Repurposing Russian Assets to Rebuild Ukraine

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Tuesday 27th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The sanctions regimes, and measures taken under them against named individuals and Russian state assets, have played a vital role in the Ukrainian resistance, albeit one of a more slow-burning nature than military help. They are a slow-paced, grinding remedy against what has turned into a slow, grinding war in which bravery, defiance and the spirit and determination of enlisted men will ultimately allow Ukraine to prevail. We must play our part. As of May, records show that 1,604 individuals and 228 entities under the Russian regime are subject to the UK’s freezing sanctions to a value of approximately £18 billion. In addition, an estimated £26 billion of Russian state assets are frozen here in the UK. Russia is the most sanctioned country in the world, and while innocent Ukrainians continue to be killed for Russian imperialist ambitions, that must remain the case. More broadly, it is estimated that some £275 billion-worth of Russian assets have been frozen worldwide.

The Government are actively freezing assets. Freezing is good, but reallocating frozen assets to Ukraine’s benefit will be better, not least because of the monumental sums that are estimated to be needed to fund reconstruction—that is, reconstruction of homes, businesses, infrastructure and lives. I was therefore interested and pleased to read the detail of the statutory instrument—the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2023—laid by the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell), last Monday. Its introduction enables freezing order sanctions to be maintained until Moscow pays compensation to Ukraine for the destruction that Russians have caused and will continue to cause until the war ends. It is a positive step towards the calls that I and many other Members of this House have been making for assets forfeiture, although we are certainly not there yet.

As part of the joint Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Treasury and Home Office press release last week detailing these new legislative measures, I read with interest that the Government’s

“proposal to force sanctioned individuals to disclose UK assets will bring in greater transparency and leaves less room to hide.”

This proposal is long overdue, and I encourage the Government to make it a legal reality as soon as possible. Could the Minister explain the planned legislative process to enable that?

Questions over the specifics of the proposal remain. When brought forward, it is crucial that if sanctioned individuals are found to be in breach of the legislation, the proposal should open all their frozen assets to seizure and reallocation. I ask the Minister: would a breach of this provision cover an individual’s entire sanctioned asset base—at least that in the UK, and not just that which may have been found to have been hidden? That would have the dual effect of equipping the Government with a large motivational stick when it comes to greater transparency and allowing the effective forfeiture of a potentially significant amount of assets if breaches are identified. Both effects are desirable, and I would be interested to hear whether the Minister agrees.

Ultimately, the strength of the UK’s response to Russia’s attack on the post-1945 world order rests on being in lockstep with our international allies. The US, the EU and Canada are all proactively working on or have already implemented means of asset seizure and reallocation, even if only in a limited way. The move to allow frozen assets in the UK to be allocated towards Ukraine’s reconstruction complements similar moves in the US and Canada last year and EU proposals made earlier this month. All of this is very welcome.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way, and I apologise for missing the opening of the debate. Has any consideration been given to what should happen to the interest or other income generated by those assets during the period that they are frozen? Surely, even if the assets are not seized in the end, their owners should not benefit from anything that the assets earn during that frozen period.

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend makes a different but important point. That aspect has been pursued by the European Union; in fact, I believe that it set up a committee a month or two ago to look at that very point. I think it is a very good idea, and we should certainly be pursuing it. Obviously, all these sanctioned assets cost money to keep—flats have to be maintained; boats have to be maintained—and we should be using income from these assets at least to pay for the maintenance of them, if not to get income that we can then give to Ukraine. He makes a very good point.

The Minister said earlier that the use of frozen assets towards reconstruction would not be allowed as a means of circumvention. It would, however, seem rather unlikely that a Russian sanctioned person would permit their frozen assets to be donated to Ukraine unless there was some benefit to them, such as sanctions cancellation. Perhaps the Minister could explain why else the sanctioned individual would want to do so. Why would they want to give their assets to Ukraine if there was not a deal to be had? The Ukrainians, it has to be said, have expressed concern at the prospect of deals being done with oligarchs in individual countries—they think that might breach the wall, so to speak. As such, could the Minister confirm that if deals are done at all, they would only be done on a multilateral basis?

