All 4 Julian Lewis contributions to the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021

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Mon 5th Oct 2020
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill
Commons Chamber

2nd reading & 2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & 2nd reading
Thu 15th Oct 2020
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill
Commons Chamber

Committee stage:Committee: 1st sitting & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons & Report stage & Report stage: House of Commons & Committee stage & Report stage & 3rd reading
Wed 27th Jan 2021
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill
Commons Chamber

Consideration of Lords amendments & Consideration of Lords amendmentsPing Pong & Ping Pong & Ping Pong: House of Commons
Wed 24th Feb 2021
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill
Commons Chamber

Consideration of Lords amendmentsPing Pong & Consideration of Lords amendments

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill Debate

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Department: Home Office

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Julian Lewis Excerpts
2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 5th October 2020

(3 years, 5 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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James Brokenshire Portrait James Brokenshire
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If the hon. Lady will allow me, I will make some further progress, but I will allow her to intervene on me later.

In order to build the credibility and trust of those under investigations, there are occasions where, in carefully managed circumstances and subject to robust independent safeguards, CHIS may need to participate in criminality themselves. This is an inescapable and essential feature of CHIS use and has always been fundamental to this work. Although I am unable to go into the detail about the specific criminality that a CHIS may participate in, for reasons I will come to, limited examples have been discussed in the public domain. For example, a CHIS may be required to join the organisation that they are seeking to disrupt. This membership alone will sometimes be criminal but will be deemed necessary and proportionate to prevent more serious criminality from taking place. Again, without going into the specifics, the use of that tactic enabled the police and MI5 to disrupt a planned terrorist attack on No. 10 and the then Prime Minister in 2017. The necessity of CHIS participation in criminal conduct has been accepted in the UK and around the world for many years. In December 2019, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that MI5 has a lawful basis for this activity and recognised that CHIS participation formed an essential part of MI5’s core activities. I want to reassure the House that this Bill does not confer the power to carry out a new activity, but enables CHIS to continue to deploy the methods that they already use. Notwithstanding those powers, this Bill puts that existing practice onto a clearer statutory footing, putting the matter beyond doubt as to Parliament’s intentions. The Bill provides certainty for CHIS and their handlers and will augment our ability to recruit and retain in the future in this regard. It is important to stress that the Bill does not change the position of CHIS who have previously been properly authorised to participate in criminal activity. It has no retrospective effect.

Julian Lewis Portrait Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Ind)
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Can the Minister explain one difference between the situation that has applied in the past and the situation that will apply in the future if the Bill goes through as it is? We are now legislating to make properly authorised criminal conduct lawful, rather than continuing with the current position whereby MI5 or another authorising authority is able to argue that it would not be in the public interest for prosecuting authorities to prosecute properly authorised criminal conduct, but there is no guarantee of immunity. What we are now saying is that they are not breaking the law, rather than, as in the past, that they were breaking the law, but that it was against the public interest to prosecute. Why the reason for that change?

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Julian Lewis Portrait Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Ind)
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Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I shall endeavour to set a good example.

Both Front Benchers have begun this debate in a solemn, sober and thoroughly non-partisan way. That is greatly to be welcomed. The Opposition Front Bench spokesman, the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds), referred briefly to the oversight role of the Intelligence and Security Committee. I can give advance warning, as it were, that other members of the Committee will be referring—in particular, I believe, my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard)—to at least one amendment the ISC will probably put forward, relating to accountability and oversight by the ISC, at a later stage in these proceedings.

The work of the United Kingdom’s domestic and overseas intelligence agencies would be considerably less complicated and decidedly less dangerous if we could rely solely on the technical triumphs which achieved so much in Room 40 in the first world war, and via the Ultra organisation in the second. Sadly, that has never been the case and, as long as spying has existed, spies in human form have proven indispensable. Covert agents operate under extremely hazardous conditions inside hostile organisations, or cells of organisations, where discovery of their true identity and purpose could prove fatal. The explanatory notes accompanying the Bill describe the use of covert human intelligence sources as

“a key tactic in protecting national security and investigating serious crime”,

and the operation of such agents as

“a core part of security, intelligence and policing work”.

It is hard to disagree with that evaluation. If it were known that CHIS agents could never engage in criminal activity in concert with the groups they are infiltrating, it would be simplicity itself for ruthless organisations to devise techniques to flush them out and eliminate them.

