Human Rights Abuses: Magnitsky Sanctions

Iqbal Mohamed Excerpts

Thursday 8th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right and that is the whole point of today’s debate. My feeling is that this Government and even the previous Government have to a degree dragged their feet. I often say to the Minister, who I know very well—we have debated with each other endlessly—that it seems not to matter who is in government, because the Foreign Office retains its reluctance over many sanctions. He will deny that, of course, because it is his job to do so, but I see him as a very decent individual and he must know in his heart of hearts that there is more that we could do. I will leave that for the moment, until he has the chance to wind up the debate.

[Iqbal Mohamed (Dewsbury and Batley) (Ind)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that there is a perception in my constituency and across the country that the money laundering checks on individual consumers going for a mortgage or buying something expensive such as a car seem to be more stringent than those for the millionaire- billionaire foreign investors who are investing in the City of London?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

The whole point of the debate is to ensure that we know where the money comes from, that we know how it has been gained, and that the individuals must pay a penalty if they are involved in what is illegal or inhuman. The key point is that all those matters can be picked out by the Magnitsky sanctions.

I mentioned Myanmar earlier. Despite historically leaning on sanctions against Myanmar’s military junta for its role in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity against its civilian population after the 2021 coup, the UK has failed to target the State Security and Peace Commission, the military’s successor to the UK-sanctioned State Administration Council. Without additional sanctions, the State Security and Peace Commission, which was established in an attempt by the military to rebrand itself and rebuild financial ties with international partners, has effectively succeeded in its mission. That is exactly what we should have been tackling through the sanctions available to us, but we have not done so.

Finally, last month the UK placed sanctions on four senior commanders of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces suspected of involvement in heinous violence against civilians in the city of El Fasher. However, no action was taken against their key military and diplomatic backer, the United Arab Emirates, or their chief commander. That highlights a broader, troubling trend: to date, only a fraction of Magnitsky sanctions have ever been applied by the UK Government to perpetrators from countries considered strategic allies of the UK. That is a very important point to make; politics have an awful lot to do with this issue. As reported by REDRESS, several of the most notorious human rights abusers and corrupt actors, including in Iran, Nigeria, Sudan, China, Eritrea, the UAE and Egypt—we have mentioned Russia, too—have not been sanctioned by the UK.

I will now come to some examples of individuals and contexts that remain unsanctioned despite overwhelming evidence of involvement in corruption and serious human rights issues. Let me deal now with China. While the UK imposed sanctions on four individuals and one entity involved in China’s violent repression of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang in 2021, it never acted on detailed evidence received from human rights organisations. REDRESS— I know, because I have seen the evidence—previously submitted it to the FCDO, calling for targeted sanctions on the following individuals and entities for their involvement in serious human rights violations in Xinjiang.

All of the following are sanctioned by the US—our ally—but not by the UK. The persons recommended for designations are: Chen Quanguo, party secretary of the Xinjiang Chinese Communist party and the key driver of the policy of genocide; Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps; Sun Jinlong, former political commissar of the XPCC, who was sanctioned by the US on 31 July 2020; Peng Jiarui, deputy party secretary and commander of the XPCC, sanctioned by the US on 31 July 2020; and Huo Liujun, former leader of the Public Security Bureau, sanctioned by the US on 9 July 2020. As somebody sanctioned by the Chinese Government myself—like you, Madam Deputy Speaker—for raising the issues of Xinjiang at the time, I think that that is a major omission. These are the key people—close almost to President Xi himself—who, when sanctioned, will really feel it. They are locked out of America, but have not been locked out by us. Will the Minister therefore outline what steps the FCDO will take to ensure that sanctions are consistently applied to all actors involved in human rights abuses and corruption?

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[Iqbal Mohamed (Dewsbury and Batley) (Ind)]

I thank the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for bringing forward this important debate on the effectiveness of Magnitsky-style sanctions for serious human rights abuses. They are tools that reflect our values as a country that is meant to defend human rights and the rule of law.

Under the UK’s autonomous sanctions framework, which is built on the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 and reinforced by subsequent legislation, the global human rights sanction regime allows us to target individuals and entities responsible for gross violations of human rights, including with asset freezes and travel bans. Magnitsky sanctions have been used against perpetrators of egregious abuses in multiple contexts, from Russian officials linked to the death of Sergei Magnitsky to those implicated in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and military leaders in Myanmar. However, today’s debate also requires us to consider the broader effectiveness and consistency of these tools in the face of major crises.

