Finance (No. 3) Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Jonathan Reynolds and Kirsty Blackman

Tuesday 4th December 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman]

It is not our position that the UK should leave the common VAT area, but we support both Labour amendments, because it is sensible that we have more information about all these provisions, so that the House can take better-informed decisions.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I am extremely grateful for the hon. Lady’s intervention and entirely agree with it.

On the access of financial services to the single market once we leave the EU, under the terms of what the Government have negotiated—that single market access will almost certainly be denied unless the equivalence provisions prove adequate, although most people expect them not to be—the Government’s advice to firms in the UK is to set up subsidiaries in the EU. It was reported to me in meetings yesterday in the City that there is concern that when those subsidiaries are created, the connected UK entities will not be able to enter VAT groups in the UK, which would therefore trigger a substantial tax liability in order for firms to comply with the Government’s own advice on market access to the EU. The Minister may not be able to answer that now, but I want to put it on the record.

I call on all Committee members to support both amendments today so that we can get a clear and full picture of the wider impact of the measures on the future VAT policy approach outside the EU and on closing our own VAT gap here in the UK.

Finance (No. 3) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Jonathan Reynolds and Kirsty Blackman

Tuesday 4th December 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I regret to inform the Committee that we are reaching the end of the section of the Bill relating to capital allowances.

The capital allowances regime clearly requires a holistic review by the Government. We all agree that we want to make the UK a competitive and attractive place for businesses. As we contemplate our departure from the EU, that requirement has never been more pressing. Yet, these measures all come at a cost. The annual investment allowance increase will cost £1.24 billion in its first three years. By 2023-24, the buildings and construction expenditure allowance will cost over half a billion pounds. They need an assessment in the round so we can aggregate these reliefs against the corporation tax reductions and see what the package really looks like, what the economic justification is for these changes, and whether that money should be reprioritised elsewhere.

With the UK becoming such an outlier among other developed countries in relation to corporation tax, with an eventual rate of corporation tax well below the average of OECD countries, we need to ensure that our overall package of measures is properly targeted. That is why Labour is moving new clause 5, which would oblige the Government to present an analysis in a year’s time of the full effect of these changes and the corporation tax alterations. We need to understand what this package looks like in the round, whether it is providing value for money, and what the real cost is to the taxpayer in aggregate. Only then can we make a judgment on whether this is the right and appropriate way to spend the money, when the UK has so many other priorities after eight difficult years of austerity.

That is why I urge Members to vote for new clause 5, which would obligate the Government to publish a review in a year’s time. By then, we will be in a position to see how these allowances have been taken up, as well as to make some initial judgments on Britain’s business investment landscape post our exit from the European Union.

Clause 34 will amend the Capital Allowances Act 2001 to clarify that land alterations qualify for capital allowances where plant or machinery is installed that qualifies for the same allowances. It helps to clarify the qualifications in place for businesses that seek to carry out such work. The Opposition have no particular objection to ending the mismatch, but this is another tidying-up measure. Will the Minister provide some insight on whether any further such measures are to come? How was the inconsistency brought to the Government’s attention? Is there any estimate of the cost associated with this measure? There should be greater transparency and understanding of exactly where such a measure has come from. If there has been pressure from a particular sector, that needs to be clear. Opposition amendment 79 calls for the Government to present to the House a report on any consultation undertaken on these provisions. I call on Members to vote for this amendment to provide proper transparency on process to the House, so that the cost and benefit can be properly scrutinised and we can assess the motivations for bringing about this change.

[Kirsty Blackman]

It is a pleasure to speak in this Committee and to serve under your chairpersonship, Ms Dorries. I want to focus my comments on new clause 2, but if the Labour party presses amendment 79 or new clause 5 to a vote, we will support it. What we are trying to do in new clause 2 is not dissimilar from what Labour is trying to do in new clause 5—we are just going about it in slightly different ways. Putting the two new clauses together would make a lot of sense, to encompass what we are both trying to achieve.

New clause 2 looks at clauses 29 to 34 and schedule 12 to the Bill and provides for a review of the changes to capital allowances. It asks for a number of reviews and for us to measure against a number of outcomes that we hope the Government will seek through any changes they make to capital allowances or through having a capital allowances system in the first place.

The first review is of business investment. What changes do the Government expect for business investment as a result of all the changes made to capital allowances? Any tax system tries to do three things: disincentivise undesirable behaviour, incentivise desirable behaviour and get money for the Exchequer. It is important to consider whether the legislation does any of those things in the way we would hope. Business investment is key; surely, the point of capital allowances is to incentivise good business investment. Therefore, it is reasonable that the Government come back and explain to us the potential changes they expect to business investment resulting from their legislative changes.