To make one final point if I may, the original purpose of our adopting the Magnitsky sanctions was to protect those whose human rights are ignored by foreign regimes. As the Russian Federation staggers on, we must remain vigilant towards those of its citizens who support democracy. At this very moment, Open Russia’s vice-chairman Vladimir Kara-Murza—twice poisoned, and now sentenced to 25 years—languishes in a Russian prison, even though his lawyers and family are unsure of his exact whereabouts. Mr Kara-Murza, whose brave wife I had the honour of meeting in Parliament last week, is a valiant spokesman for democracy and human rights. The Government have sanctioned only five of his dozens of tormentors; even Lithuania has sanctioned 15 of them. As a British citizen, should Mr Kara-Murza not expect us to be leading the way on this issue? I hope that Ministers will now respond with appropriate resolution.

--- Later in debate ---

[Leo Docherty]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth for laying out the various options. He asked what consideration we have given, give and will continue to give to them. First and foremost, we are working at pace. Our officials were in Brussels earlier this week, liaising with EU officials and looking at various models, so the work is continuing at pace. Clearly, if that were easy we would have done it already, but that does not mean that significant institutional effort and energy is not being put into the matter.

[Mr Djanogly]

The Minister is speaking about the EU. Is the issue not that at the start of the conflict the UK was leading the pace, particularly in financial services and other areas, but as the war has progressed, we seem to have been waiting for the EU, as he mentioned, and the US to lead the way? Is it not now time for the UK to regain the initiative once again?

[Leo Docherty]

I respectfully disagree with my hon. Friend’s characterisation. We are all looking at these issues. Clearly, the EU has some ideas about the potential use of interest payments on seized assets. That is an idea, not a legally tested, viable route. As the EU is considering that, so are we, which is why our officials were in Brussels earlier this week.

[Mr Djanogly]

To follow that theme, let us take the question of interest as an issue. That idea has not come out of the EU in the past two months; it has been spoken about for at least six months, but the EU has decided to look at it in the past two months. Has my right hon. Friend not considered that that is something we should have done by now?

[Leo Docherty]

It is certainly under consideration, but it will depend upon legality. If there is no legality, there is no utility.

Situation in Russia

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Monday 26th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

The hon. Gentleman makes an incredibly important point. What we have seen, horrifically, is the specific targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure by Russian forces in Putin’s war of aggression. The UK has, in addition to our military support, supported the work to rebuild Ukraine, and particularly the energy infrastructure that was so essential during the winter. The Ukraine recovery conference, which we hosted in the UK last week, saw the commitment of $60 billion—including a €50 billion promise from the European Union, which was hugely valued—for Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and reform, and we will keep working to support the rebuilding of civilian infrastructure. I have witnessed that on my visits to Ukraine, and that will remain part of the UK’s support to the Ukrainians in their self-defence.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

With the increased threat of the disintegration of the Russian Federation, does my right hon. Friend agree that it will become even more important to monitor and protect Russia’s future leaders and influencers, such as Free Russia’s Vladimir Kara-Murza—already twice poisoned and now sentenced to 25 years in prison for promoting democratic values? Will he look to extend the sanctions on his tormentors from only five people to more of the 38 Russian state gangsters who have been identified so far?

[James Cleverly]

The work that has been done by Vladimir Kara-Murza and others like him who have stood up publicly to criticise the brutality of the Putin regime is admirable, and we continue to call for his immediate release. My hon. Friend is of course right that we have sanctioned a number of the individuals involved with his completely inappropriate and unjustified detention. He will know that we do not speculate about future designations, but I and my Department have heard what he has said.

Vladimir Kara-Murza

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Monday 17th April 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Following the shocking sentencing of Vladimir Kara-Murza in Russia, which pretended to be a judicial process but frankly looked more like a circus act, will my right hon. Friend confirm not only that the 29 people who have been involved so far will be looked at, but that any prison guard, warder, doctor or Russian civil servant who causes harm to Mr Kara-Murza before his release will be subject to harsh sanctions?

[Mr Mitchell]

My hon. Friend is a distinguished lawyer and the whole House will have heard his analysis of the bogus trial that has taken place. In respect of sanctioning, we will look at every possible opportunity in the way I described earlier.

Russian Assets: Seizure

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Tuesday 14th March 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

This war must see Ukraine and its people emerge victorious—there are no plausible alternatives—but there is still a gap as to how to pay for Ukraine’s reconstruction in the short term and once the war is won. There is no doubt that the west will do its part when it comes to it, but a question of fairness, or the lack thereof, remains. It cannot be right for the burden of reconstruction to fall solely on the shoulders of western taxpayers, especially as estimates for it are astronomically high. As has been said, the suggestions on the ground in Ukraine are that it will cost around $750 billion, and that figure will only continue to grow as Russian armed forces and mercenaries continue their indiscriminate destruction.

