Bob Seely Portrait

Bob Seely

Conservative - Isle of Wight

Committees on Arms Export Controls
3rd Jul 2018 - 6th Nov 2019
Committees on Arms Export Controls (formerly Quadripartite Committee)
3rd Jul 2018 - 6th Nov 2019
Foreign Affairs Committee
20th Feb 2018 - 6th Nov 2019


Select Committee Meeting
Tuesday 26th October 2021
10:15
Foreign Affairs Committee - Oral evidence
Subject: Implementing the Integrated Review: Tilt to the Indo-Pacific
26 Oct 2021, 10:15 a.m.
At 10.30am: Oral evidence
Professor Rory Medcalf - Head, National Security College at Crawford School of Public Policy
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Select Committee Meeting
Tuesday 26th October 2021
14:15
Foreign Affairs Committee - Oral evidence
Subject: Implementing the Integrated Review: Tilt to the Indo-Pacific
26 Oct 2021, 2:15 p.m.
At 2.30pm: Oral evidence
Dr Jack Holland - Associate Professor in International Relations/Security at University of Leeds
Dr Sidharth Kaushal - Research Fellow at Royal United Services Institute
View calendar
Oral Question
Thursday 28th October 2021
09:30
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Topical Question No. 7
If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.
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Division Votes
Friday 22nd October 2021
Prayers
voted No - in line with the party majority
One of 210 Conservative No votes vs 2 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 3 Noes - 336
Speeches
Thursday 21st October 2021
COP26: Limiting Global Temperature Rises

Will the hon. Lady give way?

Written Answers
Thursday 9th September 2021
Small Businesses: Coronavirus
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, what steps his Department is taking to support …
Early Day Motions
None available
Bills
None available
MP Financial Interests
Saturday 11th January 2020
2. (a) Support linked to an MP but received by a local party organisation or indirectly via a central party organisation
Name of donor: Barry Field
Address of donor: private
Amount of donation or nature and value if donation in kind: …

Division Voting information

During the current Parliamentary Session, Bob Seely has voted in 302 divisions, and 7 times against the majority of their Party.

22 Mar 2021 - Trade Bill - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted Aye - against a party majority and against the House
One of 29 Conservative Aye votes vs 318 Conservative No votes
Tally: Ayes - 300 Noes - 318
22 Mar 2021 - Trade Bill - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 26 Conservative No votes vs 318 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 319 Noes - 297
9 Feb 2021 - Trade Bill - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 13 Conservative No votes vs 341 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 351 Noes - 276
9 Feb 2021 - Trade Bill - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 31 Conservative No votes vs 318 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 318 Noes - 303
19 Jan 2021 - Trade Bill - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 11 Conservative No votes vs 344 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 353 Noes - 277
19 Jan 2021 - Trade Bill - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 34 Conservative No votes vs 319 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 319 Noes - 308
13 Oct 2020 - Public Health: Coronavirus Regulations - View Vote Context
Bob Seely voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 42 Conservative No votes vs 298 Conservative Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 299 Noes - 82
View All Bob Seely Division Votes

Debates during the 2019 Parliament

Speeches made during Parliamentary debates are recorded in Hansard. For ease of browsing we have grouped debates into individual, departmental and legislative categories.

Sparring Partners
Dominic Raab (Conservative)
Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice
(14 debate interactions)
Matt Warman (Conservative)
(12 debate interactions)
Nigel Adams (Conservative)
Minister of State (Cabinet Office) (Minister without Portfolio)
(10 debate interactions)
View All Sparring Partners
Department Debates
HM Treasury
(21 debate contributions)
View All Department Debates
View all Bob Seely's debates

Isle of Wight Petitions

e-Petitions are administered by Parliament and allow members of the public to express support for a particular issue.

If an e-petition reaches 10,000 signatures the Government will issue a written response.

If an e-petition reaches 100,000 signatures the petition becomes eligible for a Parliamentary debate (usually Monday 4.30pm in Westminster Hall).

Petitions with highest Isle of Wight signature proportion
Petitions with most Isle of Wight signatures
Bob Seely has not participated in any petition debates

Latest EDMs signed by Bob Seely

Bob Seely has not signed any Early Day Motions

Commons initiatives

These initiatives were driven by Bob Seely, and are more likely to reflect personal policy preferences.

MPs who are act as Ministers or Shadow Ministers are generally restricted from performing Commons initiatives other than Urgent Questions.