The second review is of employment. That is important; the Government are never off their high horse about the level of employment they say we have. If they hope the changes will make a difference to employment levels, they should tell us how much change they expect so that we can measure their performance against whether that has been achieved. We just heard that the previous tax allowances put in place for first-year allowances did not have the desired effect, and the Government have to change them. Therefore, it would be useful to know what the Government expect to happen to the number of employed people as a result of their changes. We can measure the Government against that and say whether the measure has failed or has achieved what they intended to achieve.

Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Jonathan Reynolds and Kirsty Blackman

Thursday 1st February 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman]

I will speak to amendments 120 and 97 and skim over consequential amendments 98 and 99. I will also mention Labour amendments 87 and 88.

Amendment 120 is an old discussion that we had with the Minister earlier in the debate. We ask for the second “appropriate” to be left out and replaced with “necessary”. That would mean that the powers to make the provision in relation to VAT or customs or excise duties would be made as the appropriate Minister considered necessary in consequence of, or otherwise in connection with, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU.

We have had the discussion before about whether it is best to have “appropriate” or “necessary” in these sections, but it would be sensible for Ministers to make a regulation that they thought was necessary rather than appropriate. The former is a stronger word—the Law Society of Scotland believes that it is a stronger word and has a more appropriate legal definition in this regard. It would be good if the Minister would consider making the change we are asking for in amendment 120.

On the first part of clause 51, I have heard concerns about some of the stuff that has not been written into UK law either through this Bill or possibly the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. The shipwork end-use relief from customs duty is in EU law—it is a relief that people who bring things in for use offshore have from customs duty. It is written into EU law, but I have not been able to find in this Bill where it is written into UK law —perhaps it is in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. The offshore industry rely on it heavily and it would make a big difference, specifically on charges.

The shipwork end-use relief is relied on only for imports coming from third countries, but given that imports from the EU would now be potentially subject to customs duty, if the Government do not manage to get a deal to be in a customs union, it will become more applicable and will apply to many more products and goods coming through. It will be necessary to write that into UK law at some point, and I would very much appreciate a commitment from the Minister on that. A lot of companies that transport goods offshore, which particularly affects my constituency, would appreciate knowing the direction of travel in relation to this relief.

Amendment 97—the Scottish National party amendment that would apply a sunset clause to clause 51—serves a dual purpose. It submits that there should be a sunset clause and makes the case that regulations may not be made under the clause after 29 March 2021, but it would also change the procedures for the making of regulations, asking that they are made using the draft affirmative procedure. As we have discussed at some length, the draft affirmative procedure would be better than either the negative procedure or the made affirmative procedure. It would mean that no changes are made before Parliament has the opportunity to scrutinise them because they would be laid in draft rather than created and then consulted on with Members. That is why we are asking for both of those changes.

Although this is my first chance to talk about sunset clauses, we have had a fairly lengthy debate on them and they have been covered by various Members. Labour Front Benchers asked earlier why sunset clauses should be applicable to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill but not this Bill. Even though they are separate pieces of legislation, I actually believe that, in this Bill, it is reasonable for Ministers to have one process relating to the setting up of a customs or an excise regime, and for that process to be different ever after. That is why a sunset clause would be a good change in that regard.

If future Governments are to make such changes, they should be subject to more parliamentary scrutiny. I have said to the Minister previously but remind him that the Conservative party will not be in government forever—I hope not—and in that case they will be sitting in opposition, unable appropriately or extensively to scrutinise the measures. That is a major concern given that the delegated powers in the Bill allow for the Government to make radical changes without the need for much in the way of parliamentary scrutiny.

I am sure the Government do not intend to give a future Labour Government a free rein drastically to alter the customs regime, but unfortunately the way the Bill is written would give them that right. I get the impression that I would be more likely to favour the Labour party’s customs regime than the Conservative party’s, but none the less no Executive should have the power to do all those things by using such things as the negative procedure. The made affirmative procedure is not even strong enough in some cases.

Labour amendments 87 and 88 are grouped with other amendments on sunset clauses. If they put the amendments to the vote, I will support them, because I believe a sunset clause is appropriate for the provisions made in clause 51.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I wish to speak for what I will believe will be the final time in Committee. [Hon. Members: “Oh.”] There is always Report stage; we know the procedure here. I will speak to amendments 87 and 88, which relate to clauses 51 and 52. The explanatory statement for amendment 87 reads:

“This amendment limits the duration of the delegated power under Clause 51 to the period ending two years after the United Kingdom leaves the European Union.”

