I agree with the hon. Lady, who serves so wonderfully on the Select Committee. These issues are brought out clearly in the report. She also referred to the matter in the estimates debate on Tuesday. There are real shortages in relation to cyber-reserves. We must build up those specialist areas to guard against the threats this country faces.
The figures announced in Army 2020 are significantly different from those predicted in the strategic defence and security review in 2015. Does my right hon. Friend agree that the great value of this strong report is not necessarily with regard to the past, because all those redundancies have happened, but with regard to the future? Looking forward to the next SDSR, does he agree that it is vital that if the SDSR is to have any value whatever it must become binding for the subsequent five years?
My hon. Friend, who also serves on the Defence Committee, makes, as always, a very good point. It is a matter not of astonishment, because I am not astonished about anything, but of surprise that the National Security Council has not already been brought into this process. It needs to be brought into the next process on a regular basis.
(10 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberGiven how long I have been in this House, I really ought to know whether I should be thanking the Backbench Business Committee, the Government, the Chair of the Liaison Committee or you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for my securing the debate. Just to be on the safe side, I will thank them all, and especially you.
I apologise for interrupting my right hon. Friend so early in his speech, but he makes a good point. In the old days, we had regular, sensible defence debates throughout the year, but they are now at the discretion of the Backbench Business Committee, which is a retrograde step.
My hon. Friend makes a good point, but it rebounds slightly on the Defence Committee because we have been told that we are responsible for applying for such debates and, I have to confess, we have not done so in recent months, so perhaps we ought to revisit that.
The Defence Committee launched an inquiry into defence and cyber-security in January 2012, as part of a series of debates and inquiries looking into emerging threats. It was the first time the Committee had investigated cyber-security as a discrete topic, although in 2009 we had looked at Georgia and Estonia, and visited Talinn, as part of another inquiry. The UK Government had identified cyber-threats as one of four tier 1 risks to national security, and in November 2013 published a UK cyber-security strategy, updating their 2009 strategy and setting out four objectives: first, to make the UK one of the most secure places in the world to do business in cyberspace; secondly, to make the UK more resilient to cyber-attack and better able to protect our interests in cyberspace; thirdly, to help to shape an open, vibrant and stable cyberspace that supports open societies; and fourthly, to build the UK’s cyber-security knowledge, skills and capability.
The programme is to be implemented via a four-year national cyber-security programme costing £650 million, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced an extra £210 million investment after the 2013 spending review. The funding is shared between the security and intelligence agencies, the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Cabinet Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but most will be spent by the security and intelligence agencies.
During our inquiry, the Committee investigated whether the high profile given to the cyber-threat in the UK was matched by a coherent plan and a chain of command in the event of a major cyber-attack on our national infrastructure or our national interests. The complexity of the threat must be matched by an agile, many-layered response; accordingly, many different agencies are involved in the cyber-security effort, ranging across cybercrime, cyber-espionage and cyber-commerce. Cyber-security is therefore to some extent everybody’s responsibility, but we must avoid its ending up being nobody’s responsibility as a consequence. Someone has to be in charge.
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier), the hon. Gentleman contributes effectively to the Defence Committee and makes an interesting point—one I had not heard before. That is the value of these debates. We will all have to think about that issue.
We must seek to defend ourselves, but we must also, as has been suggested, expect to develop a capability to respond to threats in cyberspace. When doing that, we face some of the same considerations as when developing conventional military capabilities. Where does the balance lie between international collaboration and sovereign capability, for example? What sort of international arrangements will best suit our aims?
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State also talked about how the UK was developing a full spectrum military cyber-capability, including strike capability. This is an interesting and novel declaration. Everybody knows it has happened but nobody has been prepared before now to announce it. Will this declaration act as a deterrent or will it make the UK a more likely target for hacktivists and foreign states? What about the legal implications of establishing a strike capability for the personnel involved? The necessary rules of engagement for cyber-attack need to be put in place, although of course we will not be told about them.
