Iran (Proposed Nuclear Agreement) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
John Howell
Main Page: John Howell (Conservative - Henley)Department Debates - View all John Howell's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(8 years, 10 months ago)
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Guto Bebb
My hon. Friend makes a pertinent point, which was certainly reflected in my discussions with the representatives of the Bahraini Government last week. The fact that good intentions are being taken for granted in relation to the treaty is being questioned by some of the Gulf states, which have concerns about Iran’s foreign policy objectives, to put it mildly, in that part of the world. It is important when we consider the potential treaty that we take into account the views of not just the P5+1 but partner states in that part of the world.
John Howell (Henley) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend not feel that what he has described as the thoughts of the Gulf states are increased by the attitude to the detail, including about centrifuges? If Iran is allowed to retain 6,000-plus centrifuges against the original estimate of 1,000, that is clearly a bad sign.
Guto Bebb
I fully endorse those comments. I will address the issue of the centrifuges in due course. It is reasonable to say that the figure of 6,000 now assumed to be part of a proposed treaty is significantly in excess of the 1,000 originally discussed by the P5+1 when the negotiations started. The question whether that is actually in the treaty must be addressed.
I do not want to be described as a cynic, but it is fair to question whether the agreement is actually an effort to resolve the issue, or whether it is effectively an effort to ensure a foreign policy legacy for the current American Administration. I am making this contribution in the spirit of the Back-Bench business debate held in November 2014. I think that there is a genuine realisation that we need an agreement, but must that agreement be rushed to achieve a foreign policy goal for a US Administration who might not be in place for very long? We need some certainty on that.