Bob Seely has not been granted any Urgent Questions

Bob Seely has not been granted any Adjournment Debates

Bob Seely has not introduced any legislation before Parliament

Bob Seely has not co-sponsored any Bills in the current parliamentary sitting


40 Written Questions in the current parliament

(View all written questions)
Written Questions can be tabled by MPs and Lords to request specific information information on the work, policy and activities of a Government Department
18th Jun 2020
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, for what reason (a) weddings and (b) weddings with the minimum number of five people are not being allowed to be conducted during the current stage of the easing of the covid-19 lockdown restrictions.

The Government understands the huge significance of weddings. We recognise that because weddings have not been able to take place in recent months this has caused difficulty and distress for many people. As set out in the Government’s COVID-19 recovery strategy, published in May, the Government has been examining how to enable people to gather in slightly larger groups better to facilitate small weddings. We have worked closely with faith leaders and local government on how best to achieve this. The Prime Minister announced on 23 June that wedding and civil partnership ceremonies will be able to take place in England from 4 July. People should avoid having a large ceremony, and should invite no more than thirty family and friends. Venues should ensure they are COVID-19 secure.

Penny Mordaunt
Minister of State (Department for International Trade)
22nd Jul 2021
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, what steps his Department is taking to support businesses that are owed significant rent arrears as a result of the covid-19 outbreak.

The Government will introduce legislation to support the orderly resolution of rental payments accrued by commercial tenants affected by the pandemic. The legislation will ringfence rent debt accrued during the pandemic by businesses affected by enforced closures. The legislation will also set out a process of binding arbitration to be undertaken between landlords and tenants. This is to be used as a last resort after bilateral negotiations have been undertaken and only where landlords and tenants cannot otherwise come to a resolution.

Paul Scully
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy)
19th Mar 2021
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, what the planned timescale is for the auction process for tidal wave energy; and when the parameters for that auction process will be published.

As my Rt. Hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced through the 10 Point Plan, the next Contracts for Difference (CfD) allocation round will open in late 2021. This is set to be our biggest auction yet, with the aim of securing up to double the renewable electricity capacity of previous rounds.

We remain on course with this timetable and plan to publish draft auction parameters roughly five months ahead of round opening, with final parameters set just before round opening. These parameters will cover all technologies eligible to compete in this auction, including wave and tidal energy.

Anne-Marie Trevelyan
Secretary of State for International Trade and President of the Board of Trade
24th Feb 2021
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, what plans his Department has made for the transition away from table service in wet-led pubs as covid-19 restrictions are eased.

On 22nd February, my Rt. Hon. Friend the Prime Minister published the Government’s ‘COVID-19 Response - Spring 2021’. The roadmap is a step-by-step plan to ease restrictions in England.

With regard to the reopening of the hospitality sector, Step 2 will take place no earlier than 12 April, when hospitality venues will be able to open for outdoor service, with no requirement for a substantial meal to be served alongside alcoholic drinks, and no curfew. The requirement to order, eat and drink while seated (‘table service’) will remain.

Paul Scully
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy)
20th Mar 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, if he will meet the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight and representatives of Solent LEP to discuss the future of MHI Vestas' site on the Isle of Wight.

I should be very happy to meet with the hon. Member for the Isle of Wight and representatives of Solent LEP, by teleconference, to discuss the future of the MHI Vestas’ site. My office will be in touch to arrange a suitable date.

Kwasi Kwarteng
Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
10th Feb 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, if he will make an assessment of the implications for his policies of the findings of the report entitled, Defending Our Data: Huawei, 5G and the Five Eyes published by the Henry Jackson Society in May 2019.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the Government took into consideration the full range of threats and risks informed by the technical and security expertise of the UK’s intelligence community, led by the National Cyber Security Centre, together with all relevant information, both public and classified, including that from international partners.

7th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, with reference to the oral contribution of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Cabinet Office, Official Report, 2 May 2019, column 364, what recent assessment he has made whether Huawei is a private company.

The government’s decision to categorise Huawei as a high risk vendor takes into consideration the potential links between Chinese companies and the Chinese State. And the limits we have imposed on the presence of all High Risk Vendors constitute some of the toughest security measures in the telecoms sector in the world.

We have unique insight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), which was established in 2010. As a result of our work, we know more about Huawei, and the risks it poses, than any other country in the world. Huawei’s operations in the UK are subject to the strongest oversight possible. The company’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the HCSEC, and the HCSEC Oversight Board which has reported annually since 2014.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment he has made of the human rights implications of the decision to use of Huawei systems in the UK's 5G network.