Until now, the security service has had an implied power, derived from the Security Service Act 1989, to authorise CHIS agents to take part in criminality. As we have heard, last December the investigatory powers tribunal ruled in favour of MI5 in a case which challenged such authorisations. However, that ruling was by just a 3-2 majority, thus illustrating the point well known to the Intelligence and Security Committee that the switch of a single vote can dramatically change even a carefully pre-planned outcome. [Laughter.] The ISC welcomes the principle behind the Bill to put existing powers to authorise criminal conduct, in certain circumstances, on to an explicit statutory basis.

One of our predecessor Committees was told in 2016 by the then director general of MI5 that CHIS agents are

“the intelligence collection asset that we could not operate without. They give you insight that technical intelligence cannot give”.

Despite necessary redactions, the 2017-19 ISC’s own report on Northern Ireland-related terrorism, presented to Parliament today, although it was drafted before I rejoined the Committee, convincingly concludes at paragraph 39 that:

“While there are, rightly, concerns that criminal activity may somehow be being legitimised, the need for such authorisations is clear. What is key is that authorisations are properly circumscribed, used only where necessary and proportionate, and subject to proper scrutiny.”

Like its predecessor, the current ISC believes that these authorisations are essential if innocent lives are to be saved. Indeed, we have seen real examples where precisely that has happened—and where lives would definitely have been lost if a courageous agent had been banned from participating in any criminal activity.

Naturally, this power must be properly circumscribed and must be used, as repeatedly stated, only where necessary and proportionate. At later stages, consideration of the Bill will surely focus on how to apply necessity and proportionality, but I urge colleagues in all parts of the House not to seek too much specificity regarding what criminality meets those standards. Preventing agents inside a criminal enterprise from engaging in a specified checklist of possible crimes would make their unmasking and potential execution very much more likely. It would be dangerously counterproductive to compile such a checklist. We need to remember that there is more than one way for society to have blood on its hands.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill Debate

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Department: Home Office

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Julian Lewis Excerpts
Committee stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons & Report stage & Report stage: House of Commons
Thursday 15th October 2020

(3 years, 5 months ago)

Commons Chamber
Read Full debate Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 15 October 2020 - (15 Oct 2020)
Rosie Winterton Portrait The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Rosie Winterton)
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I remind Members that there are a number of colleagues down to speak in the debate. There will be three Front-Bench winding-up speeches, which will have to start just before 3.20 pm, and then I suspect there will be votes. I cannot introduce a time limit, because we are in Committee, but I am sure that Members will be considerate to one another. I call Dr Julian Lewis.

Julian Lewis Portrait Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Ind)
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Thank you, Dame Rosie; I shall endeavour to be helpful. It is only by the good fortune, dare I say it, of there having been yet another statement on the covid crisis that many members of the Intelligence and Security Committee are able to take part in this debate at all. I have written to the Leader of the House about this, and I appeal to the Government’s business managers in future not to schedule legislation of this sort, which is directly relevant to the Intelligence and Security Committee, on the same day that it is known that the Committee has an immovable meeting. I am grateful to the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) for being willing to leave our main meeting early, so as to be sure that new clause 3 could be covered, and I will now make some remarks about that new clause.

The Intelligence and Security Committee, as was stated on Second Reading, strongly supports the principle behind this legislation. CHIS play a vital role in identifying and disrupting terrorist plots. They save lives, often at great risk to themselves. Sometimes they must commit offences to maintain their cover, and their handlers must be able to authorise them to do so in certain circumstances and subject to specific safeguards. We welcome the Bill, which will place the state’s power to authorise that conduct on an explicit statutory footing.

However, concerns were raised on Second Reading that the Bill does not provide for sufficient safeguards and oversight measures. The ISC agrees. There is a clear role for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, and it is absolutely right that the commissioner is able to use his judicial oversight powers to ensure that those powers are used only with due care and consideration by the agencies that authorise criminal conduct.

The Bill, as it stands, does not provide for any parliamentary scrutiny of the use of these authorisation powers, so the amendment that the ISC has tabled—new clause 3—proposes not to duplicate the role of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in any way, but instead to require the Secretary of State to provide the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament with an annual report of information on the number of criminal conduct authorisations that have been authorised by the agencies that the Committee oversees as well as on the categories authorised. All we are looking for is a simple table saying that these are the categories of offences that have been authorised, those are the totals in each category and this is the grand total.

Bob Stewart Portrait Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)
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It is only the number and the category; there is no detail, because that would be extremely dangerous.

Julian Lewis Portrait Dr Lewis
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That is absolutely right, and the whole point about the detail is that that is the job of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. What we want to do is give an added layer of extra scrutiny on the scale and the categorisation, but nothing in terms of particularity of any individual case.

