Tackling Corruption Debate

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Department: Home Office
Tuesday 2nd December 2014

(9 years, 5 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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Steve Barclay Portrait Stephen Barclay (North East Cambridgeshire) (Con)
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Tonight’s debate on the Government’s approach to tackling corruption is timely for a number of reasons. It builds on the progress and leadership given by the Prime Minister at the G8 and G20. It comes as we anticipate the long-awaited Government report into corruption, which has been delayed for a year but is due out, we understand, later this month. It comes as London is hosting a conference of 14 overseas territories discussing their approach to corruption, and it comes just a day after changes applying to extraction companies on disclosing payments came into legal force.

The debate is not just timely; it is relevant to London specifically. London is home to more than 250 foreign banks, the most of any financial centre. It is the largest currency trading centre in the world, processing 18% of cross-border transactions. In 2013, the then regulator, the Financial Services Authority, estimated that the level of money being laundered through London and the UK was between £23 billion and £57 billion. Indeed, the Home Secretary used the £23 billion figure when she gave a speech to the Royal United Services Institute, which suggests that the Government accept the scale of the challenge. To put those figures into global context, the African Union estimates the cost of corruption in Africa to be $148 billion and the World Bank estimates that up to $1 trillion is paid in bribes. We know this is a serious issue, and that is why it is timely that Parliament should address it.

I want to highlight three broad themes. The first is resourcing: how to get investigating corruption right and how we give life to the Government’s plan and address some of the challenges they face on the transfer of key personnel to the National Crime Agency. Secondly, how do we improve the policy in terms of industry, so that we move from a quantity approach, particularly on suspicious activity reports, to one based more on quality and targeted at the more serious multi-million pound cases rather than low-value transactions? Thirdly, I want to highlight a number of loopholes in the legislative framework, given that there will be the Second Reading of the Serious Crime Bill in the next week or two.

On resourcing, will the Minister clarify whether colleagues in the Department for International Development have asked for reassurance on key financial investigators moving to the NCA, particularly from the proceeds of crime unit and the City of London anti-corruption units? Is it the case that, to date, only two of the 35 key investigators have agreed to move across? Such expertise takes time to grow. If we are to have a new plan, there is clearly a risk if the experts are not there to implement it. I understand that, in a letter to the Home Secretary on 20 November, the Bond group of non-governmental organisations also highlighted this issue. Given that police officers do not TUPE across and terms and conditions are less favourable, is the Minister confident that the staff will move across? I understand that in the two years that the NCA has had the intelligence unit, not been a single investigation has resulted from that intelligence. We need to tackle the concerns about resourcing.

Will the Minister update the House on the challenges of buying in resource, if that is seen as a short-term fix? The case of Malawi and “cashgate” is a good example. DFID paid for a British firm, Baker Tilly, to provide expert consultancy advice. The scandal is known as “cashgate”, but we have not recovered any cash. Has there been any enforcement? We gave £106 million—a significant amount—in aid to Malawi last year. How much has been spent on the investigation? Is it true that these consultants had no powers to require banks to disclose financial transactions or request intelligence from foreign Governments? If so, what are the constraints on using external consultants in respect of such investigations in the future?

For policy reasons, the Government have decided not to pay for law enforcement out of money recovered from corruption investigations, but given that we have fewer than 100 investigators—in the Serious Fraud Office, the proceeds of crime unit and the City of London unit—would that not make sense? It would allow us to conduct more investigations, which would be in the interests of the countries being defrauded.

Will the Serious Crime Bill deal with the evidential test? It appears to be set too high and so acts as a cost disincentive to the bringing of cases, which is compounded by the time scales. Where there is a financial institution with a complex, multi-jurisdictional case, perhaps spanning many years, law enforcement agencies have just 38 days to build a case to the satisfaction of the courts to block a payment. That is clearly insufficient. We could learn lessons from Guernsey and its approach in the Indonesian logging case. We need a mechanism of unexplained wealth orders to allow law enforcement agencies to stop the clock and allow time to investigate. Does the Minister accept that 38 days is wholly inadequate when it comes to building a complex legal case on payments?

On the relationship with industry, the suspicious activity report procedure is based on regulatory compliance, rather than investigation. The industry pays out millions of pounds for document checks on one’s granny in respect of low-value transactions, while serious cases receive little scrutiny. Of the 316,527 serious activity reports filed by banks last year, just 110 were looked at by the proceeds of crime unit. The banks do not want to exit profitable clients and see them go to other firms, so we have this defensive filing of suspicious activity reports, 95% of which are not acted on by law enforcement agencies—they just sit on file for intelligence. It is not cost-effective.

Last Thursday, on the BBC’s “Question Time”, the Chief Whip—the Whip might want to sharpen her pencil—said that Facebook had been aware of intelligence relating to a terrorist attack but had not passed it on. Do the Government know whether the 300,000 or so suspicious activity reports filed by banks include any transfers of funds to people complicit in those attacks? We do not have the mechanism for filtering them effectively. Is that an issue of concern to the Government, particularly in the light of the discussion about Facebook?

We need to shift away from this catch-all defensive policy to one based on targeting high-value corruption cases, and we need to work more in partnership with financial institutions, and combine that with a greater fear factor in respect of money laundering. Does the Minister share my concern that the current consultation relating to the Financial Conduct Authority seems to be repeating past errors? We had a Financial Services Authority report in 2011 that showed problems relating to the money laundering of banks, and two weeks ago we had an FCA report showing again that small banks were failing on money laundering. If we go back to the 1990s, 23 banks were complicit in money laundering, yet no action was taken.

