Select Committee on Foreign Affairs

Debate between John Spellar and Richard Ottaway

Thursday 3rd July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Sir Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

When problems emerged in Gibraltar last summer, with seven-hour-long delays to cross the border, the Foreign Affairs Committee took a strong interest in the situation and in what the Government were doing, and were going to do, in response. On Tuesday, the Committee published its report, “Gibraltar: Time to get off the fence”. We concluded that the behaviour of Spain towards Gibraltar is unacceptable. A NATO and EU ally is, as a matter of deliberate policy, impacting the economy and functioning of a British overseas territory. In our opinion, it is time for the Government to take a tougher line.

The dispute has a 300-year-long history. However, in the past three years, the Partido Popular Government in Spain have taken a more hard-line approach to the dispute. They have significantly increased pressure on Gibraltar and its people, and Gibraltarians have suffered. They have suffered: the deliberately imposed border delays; aggressive maritime incursions; calculated pressure at the EU and the UN; and inflammatory rhetoric from Spanish Ministers about Gibraltar’s sovereignty and its economic affairs.

We acknowledge that Spain’s actions have placed the UK Government in a difficult position. They have a strong bilateral relationship with Spain that is in the interests of all British citizens, including the 1 million Britons who live in Spain. However, the Government also have responsibilities towards Gibraltar and cannot ignore actions by Spain that are intended to make the lives of Gibraltarians more difficult.

First, we regret that talks including all three partners—Spain, the UK and Gibraltar—have been suspended, and we ask the Government to set out what offer they have made to Spain in connection with these talks and how they intend to restart them.

We are deeply concerned about the dramatic increase in maritime incursions in British Gibraltarian territorial waters and the hostile tactics of some of the vessels that conduct them. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office rightly protests about each incursion, but we were disappointed to find that it sometimes lodges diplomatic protests weeks after the event, robbing them of all force. This gives the wrong impression to Spain about how seriously the UK takes this issue. We recommend that protests are lodged within seven days.

We have no doubt that delays imposed by Spain at the border with Gibraltar are politically motivated, and that the border is being used as a means of coercion. The Government should state publicly that they will take legal action against Spain in the European Court if there is little improvement at the border in the next six months.

The Committee considered the possibility of Gibraltar joining Schengen, while the UK remains outside. Although we saw the merit in this idea and the impact it would have, we suspect that the legal and economic implications could be considerable.

Spain continues to use international institutions as a means of applying pressure on Gibraltar. Gibraltar remains on the UN list of non-self-governing territories, despite repeated UK Government attempts to de-list it. Only a few weeks ago, Spanish MEPs in the European Parliament were trying to limit Gibraltar’s aviation rights. Spain also continues to refuse to allow direct military movements between Gibraltar and Spain, even among its NATO partners. As a result of this, Gibraltar feels it is under siege.

The Government’s laudable attempts to de-escalate the dispute have not worked. They were right to try diplomacy, but they must now take a more robust approach, as long as this is agreed with the Government of Gibraltar. We recommend that the Government take some immediate actions now, including: more prompt diplomatic protests against incursions and border delays, and summoning the ambassador; increased efforts at the EU and UN on Gibraltar’s behalf; renewed effort to establish trilateral talks that are currently not taking place; and withholding UK support for Spain’s international goals, such as its aspiration to membership of the UN Security Council, unless its attitude toward Gibraltar changes. As for more serious measures, we further recommend that the Government be more robust in their defence of the territorial waters around Gibraltar, and we have asked them to report back on how they intend to do that.

Finally, we recommend that if those measures do not improve the situation within six months, the UK should take Spain to court for infringement of EU obligations at the border. I commend the report to the House.

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

I congratulate the Committee and its Chairman on a timely, well-balanced report, and look forward to a wider debate about it.

The report underlines the concern that is felt about the fact that no Minister from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office visited Gibraltar between 2011 and 2014. What reassurances has the Committee received that that is now a priority for the FCO and, indeed, for other Departments?

The Committee rightly expresses concern about the mixed message that has been sent by the delay in the delivery of protests about incursions into British Gibraltarian territorial waters, which it says—quite rightly—gives an impression of “going through the motions”. The Committee suggests a much tighter timetable. When does the right hon. Gentleman intend to seek a progress report from the Department on the implementation of that?

On 27 November last year, I said in the House:

“it is vital that the Spanish Government today hear a united statement from the House that such provocative and unlawful acts are not acceptable to this Parliament or to the British people. They cannot be ignored.”—[Official Report, 27 November 2013; Vol. 571, c. 263.]

Does the right hon. Gentleman think that the Foreign Office has heard that message?