Gavin Robinson Portrait Gavin Robinson (Belfast East) (DUP)
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I support new clause 3. I think the emphasis behind it is right, and the work that the right hon. Gentleman’s Committee does is very important. There was an interesting line in the report published by the Committee on 5 October on Northern Ireland terrorism that touches on this Bill. It said, “Authorisations are used sparingly”, and then it gave the proportion of members of the services that have had authorisations, but that number featured in the published report as “***”. I only want to raise with the right hon. Gentleman the point that, while it is important that his Committee has access to that important information, the information could be made available. There is always a consideration, to various degrees, about what is contained in reports and what is not, but it does not seem to me that that is sensitive, and for the purposes of this debate, it would actually have been an incredibly helpful figure to have.

Julian Lewis Portrait Dr Lewis
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The hon. Gentleman, with whom I worked so closely on the Defence Committee, as always gets to the heart of the matter. He says that, indeed, we have made reference in the context of Northern Ireland to numbers and scale in precisely the way we are seeking to be able to do here. Whether something is then made public is always a matter for debate and negotiation between the ISC and the agency concerned, but where it cannot be made public, that is where the ISC in a sense comes into its own. We exist to be able to see things that for good reasons cannot be made public, but we can then at least give assurance to Parliament that we have seen what cannot be made public and we are reasonably satisfied with it, and that is what this is all about.

Kevan Jones Portrait Mr Kevan Jones
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The reason for not giving that figure is clearly that it would give an advantage to those we are working against—for example, in Northern Ireland—through an indication of the scale of the CHIS. Could the right hon. Gentleman clarify the situation and highlight to the Committee that we would look at the numbers, but that we have powers to look at individual cases, as we have done in the past, if we have concerns about them?

Julian Lewis Portrait Dr Lewis
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Yes. What it is important to remember and, it must be said, what has not always been remembered in recent times, are the provisions of the Justice and Security Act 2013. That Act, among other things, said that the Committee would have greater powers to “require” the agencies to give certain information. Prior to that, it could only “request” the agencies to do so. The question is: will we have the power to be assured of getting these figures, or are we going to be able only to ask for them and perhaps not get them? The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right: if we saw something that we did not like the look of, even if we did not have the power to require that particular piece of information in order to delve further, we could at least request it. For many years, that was the only basis on which the Committee could operate anyway.

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Stewart Hosie Portrait Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)
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Before the right hon. Gentleman moves on to his next subject, there is also an issue of trust. The Bill envisages giving the Government a significant degree of ability to authorise criminal activity. As someone who is happy to give this Bill a fair wind with certain conditions, I say that if the Government cannot see fit to include on the face of the Bill this very modest new clause from our Committee—it is only about numbers, not details—I think trust in the Government is rather diminished.

Julian Lewis Portrait Dr Lewis
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I am obviously hoping that the Minister will convince us in the course of this afternoon that we can indeed trust the Government on this matter. If he wishes to do so, he needs to clear up the point I am about to raise concerning current operations.

Although sometimes the Government share information voluntarily with the Committee about current operations, we cannot normally demand such information. The danger with a letter and the slight amendment to the regulations is that it could still leave a loophole whereby the Government say, “We would like to give you these statistics and these categories, but unfortunately some of them relate to operations that are still ongoing.” Perhaps there have been 15 such authorisations, and one or two of them relate to current authorisations. That could be used as an excuse not to tell the Committee about the total of 15. In reality, I do not think that would be within the spirit of the understanding of the reasons why current operations are normally excluded from the purview of the work that the Committee does.

In order for the Minister to develop the degree of trust that we wish to have in the Government’s intentions, I hope that when he comes to address the arguments that have been put forward in support of new clause 3, he will rule out any suggestion that the fact that there might be one or two current operations included in a statistic will prevent the Committee from seeing those statistics that we have urged the Government to provide by tabling the amendment. I look forward to the Minister’s comments on that later, and I earnestly hope we will be able to reach a satisfactory outcome.

Jeremy Corbyn Portrait Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)
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The proceedings on this Bill today are an absolute travesty of parliamentary accountability. That a major Bill such as this, with huge implications for civil rights and human rights in our society and for our standing around the world, should be pushed through in a very short time this afternoon is a travesty. I suspect we will not even vote on most of the amendments—they will not have been subject to stand-alone debates. In effect, we are having another Second Reading debate to accommodate those who have tabled amendments. We should reflect on this House’s role in holding this Government to account.

I have added my name to a number of amendments, particularly those drafted by my hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy), to whom I pay tribute for her work on the Bill and her contribution this afternoon.

