so the minutes of the meeting should be released. If the Government will not release them to Parliament, they can do it in camera to the Intelligence and Security Committee. They should do it to clear the record; I recommend that they do. People like me, the Chairman of Ways and Means and others have suffered attacks from this brutal regime, which has massacred people in China and committed genocide. Surely now is the time to make our position clear.

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[Mark Pritchard]

If we have the directors of all the intelligence agencies suggesting that China is a threat, it does not get much better than that. We have great deputy national security advisers, but their line managers—their directors, their bosses—were also clearly stating that China was a national security threat. In fact, the word “threat” is mentioned 284 times in that 207-page report.

The key word in this whole episode involving the deputy National Security Adviser—that is, the DNSA for intelligence, defence and security, not the other two remaining DNSAs, unless the Minister wants to correct me—is “active”. The question is whether China was an active threat, as underscored by the testimony to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy yesterday. The evidence in the ISC’s report would suggest that China has been known to be an active threat for some time. I have mentioned the various reviews. Indeed, in his own witness statement, the DSNA refers to China conducting “large-scale espionage operations”. Again, this is not a historical reference or a past-tense reference; it is clearly referring to the here-and-now operations taking place today. There is clearly an active threat, not just a general or undetermined threat.

China being an active threat was also underscored by the director general of the Security Service’s recent speech, in which he referred to China’s

“cyber-espionage…clandestine technology transfer…interference in UK public life”

and

“harassment and intimidation of opponents”.

Once more, these threats are not just historical; they are current and active, happening in the UK right now. They have not stopped. They are increasing. They continue.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I am listening carefully to my right hon. Friend’s excellent speech. Did he see, in the testimony yesterday, the intervention in which Sir Chris Wormald suddenly said that he did not believe that Ken McCallum, the chief of MI5, had described China as a threat? He intervened on the DNSA to make that point. That is fundamentally untrue, is it not?

[Mark Pritchard]

My right hon. Friend makes a good point. I think hon. Members will take their own view on who they think is the expert on national security. I think it will be Sir Ken McCallum, who is a long-serving and distinguished member of the UK intelligence community.

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[Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)]

I put on record my anger at the collapse of the case. Colleagues have talked about the particulars of the case, so I will use the short time that I have available to broaden the lens and look again at the foundations of our security.

When the Conservative party brings Opposition day debates to the House, I attend because I am interested to hear the development of thinking in the party as it seeks to become a future Government. I also think about the party’s record in government and where it is going. I will make two points that I think the Opposition will disagree with, but I hope some Members will agree with my third point.

First, any Government, from whichever party, have a duty to invest in the institutions, infrastructure, capabilities and knowledge that enable our long-term advantage and security. Those are not built in five minutes, but they can be built in 14 years. It is my view that in the 14 years that the Conservatives were in power, they gave insufficient regard to building those things that can shore up our security.

Secondly, in cases where the Conservative Government did bother to build or pursue infrastructure, they opened the door to Chinese firms. While the Conservative leadership pretend to know what they think about China now, in truth they did not know what to think about China when they were in office, and that is an important reality to stare at. When it came to Huawei and 5G, the Conservatives were in, then they were out. When it came to nuclear, the Conservatives were in, then they were out. We are still unpacking George Osborne’s mistake on that front.

That contrasts sharply with the position of the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). I rediscovered his 2020 Hudson Institute speech, and I thought it was a very good insight into the situation at that time. Looking back at it five years on, it had considerable foresight on what has occurred. I am very sorry and saddened that he has experienced what he has at the hands of the Chinese leadership—other colleagues have experienced the same—but he is in a minority in his party in standing up on these issues.

I do not believe that the Conservative leadership have been as clear in their thinking or as forceful in their condemnation, and for the leadership of the right hon. Gentleman’s party to now pretend that they were is inaccurate and does him a disservice. We should contrast his position with the words of the Leader of the Opposition when she was in Cabinet. As the Business Secretary pursuing business, she said:

“We certainly should not be describing China as a foe”.

We should contrast his position with that of one of the nine Conservative Foreign Secretaries, who said it would be

“impossible, impractical and—most importantly—unwise”

to sum up China in one word as a threat. As a leadership team, the Conservatives need to stop throwing mud and to come to terms with what happened on their watch.