It might surprise the House to know that over the last decade, only two fines appear to have been imposed against individuals for money laundering, the highest of which was for £17,500. How confident is the FCA that, particularly given the number of foreign banks in the UK, we have the right approach to money laundering even today?

Jim Shannon Portrait Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
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I appreciate the opportunity to intervene. The hon. Gentleman refers to money laundering. In Northern Ireland, over some 30 years of a terrorist campaign, it was clear that paramilitaries were involved in it. A wealth of experience was built up by police officers both from the Royal Ulster Constabulary and from the present Police Service of Northern Ireland. If the hon. Gentleman wants to enable more prosecutions for money laundering, does he think it might be a good idea for the Government and the Department to take on some of those officers who have now retired and take advantage of their expertise to bring more prosecutions for money laundering?

Steve Barclay Portrait Stephen Barclay
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The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point about how we learn from other jurisdictions in other territories. Italy is another example, with its experience of dealing with the mafia. The hon. Gentleman speaks from experience of the challenges within Northern Ireland where there is a great deal of expertise, from which we can learn.

On the fear factor for individuals, the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards put forward very good proposals, allowing a reversal of the burden of proof, but it is still the case that money laundering reporting officers are often not seen enough within the organisation and, not being at executive level, they often do not control the budget. That risks repeating past mistakes. Let us look at HSBC and the problems it got into in Mexico. To what extent does the Minister believe that the current regime would ensure that at a group level executives would be liable individually for fines if similar mistakes were made today?

The High Court recently heard the Nigerian OPL 245 case, which was dealt with by Lady Justice Gloster. It reveals a current impediment that applies to the judiciary, which I would like to draw to the Minister’s attention. In her ruling, Lady Justice Gloster said:

“I find as a fact that, from its incorporation and at all material times, Chief Etete had a sufficient beneficial interest in Malabu”.

She refers to the well-known case of Malabu, a $1 billion oil fraud. One can only look at that judgment, which says that if Etete had the beneficial ownership, he must have had it from the point of origin when he was the oil Minister of Nigeria. That is where the companies in beneficial ownership sat, having been set up in six days by a lawyer convicted in the French courts of money laundering. Yet Lady Justice Gloster could essentially adjudicate only over the spoils of that corruption. She had no power to do otherwise, because neither of the parties to the case claimed that the funds were corrupt. To what extent would the new plan put forward by the Government allow the judiciary greater powers where, in its judgment, a case that is being disputed is corrupt? That applies particularly in the arbitration courts, given the lack of transparency often seen in those proceedings.

Of course, non-governmental organisations could act as a friend of the courts in theory, but cost pressures invariably make that very difficult, while the likes of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 cannot be used to intervene unless there is a victim. If in this case the Nigerian Government are not of the view that they have been defrauded, very little can be done. We need to look at the way our courts operate in that regard.

Property is another area. It has been suggested that 45% of London properties valued at over £2 million are currently owned by offshore companies. The Prime Minister has taken some positive measures relating to the register of beneficial ownership, but the Minister must realise that that is null and void when it comes to those properties owned by offshore companies.

It is a well-known fact that beneficial ownership is very opaque, especially in the case of shell companies. Estate agents currently have no duties in relation to buyers, and even their duties in relation to the sellers who are their clients usually extend only to the offshore companies with which they are acting, or their lawyers. Would the Minister consider a requirement for beneficial ownership of property worth over £2 million to be disclosed to the Land Registry? She might even want to consider the imposition of a fine on offshore property-owning companies that did not wish to comply with the disclosure requirement—along the lines of those that were introduced as a result of recent banking regulatory changes—with the proceeds going to good causes. That simple measure could be applied over the next 12 months, and could bring a huge amount of transparency to the top end of the property market, where we know that money is being laundered.

Let me now ask some questions about legislation. First, will the Minister update the House on the position of the British overseas territories and Crown dependencies, given the lack of transparency surrounding their plans? Consultations in the British Virgin Islands closed 300 days ago but nothing has been reported, and the same applies to the Cayman Islands. Secondly, it is feared that industry guidance might fetter the effectiveness of new United Kingdom law relating to the transparency of payments to Governments for the extraction industry. A QC’s opinion recently raised concern in that regard. Will the Home Office be making any representations to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills on the subject?

Thirdly, will the Government make it a condition that the countries to which we give aid comply with the United Nations convention against corruption? In particular, will they provide global leadership in requiring the publication of asset declarations on politically exposed persons? The UN has pressed for that, and I do not understand why we are giving aid to countries without expecting them to comply with the convention. Fourthly, will the United Kingdom introduce administrative orders, such as those introduced by Switzerland and Canada, so that we can rapidly freeze assets in post-revolutionary circumstances?

Let me end by referring to the troubling case of Sergei Magnitsky, about which concern has been raised with the Government by Members in all parts of the House, and on which there appears to have been a woeful lack of progress so far. The Minister will be well aware that the 25-year-old Russian lawyer was tortured to death in a Russian jail. I know that detailed forensic information has been given to the UK Government about British nationals who were complicit in the money laundering linked to his death, and that information has been provided by Hermitage Capital Management, but the UK authorities appear to have taken no action, despite a Back-Bench debate initiated by my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab), and supported by the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) and many others.

Other Governments have given leadership, notably the United States Congress, but there has been a serious lack of action from the UK Government in relation to the proceeds of the tax fraud that was linked to Magnitsky’s torture and death. What reassurance can the Minister give that there will be a change of gear, and that amendments will be tabled to the Serious Crime Bill to give effect to it?