Election Law Reform

Jonathan Lord Excerpts

Monday 11th February 2019 Commons Chamber

[Craig Mackinlay]

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. There is one person in this House who has been liable to prosecution: I have had the full force of that.

As I shall ask a number of times in my speech, is the Electoral Commission fit for purpose? Was the commission’s preferred interpretation of the relevant sections of the 1983 Act, which it used in support of my prosecution and, it seems, for no other obvious purpose, included in the 2015 guidance for candidates and agents? No, it does not appear anywhere. Did it find its way into the revised guidance for the 2017 general election, under which everybody in this House fought for election? No, it does not appear anywhere. Armed with the result of the Supreme Court judgment, to which the Electoral Commission was attached as an interested party, did the commission finally incorporate it into its most recent guidance for the local elections in England in May 2019? Did it incorporate within that guidance the definitive Supreme Court interpretation of sections 90C and 90ZA of the 1983 Act? I think you know the answer, Madam Deputy Speaker, and it is no. Why did the Electoral Commission intervene, at public expense, if it had no intention of advising candidates and agents, on pain of criminal prosecution, as to the proper interpretation of law following the judgment in its favour? Is the Electoral Commission incapable of speaking with itself? I ask once more: is it fit for purpose at all?

A huge grey area has now opened up. What if someone decides, without recourse to the candidate or agent for authorisation, to print and deliver thousands of leaflets saying “Vote for X”? This could cost the individual thousands of pounds, which they decide to pay themselves. Once it is printed and delivered, they inform the candidate and agent about the unwanted help that they have provided and paid for. Unknown to them is the fact that the candidate has no headroom left in their election budget for this kind of spending, which would breach the legal spending limit. The leaflets are clearly for the benefit of the candidate and they have obviously been used. They are notional, as they are free, because the third party has paid for them. The Supreme Court’s new interpretation of section 90C requires that that cost must be recorded, and in the circumstances that would breach the spending limit for the candidate and agent, with all that that might entail.

Candidates and agents need to know the risks they face. Clear warnings should be given in Electoral Commission guidance. Remember that it is candidates and agents who face criminal sanctions if spending limits are breached. Under the Supreme Court’s judgment, they lose control of spending should anyone else decide to offer their support for free, whether it is wanted or not. How can anyone hope to budget for an election campaign under such a system? We all need clarity from the Electoral Commission. It pushed for this interpretation of the law and won at the Supreme Court, so how do we deal with it in practice? At the next election, might people provide free goods and services on behalf of, say, the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), or my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), to the extent that they breach their spending limits? Will we then find them massively embroiled in police investigations and court cases? There are those who may decide to take such action and spend money simply to cause chaos. The Electoral Commission has yet to step up to the plate and explain how the interpretation that it pushed for and won on in the Supreme Court will play out in practice.

I shall dwell only briefly on some of the errors that have put people to threat of financial and criminal sanction, at the doors of the commission and its guidance. The commission offers, in its own words, “bespoke advice” to campaigners and parties. Let me highlight but one recent publicised example. Vote Leave sought that bespoke advice, on offer for free, in respect of activities during the referendum campaign. It seems that Vote Leave acted on that advice and has now been accused of breaking the law—by acting on Electoral Commission advice, which is now considered to be the wrong advice. You could barely make it up.

Battle buses have probably been part of election campaigning since buses were invented. An investigation into the Conservative party concluded with a report published on 16 March 2017 and led to fines. No similar investigation was made into the use of battle buses by any other party or by any third-party campaigners. There appears to be a lack of even-handedness in the activities of the commission across much of what it does and whom it pursues. Its status and reputation are not helped when its current director of regulation has posted anti-Conservative social media messages in the past and has provided witness statements for court use against Conservatives, including me, but against no other political party.

All political parties and candidates use correx boards—we are all familiar with them in this House. They have become the usual stock in trade at all elections. These boards are rugged—we are familiar with their construction—and would last for many years, save for the inevitable criminal damage, I am sorry to say, that characterises many modern election campaigns. Across all of these documents—of 2015, 2017, and 2019—is there one word of advice on how correx boards should be treated and how criminal damage should be reconciled and accounted for? Everyone will be familiar with my answer by now—it is no. There is not one word of advice.

The Electoral Commission offered substantial evidence during my criminal trial. Its view was that correx boards should be written off and recorded in full at the first election that they are used. I can only say, “Really?” Then say so in published guidance. Let us examine what its current perceived position really means. Let us say that successful candidate X wins in a safe seat that is likely to be held for many years. That is common for many in this House. If the boards were to be expensed through the election return at the first outing, at the second outing, there would be nothing to declare because they cannot be counted twice. The new Opposition candidate at the second election would be at an immediate disadvantage on needing to buy expensive correx boards just to keep up, while the sitting MP would have a zero cost to declare, allowing a spending advantage, as budget could be used for additional leaflets or other election promotions. I ask again: is the Electoral Commission fit for purpose? Does it actually understand what it is there to regulate?

Let me give a few examples of the perversity of the law and the situation we now find ourselves in following the Supreme Court judgment. This would certainly apply should we face—heaven forbid—a premature general election. What would be the status of a supporter—or, probably more accurately, a spoiler—deciding to hire an aircraft with a trailing banner of support which is not wanted or assented to by the candidate or agent? The benefit test and the on behalf test under the Supreme Court ruling would have been met, the candidate would probably have seen it and, as such, they would need to account for it as an election cost, potentially exceeding their election budget and placing themselves under threat of prosecution under the criminal code. That would mean a loss of seat, fraud charges, a criminal record, costs and loss of any professional qualifications—potential ruination.