Piracy (Somalia)

Debate between John Spellar and Richard Ottaway

Thursday 14th June 2012 Westminster Hall

[Richard Ottaway]

Thank you for addressing the point, Mr Sheridan.

The tenth report of the Foreign Affairs Committee is about piracy off the coast of Somalia, a major problem that costs industry and the world economy billions of dollars and threatens lives. The Indian ocean has become a no-go area for small vessels and is dangerous for large ones. The causes of the problem are many. First, at the heart of it is the fact that, despite the introduction of military forces and private armed guards, still the majority of vessels are unarmed. Secondly, there is a willingness to pay ransoms—a controversial point to which I will return. Thirdly, there are too few naval forces. Fourthly, the pirates are able to operate with relative impunity inside Somalia.

The United Kingdom Government are well aware of the problem and are taking a leading role and, although the Committee makes constructive criticisms of that role, we congratulate them on the steps that they are taking. Concerted international action is needed. The number of prosecutions has increased, but 90% of those detained are released. There is greater use of armed guards and we have regulation and guidance for armed guards. Vessels have been following best management practices. There are issues to do with tracing financial flows: the Committee’s opinion is that financial flows can be tracked—some of the most sophisticated equipment for that purpose is available in this country—and that more can be done in this regard. The Committee believes that there should be at least one UK vessel permanently on station. Of course, we have to support development in Somalia. I shall deal with those points in turn.

The UK is a big player in the world shipping industry, and our part of it is based just a mile or two up the road from here. Shipping and its management comprises 1.8% of gross domestic product. Piracy poses a threat to the UK’s economy and the security of British assets transiting through the area. Some 40% of world trade moves through the region of the Indian ocean, around the horn of Africa, into the Red sea. The danger zone now stretches over to the coast of the Indian ocean. Much of the cargo is insured here in the UK. The total cost of addressing the threat to Britain, the assets and the industry is believed to be in the region of $8 billion to $12 billion per annum.

Attacks on vessels in the Indian ocean have decreased in the last quarter. In the first quarter of 2011 there were 102 attacks, 16 of them successful, whereas this year there were only 43 attacks and only nine were successful. That downward trend is welcome. To give an idea of the sums involved, in 2011, ransoms amounted to $135 million. The opinion of some observers and witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee was that some of that money is going to al-Shabaab, which it is believed has connections with al-Qaeda.

Since piracy started in the region, some 3,500 crew members and officers have been taken captive and been held, and in the last four years 62 have been killed. Currently, 12 vessels are held and 178 hostages are still in captivity. That the figure is lower than it was reflects a welcome trend, but it is important to state that the level of detention remains unacceptable. It must not be believed that we have been successful and this situation must not become the status quo.

The peak from which we are coming down was reached in autumn 2011. I think the reason why the trend is now downward is that the self-defence mechanisms are beginning to make progress. The implementation of best management practices is clearly having a serious effect. It is too soon to see if this is a long-term trend, but it is promising. For the benefit of the House, I should say that best management practices involve self-protecting measures, including careful manoeuvring of ships, having safe rooms on ships and using detection equipment. I commend the industry on the implementation of these practices, as does the Committee, and on the results that this is achieving.

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Does not this highlight a further problem, which is that it is not so much the cargo or the vessel but the crew that is the main financial inducement? All the measures the hon. Gentleman has mentioned apply to the large multinational, well organised modern fleets, but many smaller operators with smaller vessels are becoming more vulnerable. Those measures, welcome though they are, can therefore only be regarded as part of a package, because they deal with only part of the problem.

[Richard Ottaway]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. For small vessels the region is, in truth, a complete no-go area. For the piracy of the 17th and 18th centuries, the prize was the cargo, and the crew walked the plank or went over the sides, but that has changed; now, the crew are equally valuable. That attitude of the pirates is causing the problem. That is not to say that the cargo is not still important—shipowners are paying substantial sums to get their cargo out—but as we see particularly when yacht crews are held, in international terms the yacht is worth nothing while the owners still have a high value.

The Government initially resisted the establishment of private armed security guards on board British vessels. When the Minister gave evidence to us during our inquiry, the Government’s position was that armed guards would not be welcome. However, the Prime Minister announced in October or November last year that we will now put armed security guards on board British vessels, and that view is echoed by the International Maritime Organisation. The Committee welcomes the U-turn.

The operation of a private armed guard on board a British vessel is subject to British law—the law of the flag applies on board any vessel. The Government published interim guidance, at the heart of which was a policy based on the Crown Prosecution Service policy of lawful self-defence. We were critical of that, because the CPS guidance was not written with piracy in mind. Indeed, it states:

“If a…firearm…was used…this may tip the balance in favour of prosecution.”