The Mitting inquiry into undercover policing operations, which succeeded the Pitchford inquiry after Pitchford’s death, is still going on. It was due to report in 2018; it has not even got into its second and third stages yet and may well go on for several years more before it reports. It covers undercover policing since 1968, a time which, I reflect, more or less covers my whole political life, so I will read with great interest the Mitting inquiry’s final report.

What has come out so far for those of us who have good friends in environmental groups, human rights groups, trade unions and many other campaigns is the sheer arrogance of police undercover operations that have infiltrated wholly legitimate and legal operations in order to disrupt them, spread negative information and cause problems for them. If we live in a free and democratic society, criminality is obviously not acceptable and policing is obviously required to deal with it, but we do not deal with criminality by authorising criminality through undercover policing operations and investigations into such groups.

There are those of us who have had the honour of meeting people, particularly women, in a number of groups that have been infiltrated by the police and the police have then knowingly formed sexual liaisons with those women. Children have been given birth to a result and then, often years later, the woman concerned finds out that she was completely duped—completely misled—and her life was ruined by an undercover police operation. Imagine what it feels like for someone to have been with what they thought was their life partner for several years, and they discover that that person was put there by the police to seduce them into giving information on, actually, legal activities done by environmental and other groups. Will the Bill protect women from that in future? I think we all know the answer to that.

I hope that, at the very least, the House of Lords is able to make some substantial amendments to the Bill. I am disappointed that the College of Policing advice, which has just come out, is that it is not necessarily wrong for undercover officers to form sexual relations with people to gain information. This is the kind of world that we are about to approve of unless the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Streatham, my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) and others are accepted by the Government today.

I will be brief, because there is not much time and 11 more colleagues wish to speak before 3.20 pm. The second matter to which I shall refer relates to the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Streatham. The Bill says that people cannot do anything to undermine the economic wellbeing of the country. What does that actually mean? Does that mean, for example, that if dock workers decided to take strike action because they had reached the end of the road in negotiations with their employer and therefore wished to withdraw their labour to force a settlement of their grievance, they would be acting against the economic interests of this country, because that would disrupt trade? Or would they be acting in the interests of themselves, their colleagues and other workers by trying to improve their economic wellbeing? There is a big debate about what is economic wellbeing and what is not.

There are those, like me, who have seen the activities of undercover police operations in trade unions and the blacklisting of wholly legitimate trade union representatives, who have spent 20 years and more being unable to work, as electricians, as carpenters or as plumbers, because they have been blacklisted secretly by groups of employers, when the police knew about it all along. These were wholly illegal activities. The police need to recognise that what they have been doing is completely wrong—it is simply unacceptable.

I hope that we will have a thought for the moment for the more than 1,000 groups that have been infiltrated in some way by the police at some point over the past few years. Those of us who have spent our lives campaigning for social justice and environmental sustainability, and against racism in any form, often wonder why there is apparently much less concern about, much less involvement with and much less attention paid to far-right racist organisations than to other people within our society. We need to know the answers to all these questions, but I suspect we will not get them today.

My hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) has tabled an amendment that proposes that activities should in future be authorised only by the Prime Minister. My hon. Friend the Member for Streatham has also proposed amendments on the issue of accountability, which is the key to this. I wonder whether Ministers actually knew what was going on or know what is going on now. I wonder whether senior police officers always knew what was going on. I wonder how many different quasi-secret operations were being conducted in different police authorities around the country without the relevant police commander even knowing what was happening. Inquiries in South Yorkshire in respect of Orgreave and Hillsborough tend to indicate there is a lack of transparency in the way the police operate.

The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) spoke correctly about the issue of where we are going if we go down a road of ignoring human rights and justice within our society. He and I spent a lot of time campaigning to try to get British nationals and British residents released from Guantanamo Bay. The whole thing is a disgrace. The whole thing is extra-judicial in every conceivable way. Likewise, this country and our Government here were involved in extraordinary rendition in some form. If we are to hold our heads up around the world as being supporters of human rights, and as being a signatory to the universal declaration, the European convention and our own Human Rights Act, we need to look carefully at ourselves and at what this Bill proposes. I hope that at the very least the Minister will make it clear whether the Government are committed to continuing to support, recognise and work within the terms of the historic and important Human Rights Act or whether, once again, he will be appealing to the backwoods people in the Tory party who see human rights as somehow a term of abuse and who want to repeal that Act or reduce its power and importance. These things are very important.