How would senior members of a party possibly tour the country at an election, as is the usual and expected standard practice? This would be deemed, under the benefit test under the Supreme Court, to be in support of the candidate in the particular constituency visited. The Nicola Sturgeon helicopter alone would break the budget of the candidate visited, as would the security and travel costs for the PM or the Leader of the Opposition.

I have saved the most perverse example, which is relevant to this age of digital campaigning, until last. What if a foreign national or hostile foreign Government were to spend on Facebook advertising in support of—or denigration of—a candidate but it is entirely unwanted by that candidate? The benefit and use tests under the Supreme Court ruling would have been met. If the candidate were able to obtain the cost of the advertising from Facebook and find who placed it—in itself a tall order—how many impressions would be relevant? Were the impressions seen by non-voting businesses or by minors, they would not be an election cost, but impressions viewed by those of voting age would. However, the law and Election Commission guidance state that an honest assessment needs to be made. Under the newly interpreted understanding of section 90C of the 1983 Act, an honest assessment would need to be made. Might this pitch the election expenditure over the limit, with all that follows? The double entry of election expenses requires, at all times, the identification of donors. So, madly and perversely, the candidate could find themselves in a double illegality because a second illegal activity would be deemed to have taken place by the recognition and deemed acceptance of an illegal foreign donation.

It is very easy to speak in an Adjournment debate just to have a moan, but tonight I wish to conclude with some solutions—I have a number of them. Might higher local candidate spending limits and lower national party spending limits be the answer, so that any interpretative complications at the margins would at least allow sufficient latitude for the candidate to be on the correct side of the law and spending limits? Legislative change needs to be forthcoming—it is urgent; it is needed almost within days. I have proposed a most simple and elegant solution. It is available to Ministers under a simple statutory instrument, which I recommend be passed with all haste.

Schedule 4A to the 1983 Act lists what are election expenses under part 1 and what are not election expenses under part 2—for instance, if a candidate drives themselves around in their own car. The Secretary of State has wide powers under section 15 of the Act to make orders to add or subtract from parts 1 and 2. A simple addition, in these words, to part 1 would clarify the law and revert matters to what I believe Parliament always obviously intended under the Act. It reads:

“Notwithstanding that a matter might fall to be included within Part 1”—

that is the “what is”—

“of this schedule because of section 90C of this Act”—

the deeming provision that the Supreme Court has now come to—

“it would only be deemed an election expense if section 90ZA(4) also applies.”

It is section 90ZA(4) that requires authorisation by an agent. In easy terms, this would restore, within threeand a half lines, the position that election expenses can only be so if properly authorised by a candidate, agent or somebody properly authorised by them. With this in place, we can start to unload what has been described as the compost heap of election law in due course and replace it in the longer term with legislation that is fit for purpose. But candidates and agents deserve protection right now.

[Mr Jonathan Lord (Woking) (Con)]

I am fortunate to have an excellent agent, Simon Ashall, who is fully trained, but—my hon. Friend has brought this issue out in his excellent and important speech—even he is in a muddle about some aspects of our current electoral law. There were 3,304 candidates at the last general election, and only a few hundred, at most, will have had a professional agent. A really good and experienced agent does not feel that he can be on top of things. My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We need robust and effective electoral law and regulation, but it also needs to be simplified, fair-handed and clear. I thank him for bringing this debate to the House.

[Craig Mackinlay]

I thank my hon. Friend for those robust and powerful words. As he describes, when experienced election agents treat these laws with fear, this is not a position by which any political party will be able to recruit election agents in the future. The barriers should be clear. One should know where the RPA or the PPERA kicks in. But, as my hon. Friend says, how can anybody know what cannot be known? Those are the realms that we are now in.

Candidates and agents deserve protection. There are elections in 80 days’ time and nominations for candidates close in just 51 days. I ask the Minister to act urgently, with that simple proposed statutory instrument of threeand a half lines, to bring clarity to the law and protection for all candidates and agents.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chloe Smith]

Yes, and this brings me neatly to the concluding part of my remarks. This is precisely the piece that we in the House and the Government would seek to consider, which is whether we should change the law to provide such clarity. The argument has been put very well tonight that there is a lack of clarity. That has been exemplified and expanded on, and the question remains about the consideration of that judgment and its implications for the law on notional expenditure for electoral candidates.

It is right that we continue to talk to the political parties to understand the implications for future campaigns and to consider potential solutions. Indeed, the Government proactively put this forward as a topic of discussion at the parliamentary parties panel, which we use to consult on these issues, last December. As I mentioned earlier, I will be meeting representatives from across the parties as soon as tomorrow to discuss their views.

[Mr Lord]

I thank the Minister, on behalf of colleagues, for those assurances. Given the importance of this matter, could she give us some sort of timeline? There are different ways to get this new understanding sorted out and on to the statute book, but whichever way her Department chooses, may we at least have a timeline so that this important matter is sorted out once and for all?

[Chloe Smith]

I would like to be able to do so, but I am not in a position to do so. My hon. Friends in the Whips Office will have heard that request, and they may in turn be able to advise me about what may be manageable in the forthcoming parliamentary business. However, I intend to continue considering the matter carefully, as I hope that I have outlined, because we need a better understanding of a few related complexities. For example, were we to make the change, how would we avoid the possibility of further abuses being committed between categories? Proper consideration needs to be given to such a change and to which power could be used to do that, as I said earlier. I give the House a commitment that I will continue to consider those important aspects with Cabinet Office officials.