Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Joanna Cherry Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Wednesday 17th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Robert Jenrick]

That is not the point I am making. Once again, the hon. Lady is not listening. The point I am making is not about the virtues or otherwise of our membership of the European convention on human rights, which I have said is a matter for another day. The discussion on the amendment is simply about whether we believe it is right that the Strasbourg Court should confer upon itself, without our consent, the ability to impose binding injunctions. There is a separate question, not unrelated, as to how those injunctions are made. I would like to believe that most of us agree that doing them late at night with an unnamed judge, without giving reasons, raises serious rule-of-law questions. Perhaps the hon. Lady disagrees with that, but the purpose of the amendment is to enable us to return to a previous position. [Interruption.] She now has her clip for social media, so the rest of the debate is largely irrelevant.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

I want to address the point of law in respect of the Strasbourg Court. The difficulty with the right hon. Gentleman’s argument is that, under the scheme of the convention, the Court is the body that determines the meaning of the convention. Not just in the 2005 case but consistently thereafter, the Court has held that failing to comply with interim measures amounts to a breach of article 34 of the convention. That is the legal difficulty with his argument, is it not?

[Robert Jenrick]

No. There may be a good-faith disagreement between the hon. and learned Lady and me, but I do not believe that international bodies and courts should be able to grow organically as a result of the decisions of activist judges. This is a matter of the rule of law and of parliamentary sovereignty. We in the United Kingdom chose to be a signatory to the European convention on human rights, and I do not think it is correct that the Court gave itself this power in 2005.

I return to how this matter relates to the policy. First, let us cast our minds back to the summer of 2022. A rule 39 interim measure was imposed by the Court to ground a flight and to prevent us from proceeding with the policy. Do we think that anything has changed in the months and years that have passed? My conjecture is no. We will be in exactly the same position in a few months’ time unless we take action.

We included a provision in the Illegal Migration Act that merely restated the orthodox constitutional and legal position that, in theory, it is at a Minister’s discretion whether to comply with a rule 39 interim measure. Underlying that was the Government’s legal advice—which I believe to be erroneous, for the reasons I have just described—that they would be in breach of international law not to do so. As far as I am aware, the Attorney General and the Government Legal Service therefore continue to advise Ministers and civil servants that a decision not to support a rule 39 interim measure would be illegal and in breach of the ministerial code.

My best recollection was that no Minister should give any indication that they would ignore a rule 39 interim measure. The Attorney General’s position, as I understand it, is that there is a very small number of cases in which it is conceivable that one could do so, but that is a vanishingly slim number of cases and situations. As night follows day, if that position were to continue, we would find ourselves in exactly the same situation as we were in during the summer of 2022. I do not want to be in that position. It would be a huge breach of trust with the British public if we knew that something was likely—if we watched this train not speeding down the tracks but moving slowly towards us—and had ample opportunity to resolve the issue, but chose to do absolutely nothing. We have kicked the can down the road and now there is no more road—at the end of the road there is a precipice. We are moving forward with a scheme, but we do not know how to implement it. We are pulling the pin out of the grenade, but we have not got the guts to throw it.

We need to resolve this and the way to do that is simple: the Government could accept the amendment that stands in my name and those of many others. To do so is not to say that we are leaving the European convention on human rights. There are respectable international law arguments behind the amendment, and I would wager that the Government would have no difficulty in finding senior King’s counsel and former judges in the other place who would support my position—and the Government’s position, should they choose to adopt it.

The Government could change some of the accompanying minor documentation, such as the civil service code and the ministerial code. I would not place too much emphasis on those. At the end of the day, this is not about civil servants; it is about Ministers and the law. A good captain does not blame his sailors. It is on us: we have the power to fix this and we have the responsibility. So let us use the opportunity we have today with the amendment to resolve this situation. If we do not, we will be here in two months’ time, the Strasbourg Court will impose a rule 39 measure and the Government will be scrambling around trying to resolve the situation, and they will have no one else to blame.