I regret that we have such a short time for this crucial debate today, but I am moved by the hundreds of people who have been in touch with MPs about this, and the dozens of organisations, not necessarily all protest groups or on the left—these groups cover peace, civil liberties and human rights—that are very concerned about this Bill. These are people who think seriously about these matters and we would do well to listen to them, rather than ramming this through in a few hours on a Thursday afternoon and imagining that that will be job done. It will not be, because this will all get back in the courts at some point in the future and the Mitting inquiry report will come out at some point. Many of us will continue our vigilance in order to protect civil liberties and human rights in our society and our country, and to protect the civil liberties and rights of those who work in the police and other security services.

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James Brokenshire Portrait James Brokenshire
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The UK will comply with obligations under the Human Rights Act, including when they arise extraterritorially. The UK is also bound by obligations under international human rights law.

I wanted to speak to the new clause tabled by the Intelligence and Security Committee and I thank its members for their support for the Bill. I think that underlines the role for the ISC in the scrutiny that they apply. Indeed, as the Minister who took the Justice and Security Act 2013 through Parliament, I recognised, in the creation of that Committee, its role in providing that rightful scrutiny and confidence in relation to this matter. I welcome the spirit with which new clause 3 has been tabled to emphasise the important role of the Committee, which I respect and appreciate.

I have written to the Committee Chair, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), to underline ways in which I believe we can provide the information that has been sought by the Committee, and I will place the letter in the Library to provide that certainty and clarity. I would say to my right hon. Friend that operational agencies will consider requests and specifics in the usual way, and I can commit to them considering that through the 2013 Act. The fact that it may relate to a live operation should not preclude that information’s being shared. I hope that that will be helpful to him in underlining the importance of the information’s being forthcoming.

Julian Lewis Portrait Dr Lewis
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I accept that assurance in good heart. In the letter, the Minister said, “Such information as is requested in order for the ISC to provide effective oversight of these policies relating to these authorisations shall be provided to the Committee,” so I take it he is saying that we will not get refused those statistics when we want them.

James Brokenshire Portrait James Brokenshire
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I take in equally good faith the way in which my right hon. Friend and the Committee have approached this, and it is firmly my intent that information will be provided. He knows the debate and discussion over live operations and being bounded in that way, but I would want to ensure that information is given to his Committee, so that they can fulfil their oversight function and also, I think, give confidence to the House. He and his Committee have raised an important point, and I recognise the contribution that they make.

I turn to the issues of redress in relation to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy), in amendment 2, the Leader of the Opposition, in new clause 1, and the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland in amendments 20 and 21. Let me be clear: there is no barrier under the Bill for affected persons seeking a judicial review of a decision made by a public authority. Similarly, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal already has jurisdiction in relation to conduct to which part 2 of RIPA applies, which will include the amendments made by the Bill. I am, though, listening to concerns expressed by Members about the Bill’s potential impact on routes of redress, and I am happy to consider whether anything further is needed.

I shall now discuss the amendments that seek to place further limits on what can be authorised. The limits that other countries have chosen to place on the face of their legislation have featured prominently in this debate, as they did at Second Reading. Further to the Second Reading debate we have continued, for example, to engage with our Canadian friends with regard to their limits on the conduct of their covert human intelligence sources. The Solicitor General and I agree that it is correct to say that limits are found on the face of their legislation, but it is not straightforward to make comparisons between what we are proposing here and what might exist for other countries. We have our own legal systems; our operational partners each have their own practices and functions; and—perhaps most importantly—we have a very different threat picture.

For example, our friends and partners, such as Canada and the US, are not signatories to the European convention on human rights. We are the only members of Five Eyes that are bound by the convention and the obligations that it comes with. Again, I reference clause 1(7)—it has been focused on quite a lot during today’s debate—which makes specific reference to the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998 being taken into consideration. Placing explicit limits on the face of the Bill risks creating a specific list of prohibited activity that would place into the hands of criminals, terrorists and hostile states a means of creating a checklist, as I have explained and as I think my hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell (James Sunderland) set out so clearly in his contribution. Therefore we cannot accept amendments 8, 13 or 22.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill Debate

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Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Julian Lewis Excerpts
Consideration of Lords amendments & Ping Pong & Ping Pong: House of Commons
Wednesday 27th January 2021

(3 years, 2 months ago)

Commons Chamber
Read Full debate Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Amendments as at 27 January 2021 - (27 Jan 2021)
Conor McGinn Portrait Conor McGinn
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I think I might put the first part of what the right hon. Gentleman said on my election leaflets the next time around. On the second part of what he said, I respect entirely the point he made. I listened carefully to the Solicitor General and I will explain in my conclusion our approach to the Bill, which I think has been one where we have sought to co-operate, given its serious and sensitive nature. We rightly and understandably wanted to scrutinise the Bill in its entirety and would seek to improve it were we in the position of introducing it. I hope that will make sense in the next few minutes.