Amendment 88 would apply the same limits to the powers entitled under clause 52.

These are obviously a fairly similar set of arguments to those we have just heard relating to clause 45, but I think we have clearly established that there are strong reservations about the use of delegated powers under the Bill and its democratic implications. The famous House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee said specifically in its report that clause 51, which relates to VAT or duties of customs or excise, is such that a sunset clause would be possible and welcome. As the Lords report said, clause 51 contains a very wide power that, in the words of the Treasury itself

“is necessary to ensure that the Treasury and Secretary of State have the ability to deal with the consequences of withdrawal from the EU and to maintain fully functioning and legally operable customs, VAT and excise regimes in a range of scenarios”.

It is about withdrawal from the EU, yet the powers would give considerable scope to the Executive to shape the regime for many years, perhaps decades, into the future. That is surely why a recommendation for a sunset clause relating to clause 51 is appropriate.

Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Jonathan Reynolds and Kirsty Blackman

Tuesday 30th January 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Graham Stuart]

Three groups of amendments need a response. I will start with amendments 45 and 54, which seek to impose a two-week time limit on the Secretary of State’s decision to accept or reject the TRA recommendation. I will then turn to amendment 47, which seeks to create a presumption of five years as the normal, rather than the maximum, duration of definitive measures. Finally, I will address amendments 48 and 53, which seek to ensure that the duration of definitive measures is not affected by the length of any provisional measures that might have been applied against the same imports.

On amendments 45 and 54, on receipt of the TRA recommendation, it is the responsibility of the Secretary of State to respond in a timely manner, while ensuring that the public interest aspect of their role is given due weight. We fully recognise that a swift response is crucial to UK industry, as the hon. Gentleman said, so that the injury being caused by unfair trade practices can be halted. However, in some cases there will inevitably be difficult matters that the Secretary of State will need to reflect on. Although we expect that such matters will be rare, it is important that he has full opportunity thoroughly to consider the issues in making his decision. That might lengthen the process, but it is important to do the job well rather than quickly. To place an arbitrary two–week time limit on the Secretary of State is, therefore, not appropriate. Even though that duration might be sufficient in most cases, the legislation must provide flexibility for cases in which complex considerations must be made in the public interest.

As the hon. Gentleman is aware, once the investigation has been concluded and measures have been proposed by the TRA, the pressure on the Secretary of State quickly to come forward with the adoption of the measures to protect British industry will be great. I perhaps lack the hon. Gentleman’s imagination, but I find it hard to imagine a situation in which the pressure on the Secretary of State to get on with it would not be much greater than a pressure to delay and put it into the long grass, as the hon. Gentleman said. I think we can be confident that any Secretary of State under any Government would wish to make the decision as quickly as reasonably possible.

For those reasons, I do not agree with an arbitrary two-week limit. I understand why the hon. Gentleman has tabled the amendment and I hope it is a probing one. I understand what lies behind it, but I hope I have reassured him.

On amendment 47, it is important to note that the WTO agreements set out that measures may remain in force for up to five years. They do not provide that five years is the default. In fact, they specifically set out that measures should remain in force only for as long as, and to the extent, necessary to counteract the dumping or subsidisation that is causing injury. The TRA analysis may suggest that a period shorter than five years will be sufficient to counteract injury, and in such cases the TRA should set an appropriate duration accordingly.

On request, the TRA will initiate an expiry review before the termination of any measures, provided that UK industry can demonstrate that injury would continue or recur if the measures were to expire. If the review finds that continued application of measures is required to maintain sufficient protection for UK industry, the measures will be continued. I assure the hon. Gentleman that industry is adequately protected without the need for the amendment and I ask him to consider withdrawing it.

Finally, on amendments 48 and 53, I understand the hon. Gentleman’s concerns, but I have to reassure him that that which he fears is not the intention of the provisions. The WTO agreements allow in certain circumstances for trade remedies to be applied from a date prior to the date of the application of definitive measures. The purpose of the provisions is to allow us to reflect that in secondary legislation, not to shorten the duration of definitive measures. We are not seeking to shorten the duration of definitive measures, but are seeking to allow trade remedies to be applied from a date prior to the date of those measures.