To me and to the Committee, that seemed to be off-loading responsibility for the use of armed guards on to shipowners. The simple question we posed in our report was: if armed guards on board a ship see an armed skiff approaching, can they open fire? That is the test. The initial interim guidance contained little to help make a judgment on the use of force.

In the Government response, as I pointed out in my point of order, clarification was promised by April 2012, which then became May, then June. I have no idea why there was a delay, but I like to think that it was because international co-ordination and consultation with the IMO were necessary. Indeed, earlier this year, at the invitation of the Department for Transport, I attended a particularly constructive piracy conference at the IMO. What is important, however, is that the UK plays a leading role in the establishment of any guidance, and that is why I regret the new guidance not being available for us to see, because we cannot really comment. We are in limbo—the guidance is out but we are unable to comment on it today. The UK should be playing a leading role, but the issue is current. I want to ask the Government whether they have been happy with the use of armed guards on ships from implementation up to now. How many applications have been received to establish armed guards on board a ship?

The House might be interested to know about the Italian ship Enrique Lexie, which was carrying two Italian marines on board. Though the facts are in dispute, there was an exchange of armed fire with small vessels and two fishermen were killed. For reasons that are not clear, the Italian vessel then went into an Indian port and the marines were arrested amid a dispute about whether the incident took place in international or territorial waters. The matter is unresolved, but the incident highlights the importance of the need for clear guidance and international agreement on the use of force.

We can see how easily diplomatic incidents can occur in the absence of proper guidance or internationally agreed standards. That is mainly because so many factors are involved in international waters, such as a British ship with a foreign crew going into another country’s waters; several jurisdictions are in play. I was interested to read that the IMO has called for an international standard for the use of armed guards, so I shall read the newly published guidance with interest to see whether such a standard has been established. I hope that a Minister might be able to summarise the guidance when he makes his contribution to the debate.

[Richard Ottaway]

That is very helpful, Mr Sheridan, and I am grateful to all those involved in expediting the availability of the guidance.

To conclude on armed guards, I hope that UK rules can influence the international debate, to the benefit of everyone concerned.

Another issue that we identified is that there are no regulations on the movement of weapons, and in that part of the world, a lot of weapons are moving around. We clearly need to have a regime for such movements, and I welcome the UK’s introduction of a revised licensing regime in February this year, although that does not tackle the difficulty of floating armouries. Believe it or not, some ships out there will lend guns to ships that enter the danger zone and get them back when they leave. All that is outside the control of any organisation, and an international approach to that difficulty would be appropriate.

The naval response has been better than expected—possibly damned with faint praise—but the truth of the matter is that the Indian ocean is not safe, and to have a 30-minute response throughout the ocean would require the deployment of 80 warships at any given moment, which will clearly not happen. The strategic defence review under way in this country can only heighten the impact on the availability of British ships for deployment, but the UK could have a role to play in providing leadership in operations—we have a good record—perhaps with other countries supplying the ships. As reported by the Ministry of Defence, however, last month HMS Westminster foiled three attacks. Can one of the Ministers present tell us what happened to the suspects from those incidents? Were they detained, released or fended off with no detentions? As I understand it, there have certainly been no prosecutions.

What is needed is international co-ordination. We have the successful UN contact group on piracy and recently—established in February this year—the Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Co-ordination Centre in the Seychelles. The centre has to be welcome. It will co-ordinate information on ransoms and target the kingpins in the piracy world.

On the naval response, one of the unexpected side effects is how the international operations have been getting on quite well with one another. We considered a recommendation on whether they should be co-ordinated by a single organisation, but we reached the conclusion that there were bigger fish to fry, rather than having that sort of upheaval at the moment. We have Russian, Chinese, Indian, British and NATO ships there, and given the lack of a big umbrella organisation, the close co-ordination is very welcome.

Turning to convictions, it is difficult to obtain evidence in such situations. Our Committee recommended that more effort should be made, perhaps with the use of video links for witnesses. There are difficulties with various national laws because piracy is a crime in some countries but not others. Implementing such proposals can be expensive for poorer countries.

To date, no suspect has been brought back to the UK for prosecution. We have transfer agreements with Kenya and the Seychelles, and I welcome the new agreement with Mauritius, as I hope that it will result in more prosecutions of suspects. Will the Minister who responds on the memorandum of understanding with Mauritius indicate the conditions that suspects are held in and whether that is monitored. I wish the Government well with implementation of the memorandum of understanding, which sounds to our Committee to be a pragmatic solution. However, if it fails, I hope that the Minister involved will note that the French are now engaged in their second trial of suspects.