The UK has been vocal in drawing attention to the systematic human rights violations against Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic minorities in China. Ministers and senior officials regularly raise our concerns both directly with the Chinese and multilaterally. On 29 October, at the UN Third Committee, the UK read out a joint statement, on behalf of 22 other countries, drawing attention to the human rights violations in Xinjiang and calling on China to uphold its obligations to respect human rights. The UK also co-hosted an event on Xinjiang during the UN General Assembly in September.

The Government has also set out its expectations of businesses in the UK National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights and continues to encourage all British businesses to undertake appropriate levels of due diligence before deciding to do business or invest in foreign companies. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights advises UK companies to respect human rights wherever they operate including adopting appropriate due diligence policies to identify, prevent and mitigate human rights risks, and commit to monitoring and evaluating implementation

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what criteria the Government is using to define the safety critical infrastructure that will be excluded from high risk telecommunications vendors.

As set out in the oral statement of 28 January by the Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a high risk vendor is a vendor that poses greater security and resilience risks to UK telecoms. That statement also provided details of the non-exhaustive set of objective factors that were taken account of to assess a vendor as high risk. This set of factors has been further elaborated on in the National Cyber Security Centre’s advice on the use of equipment from high risk vendors in UK telecoms networks that was also published on 28 January and can be found on their website.

The NCSC also published a summary of the security analysis for the UK telecoms sector that informed the conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review. The summary notes that sensitive networks either route or have access to sensitive information, and include those directly relating to the operation of government or any safety-related systems and in wider critical national infrastructure. The summary of NCSC’s analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, if he will make an assessment of the implications for his policies of the evidence reported to have been obtained by US authorities on the involvement of Huawei in sanctions fraud.

The Government does not comment on other countries’ ongoing legal processes.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, with reference to the Foreign Secretary's oral statement to the House of 27 January 2020 on Huawei, Official Report, coulum 533, for what reason the Government decided to give different permissions to high risk vendors for critical and non-critical cyber infrastructure.

The Government has complete confidence in the independent technical assessment of the UK’s security experts. The security analysis conducted by the National Cyber Security Centre underpinned the final conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review.

NCSC published a summary of its security analysis which informed the conclusions of the Review. This analysis includes a summary of NCSC’s assessment of the distinction between the ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the network under section 8.3.1. The analysis states that:

“In 5G networks, core functions can be relocated nearer the ‘edge’ of the network. This has been described as blurring the line between core and edge. This is technically inaccurate as the ‘core’ is defined by a set of functions, standardised within [5], rather than a location. Consequently, the distinction between the two remains clear, as does the advice above. Our advice remains that HRVs are excluded from performing core functions, and this applies whether these functions are deployed centrally or towards the ‘edge’. Our understanding is that this clarification is unlikely to be consequential in the UK, as we are informed that core functions may run near the edge, but not actually on edge access equipment (such as base stations).”

The summary of NCSC’s security analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the UK Government took into consideration the full range of risks, including in relation to malicious code or programming errors.

Huawei’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), and we remain confident in these arrangements. However the Government recognises that HCSEC alone cannot mitigate all the risks, and that is why the final conclusions of the Telecoms Supply Chain Review - as announced on 28 January - set out the additional controls that should be applied to high risk vendors.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment he has made of the implications for his policies of the findings of the report by the Henry Jackson Society, entitled Defending our Data: Huawei, 5G and the Five Eyes, published on 16 May 2019.

The Telecoms Supply Chain Review included an international workstream to take account of the range of international positions so that they could be factored into UK decision-making.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the Government took into consideration the full range of threats and risks informed by the technical and security expertise of the UK’s intelligence community, led by the National Cyber Security Centre, together with all relevant information, both public and classified, including that from partners.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what representations the Government has received from the (a) French Government, (b) Australian Government, (c) US Administration and (d) Czech Government on the safety of Huawei systems.

The Telecoms Supply Chain Review included an international workstream to take account of the range of international positions so that they could be factored into UK decision-making.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the Government took into consideration the full range of threats and risks informed by the technical and security expertise of the UK’s intelligence community, led by the National Cyber Security Centre, together with all relevant information, both public and classified, including that from partners.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, for what reasons the Government's assessment of the safety of Huawei systems is different to the assessments of those systems made by the (a) French Government, (b) Australian Government, (c) US Administration and (d) Czech Government.