The unintended consequence of the Opposition amendments would be to prevent the TRA from collecting duties for a period before the date of the section 13 notice, even though this is permissible under the WTO agreements in limited circumstances. I entirely understand why the hon. Gentleman tabled the amendment and what he was seeking to probe. I hope my explanation has been sufficient to make him see that that which he desires will not be delivered by the amendments.

We believe that this is a necessary provision. We have been clear that we want to incorporate all of the protections permitted under WTO rules into the UK’s trade remedies framework. Removing the ability to do that could be detrimental to the protections available to UK industry. It is on that basis that I ask him to consider withdrawing the amendment.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I express the Scottish National party’s support for the Opposition amendments. It is sensible that we are asking the Secretary of State to make a decision within a relatively short time period because, as has been stated, we do not want that to be dragged out for any significant length of time. It is reasonable that, after a significant investigation has taken place—and the TRA’s investigations will be significant—the Minister will quickly review the evidence presented and make a decision in the shortest possible time.

On amendment 47 and the five-year period, I have the Department for International Trade call for evidence on the current EU trade remedy measures. I can see possibly one that is in place for less than five years. In fact, many have been place for over a decade because they have been renewed. It is very unusual in that document, which lists all the trade remedy measures currently in place, for any of them to have a review date of less than five years. It is completely reasonable that the Opposition are asking for the starting period default to be five years, and for the TRA to decide on a lesser period in compelling circumstances. Given the number of these measures that have been extended and how few of them have fallen at the five year period, I suggest that five years is likely to be a reasonably short period for trade remedies to be in place, and that it is sensible for them to extended as a result.

We are talking about the trade remedies body doing substantive investigations and coming up with a huge amount of evidence. Asking it to do so on more than a five-yearly basis would probably be adding to their workload unnecessarily. The Opposition’s suggestion is incredibly sensible in that regard. The presumption should be five years, and the TRA should make decisions for it to be less if it believes that that would be appropriate.

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I appreciate the Minister’s response but it is our intention to move these amendments to the vote.

In respect of amendment 45, the Minister has already talked about the political pressure that has almost certainly been brought in the event of the TRA making a determination. However, it is also true that there are many examples we could go through of Governments resisting such political pressure. We should bear in mind that, in our discussions earlier, the Government effectively brought back a new constitutional procedure in order to stress the need for speed of announcements. Therefore, it does not seem consistent this afternoon to say that there is very little flexibility offered by the need for speedy resolution of cases.

Amendment 47 offers flexibility where five years would not be appropriate, but as the hon. Member for Aberdeen North just said, given the standard length of time these measures tend to be in place, this is—as industry has told us—a fairly modest measure, making it consistent with industry practice. We will press the amendment to a vote, Mrs Main.

Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Jonathan Reynolds and Kirsty Blackman

Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 30th January 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Jonathan Reynolds]

Good morning, Ms Buck. It is a pleasure to begin the second week of our Committee’s consideration of the Bill.

The amendments, like many that the Opposition have tabled, concern the democratic deficit in the Bill. As we have covered in numerous evidence sessions and in our discussions so far, the Bill is far too reliant on secondary legislation. The scrutiny of Delegated Legislation Committees—especially those that consider instruments laid according to the negative procedure, as the majority will be—is insufficient for taxation matters of such potential magnitude. Parliament will have the option to raise objections to the instruments, but they will not be debated on the Floor of the House as a matter of course.

The amendments are important because the Bill introduces an even more troubling concept: that of making law by public notice. After Second Reading earlier this month, the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee published a report that probed the most worrying aspects in detail. The report emphasises that the concept of public notice, on which the Bill is heavily reliant, is effectively a modern form of rule by proclamation that removes the opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny. It states:

“For Ministers and others to make law by ‘public notice’, without any recourse to Parliament, is highly unusual and such provisions should attract strict surveillance by Parliament.”

It also notes that

“the Treasury’s Delegated Powers Memorandum says that such notices will only make provision that is purely technical or administrative in nature. Nonetheless, clause 32(9) of the Bill allows anything that can be done under public notice to be done by regulations, implicitly acknowledging the importance of things done by public notice.”

It identifies the Bill as a throwback to the Statute of Proclamations 1539, which

“gave proclamations the force of statute law…it was repealed in 1547 after the death of Henry VIII”.

We should all be grateful for the institutional memory of the House of Lords.