The aggressor in this case—the Russian Federation—its political and military leadership, and, yes, its people must pay the price. They must pay the price for disregarding, and in fact smashing, the rules and norms of the post-1945 world order that had guaranteed the peace in Europe for so long. What Russia started by invading Georgia in 2008, it continued in Crimea, Donbas and then wider Ukraine, so there must be no more free passes for Russia to invade, brutalise and plunder. To appease Putin would only encourage him to greater brutality.

Our current freezing sanctions are robust, wide-ranging and necessary, but in the light of Russia’s barbarism, they do not go far enough. There remains some debate as to the quantity of assets frozen here in the UK—assets of the Russian state and of individuals, and we have had a discussion about that this evening—but regardless of the specific value of those frozen assets in the UK, it is clear that frozen assets worldwide could form the lion’s share of future support to Ukraine, including for the vital reconstruction of people’s homes and national infrastructure.

Seizure, however, requires both political courage and will, and that has been exhibited by our Canadian allies. I advise my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) that the Canadians are doing more than talking about it; they are acting on it. In June last year, lawmakers in Ottawa empowered the relevant Canadian Ministers to approach their Attorney General to apply to the courts to forfeit assets—assets that had already been frozen—for the benefit of Ukraine. The legislation builds in important safeguards to protect rights to property, including that any person who appears to have an interest in the frozen assets may be heard by the court. None the less, seizures are now under way specifically in relation to an estimated $26 million held by Granite Capital Holdings, a company owned by the sanctioned oligarch Roman Abramovich. Discussions are, I understand, ongoing about how the proceeds should be used and distributed in Ukraine, be that directly through the Ukrainian state or by select non-governmental organisations, but the fact of seizure is now a legal reality in a friendly nation with a legal system similar to our own.

Conversations I have had with lawmakers in other allied nations, such as the US, indicate that they are also considering how to make seizures legally viable and feasible in their own jurisdictions, and media reports suggest that this is also the case in capitals across the EU, such as Tallinn. We should be doing likewise here in the UK as well. Not to do so, I believe, risks our finding ourselves in the morally dubious political situation of handing back frozen assets to Russia and to sanctioned individuals, or it could lead to individual national deals with sanctioned people that could put us out of lockstep with our allies.

One of the many lessons of the last year since the renewed invasion is how important it is to present a relentlessly united front to Russia. On the day that we were privileged to welcome President Zelensky here for his outstanding address, the Prime Minister made positive and welcome comments about the necessity of asset seizures, as I note did the Leader of the Opposition. Now is the time to follow that up with firm action. As of today, I am confident in predicting that such action would have the overwhelming support of this House, and I think we have seen the cross-party support here today. Where there is political will, there is always a way, as our fellow Canadian parliamentarians have demonstrated. I strongly welcome this debate, and I urge the Government to set out a practical and effective plan for frozen Russian assets to be seized and repurposed to Ukraine’s benefit.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anne-Marie Trevelyan]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that. If I may, I will continue with my speech before I run out of time. I hope to give him some assurance on his question.

We are continuing to engage with think-tanks, lawyers and Members of the House, and those they are working with, to ensure that we test every available option in detail. I reiterate that I am genuinely grateful to all colleagues for their interventions and proposals to help us work on these challenges, and we are meeting them regularly.

I want to be clear that the Government believe that we should develop the power for frozen assets to be used to rebuild Ukraine, to ensure that we can achieve that practically and lawfully. Given that Ukraine is fighting for its future and the principles of the UN charter and international law, it would be an own goal for Ukraine’s allies to risk being seen to act inconsistently with domestic and international law in their approach to seizing Russian assets.

[Mr Djanogly]

Is there not also a concern that if we do not act with our allies to move ahead on this principle, and we all start doing our own deals on releasing assets, that would be very damaging for the wall of sanctions? Indeed, the Ukrainians have said that they would be very much against individual deals.

[Anne-Marie Trevelyan]

I thank my hon. Friend for setting out one of the important issues that we are making sure we work on as effectively as possible. We are working very closely with our allies on the handling of seized Russian assets, and we will continue to do so. Let us be clear: our international partners face the same challenge. No country has yet found a legally tested solution. The right hon. Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge) highlighted that Canada is testing the first seizure proposals and we are watching closely. I reassure the House that as progress is made by individual international partners, we will be right alongside them in considering how the UK can find solutions here too. Of course, as has been set out by colleagues, many proposals need UN leadership, and we will keep on driving that coalition.