I am here to help the Government, to ensure that this policy works, because I, like everyone, at least on this side of the Committee, believe passionately that we have to make this policy work and to stop the boats. So I strongly encourage my hon. and learned Friend the Minister, and indeed the Prime Minister, to support the amendment, and I encourage everyone else on both sides of the Committee who shares my determination to fix this problem to do exactly the same.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. I know, Dame Rosie, you would not want me to abuse the privilege you have given us to range slightly more widely in this debate to range quite that widely, so I will not. He is right that I am making a fairly precise point about what this language appears to me to say. I stress that I do not think it is necessary to include this language in order to achieve the objective that the Government have set in this legislation—with which I have some sympathy, although their methods make me nervous, and I make no bones about that. Worse than unnecessary, it presents some dangers that I do not think we need to present in order to achieve the Government’s objectives.

I suspect my hon. and learned Friend the Minister will tell me in a few moments’ or hours’ time that I do not need to worry about any of this. He may give two reasons for that. First, he may say that the Bill does not mean what I think it means. You will forgive me for saying this, Dame Rosie, but I am increasingly troubled that in this place we answer points such as mine by saying, “Yes, well, it doesn’t really mean that, and we don’t really mean that by it.” We should be concerned as legislators with what the language we are passing into law actually says, not what we meant to say. I am concerned that what this language says is not in accordance with what I am sure the Minister wants to do or what the Government want to do, but it might none the less have that effect, or be taken by others to mean the things that I am concerned about.

When the Bill says what a safe country is, it is potentially confusing two different things. One is deeming our own compliance with international law, which I do not think any country should be able to do, and the other is saying that Parliament resolves to do something even if it contravenes the UK’s international law obligations, which, going back to the previous intervention by the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy), I do think the British Parliament can do. We as a legislature can resolve to do that if we so choose.

We have to decide whether that is a wise and sensible thing to do, with all the ramifications it might bring, but as a matter of law it seems to me that the UK Parliament can, if it wishes, pass a law to say, “Despite or irrespective of our international responsibilities, this is none the less what we want to do.” That is not the same as deeming our own compliance with international law, which I worry this language almost certainly seems to do.

The point I make about the UK Parliament being able to do things even when they contravene its international responsibilities is already in the Bill and reflected in the language of clause 1(4)(b), which points out that

“the validity of an Act is unaffected by international law.”

Quite right. We can, if we so choose, deem a country a safe country for the purposes of domestic decision making if we want to. What I do not think we can or should do is legislate to say that we comply with our international law responsibilities when we do not—and when, crucially, to achieve the objective of this Bill we do not need to.

The second reason the Minister may give for why I do not need to worry myself about all this is that he may say that domestic and international law exist on different planes, and that this legislation is only targeted in any event at domestic authorities, so the Bill could not, even if it chose to try, deem our compliance with international law in actual fact. I would agree with that. It is perfectly true that domestic law and international law operate on different planes, and it is not likely that this Bill could determine any question of international law before any international tribunal.

If that is so, though, why include the language? If it does not have any meaning or legal effect, it does not serve any purpose, but I fear it may send a damaging political signal to other states. The language I am concerned about, which amendments 54 and 55 would remove, is either offensive or otiose, and in either respect the Bill would be better without it.

[Joanna Cherry]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright). I find myself in agreement with much of what he said, and he made his points very forcefully.

I rise to speak to amendments 32, 33 and 34 and new clause 4 in my name and amendments 4 and 5 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North (Patrick Grady), and to support the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss). I also want to comment on clause 3 and clause 5 stand part and the amendments that have been put forward, particularly by the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), in my capacity as Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

I turn first to my amendments, which relate to the impact of this Bill in Scotland, and in which respect I am speaking in a personal capacity. My amendments and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North deal with the extent of the Bill, its extension to Scotland and the date of its commencement in Scotland. We both seek to prevent this Bill’s extending to Scotland and, in the event that we are not successful in doing that, my amendments seek to ensure that the Bill will not extend to Scotland without the legislative consent of the Scottish Parliament and that nothing in it will interfere with the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session or its nobile officium. I will explain what that means later.

We must not forget that the regime this Bill seeks to impose, together with the Illegal Migration Act 2023, is imposed on asylum seekers across the United Kingdom, not just those who arrive in small boats on the Kent coast. The UK Government have not forgotten that, and that is why they want this Bill, with its far-reaching and unprecedented ouster clauses, to extend to Scotland. Accordingly, asylum seekers in Scotland looking to our courts for protection will find that the courts in Scotland have been emasculated in the same way as this Bill emasculates the courts of England and Wales.