Equally problematic are the mechanics by which public notice takes place. As the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee emphasises, under clause 37(5) the only qualification for public notice is that the person who issues it has selected a channel that they consider appropriate, but a definition of “appropriate” is absent from the Bill. Public notice could therefore mean anything from a full-page advert in the Financial Times to a small ad in a trade journal or perhaps even a tweet. Clause 24 permits Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to establish a system for making rulings to determine the customs code and the place of origin of particular goods, both of which have an impact on the duty. Other rulings could affect the rights and liabilities of an individual.

The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommends

“the creation of a generally applicable system for making determinations which are capable of affecting an individual’s legal position should ordinarily be dealt with by legislation, subject to scrutiny by Parliament, rather than by public notice without any such scrutiny”—

checks and balances. The Opposition agree wholeheartedly —hence our amendments.

The Government’s manoeuvres are deeply concerning. We would be failing in our duty of scrutiny if we did not step in to raise our anxieties about how powers of proclamation may be used. We are well aware of the volume of new legislation that needs to be produced to create and implement a new customs code, and of the temptation to create or take advantage of constitutional shortcuts to facilitate the process. However, protecting the rights of the individual must come first. Where matters of taxation are concerned, the parliamentary process is usually more rigorous with respect to the reasons for setting the duty.

As I have already said, the secondary legislation process is not optimal, and we believe that the balance between primary and secondary legislation in the Bill is unsound. However, using delegated legislation for these matters instead of creating regulations by public notice would surely be the least-worst option. It would allow for a bare minimum of parliamentary involvement and oversight of new tax and customs law. Even the negative procedure gives Parliament the option to reject a statutory instrument, although no formal debate takes place. Where possible, more significant matters should surely be considered via the affirmative procedure, so that at least there would be the basis for debate.

The Opposition believe that, without such debate, we will be at risk of setting a dangerous precedent that allows the ruling Executive to make regulation by public notice as it pleases, potentially even beyond the scope of the Bill. Therefore I call upon all members of the Committee to support the amendment, to ensure that we can continue to perform our vital role providing checks and balances in the structure of taxation and customs law in the UK.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

Thank you for the opportunity to speak and for chairing the meeting, Ms Buck. I would like to speak briefly around the amendments. One of my earliest questions about the Bill was: what is a public notice and how does one justify that it has been made sufficiently public? The Opposition raised that case clearly. On the definition of public notice and the fact that the person making the public notice has to make that judgment call, particularly in relation to clause 13, which concerns the dumping of goods, foreign subsidies and increases in imports, and given that the UK has not had provision to make regulations and rules, it seems sensible to say that a public notice is not the best way. Parliament should have some say. We have raised concerns previously that, although Brexit is apparently about taking back control, it appears that control is being taken back to the Executive rather than to Parliament as a whole. I will therefore support amendments 137 to 139 if they are pushed to a vote.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for International Trade (Graham Stuart)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Ms Buck, and to welcome back the hon. Member for Stalybridge and Hyde. This group of amendments would require trade remedies measures to be imposed and given legal effect by regulations. I appreciate the concerns in relation to the use of public notices, which were raised by both Her Majesty’s Opposition and the Scottish nationalist party representative. I am grateful for the opportunity to set out why this is an entirely appropriate procedure for imposing trade remedies measures.

If you were cynical, Ms Buck, you might think that, because the Opposition have decided to make parliamentary scrutiny the central theme of their critique of the Bill, they are leveraging that into every single argument at every single stage. I am not a cynic, and take the concerns at face value, as the genuine ones that I am sure they are.

The imperative is to act quickly once the Trade Remedies Authority has identified the need to tackle injury to UK industry. I would have hoped that Members on both sides of the Committee would recognise that the imperative is to act quickly when injury to UK producers has been identified, and to move as swiftly as possible to put that right. Measures will be calculated and recommended by a fully expert and independent body, following an extensive investigation that is governed by strict World Trade Organisation rules. Our priority has to be to ensure that those recommended measures are imposed quickly, to provide relief to industries suffering injury.

The additional proposed process would delay our ability to apply measures precisely at a time when UK industry is suffering injury, and when it has been independently established that that is so. It would run counter to the calls we have heard from industry for a swift process. The use of public notices to implement trade remedies measures is consistent with the approach taken in comparable WTO countries such as New Zealand and Australia, and is therefore in line with international good practice.

Therefore I say to the hon. Member for Stalybridge and Hyde that, to suggest that this use of public notice is untoward and could lead to further government by proclamation, even outwith the Bill, is disproportionate. The reality is that this set of amendments, as with so many put forward by the Opposition, would in fact undermine the very principles that they say they are interested in: namely, to protect UK industry to ensure that we have a proportionate and speedy response to unfair dumping or use of subsidy and make sure that injury to British industry is put right. It is a shame that, collectively, the Opposition’s amendments suggest that their priorities are somewhere else.

Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Jonathan Reynolds and Kirsty Blackman

Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 25th January 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Jonathan Reynolds]

Okay. I will take your advice on that, Ms Buck.

Over the course of the Committee’s remaining days, given the amendments we are due to consider, I believe there will be a fuller debate about the issues I have mentioned. However, as things stand, we appear to be shackled to this process and it is therefore vital to enshrine a right of consultation for manufacturers to guarantee the future of UK industry and the 2.7 million jobs bound up within it. No one wants to see a Brexit underpinned by a race to the bottom, leaving the UK susceptible to a repeat of the events that punished Tata Steel in 2016. We cannot risk these being repeated in the rest of the UK manufacturing sector. Parliament must work with and listen to those on the front line, consider their input and let them guide us on what we need to succeed as a global economy in a post-Brexit world, drawing on existing best practice from around the world.

I call on the Committee to support the Opposition’s amendment, to enshrine the right to consultation, to protect British jobs and British manufacturing, and to guarantee that our post-Brexit economy does not leave British industry out in the cold.

[Kirsty Blackman]

This aspect of the clause is about

“considering the rate of import duty that ought to apply to any goods”,

and we have tabled amendments. The Government have chosen not to include in this provision a reference to “any other factor” or even the preferable “any other relevant factor”, but have laid down a number of factors that they are believe are relevant in this case. Both the Scottish National party and the official Opposition, with amendments 1, 78 and 106, are trying to increase the number of factors that will be considered when the rate of import duty that ought to apply is being considered. The clause already includes

“the interests of consumers…the desirability of maintaining and promoting…external trade…the desirability of maintaining and promoting productivity…and…the extent to which the goods concerned are subject to competition.”

On amendment 1, I associate myself with many of the shadow Minister’s remarks about the importance of manufacturing. It has been concerning that the Government have not taken into account the interests of manufacturing in many of the actions that they have taken. Therefore, it would be useful for the House to have the comfort that the Government would have to consider the importance of manufacturing when they were making these decisions.

The Scottish Government are in a much better place in that, in relation to steel and Tata Steel specifically, we have saved the Lanarkshire plants, and we have worked with BiFab. If the UK Government had previously taken actions like that, we would be in the much better position of feeling that they would be likely to protect the interests of manufacturing. We are therefore happy to associate ourselves with the Labour amendment.

Amendment 78 has been suggested by Traidcraft. I will talk about exactly why Traidcraft says that it is important. The UK has signed up to the sustainable development goals. They are incredibly important for the future of the world—for our children and our children’s children—in ensuring that there is sustainable development. Traidcraft says:

“It is therefore vital that consideration of sustainable development is contained in primary legislation to avoid the potential for the UK to inadvertently contravene its global commitments…If sustainable development were added to this list it would ensure the Government were able to fulfil its global commitments.”

That is a strong message from Traidcraft about this aspect of the clause. Because, as I said, the Minister has not included in it “any other relevant factor”, we want to be clear that the Government are protecting the interests of manufacturers, but also the interests of the future of the planet.

Amendment 106 is in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and West Fife. Again, the factors that the Minister is required to consider when setting the rate of import duty are not wide enough. We suggest including a reference to the public interest generally, so that the Minister and the Treasury, in making these decisions, would be required to look at whether the public interest generally would be served by the rate of import duty that they were imposing.

All three proposals are relevant considerations for the long-term future of manufacturing which, given the not-very-good productivity in the UK, is hugely necessary and something that we need to protect. I do not know how anybody could argue with looking at sustainable development, given that the future of our planet is at stake. On the point about the public interest in general, we are all here to represent our constituents—we are here to ensure that their views are heard in this place—so it is completely reasonable that the Minister and the Treasury, in making any rules under this aspect of the clause, would consider the public interest generally, as well as the other four factors already mentioned.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jonathan Reynolds]

I will endeavour to take a little less time on amendment 2, Ms Buck. My enthusiasm and enjoyment of a Bill Committee perhaps gets the better of me at times.