We must also look reality in the face: we cannot shy away from engagement with China. I bet that most Opposition Members have an iPhone in their pocket that was made in China; I bet they have other things in their home that were made in China. We must engage, but all of us in this Parliament must do so with our eyes wide open about the risks that that involves. Some of us in this Parliament have prophesied about that for many years and for longer than others, but we must be aware of that.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I was not going to intervene, but the hon. Gentleman made a statement about me justifying the position of the Opposition, as opposed to the Government. I assure him that had the two sides been switched, I would be carrying out exactly the same cross-examination that I have done today. No matter who has been in government, I seem to have been in opposition, and I want to say so. I am not doing this for any betterment; I am doing this because it is right.

[Tom Hayes]

I apologise if I misrepresented what I was saying. I was saying that throughout his time on these Benches, the right hon. Gentleman has been forceful in his condemnation. Whoever was in government, I believe that he would have done that, but I do not believe that the Conservative leadership either on the Opposition Benches or in office did the same. That is the point I was trying to make.

The Opposition called this debate to throw mud, but it is an opportunity to think about the wider security context in which we operate. As the months go on, I am intrigued to see what the Conservative party’s posture will be as it contemplates the security and intelligence environment we are in. Will it shy away from engagement with China—a significant market and economic opportunity for us—or seek to engage with China with its eyes wide open?

The Conservatives need to accept that they did less than they could have done in office to create the foundations for our security and economic growth. In so doing, they made us more vulnerable. Until they accept that and apologise for it, it begs the question: why should any of us in this Chamber and in the constituencies we represent listen to them ever again on the subject of keeping our country safe?

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[Dan Jarvis]

Let me just finish my point. I will come back to the right hon. and learned Gentleman if time allows.

The meeting was specifically set up to provide the FCDO with an opportunity to discuss—at an appropriately senior official level; no Ministers attended the meeting—what the approach would be to handling engagement with China across a range of scenarios related to this case, as well as in relation to wider issues that would come up. Those who attended the meeting were operating on the basis that the trial would go ahead at the start of October.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

rose—

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

rose—

[Dan Jarvis]

I am going to make a bit of progress, because time is against me.

Meetings such as this are a routine part of the NSA’s role.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Will the Minister give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

The Minister did say he would give way to me.

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[Dan Jarvis]

My hon. Friend the Member for Rugby (John Slinger) nailed the myths, I thought very effectively, in his contribution. The right hon. and learned Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox) described his duck. It felt as if his contribution was as much aimed at the DPP and the CPS as at the Government, but it was engaging none the less. My hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale (Paul Waugh) raised important points about some of the critiques that have been levelled, and I agree with him about trying to establish cross-party consensus.

The right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green spoke about the nature and the description of the threats we face from China. Let me say to him that it is completely unacceptable that he and other Members of this House are sanctioned, and I give him an absolute assurance of the seriousness with which this Government take those particular threats. My hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell (Peter Swallow) spoke about transnational repression. He has raised it previously, and I can tell him that the defending democracy taskforce has concluded a review, and the Government have developed a range of support and security mechanisms. Most importantly, however, we condemn any malign activity towards anyone here in the UK.

The right hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) spoke about the work of the ISC, and he was right to do so. The Government welcome the work of the ISC in looking carefully at the circumstances of this case, as we do the important work of the JCNSS. I thought my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Gareth Snell) made the really important point that, given the concerns that have rightly been expressed right across this House about what has happened, we should be trying to seek to work together and establish a consensus. I thought he made that point very powerfully.

Time is running short, so let me say to the House that national security is the first duty of this Government. That is why we oppose the Opposition’s motion, which would see the release not only of information subject to legal professional privilege, but of information vital to the security of the United Kingdom, including advice to the Prime Minister. Successive Governments, including the previous Government in which the shadow Home Secretary served as a Minister, have maintained that position. This is not a question about parliamentary scrutiny. We welcome the ongoing process with the JCNSS, and we look forward to continuing to work with it, as we do with the ISC. This Government will continue to develop a consistent and pragmatic approach to economic engagement, but without compromising our national security.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I have a very simple question: if the Minister will not give the minutes of that meeting to the House, will he give them to the Intelligence and Security Committee, which sits in camera?

[Dan Jarvis]

The Government have given a very clear commitment that we will co-operate and work closely with all of the Committees of this House.

It is precisely because everything this Government do is rooted in the national interest that I say that this Government are extremely disappointed that this case has collapsed. It is right that the matter is being investigated by the appropriate parliamentary Committees, and we look forward to co-operating with that work.

Question put.