Exiting the European Union (Sanctions)

John Redwood Excerpts

Tuesday 9th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Duncan]

As soon as we are practically able to do so.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Our American allies have a disagreement with our European allies about the extent of sanctions against Iran and how best to handle the difficulties with Iran. What thinking has the Foreign Office given to an independent UK policy on this? Are there any merits in the American approach, or are all the merits with the European approach?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

If we are looking at individual cases such as that, we are straying slightly outside the terms of this debate, which is about the framework for the operation of sanctions in these four areas. We work closely with our European allies on the operation of the joint comprehensive plan of action, and we will continue to do so. However, we will of course look at all sanctions under the terms of the Act that we passed last year.

The four statutory instruments under consideration transfer into UK law the EU sanctions regimes on Burma, Venezuela, Guinea-Bissau and Iran—the human rights element of Iran, rather than the anti-nuclear side. In each case, the instruments seek to substantially mirror the measures in the corresponding EU regime, which include financial, immigration and trade measures.

These SIs were laid on a contingent basis to provide for the continuation of sanctions should we leave the EU without a deal. This would ensure that we have the necessary powers to impose sanctions on the countries in question from the date of exit. If we reach a deal, sanctions would continue to apply under EU law during any implementation period, and these SIs would not immediately be needed.

As I said at the beginning, should we leave the EU without a deal, we will publish the list of those sanctioned under these SIs and all our new sanctions SIs on exit day. We will seek to transfer EU designations in each case, but as I said earlier these decisions will be subject to the legal tests contained in the sanctions Act. Any EU listings that do not meet the tests would not then be implemented.

Hon. Members may recall that review and reporting requirements were incorporated into the sanctions Act. Hence, alongside these statutory instruments, we have published reports on the purposes of each regime and the penalties contained in them—these are known respectively as section 2 and section 18 reports. These reports, plus an explanatory memorandum for each SI, are available in the Vote Office should Members wish to read them in detail. The Government will also review each sanctions regime on a regular basis.

I would now like briefly to describe the purposes of each regime. The Burma sanctions regulations seek to encourage the Burmese security forces to comply with international human rights law and to respect human rights. The corresponding EU sanctions were established in their present form in April 2018, in response to systematic human rights violations by Burmese security forces since the summer of 2017.

The EU sanctions regime designates members of the Burmese security forces who were involved in human rights violations or abuses, or in the obstruction of humanitarian assistance activity or an independent investigation into the atrocities in Burma.

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[Helen Goodman]

I am interested to hear the Minister’s response, because if the Government wish to tighten the sanctions regime, he and the Foreign Office will have the opportunity to do so, and they might well succeed in that. However, what is not acceptable is pursuing a tighter policy without a clear legal base; I suggest that that would not do much for our reputation.

I want to pick up on the point that was made about Iran by the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood). EU sanctions were introduced in the case of Iran in 2011, in response to violent crackdowns against street protests. In view of the continued serious human rights abuses in Iran—notably, extensive use of the death penalty, including for juveniles; torture; the repression of women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender activists; and the detention of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe three years ago and the denial to her of access to medical treatment—we believe that these sanctions are justified. They cover in particular goods and technology used for repression, and we believe that that is right.

However, we believe that the American decision to lift the trade sanctions against Iran, which was taken as part of the international community’s joint comprehensive plan of action—JCPOA—nuclear deal, was also right. Sanctions have been an effective tool and they will continue to be effective if we impose them when things go badly and lift them when things go better. The Trump Administration’s decision to reimpose those trade sanctions and to withdraw from the JCPOA is mistaken. The JCPOA does not cover ballistic missiles or regional aggression—the arguments the Trump Administration put forward for reimposing sanctions. The decision further destabilises the region. That is a problem in foreign policy terms—it is unhelpful.

I would also be interested to know what the Government have done about the impact on European and British businesses and banks. Our businesses and banks are in an extremely difficult situation, whereby trade and investment under European law is completely legal, but under American law is completely illegal. There is an extraterritoriality effect of American law. I therefore have two questions for the Minister. First, will he hold to the current position in a post-Brexit scenario and not shift to the American position? Secondly, what has been, is and will be Government action to support British businesses and banks that wish to trade with and invest in Iran?