Some maintain that cyber is just another military domain and that we can expect to do everything in cyberspace that we do in the air, on land or at sea to prevent, deter coerce or intervene. But has the distinctiveness of the cyber domain been fully grasped? It is not clear, for example, that deterrence is a concept that can apply to a domain where there are real difficulties in discovering quickly who has perpetrated an attack and for what purpose, or even that an attack has taken place. Neither is it clear that everyone has grasped how important it is to avoid a silo approach to the cyberworld. It is essential to break down the dividing lines between civilian and military, among Government Departments, between Government and the private sector, and between our country and other countries, and therefore to approach the issue in an holistic way. Paul Dwyer of Mandiant came to brief the Defence Committee and told us that it takes a network to defeat a network.
Perhaps because the threat cannot be neatly categorised, it may be unrealistic to expect a neat categorisation of the responses. Everything we have been told in the UK emphasises that the armed forces have a very limited role, protecting their own systems and developing military cyber-capabilities. For other areas of activity, those in the lead are likely to be based elsewhere, particularly in the intelligence services. That is where the important point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury comes in.
My right hon. Friend makes a good point about the threat being so diverse as to be difficult to counter. None the less, the briefing we were given by Mandiant was very interesting: there are a large number of extremely serious attacks, not by a lot of people but by one or two groups. He even named Unit 61398 of the People’s Liberation Army as one of the main culprits. In other words, it would be reasonably easy for the British Government and the MOD to counter a specific attack such as that.
I am sure that my hon. Friend is right in saying that the Government are well aware of where some of these attacks are coming from. I do not agree that it would be relatively easy to counter them, because these threats are developing at a frightening speed, as the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) said. The diversity and development of these threats is changing on a second-by-second basis.
I am pleased to say that the Government are taking action to make the UK more resilient to cyber-attacks. It has established a new computer emergency response team in early 2014, CERT-UK, to improve the co-ordination of national cyber-incidents and to share technical information among countries. The Government set up a new cyber-incident response scheme in GCHQ to help organisations recover from a cyber-security attack. They have extended the remit of the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure—the CPNI—to work with all organisations that may have a role in protecting the UK’s critical systems and intellectual property. They have agreed with regulators in essential services a set of actions to make sure that important data and systems in our critical national infrastructure continue to be safe and resilient. As I have said, responsibility for cyber-security rests principally with companies and organisations themselves. Government agencies’ roles will be limited by available resources and national priorities.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend never misses an opportunity to speak up for the Royal Marines, and he is absolutely correct. I was not for one second suggesting that the House was silent on these matters during those years; I merely said that their prominence had declined somewhat at various times over the past 50 years.
Into that relative desert of knowledge, awareness and understanding of our armed forces came the figure of Sir Neil Thorne—this is where my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) did me a disservice a moment ago. Realising the shortage of information and awareness in the House, Sir Neil created the armed forces parliamentary scheme 25 years ago this year. Since then, he has run the scheme more or less single-handedly. He has help from a variety of people, but he is the driving force behind it. The scheme has gone through all sorts of changes. When I joined it in 1997, it was extremely small, with one MP from each side of the House attached to each of the four services. This year, there are about 70 people involved, including MEPs, Clerks of the House, Members of the House of Lords and others.
The work of the armed forces parliamentary scheme under Sir Neil has significantly increased the level of understanding and awareness of our armed forces and, in particular, of the work done by our boys and girls on the ground. A significant cadre of Members of Parliament now truly understand what happens on the ground. MPs are embedded for up to 22 days a year, perhaps wearing some kind of uniform, and they get intimately involved with activities of our armed forces on a variety of levels. That is central to the excellence of the understanding that the scheme has brought to this place.
In that context, it is probably known around the House that there will be some changes coming to the armed forces parliamentary scheme. Sir Neil has indicated that he would like to see changes, and the Secretary of State for Defence and Mr Speaker have joined him in that. The scheme will soon be re-established as a charitable trust under nine trustees, and we very much look forward to its continuation under the slightly new format.
Two things are central. First, it seems to me essential that the armed forces parliamentary scheme should remain as it is, or very much like it is, for 25 or 50 years to come. It would be no good at all if we said right now, “That’s it. It has been great, but let’s say goodbye to it.” We must not do that—the armed forces parliamentary scheme plays a terribly important part in all our parliamentary debates. Secondly, there are all sorts of ways of doing this, but on this 25th anniversary of the scheme’s foundation, it is terribly important that we pay due respect to the fantastic contribution to the defence of the realm and to our understanding of it that Sir Neil and his wife have made. He has done a great job; it is right that we should acknowledge it.