The Telecoms Supply Chain Review included an international workstream to take account of the range of international positions so that they could be factored into UK decision-making.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the Government took into consideration the full range of threats and risks informed by the technical and security expertise of the UK’s intelligence community, led by the National Cyber Security Centre, together with all relevant information, both public and classified, including that from partners.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment his Department has made of the adequacy of the model provided by the UK Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre on mitigating the risks to UK national security of Huawei's involvement in the UK's critical networks.

The Government has complete confidence in the independent technical assessment of the UK’s security experts. The security analysis conducted by the National Cyber Security Centre underpinned the final conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review.

NCSC published a summary of its security analysis which informed the conclusions of the Review. This analysis includes a summary of NCSC’s assessment of the distinction between the ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the network under section 8.3.1. The analysis states that:

“In 5G networks, core functions can be relocated nearer the ‘edge’ of the network. This has been described as blurring the line between core and edge. This is technically inaccurate as the ‘core’ is defined by a set of functions, standardised within [5], rather than a location. Consequently, the distinction between the two remains clear, as does the advice above. Our advice remains that HRVs are excluded from performing core functions, and this applies whether these functions are deployed centrally or towards the ‘edge’. Our understanding is that this clarification is unlikely to be consequential in the UK, as we are informed that core functions may run near the edge, but not actually on edge access equipment (such as base stations).”

The summary of NCSC’s security analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the UK Government took into consideration the full range of risks, including in relation to malicious code or programming errors.

Huawei’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), and we remain confident in these arrangements. However the Government recognises that HCSEC alone cannot mitigate all the risks, and that is why the final conclusions of the Telecoms Supply Chain Review - as announced on 28 January - set out the additional controls that should be applied to high risk vendors.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment his Department has made of the comments by former Chief of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove in respect of the Government's UK Telecommunications strategy.

The Telecoms Supply Chain Review included an international workstream to take account of the range of international positions so that they could be factored into UK decision-making.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the Government took into consideration the full range of threats and risks informed by the technical and security expertise of the UK’s intelligence community, led by the National Cyber Security Centre, together with all relevant information, both public and classified, including that from partners.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment his Department has made of the adequacy of the UK Cyber experts' review of security risks in respect of the Government's proposed 5G solution.

The Government has complete confidence in the independent technical assessment of the UK’s security experts. The security analysis conducted by the National Cyber Security Centre underpinned the final conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review.

NCSC published a summary of its security analysis which informed the conclusions of the Review. This analysis includes a summary of NCSC’s assessment of the distinction between the ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the network under section 8.3.1. The analysis states that:

“In 5G networks, core functions can be relocated nearer the ‘edge’ of the network. This has been described as blurring the line between core and edge. This is technically inaccurate as the ‘core’ is defined by a set of functions, standardised within [5], rather than a location. Consequently, the distinction between the two remains clear, as does the advice above. Our advice remains that HRVs are excluded from performing core functions, and this applies whether these functions are deployed centrally or towards the ‘edge’. Our understanding is that this clarification is unlikely to be consequential in the UK, as we are informed that core functions may run near the edge, but not actually on edge access equipment (such as base stations).”

The summary of NCSC’s security analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the UK Government took into consideration the full range of risks, including in relation to malicious code or programming errors.

Huawei’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), and we remain confident in these arrangements. However the Government recognises that HCSEC alone cannot mitigate all the risks, and that is why the final conclusions of the Telecoms Supply Chain Review - as announced on 28 January - set out the additional controls that should be applied to high risk vendors.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment he has made of whether Huawei has the ability to remove malicious code introduced by third-parties.

The Government has complete confidence in the independent technical assessment of the UK’s security experts. The security analysis conducted by the National Cyber Security Centre underpinned the final conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review.

NCSC published a summary of its security analysis which informed the conclusions of the Review. This analysis includes a summary of NCSC’s assessment of the distinction between the ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the network under section 8.3.1. The analysis states that:

“In 5G networks, core functions can be relocated nearer the ‘edge’ of the network. This has been described as blurring the line between core and edge. This is technically inaccurate as the ‘core’ is defined by a set of functions, standardised within [5], rather than a location. Consequently, the distinction between the two remains clear, as does the advice above. Our advice remains that HRVs are excluded from performing core functions, and this applies whether these functions are deployed centrally or towards the ‘edge’. Our understanding is that this clarification is unlikely to be consequential in the UK, as we are informed that core functions may run near the edge, but not actually on edge access equipment (such as base stations).”