In the meantime, we have made it clear that, consistent with our legal systems, Russia will have no access to the assets we have frozen or immobilised until it ends, once and for all, its violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia will not get a single euro, dollar or pound back until that is realised.

Colleagues have raised questions about the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill. It will sit alongside the National Security Bill, the Online Safety Bill and the forthcoming economic crime and fraud strategy. It will bear down on criminals who abuse our open economy by reforming Companies House to prevent abuses of limited partnerships; there will also be reforms to target more effectively information sharing to tackle money laundering. The right hon. Member for Barking is right about the effectiveness of section 11 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, and it is used regularly.

I know that right hon. and hon. Members will be disappointed that I cannot speak more fully about sanctions enforcement and OFSI, as these are matters for His Majesty’s Treasury, but I know they will continue to raise their concerns directly and I have heard them today.

War in Ukraine: Illicit Finance

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Thursday 17th November 2022 Westminster Hall

[Bob Seely]

I thank the hon. Member for his very sensible point. There is absolutely a wider issue. As well as shell companies, there are vast developments on the south side of the river, around the US embassy, where entire blocks are being bought up as investment options rather than being used to provide housing for Londoners. That is shocking, especially because we have a housing shortage. There is a wider argument on reform of our housing in the UK for giving options first to allow ordinary folks to be buying it, rather than—as much as we love them—Hong Kong, Chinese or Indonesian investors to block buy endless numbers of flat and rent them out or never have them occupied.

I was going to talk a bit about the Azerbaijani laundromat. Between 2012 and 2014, about £3 billion went through UK shell companies as part of the so-called Azerbaijani laundromat; funding was dispersed from Azerbaijani officials to various outlets in this country. As well as that, London’s open economic environment has been a key centre for raising finance for companies or individuals over whom there are now very considerable question marks.

In 2017, En+ was floated on the London stock exchange, raising £1.5 billion from international investors in an initial public offering. We now know—well, we knew at the time—that En+ was very closely associated with Oleg Deripaska, despite his ownership of companies linked to supplying Russian military materials and sanctioned Russian shareholders. He himself is now sanctioned, I believe. En+ and Oleg Deripaska were part of a considerable lobbying effort by a former Member of the House of Lords—a former Conservative Minister, as much as it shames me to say it—to separate Deripaska from En+ in frankly pretty questionable circumstances.

Shortly after the Skripal poisoning, Russia continued to sell Russian sovereign debt in London, facilitated by the sanctioned Russian bank VTB. While our financial services provide anonymity to those who wish to invest, many UK legal firms have sought to further silence those who question the origin of investments.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a very powerful case. I agree with everything he has to say. On sanctions, he will know, not least from the talk he did yesterday afternoon with a group of Ukrainians, that there is a big call in Ukraine at the moment to turn the freezing sanctions into confiscation sanctions, and to use the money we are holding, which would presumably otherwise be given back to the oligarchs, for the reconstruction of Ukraine. Would my hon. Friend comment on that?

[Bob Seely]

I would love to; we were debating that yesterday at the Henry Jackson Society with Bill Browder and a number of other people. My hon. Friend is welcome to correct me on this, but I think Canada has prepared an Act to enable that frozen money effectively to be given to the Ukrainian authorities or set up in some kind of international fund to help reconstruction in Ukraine.

[Mr Djanogly]

The Act is quite straightforward. By way of clarification, it takes the existing sanctions legislation, including the Canadian Magnitsky law, and latches on to that the ability to change freezing orders into confiscation orders. It is a relatively simple way of going about what could be a very complicated process.

[Bob Seely]

Indeed. If it is effective, I look forward to working with my hon. Friend, and potentially other Members, to see how we can bring in such a law in the UK, so that we move from freezing money to taking money and using it for a more moral purpose.

Mahsa Amini

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Tuesday 11th October 2022 Commons Chamber

[Gillian Keegan]

We continue to work with many, including our international partners, on many countries where we see human rights violations, but we do not comment on operational matters or ongoing discussions.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I congratulate the Minister and the Government on the decisive and meaningful action on sanctions. Sanctions often work best when done on a multilateral basis, so what contacts are she and the Government having with other countries, in order that we can concert the actions on sanctions?