Before I come to that conclusion, let me say that it is unfortunate and disappointing that the Government and the Scottish Government have not been able to reach an agreement. We encouraged those discussions from the outset to ensure that the Bill covered the entirety of the United Kingdom. Even at this late stage, I urge them to work together, because it is important that the public in Scotland have confidence not only that their safety and security is protected, but that they have the safeguards that other parts of the United Kingdom will have, too.

In conclusion, we feel that the Bill has been improved by the amendments. It is not perfect—far from it—but it does provide an important legal framework for activity that previously operated with none. We recognise that it provides formal safeguards and protections for those who operate in this field at this precise moment and who seek to keep us all safe. It provides clarity and guidance for those who have to make difficult decisions in the interests of law enforcement in areas of serious and highly organised terrorism and crime, and it provides protection and the potential for recompense for those who may be adversely affected.

As I have said before, this is uncomfortable territory for the whole House and for many of us personally. It covers activity that operates, frankly, in the shadows, tackling serious and deadly crime and some of the most heinous and awful offences imaginable. The Opposition are committed to working in the national interest to keep people, their families, our communities and the country safe. We know that it is not just the Government who have to make difficult decisions to do this but us as well. I want to be clear: we would and will put forward a different Bill with the safeguards we have outlined at its heart. But when it comes to national security and keeping the public safe, we are not prepared to allow these matters to remain outside parliamentary scrutiny and without any statutory footing. We have a duty to the public and to those who keep us safe.

We acknowledge the importance of putting CHIS activities on a statutory footing, and we have unapologetically worked to scrutinise robustly and responsibly the way in which that is done. We have hopefully ensured some vital safeguards, accountability and protections, and we will continue, as always, to place national security, human rights and support for victims at the centre of our approach to these matters.

Julian Lewis Portrait Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
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On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I entirely endorse the tributes and good wishes paid by the Solicitor General and the hon. Member for St Helens North (Conor McGinn) to my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire). His professionalism, calmness and dedication as Security Minister and in other roles are a model for us all. We admire him greatly and wish him the best of health.

Despite extraordinary technical advances in surveillance and espionage methods, human sources in intelligence operations remain indispensable, especially in the counter-terrorist work of our Security Service. Going undercover to join terrorist groups or remaining in a terrorist group, having become disillusioned with its objectives, in order to frustrate them, calls for courage of the highest order. The Intelligence and Security Committee has been briefed by MI5 on specific instances of this, and we accept that, without the use of covert human intelligence sources, many of the attacks foiled in recent years would have succeeded in their horrific aims. That is what justifies the authorisation of specified criminal acts, on occasion, in order to maintain an agent’s cover and in proportion to the potential harm that he or she is working to prevent.

As pointed out on Second Reading on 5 October, the report on Northern Ireland-related terrorism compiled by our predecessor Committee and presented to Parliament that same day firmly concluded at paragraph 39:

“While there are, rightly, concerns that criminal activity may somehow be being legitimised, the need for such authorisations is clear. What is key is that authorisations are properly circumscribed, used only when necessary and proportionate, and subject to proper scrutiny.”

Precisely because covert human intelligence sources are so effective, ruthless terrorist organisations have no qualms in devising tests of the utmost depravity to flush out agents infiltrating their ranks. That is why the provisions of Lords amendment 2 to prohibit the granting of criminal conduct authorisations, or CCAs, are certain to be as counterproductive as they are well-intentioned.

What the amendment proposes, if enacted, would soon come to constitute a checklist of atrocities that could be used to expose undercover agents known to be forbidden from carrying them out. As sure as night follows day, it would also increase the number of such atrocities committed. In order to flush out MI5 agents by putting suspects to the test, paranoid extremists would resort to testing more and more of their group members, if they felt that their organisation was coming under pressure and suffering setbacks.

David Davis Portrait Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)
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My right hon. Friend does great service to this House and the Committee. Given what he has just said, does he believe that these terrorists are unable to read the Human Rights Act?

Julian Lewis Portrait Dr Lewis
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I have the advantage of having been present when my right hon. Friend made that very point on Second Reading, and therefore I was entirely prepared for that intervention. I will give a response that is perhaps slightly unorthodox, despite the emphasis put on the Human Rights Act by my right hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General.