Multiple authoritative assessments, particularly from REDRESS and UK parliamentary evidence submissions, highlight several areas where the UK Magnitsky sanctions regime has failed to act effectively. Evidence shows that the UK has not replicated the majority of Magnitsky sanctions imposed by partner jurisdictions across the US, Canada and the EU. Only 14% of global Magnitsky designations are listed under the UK Magnitsky regime and another 17% appear under other UK regimes, meaning that 69% of perpetrators sanctioned abroad are not sanctioned by the UK at all. Of the unsanctioned cases, 71% were designated by the US, 27% by Canada and 2% by the EU, yet the UK has not followed suit.

The gap means that the UK is failing to act against individuals already identified as human rights abusers or corrupt actors by close allies. The UK has received at least 15 detailed evidence packages from NGOs such as REDRESS documenting alleged human rights abuses or corruption in many of the countries that were referenced by previous speakers, including China, Sudan, Uganda, Bangladesh, Venezuela and others. In many of those cases, the US has already sanctioned the perpetrators, but the UK has failed to act in almost all of them.

On the use of the legal powers available, according to parliamentary evidence, since September 2021 the UK has sanctioned only three individuals under its Magnitsky human rights regime, compared with 105 designations in the preceding period under the previous Foreign Secretary. That reflects a significant slowdown and a lack of strategic direction. There is also poor co-ordination with our allies in the US, the EU and other sanctioning partners. The recommendations from the all-party parliamentary group on Magnitsky sanctions and reparation stressed that the UK’s unilateral approach weakens the effectiveness of sanctions. The UK has failed to systematically sanction individuals already targeted by partners, co-ordinate multilateral actions to target corrupt networks instead of isolated individuals, or match the scale and frequency of designation by allies.

Magnitsky sanctions have been used against the egregious abuses that I have mentioned. However, today’s debate requires us to reflect on the broader effectiveness and consistency of these tools. In recent months, the United Kingdom has taken steps to sanction two Israeli Government Ministers over their repeated incitement of violence against Palestinian civilians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Those designations, made alongside partners including Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Norway, include travel bans and asset freezes and were justified by the Foreign Office as necessary responses to genocide and serious abuses of human rights. Moreover, the UK has suspended trade negotiations with Israel in response to its ongoing military offensive in Gaza and related violence in the west bank and has applied sanctions against settlers and settler organisations linked to violence against the Palestinian communities.

The scale and scope of action by the UK Government has not been sufficient, and we have failed to reflect our obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law to ensure that civilians do not suffer, particularly in the light of provisional measures from the International Court of Justice ordering the protection of civilians in Gaza and actions directed at ending grave human rights violations in Gaza and the west bank. The sheer scale of suffering in Gaza, including from the blockade’s effect on civilians and the risk of mass starvation, must prompt far stronger measures, ranging from broader sanctions and trade restrictions to the enforcement of legal obligations to prevent atrocities.

Instead, we see 37 NGOs, including Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Rescue Committee, ousted and banned from providing aid across the west bank and Gaza with impunity. That is despite nearly 1.9 million displaced Gazans being vulnerable to shortages of tents, shelter materials, medical assistance, clean water and sanitation support during winter, and we still refuse to go further on sanctions and punishment for Israel’s actions. At the same time, the UK Government have stressed their continued support for Israel’s security while the Israeli Government expand illegal settlements deeper and deeper into Palestinian territory. We have recognised the state of Palestine, which is a welcome step, but we must follow that up by fulfilling our obligations under that recognition to the Palestinian people.

All that illustrates an essential point: Magnitsky-style sanctions are neither symbolic nor irrelevant, but their effectiveness depends on consistent, principled application, rigorous enforcement and alignment with broader obligations and foreign policy goals. Targeted sanctions are most effective when they clearly align with international law, with evidence and with credible human rights concerns, when they are co-ordinated with international partners to avoid loopholes and politicisation, and when they are part of a broader strategy that includes diplomacy, humanitarian advocacy and engagement with multilateral justice mechanisms. Used in isolation, sanctions risk being dismissed as gestures rather than being seen as instruments of accountability. Used in co-ordination with wider action, they can contribute meaningfully to deterrence, pressure for change and justice for victims.

The United Kingdom should make principal use of Magnitsky sanctions wherever there is credible evidence of human rights abuses—be it in Russia, the middle east, Sudan, Myanmar or elsewhere—but they must also be prepared to act boldly and consistently, in line with international law when confronted with mass civilian suffering anywhere on the globe. Our inconsistent approach to human rights, and the protection of so-called allies, condemns us all to an unsafe world in which might is right and wrongdoing is never corrected. In the same stroke of a pen, we shame our enemies and sign away the human rights that we like to proclaim are sacrosanct. We must ensure that our sanctions regime is not just a statement of values but a tool that genuinely contributes to accountability, justice and the prevention of atrocities. I commend the motion to the House.