[Gillian Keegan]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point, and the UK has been robust in its response to Iran’s repression of protesters. We have summoned the most senior Iranian diplomat in the UK to express our concern, we have engaged at senior levels in Iran and, yesterday, we issued new sanctions against a number of individuals responsible for human rights violations. We expect other countries, and the EU, to follow suit in the coming weeks.

Georgia and the War in Ukraine

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2022 Westminster Hall

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered Georgia and the war in Ukraine.

During the Easter recess, the all-party parliamentary group on Georgia sent a delegation to Georgia, which I was pleased to be a part of. I declare my related interest as set out in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I am also pleased to have the opportunity to discuss issues that arose from the visit and also to thank the Speaker and MPs in Georgia, the Georgian ambassador to London, Sophie Katsarava, whom we are honoured to have here with us this afternoon, and also our ambassador to Tbilisi, Mark Clayton, all of whom made it a very useful, fascinating visit. We had meetings with the Prime Minister, many other Ministers, Select Committee Chairs, Opposition Members, and civil society activists.

I will start with a general observation: I doubt that UK-Georgia relations have ever been as good as they are at the current time. Under the Wardrop dialogue, bilateral discussions have improved relations in the diplomatic and ministerial spheres. I am very pleased to report that parliamentary-level relations are also excellent. During our visit we saw great potential for improved economic ties, with our post-Brexit free trade agreement in place, and also cultural ties—for instance, going with my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby (Mark Pawsey) to visit the Georgian rugby headquarters. They are crazy for the sport, by the way.

There is no doubt that Georgia is a country that faces west and wants to be part of the wider family of free and democratic countries with western values and economies. It is a young democracy and has a somewhat politically polarised society, but united, with huge polling majorities in their wish for membership of the European Union and also NATO. In fact, both aims have now been written into the constitution. As with Ukraine, a formal EU membership application has been made. That builds on Georgia’s existing EU accession agreement and its three-month EU visa, which it entered into at roughly the same time as Ukraine.

In practice, the EU often looks at developments with those two countries together. Russia, before its 24 February wider invasion of Ukraine, occupied roughly 20% of both countries and in practice runs the puppet regimes that it props up in both from the same Moscow office. Whenever President Putin warns against Ukraine membership of the EU and NATO, he usually simultaneously warns against Georgian membership. We can debate the rights and wrongs of the EU and Russia lumping Ukraine and Georgia together, but in practice we need to acknowledge that it happens to some degree.

As far as NATO is concerned, both Ukraine and Georgia have been forming closer links over recent years. Georgia, for instance, provided significant detachment operations in Afghanistan. Our delegation took the opportunity to visit the NATO-Georgia joint training evaluation centre, which was set up after the 2014 NATO summit in Wales. Georgia’s troops are trained in NATO tactics by NATO troops and, clearly, the ground is being set for ever-closer NATO compatibility, whatever the speed of Georgia’s membership application may be.

Of course, the threat presented by Russia hung over much of our delegation’s meetings in one way or another. It is important to realise that the intransigence, brutality and violence expressed by Russia under Putin did not start with Ukraine in 2014. Rather, it started with the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. As a result, to this day, 20% of Georgia—Abkhazia and South Ossetia—is occupied by Russian troops, and Georgia supports some 250,000 internally displaced persons from those regions.

The pattern of Russia’s use of disinformation and cyber-warfare and its escalating use of agents provocateurs, special forces and devastating slash and burn techniques have consistently recurred where Russia has meddled. So we should be horrified and disgusted by Russian actions in Ukraine, but we should not be surprised. As with the occupied Donbas, post occupation, Russia puts virtually no investment into these places, other than garrisons. They are effectively left to rot, in a kind of limbo. Sokhumi, the capital of Abkhazia and once the pearl of the Black sea, is now an empty ghost town of tumbleweed. Mariupol—need I say more? This is Russia’s plan: to have weak, corrupt and malleable puppet states, that it preferably does not have to pay for, to act as buffers on its borders.

In the case of Georgia, every few weeks Russia stages some farcical provocation action in the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, such as moving the barbed wire fence forward a few metres, or closing crossing points, or arresting shepherds rounding up their sheep—always to stir the pot and maintain tension and leverage. The United States calls these occupied territories, “occupied territories”. Can the Minister explain why the UK Government still refuse to do so?