The amendment would require the Treasury to have regard to the recommendations of any relevant Select Committee or those contained in a resolution of the House of Commons in considering the rate of import duty. This goes to the heart of how the Bill is constructed and how we will seek to scrutinise it. For reasons we have already covered, the Bill is very much an outline framework Bill, the details of which must be added at a later date. That relates to the way in which the negotiations have progressed. We must think about how to ensure that there is no democratic deficit in how the detail of the Bill is filled in, and that the core objective of Brexit—greater democratic control for the House of Commons—is achieved.

The Opposition recognise the need for the Government to make the necessary preparations to create the UK’s customs and tariff regimes post-Brexit, but we do not accept that that means allowing the Government to concentrate all those powers in the Executive. It is the Opposition’s view that, in this instance, the Conservative interpretation of taking back control has simply meant moving it from Brussels to Whitehall. That is true not just of this Bill but of many parts of the Brexit legislation. In our view, tariffs should undergo the same parliamentary process as taxation, with similar levels of parliamentary scrutiny.

In the evidence sessions on Tuesday, we heard about the sheer diversity of areas that could be affected and that will need input into the detail of the Bill. We believe that Select Committees could play a crucial parliamentary role in providing some of that detail. If the Select Committees were allowed to engage with a wide range of stakeholders to contribute to the Government’s evidence base, we believe that it would widen the debate. It would also provide for a critical role in holding the Government to account. Select Committees’ ability to compel witnesses to appear to give evidence would allow them to interrogate Ministers about the consequences of some of the details of the secondary legislation and process as it unfolds, which could be invaluable. It could also help build political consensus by identifying common ground between different groups of politicians, which is especially important given how divisive Brexit has been thus far.

Lastly, Select Committees could engage with the media and public, which would be a key contribution to the transparency of the process, accountability and scrutiny. Where there is potential in the Bill for trade decisions to be made seemingly unilaterally by the Secretary of State, having public and transparent debates through parliamentary Select Committees could be critical. I therefore urge the Committee to vote in favour of the amendment, which would be a significant step towards ensuring that we make every effort to handle this once-in-a-generation event with the parliamentary scrutiny, accountability and checks and balances that it demands.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have previously complained about the composition of Public Bill Committees, given the UK Government’s gerrymandering so that they can have a majority in Bill Committees despite not having a majority in the House. The change would mean that scrutiny would be done effectively, and not just by Committees with a majority of Government representatives who will win every vote by 10 to nine. The amendment is incredibly important and would ensure effective and appropriate scrutiny, and make for better legislation.

Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Jonathan Reynolds and Kirsty Blackman

Tuesday 23rd January 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Jonathan Reynolds]

Q One of the Opposition’s general concerns about a lot of the Brexit-related legislation is about the level of clarity. A lot of the concerns relate to the powers that will then go to the Executive and the future policy consequences of that. In your assessment, do you think that this Bill provides the right level of legislative scrutiny and safeguards as to what the policy intentions will be?

Sue Davies: I want to say at the start that from the perspective of Which? we focus on making sure that we get the best outcome for consumers from Brexit. We took a neutral position on the referendum, and that also applies to trade policy. Our interest in the Bill lies in making sure that it is as explicit as possible, within that, on how consumer interests will be taken into account.

In relation to what is in the Bill and what is dealt with by subsequent legislation, we want to make sure that any changes are limited to technical matters, and that anything with wider policy significance—particularly given the sensitivities of trade issues to some extent—is dealt with openly, so that we can see and weigh up its pros and cons. We feel that some aspects of the Bill need to be strengthened to make the consumer interest more explicit. There is recognition in the Bill, for example, of the need to take into account consumer interest when setting import duties. We also strongly support the inclusion of what is called the economic test in relation to trade remedies, because we want to make sure that we have a thorough understanding before we potentially raise consumer prices in order to support particular industries. There are aspects of the Bill that we think are important, but we also think that there could be greater clarity to make sure we see how the consumer impact will be assessed.

Helen Dennis: On the delegated powers issue: across the board we do have some concerns, more so with the Trade Bill and the process for agreeing future trade deals than are necessarily within this legislation. Here, we do have a lot of delegated powers around setting tariffs, establishing rules of origin. We are thinking about it from the perspective of developing countries, where in some instances there is a high dependency on the UK market and where there are products with tight margins, so changes to tariffs could make or break the livelihoods of producers. If you were to ask for a vote on every single tariff change, that would not be workable, so this is about finding the right balance in terms of moving forward.