Finally, I come to Guinea-Bissau. The European Union imposed sanctions, which cover 20 individuals, in 2012 following an attempted coup. Guinea-Bissau is an extremely poor country with a lot of cocaine trafficked through it. There were some elections in March, and I ask the Minister what the Government are doing to improve governance in Guinea-Bissau. What are they doing to reduce drug trafficking via Guinea-Bissau? Does the Minister anticipate the UN Security Council changing its posture on sanctions?

[John Redwood]

The hon. Lady has made a powerful case about the things we are trying to put right in the countries we are discussing through sanctions, but it is worrying that they have been in place for a long time and not a lot of favourable change has occurred. Does she see any way of strengthening what we do once we have our own policy? We all share the aim of trying to improve Venezuela and Iran.

[Helen Goodman]

That was going to be my concluding point.

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[Mark Menzies]

The hon. Gentleman is 100% on the money. That is the inconvenient truth that many Opposition Members fail to recognise, because massive abuses were committed well before the collapse in the oil price, and it is one of the reasons why sanctions are needed.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

In support of my hon. Friend’s case, has he noticed that this is shown not just in the oil price, but in the volume of oil produced, because they so trashed their industry and failed to invest in it that it now produces a fraction of its potential capacity? That is why Venezuela is so poor.

[Mark Menzies]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. Not only has the volume of oil produced collapsed, but many of the oil workers who would have produced the oil have fled the regime. Their families are living in absolute penury as a result of years of neglect and economic mismanagement. The hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) was quite right to point out the extreme wealth that is being accumulated corruptly by members of the Chávez and Maduro regimes and by the military. Much of that money is offshored, including vast amounts in Spain. This is not a new phenomenon: for many years, the property market in some areas of Madrid was red hot with money that was flowing out of Venezuela and being used to buy office blocks and residential properties galore in order to cleanse the money out of Venezuela.

Any robust sanctions regime should not only ensure that money is prevented from leaving the country now but take into account the money that has been leaving for years, including at massive rates under Chávez. [Interruption.] That is clearly uncomfortable for the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland, but that money was stolen from the people of Venezuela and it needs to be taken back in as part of any sanctions regime. [Interruption.] If we are talking about laughter, we have seen great amount of laughter from the hon. Lady. This is either something she finds funny or something that she fails to understand.

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[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

I shall be brief, and I shall not take interventions, because others wish to speak. It is disappointing that these orders do not have this week’s date on them. We have let the public down once over leaving the EU on 29 March, and we should be leaving this week. I am grateful that planning is still going on for us to leave, and the sooner the better.

I want us to have a more ambitious foreign policy once we are an independent country again. There is a huge opportunity here for us to do good in the world by promoting the right kind of sanctions policy. I agree with all those colleagues who say that sanctions are more effective if we get more countries to buy into them. There are a number of areas, most notably Iran, where our US ally is very much at variance with our European allies, and that is surely where the United Kingdom—by adopting a distinctive approach and perhaps working more directly through the United Nations, freed of the constraint of belonging to one side in the two-sided row—could make a direct contribution, influence the world for the better and create a more united sanctions regime.

There are those who are very worried about sanctions targeting the wrong people. Of course it is best to target the guilty men and women at the top of evil regimes, but we need to recognise that they need access to hard currency. It is often by exploiting commodities or other hard currency generators in their economies that they perpetuate their evil and buy the things we do not want to sell them from others around the world who will. It is not easy to target just a limited number of people, so we have to find our way through.

I hope we can do that with Venezuela, where we need to back all the initiatives to try to get food and other aid in and to support the forces for democracy. Above all, we need to work with the opposition in Venezuela to show how they could restore their economy with the colossal oil wealth that is there beneath their feet but is deliberately not exploited by the evil incompetents of the regime. Let us have our own policy, and let us get on with it.