We should recall that the year 2008 was a difficult time, with the global financial crisis. Standing up to Putin was not the No. 1 priority in the west. The west, led by the US, refused to intervene on behalf of Georgia, while in the UK Russian investment was being actively encouraged as one way of propping up our failing economy and banks. In 2008, Putin received his first of numerous free passes from the west. Sensing the west’s disinterest and lack of cohesion, onward he marched to Crimea and Donbas, not to mention with the stamping out of democracy in those countries directly in Russia’s ambit such as Chechnya, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Each time, more or less, he received a free pass.

During this time, the UK failed to arm Ukraine and Georgia. Yes, we gave army training and other aid, but not guns. Of course, the UK did more than most other countries and that should be recognised, as should our very significant contribution of weaponry after the start of the recent war, but the question does need to be asked: would Putin have attacked if Ukraine had received the means to fight back then, as it has now? Would so many people—some 8,000 civilians so far—have been killed? Would such physical and cultural disruption as we have seen have happened?

Both Ukraine and Georgia have been receiving high-level assistance from the UK to counter cyber-warfare. We must not forget that the prediction in the first days of the February war was that Russia would wipe out Ukraine’s infrastructure through the use of cyber-attacks. That has not happened. Frequent Russian cyber-attacks on Georgia have also failed. We gave help on cyber before the war started and it worked. Why did we not do so with weapons? Surely, we need to learn the lesson here: prevention is better than cure. The US has provided the Javelin anti-tank system to Georgia, but we have not sent arms. Let us not make the same mistake again. Let us give Georgia the weapons they need.

Georgian public opinion is pro Ukraine’s fight for survival and liberty to an overwhelming extent. In Tbilisi, every third house I saw flew the Ukrainian flag and there were huge rallies held in support. I understand that hundreds of Georgians have unofficially volunteered to fight in Ukraine. The Georgian Government have been very vocal in their support for Ukraine. They have been supporting anti-Russian motions at the UN. They have sent a very significant amount of non-military aid to Ukraine and are hosting some 25,000 Ukrainian refugees. Georgia has not adopted the western sanctions directly, although it is applying them indirectly, for example in financial services.

Georgian opposition parties and Ukraine have been demanding a tougher position on sanctions and military intervention. Against this is Georgia’s proximity to and partial occupation by Russia, with a population of only 3.5 million and without the cover of being a NATO member. The pain of being left alone against Russia in 2008 remains raw with the Georgian governing party and so the Government tread carefully with Russia. This approach has resulted in varying degrees of friction with Ukraine.

The recent arrival of some 30,000 Russians to Georgia is contentious. They tend to be young, middle-class Russians who do not want to be involved with the war. They can live in Georgia for a year and set up businesses there. The practical if not official position taken by the Georgian Government is that this is a welcome benefit to Georgia of the Russian brain drain. Opposition parties tend to be less charitable towards these Russians and there can be tension in public when Russian is heard spoken. Given that huge numbers of Russians are fleeing—there are another 200,000 in Istanbul alone—I would be interested to hear the Minister’s view on them and whether we know how many are in the UK.

It is also important to recognise that the strategic issues for the UK and the west go beyond Ukraine and into the wider Black sea region. Possible Ukrainian neutrality—subject to a referendum—was apparently mooted by President Zelensky at the Istanbul peace talks. A heavily-armed Swiss-type neutrality might work for a large and very populated country such as Ukraine, but that is not the case for Georgia, which is small geographically and has a small population. Indeed, the ground taken by Russia on the first day of its February offensive was more than exists in the whole of Georgia. Georgia’s long-term security is considered by the Georgians to be effectively bound up in joining the NATO umbrella, not in neutrality. If Ukraine were to go neutral, Russia’s attention would be drawn to Georgia—possibly with disastrous implications for Georgian security.

Although the UK Government’s security documents seem to be slowly coming around to recognising the importance of the wider Black sea strategic balance, the 2021 integrated review, “Global Britain in a competitive age”, mentions the Black sea only once. Britain conducts £21 billion-worth of bilateral trade in that region. That makes up 3% of our exports and it is significantly expanding. I believe that we still have the largest Navy in Europe. In April 2021, HMS Defender was deployed to challenge illegal Russian claims around Crimea, and was very much welcomed in Ukraine and Georgia. In the current war, we have started to provide Ukraine with our anti-ship missiles.

Let us assume that Ukraine prevails in this war. How, Minister, are we going to get trade going again in the Black sea region? Will we help to get rid of the mines? Will we work with Ukraine, with Georgia and, importantly, with Turkey, to keep the lines open and uphold maritime law? What kind of post-war planning is going on?