In my previous role as Chair of the Defence Committee, it became more and more obvious that the Human Rights Act, and the European convention on human rights, had had serious, and perhaps largely unanticipated, adverse consequences for the operations of our military. I suspect that if applied too literally, they would have equally adverse effects on the operations of our security and intelligence services. As the years go by, and as experience shows, I fully expect that there will have to be amendments to the Human Rights Act. I believe that although terrorists could indeed read it, they would take rather more seriously a categoric list of forbidden offences in the Bill than they would the rather generalised content of the Human Rights Act. I do not expect my right hon. Friend to be wholly satisfied with that, but it is my honest opinion.

Consequently, terrorist groups whose operations might have been compromised by technical means, rather than by human infiltration, would be likely to ask their genuine members to commit more and more forbidden offences, simply to prove their loyalty. The outcome would inevitably be an increase in murders and other serious offences on their lordships’ list, which would not have happened but for the incorporation in statute of such a collection of prohibited crimes.

As I said earlier, the ISC has had a comprehensive briefing from MI5, explaining how those authorisations are used in practice. We are convinced that the Security Service uses them appropriately and proportionately. We are also reassured that the measures in the Bill legalise only what is specified in each criminal conduct authorisation. That means that any other criminal behaviour not covered by the terms of a CCA may be subject to prosecution—a safeguard that will hopefully encourage the House to reject Lords amendment 2. This is one of those occasions when it is necessary—really necessary—to keep our enemies guessing.

Joanna Cherry Portrait Joanna Cherry [V]
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I mean no disrespect to the Solicitor General when I say that, like others, I am sorry not to see the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire) on the Government Front Bench today. He is a thoroughly decent man. I wish him all the best, and I have been in touch to tell him that privately.

The Scottish National party will support the Lords amendments, but we do not support the Bill. We voted against it on Third Reading for reasons that I set out in some detail in Committee. We regard it as another milestone in the British Government’s retreat from support for such basic rule-of-law principles as equality before the law, and another milestone in the rolling back of human rights protections. That is not to say that we do not see the necessity for some legislation, given the ongoing court proceedings, but we do not think the balance is right in this legislation at all.

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Edward Leigh Portrait Sir Edward Leigh
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I apologise for missing that. I was summoned in to see the Speaker, as I warned the Deputy Speaker, so I missed that part of my right hon. Friend’s speech, but I listened to everything that was said in the early part of the debate, and I followed it carefully. I made an intervention on the Opposition spokesman, and I still believe it. I frankly trust Mr Blair and Mr Brown more than I trust the former leader of the Labour party on these issues.

Julian Lewis Portrait Dr Julian Lewis
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In support of my right hon. Friend, it will come as no surprise that I would simply say that, whether one trusts this expert or that expert, or this or that Committee Chairman, that is what is known in philosophical terms as the appeal to authority. I am happy to rely on the argument that I put forward, which is that, if we create a list of things that agents cannot do, we invite terrorists to use it as a checklist to test their own membership for spies and infiltrators.

Edward Leigh Portrait Sir Edward Leigh
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Of course I agree with that, and I wanted to make that point as best I could. It is quite a weak argument to say that, because certain people who have been in authoritative positions make a certain argument, that it is therefore a clincher in argumentation. Actually, the point put by my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East was far more powerful, frankly. He was adducing a specific example. If it is laid down in statute that a covert agent cannot take a particular action, that is an invitation to terrorist or gangster groups to have an initiation ceremony based precisely on what is forbidden by Parliament. I thought that that was a completely unanswerable argument.

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Edward Leigh Portrait Sir Edward Leigh
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So he says, but I am no expert.

Julian Lewis Portrait Dr Julian Lewis
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Just because an ally has a system that may leave its agents vulnerable to exposure and death, that does not mean that we should copy that.

Edward Leigh Portrait Sir Edward Leigh
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Exactly, and I hazard a guess—as we have seen with the covid outbreak—we are a uniquely open society. We have very large levels of immigration. We have large minority communities. By the way, 99.9% totally oppose terrorists, do not believe in that and all the rest of it, but we know we are fundamentally and hugely vulnerable as a nation, probably much more vulnerable than Australia or New Zealand, so the fact that Australia does certain things does not apply. Personally, speaking for myself, I would rather listen to arguments from my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, who has been briefed by MI5 and MI6, than to arguments adduced at second hand by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden, who tells me that in New Zealand and Australia they do things in a different way and are at no higher risk. In any court of law, the evidence adduced by my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East is more powerful than the arguments adduced by my other right hon. Friend.

