Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Joe Robertson Excerpts

Thursday 5th February 2026 Public Bill Committees

“has been one of the great success stories of modern Britain’s railways…Lumo and Hull Trains have demonstrated how innovative, non-publicly subsidised services can complement conventionally operated services, broadening choice, increasing ridership…and delivering more affordable travel options for passengers…Open Access operators play a unique role in growing rail’s market share, connecting communities in underserved markets, and fostering innovation across the wider network.”

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

This question is possibly better directed at the Minister, but does my hon. Friend think that the clause might be so restrictive because, in truth, the Government do not really want open access, despite what they say?

[Rebecca Smith]

I agree with my hon. Friend. I alluded to that issue earlier in my comments, and my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham raised it on Tuesday. That is why we are concerned on behalf of not only open access, but first of all passengers, who are not going to get the best possible service because of the inbuilt assertion that open access can ultimately be discarded if the Government do not see it as palatable.

The written evidence from Lumo and Hull Trains also says:

“As the Government and GBR seek to deliver a thriving, growing railway, it is vital that the Railways Bill recognises and protects the contribution that Open Access makes to these shared goals. This will ensure that it will continue to deliver these benefits to the millions of passengers who rely on them, now and into the future…As the Government looks to modernise and centralise rail through GBR, it will be important that competition remains an embedded principle within this framework. Open Access provides a proven model of innovation and efficiency, which can help GBR achieve its statutory objectives. Recognising the role of competition as a driver of value and growth will ensure that passengers, the network, and the public purse all continue to benefit.”

FirstGroup’s written submission to the Transport Committee tells a similar story, saying that open access operators

“receive no government funding, take on full risk, and generate their own revenue— giving them very strong incentives to deliver a service which is endorsed by passengers…The way in which GBR structures its timetable will be critical. It should be obliged to carry out its functions fairly and without discrimination, so that if an open access train service can provide passenger benefit monopoly interests do not prevent that train from running.”

FirstGroup also says:

“Clause 63 must ensure that un-funded services which GBR ‘expects’ are not given train paths in advance of funded open access services, which will provide passenger benefit sooner.”

The Rail Freight Group is also concerned by the clause, telling the Transport Committee:

“We understand that the basis of the new approach will be via Infrastructure Capacity Plans (Clause 61) and, for GBR’s own trains, via the Capacity Duty (Clause 63). It is very difficult from these clauses to have a clear understanding of how the new process will operate, and how rail freight and rail freight growth will be facilitated, including in contractual rights for operators…For example, we understand from our discussions that there could be numerous infrastructure capacity plans across the network which a new freight service will have to navigate. We also understand that when an infrastructure capacity plan is reviewed, existing freight services could be stopped from operating if other services are considered to be higher value, as contractual commitments are expected to expire in line with the capacity plans.”

Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL told the Transport Committee:

“I think we would look for clarification, regarding clause 63, that GBR cannot reserve capacity for hypothetical future GBR long-distance services at the expense of privately funded open-access proposals or existing services that provide immediate benefits—and extra infrastructure income, of course, because open-access operators are paying track access fees too. For that, I think you need to prioritise funded open access over speculative GBR services ‘someday in the future.’”

It is very clear what the sector thinks: clause 63 needs substantial clarification. That is why, along with the Lib Dems, we have tabled a number of amendments, which I will briefly speak to. Amendment 81 would make it clear that capacity allocation should be based on a level playing field, without priority given to any particular operator. That would allow the best outcome for the passenger, and allows the public interest bit in clause 18 to take the lead. Proceeding on any other basis will leave us with a monopoly that is allowed to abuse its position.

Amendment 80 puts forward an alternative approach, based on key performance indicators, but it is clear the Government are not interested, so in the interests of time I will not pursue that further today—that will be one fewer Division, the Government will be pleased to hear.

Amendment 253, in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, requires GBR “to retain sufficient capacity” to ensure that the rail freight target is met. To progress, there would need to be a mechanism to reach a decision if that conflicted with any planned GBR service.