As well as having their jurisdiction ousted on certain matters of fact, as was debated yesterday, the Scottish courts will find themselves unable to apply the Human Rights Act or to respect the United Kingdom’s obligations under the European convention on human rights and other international treaties. I believe that that constitutes a serious and unprecedented intrusion on the jurisdiction of the Scottish courts, and a serious interference with the separation of powers between legislature, Executive and judiciary. I do not think that this Parliament should be rubber-stamping the Bill at all, but particularly not in relation to Scotland.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

Without prejudice to the content of what the hon. and learned Lady is saying otherwise, may I simply say in relation to her notwithstanding clause that I am extremely glad that the Scottish eagle has landed?

[Joanna Cherry]

I certainly will not be supporting the other notwithstanding clauses in the Bill, but I felt that it was perhaps time that we had one that benefited Scotland for a change.

My amendments are designed to protect Scotland’s courts and constitutional tradition. They are there to ensure that asylum seekers in Scotland might still enjoy the protection of the courts from the infringement of their fundamental rights. That is what people in Scotland want, and it has been expressed repeatedly through the Scottish Parliament. I am, of course, a Scottish MP and a member of the Scottish Bar, and I am here to do what I can to protect Scotland and its legal system from the extraordinary attack on human rights and the rule of law that this Bill constitutes.

However, I am not a Scottish exceptionalist. I recognise that—as reflected in the House of Commons Library’s excellent legal briefing on the Bill, and indeed in the speech that preceded mine, by the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam—concerns about the impact of the Bill on the rule of law and the constitution are shared by many in England, including many lawyers. For every lawyer cited by Conservative Members in favour of the Bill and the draconian amendments to it, they will find two lawyers who disagree.

The Library briefing, which is an excellent summary of the different legal views on the Bill, concludes:

“Tension between the sovereignty of Parliament to legislate, and the role of the courts in enforcing the rule of law principle that executive bodies must exercise their powers within their statutory limits, may be tempered by restraint on both sides. If either the courts or Parliament ceased to exercise such restraint, significant constitutional uncertainty could result.”

I believe that if we pass the Bill, this Parliament will have ceased to exercise the restraint referred to there—it would be a major departure from such restraint. I predict that, if the Bill passes, we will see what might be an unprecedented constitutional challenge to an Act of the British Parliament.

[Sir John Hayes]

The hon. and learned Lady is making a good point about the checks and balances that prevent arbitrary power, and she is right that that is central to our constitutional settlement, but this is not the exercise of arbitrary power, because the Bill, and the amendments to it, are quite specific about their provisions. For example, in the amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), our separation from the international obligations that I know she holds so dear is very specific to this particular legislation. That is not arbitrary—it is anything but.

[Joanna Cherry]

The Bill seeks to carve out a group of people coming to our country, or who are in our country, from the protections that the rest of us enjoy. History shows us that that sort of legislation can put a state on a pretty slippery slope. That brings me to my arguments in relation to clauses 3 and 5 stand part.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights has not yet had the chance to complete legislative scrutiny of the Bill given the speed with which it has passed through the House, so we have not as a Committee reached a concluded view on the Bill. However, before Christmas and before Second Reading, a Chair’s briefing paper referring to the legal advice that the Committee had received was published, and it is extensively referred to in the excellent legal commentary published by the House of Commons Library.

The briefing says, inter alia, that the disapplication of the Human Rights Act 1998 in clause 3 is very significant. As I indicated a moment ago in my answer to the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), human rights are meant to offer a fundamental level of protection for every person on the basis of their humanity alone. As our Committee has noted in a previous report, if those protections are disapplied when they cause problems for a policy goal, they lose their fundamental and universal character. Arguably, that is especially the case when they are disapplied in respect of a particular group. In this case, fundamental human rights are being disapplied in respect of migrants who come to the United Kingdom without prior permission.

Bills that disapply parts of the Human Rights Act are not unprecedented under this Government, I am sad to say. Both the Illegal Migration Act and the Victims and Prisoners Bill have sought to disapply section 3 of the Human Rights Act in respect of certain legislation. However, this Bill seeks to disapply section 6 of that Act—the obligation on public authorities to act compatibly with human rights—which has never before been attempted, even by this Government, and represents a significant inroad into human rights protections. If we pass the Bill with clause 3 in it, it will effectively mean that this Parliament is authorising public authorities to breach human rights. That is an awful long way from what this Parliament intended when it passed the Human Rights Act, and what the United Kingdom intended when it signed up to the convention.