Does my hon. Friend agree that Sir Neil has not only put in a large amount of his own time and considerable expertise but has invested a large amount of his own money into creating the scheme, and that it is has proved so successful that it has been copied in other countries around the world and has given rise to similar schemes for the police, for example?
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right: Sir Neil’s personal contribution in respect of time, money and, indeed, the excellent Lady Thorne has been significant. A similar scheme has been established in Australia and, as my right hon. Friend says, there is a similar police scheme in existence—in this Parliament, and who knows where else it might spread.
On an occasion such as today’s when we are talking about defence personnel, it is right to pay our respects to and honour those people who do things that we in the Chamber could not contemplate doing, although one or two of us have done them—my hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti), for example, who is not in his place at the moment. He has had the great advantage of having spent six months in Afghanistan, with 36 hours of contact, firing a light gun at the enemy. Very few Members of Parliament have achieved anything of that kind; I think we should pay our respects to my hon. Friend for that.
It is right that we should make use of the armed forces parliamentary scheme, the all-party group for the armed forces and the welcome home parades. We should also celebrate the respects paid to the armed forces down the streets of Royal Wootton Bassett—or now in Carterton in Oxfordshire. The people of the United Kingdom and the Members of this House understand what a great contribution our armed forces make to the defence of our realm. It is right that we should convert that understanding into visible signs of it; various organisations do that very well.
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House has considered the matter of progress on defence reform and the Strategic Defence and Security Review.
I begin by welcoming the Secretary of State to the first full debate on defence in which he has taken part as Secretary of State. In the short couple of months in which he has been in post, he has really impressed the Defence Committee, and me. I have formed an extremely high opinion of him as Secretary of State. I am perfectly well aware that he will be thinking at the moment, “If only I could say the same of him,” but I hope that during the course of the debate we will get to the bottom of some of the issues we face. I also welcome the very fact that we are having the debate, and thank the Backbench Business Committee for at last finding a day on which we can discuss one of the most important issues in the world, and the most important issue of government.
I, too, welcome the fact that the Backbench Business Committee has found time for this debate, but does my right hon. Friend not agree that defence should be a matter not for that Committee but for Her Majesty’s Government? This issue should be debated in Government time, not in Backbench Business Committee time.
I would hope that this issue could be debated both in Back-Bench time and in Government time, because of its central importance, but as the Committee will see, the pressure on speaking opportunities this afternoon is heavy, so there is a time limit even though there will not be a vote at the end. I hope that that means that we will have further such debates.
(14 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberIt would be quite wrong of me to fail to pay tribute to the RAF. It achieves extraordinary things with a very small force—they are few in number. The same can, of course, be said of our Royal Navy and Army. I certainly share in the hon. Gentleman’s tribute to the RAF; it is well deserved.
As I said, the timetable for this review has been about five months. Most of the work has already been completed, about six weeks before the issue of the review. Even as I stand here, it is being finalised by the Treasury and the NSC. That means that the review has taken much less than half the time of the defence review of 1997-98, even though it is arguably even more important than that earlier review. Also, the current review should be based on an identification of the UK’s defence and security needs and what the threats are to us as a country and our interests, but it appears that it will end up being driven by the need for financial cuts and by little else.
The haste with which the review is being pursued has had some obvious consequences. Some 40 or so work streams fed into it, which is too few, and their analyses and costings cannot be as robust as they otherwise might have been, which threatens to weaken the review’s conclusions, possibly seriously.
Am I right in thinking that somewhere in the report, the Committee comments on the unfortunate consequences that might arise if defence estates were closed down because of the review without proper thought being given to the effects on the local economy and community, such as those that would occur if RAF Lyneham in my constituency were closed?
My hon. Friend is absolutely correct to say that the Committee comments in its report on the need for the MOD to work out with other Departments the consequences of changes to the defence estates. We did not mention the words “RAF Lyneham”, but had we thought of him, I am sure we would have.