Let me state the obvious. The Georgians, like the Ukrainians, will always tell people that they do not want war and they do not want instability in their region. They want recognition of their sovereignty and the democratic freedom to embed themselves in the European family, encourage free trade and improve the economic lot of their people. The sacrifices and suffering of the Ukrainian people since 2014—as for the Georgians since 2008—have been immense and totally unjustified. I hope that our Ministers are looking at the clear pattern established by Russia and are learning the lessons of our earlier years of relative inaction, so that we can stop the rot from Russia spreading further.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

This is a good and appropriate debate to have had at the current time. Let me first thank the Back-Bench contributions of my fellow delegation members: the hon. Member for Newport East (Jessica Morden) for bringing in the local community aspect, which is important and something we should be building on; my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) for his astute observations from his visit and his assessment of the political situation; and my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton), who discussed the historical context, which is always appropriate in that part of the world.

It would be fair to say that there was a clear degree of cohesiveness and unanimity from the Front Benches of the Government, Labour and the SNP, and that has been consistently shown in this place, within the main Chamber and outside it. Given the precarious nature of the part of the world we have been discussing, it has been good for MPs and the Government to state their various positions, and it was probably time that we did that.

Rightly, there is overwhelming support in this place for Ukraine and its people. The message today is that issues arising out of the Russia-Ukraine war—supporting democratic values, Black sea security, addressing Russian intransigence, addressing the need to secure grain supplies, and many others mentioned by hon. Members—are important for many countries beyond Ukraine. Britain’s strategic interests require us to stand back and look at the wider picture coming out of the Russia-Ukraine war, and Georgia should and must form part of that picture.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered Georgia and the war in Ukraine.

Sanctions

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Monday 28th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

Our ambassador, who is in Lviv, is doing a fantastic job in very difficult circumstances. We are doing all we can to support people in Ukraine. As I said, the case is a matter for the Home Office. I am very happy to take it and ensure that the Home Secretary is aware of it.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I realised that the Government really understood the nature of sanctioning oligarchs when the sanctions on Aeroflot were extended to private jets. In that vein, will my right hon. Friend consider banning insurance for Russian yachts and jets? It would have a worldwide application and make life a lot tougher for those concerned.

[Elizabeth Truss]

I thank my hon. Friend for his idea. Nothing is off the table.

Sanctions

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd February 2022 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

I thank my right hon. Friend for giving me the opportunity to make clear our position. If this has not become clear to the House, let me make it clear now: we intend to escalate these sanctions—to ratchet up these sanctions—in response to what has already happened in order to deter further aggression and in order to stimulate Putin to withdraw the troops from Ukraine, take them away from the border and send them back home to their families and barracks in other parts of Russia.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Will the Minister give way?

[James Cleverly]

I have got to make some progress, but I will give way again.

[Mr Djanogly]

I thank the Minister for kindly giving way. May I ask him to explain that point a little further? The items of sanction today were under the existing legislation, and what is being proposed today will enable further types of sanction. Obviously they will be worked on with foreign Governments, but will he also be looking at further sanctions from a UK perspective at the same time as looking at this with other countries?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Can I say how heartening it has been to hear so much support for the brave Ukrainians who really need our help at this difficult time? When I looked at the regulations, a thought process arose and my key question was if, or to what extent, it was correct for us to amend existing regulations specifically to deal with Russia and especially those connected with Russia. I appreciate that there are some complicated questions to be asked here. For instance, to what extent are the actions of Russia interchangeable with those of President Putin? Can we say that what the kleptocratic dictatorship that he has established and developed, supported by a coterie of sycophantic oligarchs, wants is the same as what Russia wants? I think that most people, on any rational assessment, would say yes. In Russia, civil society, democracy, a free press and financial regulations have all gone to virtually nothing, while corruption, police statism, rotten judges and political gangsterism have reached new heights. It is frankly a brave person who now stands up in Russia to make any kind of criticism of President Putin, who sees himself in place for life.

There are other questions that go to assessing the status of Russian individuals, many thousands of whom live in the UK. Some of them may well be supportive of Putin’s regime, but there are many others who are not. In fact, many Russians are here to escape the clutches of Putin’s regime. On the other hand, the sources of those people’s wealth may lead to yet more questions concerning criminality, albeit criminality that is unconnected to Putin or indeed Ukraine. I urge the use of caution and due process in the way that those Russians here are treated. For instance, just throwing them all in prison, as the UK did with all the Germans resident here at the beginning of world war two, is not going to work and would not enhance our democratic reputation. On the other hand, there comes a tipping point towards war when individual interests are to some degree going to be affected or subsumed just by being a citizen of the country concerned. It seems that these regulations are effectively preparing the ground for that to happen.