Amendment 211 would require GBR

“to publish a statement explaining any decision not to grant access to a specific part of the network on the basis of network capacity.”

For an appeals process to have any meaning at all, that would need to be a pre-requisite.

Amendment 229 would ensure that

“capacity allocation decisions reflect both planning priorities and freight-increase ambitions”

and would require

“GBR to publish and maintain a list of strategic freight corridors and ensures that any material reduction in capacity must be approved by the ORR.”

The amendment would give a better balance to capacity considerations than the current wholly one-sided drafting. That is incredibly important because, ultimately, the Government are seeking to reduce climate change and achieve net zero. Freight plays a huge part in that, and if we do not have strategic freight corridors to ensure that we can make use of the freight system, we will fall short of what could be achieved.

Finally, new clause 56, in the name of the Libs Dems,

“requires GBR to explore and consider the potential benefits of centralised train planning and auctioning.”

That is an interesting concept and could have significant benefits for passengers and taxpayers by driving competitive pricing for certain routes, while avoiding the abstraction arguments in relation to competing open access applications.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Mather]

It is my pleasure to speak to this long-awaited group of amendment to what are arguably some of the most critical aspects of the legislation. Clause 60 will require GBR to set out its proposal for the best use of its infrastructure, while clause 63 will require GBR to retain sufficient capacity to run its own passenger services and carry out engineering work.

First, I will explain how the Government have reached that conclusion. We are here because the current system for allocating capacity is clearly not working; it is designed so that each part of the railway acts and takes decisions in isolation. There was a four-year delay to the implementation of the new east coast main line timetable that was finally achieved in December 2025. Meanwhile, there is no single body with a clear vision for the best use of the network, and therefore no clear statement of the capacity that can be made available for different users of the railway. As a result, open access operators have expended considerable effort and resources in developing proposals for access to the network, many of which have ultimately been rejected by the ORR.

Both freight and open access operators would benefit from a single body empowered to provide that clarity about future opportunities for them to grow their presence on the railway. The only possible answer to fixing that is GBR, which can take decisions strategically, making the very best use of the limited capacity that we have. Only GBR can review the network holistically with a view to creating more space, which will benefit open access operators where they can show that their new services constitute best use of the network. That will benefit every hon. Member’s constituents, because there will be more opportunity for connectivity and more co-ordination to avoid disruption and delays.

In our new system, the process of allocating capacity starts with clause 60. The infrastructure capacity plan will set out GBR’s view of the best use of the network, showing how capacity can best be allocated between GBR’s own services, freight services and open access services. In creating that plan, GBR must have regard to the need to accommodate all types of services. The clause is one of the most crucial in the Bill, because it is where GBR—having consulted carefully with existing and prospective operators and other interested parties, and taken account of its statutory duties—will set out its view of the best use of the network. Once established, the plan will provide much-needed certainty for operators contemplating investment in new services.

I will be crystal clear for the benefit of the Committee: the capacity duty mentioned in clause 63 does not apply to the creation of the infrastructure capacity plan. Under clause 60, GBR will make its best-use assessment on the basis of the duties in clause 18 and other general duties in the Bill only. At this stage, it will not have any basis to refer to the duty as described in clause 63. It will take the decision fairly and transparently, in line with its duties, with the need to allocate paths for freight, open access and itself in mind.

There is absolutely no intention for other operators to be unfairly pushed out or disadvantaged by GBR. We want the best service for passengers, freight users and the public on every part of the route, to enable the best possible connectivity, quality of service and overall economic benefit. That is the goal, regardless of who provides those services. Were GBR to mistakenly apply the capacity duty at the capacity plan stage as part of its determination of best use, that would be grounds for appeal to the ORR.

[Joe Robertson]

I note the Minister’s assertion that there is no intention to squeeze out other operators, but given the way in which the Bill and the clause are drafted, that surely is an inevitability regardless of whether he intends for that to happen. It is the outcome that matters. If it will not enable open access and competition, that is in itself a problem, notwithstanding he might not intend that to be the case.