The summary of NCSC’s security analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the UK Government took into consideration the full range of risks, including in relation to malicious code or programming errors.

Huawei’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), and we remain confident in these arrangements. However the Government recognises that HCSEC alone cannot mitigate all the risks, and that is why the final conclusions of the Telecoms Supply Chain Review - as announced on 28 January - set out the additional controls that should be applied to high risk vendors.

5th Feb 2020
To ask the Minister of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, what assessment he has made of the durability of the distinction between core and periphery in the 5G network in respect of the Government's decision to limit Huawei's involvement to core aspects of that network.

The Government has complete confidence in the independent technical assessment of the UK’s security experts. The security analysis conducted by the National Cyber Security Centre underpinned the final conclusions of the Government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review.

NCSC published a summary of its security analysis which informed the conclusions of the Review. This analysis includes a summary of NCSC’s assessment of the distinction between the ‘core’ and ‘edge’ of the network under section 8.3.1. The analysis states that:

“In 5G networks, core functions can be relocated nearer the ‘edge’ of the network. This has been described as blurring the line between core and edge. This is technically inaccurate as the ‘core’ is defined by a set of functions, standardised within [5], rather than a location. Consequently, the distinction between the two remains clear, as does the advice above. Our advice remains that HRVs are excluded from performing core functions, and this applies whether these functions are deployed centrally or towards the ‘edge’. Our understanding is that this clarification is unlikely to be consequential in the UK, as we are informed that core functions may run near the edge, but not actually on edge access equipment (such as base stations).”

The summary of NCSC’s security analysis can be found at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/summary-of-ncsc-security-analysis-for-the-uk-telecoms-sector.

In reaching the final decision on high risk vendors, the UK Government took into consideration the full range of risks, including in relation to malicious code or programming errors.

Huawei’s presence in the UK has been subject to detailed, formal oversight through the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), and we remain confident in these arrangements. However the Government recognises that HCSEC alone cannot mitigate all the risks, and that is why the final conclusions of the Telecoms Supply Chain Review - as announced on 28 January - set out the additional controls that should be applied to high risk vendors.

14th Jul 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, with reference to the Agriculture Bill, what assessment he has made of the importance of small, mobile abattoirs to rural or isolated communities.

The Government supports a competitive agri-food supply chain that provides opportunities for all businesses, including farmers, processors and abattoirs. We are working across government, with industry and stakeholders to ensure that the UK maintains its high-quality slaughtering facilities within a robust and competitive market providing options for farmers particularly in rural and isolated communities and reducing animal welfare impacts.

The Food Standards Agency is working closely with a business in England who are looking to introduce a mobile slaughter unit which will service local suppliers and support the rural economy. If this model can meet regulatory requirements and is deemed viable it could be replicated in other parts of the country where facilities for slaughter are in decline.

Victoria Prentis
Minister of State (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs)
10th Feb 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for International Trade, what steps the Trade Remedies Authority is taking to prevent the dumping of high-tech 5G network products and services.

There are no existing trade remedies measures or ongoing investigations into the dumping of high-tech 5G network products. Trade remedies only apply to goods and not services. We have set up the UK’s trade remedies system, built on international best practice, to provide real and robust protections to UK industries which are suffering injury caused by unfair trading practices or by unforeseen surges of imports. Industry will be able to apply for an investigation, following the end of the Transition Period, and the Trade Remedies Authority will initiate an investigation provided there is sufficient evidence.

Conor Burns
Minister of State (Northern Ireland Office)
7th Feb 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, what recent estimate he has made of the average (a) amount and (b) proportion of the original cost estimate of overspend on major infrastructure projects.

The Department does not calculate the information requested.

Information about the Department’s projects is published annually in the Department’s Annual Report, available here:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/824019/2018-2019-dft-annual-report-web.pdf.

Information can also be found in the Annual Report and Accounts of individual delivery bodies.

In addition to the Department’s own processes, financial and other relevant information about the performance of our largest projects, is published annually by the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA). The latest (2019) Annual Report can be found here:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/817654/IPA_AR_MajorProjects2018-19_web.pdf

Chris Heaton-Harris
Minister of State (Department for Transport)
30th Jan 2020
What recent discussions he has had with the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government on the adequacy of planning requirements for new housing developments in relation to (a) motorists, (b) cyclists and (c) pedestrians.