I support these proposals and feel that ultimately, in the circumstances, they are appropriate. Moreover, I am ever more of the belief that the lacklustre response of the UK, the EU and the US to Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and its 2014 Ukraine incursion is one of the main reasons that we are here today. It was lacklustre in terms of sanctions and also of military and economic support. Ukraine’s and Georgia’s borders were accepted by Russia—and indeed by the world community—and we should have been much tougher in protecting their integrity and their sovereignty.

The problem with dealing with dictatorships is not a new one. If they see a gap, they will take it; if they see a weakness, they will exploit it; and they can generally move faster than democracies. Russia clearly wants to have a series of weak, poor, corrupt countries along its border and to act like it was still 1980. We cannot let that happen. These regulations will provide the framework for sanctions, but not the sanctions themselves. That will depend on the ability of western-facing democracies to act together. This is now the challenge for our Government, but I have to say that, on their performance so far, I believe that it is one they can and will deliver.

2002 Gujarat Riots

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

Wednesday 9th February 2022 Westminster Hall

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank my hon. Friend, and I agree absolutely with him. We have to ensure that we find a way, wherever possible, to live peacefully. I will talk about that in more detail shortly.

As I said, many people lost their lives in the riots. I cannot speak for the families of all of them, other than to say that, whatever a person’s background, whatever their faith or religion, and whatever their politics, if they have any, the suffering they feel is no different to anybody else’s. Every family’s story will be different, but I want to talk about one family in particular, as they are constituents of mine in Batley and Spen, and are with us here today in the public gallery, along with relatives and supporters. It is on their behalf that I ask that the anniversary of the Gujarat riots is marked with respect in this parliamentary debate, and that I ask that their belief that justice is yet to be done for what happened is acknowledged.

On 28 February 2002, four tourists were on their way back from visiting the Taj Mahal. It should have been the trip of a lifetime. Their names were Sakil and Saeed Dawood, their 18-year-old nephew Imran, and their childhood friend Mohammed Aswat. Not long after they crossed the state border into Gujarat, their Jeep was stopped at a roadblock. A mob encircled the vehicle, demanding to know their religion. They replied that they were Muslim and that they were British citizens on holiday. In the violence that followed, Sakil, Saeed, Mohammed and their driver were all killed. Miraculously, although Imran Dawood was left for dead, he survived, and is with us today. It is only through his testimony that we know the circumstances of what happened. He remembers Saeed and Sakil pleading for their lives to be spared. It is his fight for justice that brought the international campaign for proper recognition of what happened to my constituency of Batley and Spen.

Nothing that is said or done today can bring Sakil, Saeed or Mohammed back, but that does not mean that nothing can be done to provide some comfort to the Dawood family and, after 20 years, possibly even some sense of being able to move forward with their lives. It causes them enormous hurt that the remains of their three young men have never been returned to them. I ask the Minister to investigate with the Indian authorities whether the repatriation of the remains is possible, and if so, I ask that it should happen as soon as practicable.

The family have also asked about the possibility of an inquest being conducted in this country, a request that I have passed on to the coroner. I have given the Minister notice of my own request that any so-far unpublished report into the rioting carried out on behalf of the British high commission or the Government at the time be made public.

I know how sensitive and emotive this subject is, but at the heart of the debate is a family who are grieving. I know that it means a huge amount to them that we are able to be here today—not just to mark the occasion of the anniversary but to reflect on the issues surrounding it more generally. The Dawood family tell me that recent reports of renewed anti-Muslim violence only make it harder for them to move on with confidence that the terrible events of 2002 could never happen again.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I sincerely congratulate the hon. Lady on securing the debate on this issue, which so tragically impacted the Dawood family, some of whom live in my constituency. This is a terrible story of bigotry-motivated violence. I shall continue to work with her to help my constituents to seek the justice that they have long deserved.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention and for meeting me earlier to discuss these events.

Once again, let me make it clear that I am not seeking to make a judgment from afar. Undoubtedly, inter-communal violence is, sadly, not unique to India; tragically, we see it in many parts of the world. I am sure that there is agreement across all parties at Westminster that anything and everything that can be done to prevent such violence should be done.