We have just heard a passionate defence of children. No one denies the commitment of the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) to the welfare of children, but when I was reading about this debate in some Sunday papers and other parts of the media at the weekend, it gave the impression that we were almost going back to Stalin’s Russia, and getting children to spy on their parents. This is ridiculous—we have to have a sense of proportion. We live in the United Kingdom. We have a system of law. Can we not trust our operatives in MI5, MI6 or the police force to act proportionately and in a necessary way?

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill Debate

Full Debate: Read Full Debate
Department: Attorney General

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Julian Lewis Excerpts
Rosie Winterton Portrait Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
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We have until 6.56 pm to conclude proceedings on the Bill, so if Back-Bench contributions were less than five minutes long, that would enable us to get as many Members in as possible. I do not want to impose a time limit, but I hope that colleagues will be considerate of one another. I call Dr Julian Lewis, Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee.

Julian Lewis Portrait Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
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Right from the outset, the Intelligence and Security Committee has supported the principle behind the Bill, although we have also welcomed attempts by Members in both Houses to improve it. It is a very important Bill. Covert human intelligence sources or agents provide vital information to assist the security and intelligence agencies in their investigations. They save lives. As the head of MI5 recently said, without them, many of the attacks foiled in recent years

“would not have been prevented.”

In working undercover, CHIS need to be trusted by those they are reporting on, so that they can gain the information that the authorities need. CHIS may therefore need to carry out criminal activity to maintain their cover. Their handlers must be able to authorise them to do so, in certain circumstances and subject to specific safeguards. The Bill places the powers that certain organisations have to authorise such activity on an explicit statutory basis—something that we should all welcome.

The Bill before us has been improved since it was introduced in September, and that is a measure of the effective scrutiny of national security legislation by Parliament, including by the ISC. These are very serious powers for the state to exercise, and it is right that they be properly scrutinised. In particular, the ISC welcomes the provisions brought forward in the other place by Lord Anderson, the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, requiring all criminal conduct authorisations to be notified to judicial commissioners as soon as possible and within seven days. Judicial oversight is a vital safeguard, and this measure should give the public confidence that these powers will be used only when proportionate, necessary, and in accordance with the law.

The final amendments to the Bill that the House is being asked to approve today are sensible provisions that the House should welcome. The additional safeguards for children and vulnerable people are particularly welcome, and it is clear that the Government have listened to the strength of feeling in both Houses on this matter. Many of the changes made to the Bill will be reflected in an updated CHIS code of conduct, which I understand will be drafted over the coming months. This revised code of conduct will include new language emphasising the important oversight role of the Intelligence and Security Committee in relation to the use of these powers by the intelligence agencies. The Committee welcomes that, and I can assure the House that the ISC fully intends to exercise its oversight powers to ensure that criminal conduct authorisations are used appropriately.

I thank Ministers and those who support them for the constructive way in which they have engaged with the Committee on the Bill. I pay particular tribute to my right hon. Friend the Minister for Security, who unfortunately cannot be with us today. I wish him the very best for his recovery, and I look forward to working with him in future. Finally, I pay tribute to the men and women of our security and intelligence agencies and, most importantly on this occasion, to their covert human intelligence sources—individuals whom few of us will ever know, but whose bravery saves lives. We all owe them a great debt of gratitude for their courageous service.

Stuart C McDonald Portrait Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP) [V]
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It is a pleasure to follow the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, and I join him in sending my party’s best wishes to the Minister for Security.

There is absolutely no disagreement about the need for a Bill. These are self-evidently significant, extraordinary and important powers being put on the statute book, and not before time. However, it is precisely because of the significance and importance of these powers that, although we acknowledge the need for a Bill, we could not support one that did not provide proper safeguards, oversight and limitations on these powers. Those points were made at earlier stages by my hon. Friends, including my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and my hon. Friend the Member for Gordon (Richard Thomson), and that is why we ultimately voted against the Bill on Third Reading.

As the Solicitor General set out, the latest round of ping-pong has produced additional protections in cases where authorisations are being considered for covert sources who are children or vulnerable people. It has also ensured that some access to criminal injuries compensation will continue when a person is a victim of the criminal conduct of a covert source. The Bill is certainly better with these changes. In particular, we welcome the work undertaken by Just For Kids Law, and others, in advocating for safeguards for children and vulnerable adults. They could, and probably should have been even stronger, but even speaking about authorising criminal conduct by a child operating covertly feels very troubling. Hopefully those limits will make such occurrences very rare, as they should be, and we must and will monitor risk closely.