It is a question to throw back to parliamentarians: to consider the role that parliamentarians feel they should have around parliamentary scrutiny, consideration of different tariff changes and rules of origin—the things we were discussing earlier. The Government have set out quite an ambitious vision about trade for development, for example in their trade White Paper, in which they want to use trade policies to improve access for developing countries. At the moment, however, we do not see those improvements in this legislation, because the focus is on continuity and maintaining the status quo for now, but we do not want to lose sight of future improvements and future discussions. I would say that actually, as things stand at the moment, there should probably be a process whereby Members of Parliament can call things in or request further scrutiny, but that is part of the wider discussion about trade policy going forward, including how the Houses want to be involved in that and how public consultation is built into it. It is something that needs to be thought about in tandem with the ongoing discussions about the Trade Bill, as well.

Jeremy White: I have a problem with the structure of the Bill, the consequence of which is that parliamentary scrutiny will be excessively difficult. I can illustrate that with this visual aid that I have brought in, which is a handbook that I edit. This is the regulatory framework for customs duties in the Union—the Union Customs Code—and its guidance. The UCC and its implementing provisions are about this wide, very finely typed—about 1,300 pages. The rest—this part here—is the necessary European and national guidance on the matter.

Therefore, when we think about the implementing provisions, of which we have maybe 15 or 20 pages of detail in the Bill, which are meant to be implemented by this, we know that the statutory instruments are going to be an enormous burden. The problem is that the Bill is overly ambitious. It fails to distinguish between those provisions that I will call just charges and the machinery—the regulatory framework. This book does not concern the charges, the tariff schedules, the trade instruments or the preferential agreements. They are in another book, of about the same size. I am not concerned about those, and the Bill would deal with them.

The trouble is that it brings into force the repeal of the UCC, in effect, on exit day. That being so—it is hard-wired into the Bill—its commencement provision requires there to be statutory instruments of this magnitude on exit day. The problem is that since the destruction of the Bill is a recast, they will be recast into other, English language. Such an approach might be appropriate for a no-deal arrangement with the EU, but it creates burdens of cost and risk in respect of any trading activity that follows afterwards, particularly if we have any transition period at all or are subject to obligations under the leaving treaty—I will call it the leaving treaty, but whatever it is—to preserve the regulatory framework of the UCC.

To be realistic, we cannot expect the EU to be in favour of or agree to any kind of regulatory framework that is different from the UCC. The UCC is what they have budgeted for. At the moment, it is in an implementation phase; we will probably come to that in other questions, and the problems of the timetable for its implementation now that, yesterday, the Commission has endorsed a report following the revised road map for the implementation of the UCC, which I could cover later.

The primary point then is that if we have a complete recast on exit day, anybody who is involved in trade, particularly if we have obligations to retain the same effects as the UCC, will have to be looking at both the UCC and the English implementation at the same time for every single piece of endeavour—almost every importation. As I said, the scrutiny will not just be on the basis of whether the legislation achieves its objective with respect to any changes from the UCC; it will also have to look at it on the basis of whether it preserves the effect of the UCC that was intended. That is an enormous burden, and I would say that it makes parliamentary scrutiny unnecessarily and excessively difficult.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q The Chartered Institute of Taxation submission is particularly damning; it is quite difficult to pick out a particular issue to ask you about because it has so much about how unclear this legislation is and how many unintended consequences it might have. In terms of the members that you have, the organisations that you work with, making decisions now for what will happen in 15 months’ time, are organisations making decisions now that will have a negative impact because of the process that we are undergoing, and is there a way that this process could be made better in order, for example, to safeguard supply chains in the UK rather than moving them to Europe?

Jeremy White: That is an important point. The CIOT’s report brings out some evidence of some members having already amended their supply chains in order to cope with arrangements, because of the uncertainty. Uncertainty is a burden that trade faces at the moment, and it has to make decisions about it, so you are right. The CIOT has noticed that clients—enterprises that are members—are changing their supply chains because of the uncertainty, so anything that the Bill can do to reduce uncertainty would be good. For example, if the Bill can, by its commencement provisions, instead allow the withdrawal Bill to operate—therefore the UCC is automatically incorporated—and then exercise the powers to modify that application, that will reduce a lot of uncertainty and there will be no need to read this book—the UCC—and the English version. This book has to be read anyway, and this, and there will be a very small amount of variation where we want to improve on the UCC for the United Kingdom.

This is about uncertainty and cost, and what enterprises want to do. Everything can be resolved by law and by allocating resources to the issues, but that just increases cost, besides the parliamentary scrutiny being a burden for Parliament and for those who want to assist it—charities such as the CIOT and so on. Businesses themselves will see this as an issue of cost that it is unnecessary for them to incur.