As we heard at some length yesterday, as a result of parliamentary sovereignty, if we pass the Bill, breaching human rights would be in accordance with our domestic law. However, it would still violate the UK’s obligations under the convention, because we cannot unilaterally change what the convention says. Also, as the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law has noted in its briefing on the Bill, if we disapply the Human Rights Act in the manner proposed, we are also breaching article 13 of the convention, which entitles people to an effective remedy.

I am afraid to say that the amendments to clause 3 tabled by the right hon. Member for Newark, who is no longer in his place, would make the situation even worse. His amendments 11 and 12 appear to extend the disapplication of the Human Rights Act to anything done under the Illegal Migration Act that relates to the removal of a person to Rwanda. That could potentially mean that the detention of people awaiting removal to Rwanda and their treatment prior to their removal would not be protected under the Human Rights Act. Is that what this Parliament really wants to legislate for?

Additionally, the right hon. Member for Newark wants to extend clause 3 to disapply section 4 of the Human Rights Act. As it stands, that clause does not disapply section 4; if the clause remains as it is when the Bill becomes law, it would be open to a court in future to declare that it is not compatible with the convention. That would be through a declaration only: it would not affect the ongoing function of the Bill, or allow removals to Rwanda to be prevented or delayed, but this Parliament and the Government would have to decide whether any changes to the law should be made. If we amend the Bill to disapply section 4 of the Human Rights Act, again, that would be something that has never been done before, and would further restrict the jurisdiction of our courts in saying to the Government and the public what their view is on the law’s compatibility with human rights.

Finally, I also believe that clause 5 should not stand part of the Bill. We have heard a lot today about Conservative Members’ concern about interim measures issued by the European Court of Human Rights. The reality is that, no matter what this legislation ends up saying, it can only affect domestic law. In respect of the ECHR in particular, the UK will remain bound by the convention as a matter of international law. Indeed, even if this Government—God forbid—were to exercise the nuclear option of withdrawing us from the convention, thereby putting us in bed with Russia and Belarus, we would remain bound for a further six months after withdrawal takes place. I hope they will bear that in mind.

At the moment, clause 5 says that only a Minister can decide whether to comply with interim measures, and that the domestic courts should ignore them. It remains to be seen what a Minister would do, but we all know that the Prime Minister has said repeatedly that he would not let a foreign court—to use his words—prevent flights taking off, which indicates that interim measures may be ignored. As I said earlier, in my intervention on the right hon. Member for Newark, interim measures are made under rule 39 of the Court’s rules of procedure. They do not form part of the text of the convention ratified by the UK, but when we ratified that convention, we signed up to the idea that the European Court of Human Rights is the body that determines its meaning, and since the 2005 case that the right hon. Member mentioned, it has held consistently that failing to comply with interim measures amounts to a breach of article 34.

Interim measures are fundamental to any court—they are issued to protect the position of an individual while their legal rights are determined. All this fuss about people in their pyjamas in the middle of the night is very silly. Judges in the United Kingdom, both in the English jurisdiction and in the Scottish jurisdiction, are regularly got out of their bed in the middle of the night to issue interim injunctions in England and interim interdicts in Scotland. It is a standard part of any legal system, and many of the concerns that Conservative Members have expressed about those interim measures have now been addressed by the Court in the reforms it is proposing.

Any decision of a Minister not to comply with an interim measure would be inconsistent with our obligations under the ECHR. That means that if we let clause 5 stand part of the Bill, we will expressly authorise British Government Ministers to act in breach of international law. That is the reality, and I note that according to The Times, that is the advice that has reportedly been given to the Government by the Attorney General and by the Minister, the hon. and learned Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole (Michael Tomlinson), when he was Solicitor General. That does not surprise me at all; it should not surprise anyone, because any legal undergraduate would be able to tell them that. As such, in so far as amendments 23 to 25 state that interim measures are not binding, that is inaccurate as a matter of law, and we must understand that they would put the UK directly in conflict with our international legal obligations.