The Department works closely with MHCLG on planning policy related to transport for new housing, but we need to go further to ensure better integration at all scales.

The National Planning Policy Framework ensures sustainable transport issues are included at the beginning of housing planning and decision making and a projected £2.4bn will be invested over this parliament to support local authorities to develop ambitious Local Cycling and Walking Plans.

George Freeman
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy)
8th Jan 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, what his policy is on the future of South Western Railway; and what plans he has for the future funding of the Island Line railway.

As part of responsible contingency planning, we have measures in place on every franchise to protect the interests of passengers and taxpayers, and to ensure that services keep running and the taxpayer is reimbursed if a franchise is unable to deliver the services required. The Island Line will continue to operate under the South Western Railway franchise. On 16 September 2019 I announced significant investment on the Island Line confirming our determination to provide passengers across the country with the modern rail network they expect.

Chris Heaton-Harris
Minister of State (Department for Transport)
20th Oct 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, how many and what proportion of universal credit claimants were categorised as self-employed in the latest period for which that data is available.

In August 2020, the number of self-employed people claiming Universal Credit and required to report self-employed income, stood at 746,000.

This represented 13.4% of all people claiming Universal Credit.

Notes:

Volumes are rounded to the nearest thousand

Mims Davies
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Work and Pensions)
20th Oct 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, what recent estimate her Department has made of the number of universal credit claimants who will be subject to the minimum income floor when the relaxation ends on that threshold on 13 November 2020.

The Information requested on the minimum income floor is not available.

Mims Davies
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Work and Pensions)
13th Jul 2021
What steps his Department is taking to help improve​ the service provided by GP practices on the Isle of Wight.

NHS Hampshire, Southampton and Isle of Wight Clinical Commissioning Group is responsible for commissioning healthcare services from general practitioners and other providers and supporting them to continually improve services.

To support local commissioners to provide high quality primary care services, we committed a record level of additional investment in primary and community care of an extra £4.5 billion per year by 2023/24.

Jo Churchill
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs)
19th Feb 2021
To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, what assessment he has made of the implications for his policies of the finding by Ernst and Young in its September 2020 report, Impacts of current funding, policy and economic environment on independent pharmacy in England, that three-quarters of independent pharmacies are at risk of closure by 2024.

The data referenced in the Ernst and Young report is not publicly available and we are unable to verify its forecast. On 31 March 2020, latest published data available from the NHS Business Services Authority, there were 11,421 community pharmacies in England. This is 280 fewer pharmacies than on 31 March 2016 but 470 more than on 31 March 2011. Maintaining access to pharmaceutical services is a key priority for the Government and the Department continues to closely monitor the market.

Jo Churchill
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs)
19th Jan 2021
To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, how many people on the Isle of Wight are in each of the top four priority groups for covid-19 vaccination.

NHS England does not hold the information in the format requested.

Nadhim Zahawi
Secretary of State for Education
21st Oct 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, what steps his Department (a) is taking and (b) plans to take to provide greater access to NHS dental care on the Isle of Wight.

Dental practices were required to close for face to face care on 26 March 2020 due to COVID-19. Urgent care continued to be provided by practices, restricted to remote triage, advice, analgesia and antibiotics where appropriate. In April, urgent dental care (UDC) hubs were established in Cowes for patients who were at greater risk or shielding as well as Ryde for all other patients. In July a further UDC hub was established in Bembridge.

Since 8 June, practices have been able to see patients for face-to-face care. The pace of restoration of dental services is limited by public health measures on social distancing and the infection prevention control guidance. All National Health Service dental practices on the Isle of Wight are open and seeing patients who require urgent dental care which cannot be controlled by pain relief or assisted by antibiotics, those who were in a course of treatment that was not completed prior to the lockdown, and those who may be at greater risk of oral disease. Dental clinicians should identify and recall patients according to their clinical and professional judgement.

Jo Churchill
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs)
21st Oct 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, what steps his Department is taking to ensure people do not need to cross the Solent in order to access covid-19 testing.

For residents of the Isle of Wight we have established a regional testing site at Newclose Cricket Ground. The average distance travelled for tests across the country is 5.2miles and for the week 8 October to 14 October the median distance has decreased to 2.9 miles.