[Mr Spellar]

Will the hon. Gentleman, and later a Minister, clarify the position on bringing captured pirates back to the UK for trial, given the real risk of applications for leave to remain? Is it not better—this is why the Mauritius agreement is so welcome—to support efforts in the region?

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Debate between John Spellar and Richard Ottaway

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

The British involvement in Afghanistan has been long and costly, and whether it has achieved its stated objectives is a moot point, but that does not imply that it was the wrong decision or that we should not be there.

In the aftermath of 9/11, it was essential to deny al-Qaeda a base to operate; the intervention was essential; and there was a United Nations-mandated coalition of the willing led by the United States, but as usual we were in close support. Following the general election, the coalition Government very much followed the Afghanistan policy of their predecessor, but two important changes did take place: first, the establishment of the National Security Council to co-ordinate Whitehall’s Afghan war effort; and, crucially, the publicly announced decision to set 2015 as the deadline for withdrawing British combat troops.

Both initiatives were welcome, although famously the National Security Council did not make the withdrawal decision. Nonetheless, the key policy objective in Afghanistan mirrors that of the Government’s predecessor: Afghanistan should not again become a place from where al-Qaeda and other extremists can attack the UK and British interests.

Achieving that objective is said to rely on four main goals: a more stable and secure Afghanistan; the conditions for withdrawal of UK combat troops by 2015; an Afghan-led political settlement that represents all Afghan people; and regional political and security co-operation that supports a stable Afghanistan. They were the right objectives then, and they are the right objectives today.

Some progress is being made on all those fronts. Increasingly, the Afghan army and security forces are taking over control of the districts, troops are beginning to withdraw and there is talk of a political-led settlement, all of which is of course welcome.

I just wonder whether we need to reassess the policy objectives. The Foreign Affairs Committee received evidence to suggest that the core foreign policy justification for the UK’s continued presence in Afghanistan—that it is in the interests of UK national security—may have been resolved some time ago. There is a big difference between the Taliban, who are locals who want their country back, and al-Qaeda, which is made up of hard-nosed international terrorists. Given the apparently limited strength of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, its desire to continue to use Afghanistan as a base is questionable. The tracking down and shooting of Osama bin Laden adds weight to that argument.

When the Prime Minister appeared before the Liaison Committee, I asked if he was still receiving intelligence that al-Qaeda in Afghanistan remained a threat to UK national security. He confirmed that it did, and he said the same when I put a similar point to him this afternoon. I said that that poses a dilemma for Parliament. It seems that the justification for Britain’s most important policy initiative is based on an intelligence assessment that has not been subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The ghost of the Iraq war hangs over us. Under the circumstances, I suggest that the intelligence is shown to a committee of Privy Councillors or the Intelligence and Security Committee, which can report to the House on whether it agrees with the assessment.

In the meantime, the military campaign continues. The Taliban are being pushed back, and so they should be with the firepower ranged against them. However, I question whether they can be defeated militarily. The Foreign Affairs Committee has considerable doubts over whether the international security assistance force’s counter-insurgency campaign is succeeding. We question the fundamental assumption that success in Afghanistan can be achieved through a strategy of clear, hold and build. The Taliban are, at heart, Afghans who resent the presence of occupying forces. It is questionable whether the USA’s full military onslaught on the Taliban is necessary to deny al-Qaeda a place from which to operate. The key thrust of the Committee’s report is that we should encourage ISAF, and the United States in particular, to engage in a political reconciliation process. There is little support outside the United States for continuing the surge started by George Bush and continued by President Obama. The continued military pummelling of the Taliban is, in all certainty, counter-productive in achieving a political settlement.

The recent announcement by President Karzai that the United States is involved in reconciliation negotiations is a good start. However, talking to the Taliban is not easy. There is no address or phone number, and the hard-liners and the top brass of the Taliban have turned their backs on any reconciliation attempts. None the less, in my judgment there is a split in the Taliban between the hard-liners and the moderates. Those who are most opposed to a political settlement tend to be more on the fringes of the movement—the uneducated and the unemployed. Those who are more focused on the future prosperity of their country are prepared to talk. We should exploit the divisions in the Taliban and engage in the process of reconciliation as soon as possible. The US draw-down of troops will help in that, as will the additional numbers announced by the Prime Minister during his visit this week. We have to set the tone and show that there is light at the end of the tunnel for Afghans who want to bring up their children and enjoy the prosperity that we are used to in the western world.

Combined with that, we must continue to support the Afghan army, police and security services. Huge strides have been made to bring those forces up to a level of competence that will allow them to maintain law and order in their country. There will be a large army and a large police force. The Prime Minister said this afternoon that for every one troop that is withdrawn, two will go in from the Afghan police and security services. Those services have a long way to go to achieve the operational standards that we see elsewhere. The exit of NATO combat troops will not be smooth, and the handover will be fraught with problems, but the sheer size of the Afghan forces should be sufficient to hold the line against the inevitable counter-attack once the occupying forces have left.

The US draw-down is bigger than expected, and 33,000 troops will have been withdrawn by this time next year. The President of the United States says that the US has crippled al-Qaeda’s capabilities and been successful in its mission in Afghanistan, claiming that Kabul is much safer than it was before despite continued attacks such as the one on the Intercontinental hotel last week.

Interestingly, the President has been criticised on both sides in Congress, with his opponent in the last presidential election, John McCain, arguing that the current troop levels should be maintained for at least another year to accomplish their objectives. On the other hand, the Democrats have argued that the President has been too timid. The cynic in me says that that probably suggests he has got it about right.

However, the military do not agree with the President either. We may raise eyebrows here when senior military officers enter the political arena, and we may wish that they would do the fighting while we do the talking, but they have nothing on what has been going on in the United States. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quite openly said that he advocated a less aggressive draw-down schedule. General Petraeus, the former head of the armed forces in Afghanistan, who is about to become the director of the CIA, said that he, too, had recommended a more gradual withdrawal. Marine General James Mattis, commander of US central command, who was General Petraeus’s boss and immediate superior, agreed. With friends like that, who needs enemies? I respect the President for his courage in rejecting the arguments of his military and continuing with the draw-down.

The House should be in no doubt that this is going to be messy. Security incidents in Afghanistan continue, such as the tragic loss of Scott McLaren from the Royal Regiment of Scotland. However, the provinces and urban districts continue to be transferred to Afghan forces, which shows progress towards transition.

No one likes to engage in talks with an enemy that has been killing one’s own armed forces, and I share the view of Hillary Clinton, who has said that she finds the need to have contact with the Taliban “distasteful, but worthwhile”. It is not a pleasant business, but it is a necessary one. I have no doubt that any negotiations leading to a political settlement must be Afghan-led, despite the Taliban saying that they want to speak directly with the United States. So far, top US officials have sidestepped that, and I hope the Government will now encourage them to get more fully involved and get a forum up and running with the full involvement of Afghanistan, the United States and Pakistan.

Relations with Pakistan are difficult, but if we think we have problems, nothing compares with the US-Pakistan relationship, which is at rock bottom. I have to confess that I am quite shaken by the level of mistrust between Pakistan and the United States. The situation has been exacerbated by the shooting of Osama bin Laden. I personally have no doubt whatever that that was a necessary step for the United States to take, and I quite understand why such sensitive information could not be shared with anybody. As a result, I am quite puzzled by Pakistan’s aggressive reaction and apparent failure to understand why the US did not share the information with it.

Pakistan has difficult decisions to make. It has deployed troops in Waziristan and the north-west frontier, but my instinct is that its heart is still not in it. Another illustration is the US use of drones, which are fearsome weapons that are turning out to be remarkably effective—so much so that everybody wants them. So why is Pakistan ordering the United States to take its drone bases out of the country?

[Mr John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that Pakistan has suffered huge losses, and at a high level, from the activities of the Taliban and other terrorists? That partly demonstrates its level of commitment.

[Richard Ottaway]

Yes, which makes it more the mystery why it does not take stronger action against the Taliban. It is not how to get into the hole that counts but how to get out of it, and I believe that Pakistan is still worrying about how it got into the hole. I would encourage it to engage fully and totally in denying the Taliban a base in its own country.

On the other side of the equation, the US should recognise that Pakistan is a proud and sensitive country. We all admire the US for its can-do attitude and for getting things done, but there comes a moment every now and again when it must think about how others will feel about that, and work with the grain, despite its dominant position on the world stage.

The UK does have a role in all that. There are now 3 million Pakistanis living in the UK. Our embassy in Islamabad is making every effort, but diplomatic opportunities exist to win Pakistan’s confidence in our genuine desire to help them. Can we help with textile exports or commercially in another way? Can we help it to break down the barriers with India? Above all, we should encourage the US to adopt a policy on Pakistan that takes account of Pakistan’s security concerns, and we should help the US to play a constructive role in the reconciliation process.

I am under no illusion about the difficulties involved in respect of any of those countries. None the less, the Foreign Affairs Committee commends the UK Government for its advocacy of the regional approach to political reconciliation. Currently, the conditions for political settlement are virtually non-existent, but if ever there was a time to make the effort, it is now.