Helen Whately
Exchequer Secretary (HM Treasury)
20th Apr 2021
What plans he has to develop a forum for the world's ten leading democracies.

As set out in the Integrated Review, the Prime Minister’s ambition is to work with like-minded democracies to support open societies and work together internationally. We will use our G7 Presidency to intensify this cooperation. The Prime Minister has invited Australia, India, the Republic of Korea, and South Africa to attend the G7 Summit as guest countries to deepen the expertise and experience around the table.

Nigel Adams
Minister of State (Cabinet Office) (Minister without Portfolio)
7th Jun 2021
What steps she is taking with Cabinet colleagues to ensure that British shipyards can compete in procurement processes for UK Border Force vessels.

Earlier this year, the Secretary of State for Defence announced a refresh of the National Shipbuilding Strategy. This will outline the Government’s plans for shipbuilding programmes and how it intends to set the conditions for a globally successful, innovative and sustainable national shipbuilding enterprise.

Naturally, the Home Office and specifically Border Force is fully engaged with the strategy refresh as part of its programme to renew our maritime capabilities.

Chris Philp
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport)
5th Feb 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the effect on the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing relationship of the risks associated with Huawei in the Government's proposed 5G solution.

I refer the hon. Member to the Written Ministerial Statement about the Government's proposed 5G solution, and the risks associated with high risk vendors, which was laid before the House of Lords by my noble. Friend Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport) on 28 January 2020 (HLWS66). This stated that "Nothing in the Review's conclusions affects this country's ability to share highly sensitive intelligence data over highly secure networks, both within the U.K. and with our partners, including the Five Eyes"

Huawei will be excluded from those parts of the 5G and full fibre networks that are critical to national security. Even then the market share will be capped at 35 per cent.

Anne-Marie Trevelyan
Secretary of State for International Trade and President of the Board of Trade
25th Mar 2021
To ask the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, what plans he has to close loopholes in legislation that allow developers to destroy areas classed as Sites of Special Scientific Interest.

The National Planning Policy Framework is clear that development on land within or outside a Site of Special Scientific Interest, and which is likely to have an adverse effect on it should not normally be permitted. The only exception is where the benefits of the development in the location proposed clearly outweigh both its likely impact on the features of the site that make it of special scientific interest, and any broader impacts on the national network of Sites of Special Scientific Interest.

Christopher Pincher
Minister of State (Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities)
10th Nov 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, what assessment he has made of the contribution of the statutory requirement to publicise planning applications in local newspapers to ensuring that there is (a) transparency and (b) democratic engagement in the planning process; and if he will make a statement.

Local planning authorities are required to publicise certain types of planning applications in local newspapers as set out in Article 15 of the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2015.

In response to coronavirus restrictions, temporary regulations have been introduced to supplement the existing statutory publicity arrangements for planning applications.

Local planning authorities now have the flexibility to take other reasonable steps to publicise applications if they cannot discharge the specific requirement for newspaper publicity – for instance, if the local newspaper is not now in circulation. These steps can include the use of social media and other electronic communications, such as local online news portals, and must be proportionate to the scale and nature of the proposed development.

However, if a local planning authority is required to publicise a planning application in a local newspaper, and that paper is still in circulation, then they must continue to do so.

Christopher Pincher
Minister of State (Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities)
18th Sep 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, what plans he has to bring forward legislative proposals to implement reforms on the planning system outlined in the Planning for the Future consultation, updated on 6 August 2020.

The proposals are out for consultation until 29 October 2020. Following consideration of the consultation responses received, the Government will publish a response in due course. The response will set out any decisions and any associated proposed implementation.

Christopher Pincher
Minister of State (Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities)
18th Sep 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, if he will ensure that potential implementation of proposal 4 of the consultation Planning for the Future, updated on 6 August 2020, on a standard method of establishing housing requirement, will be subject to approval by the House.

The proposals are out for consultation until 29 October 2020. Following consideration of the consultation responses received, the Government will publish a response in due course. The response will set out any decisions and any associated proposed implementation.

Christopher Pincher
Minister of State (Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities)
18th Sep 2020
To ask the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, if he will ensure that temporary changes to the standard method for assessing local housing need proposed in the consultation Planning for the Future, updated on 6 August 2020, will be subject to approval by the House.

The proposals are out for consultation until 29 October 2020. Following consideration of the consultation responses received, the Government will publish a response in due course. The response will set out any decisions and any associated proposed implementation.

Christopher Pincher
Minister of State (Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities)