Afghanistan and Pakistan

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

My hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart) has been to Afghanistan on 57 occasions, as he told us. That is 56 occasions more than me. Nevertheless, I have a few ideas about campaigning there. When faced with a deadly insurgency, one has three options: to counter it, contain it or quit. We have been trying to counter it and now we are going to quit. It seemed to be the nub of my hon. Friend’s eloquent contribution that those are the only two alternatives.

I believe that NATO’s Afghan strategy has a fatal flaw: the knowledge that however effective our efforts may be, we plan to quit. That signals to the Taliban that they will ultimately win and removes their incentive to negotiate the political deal that we all agree is what must end an insurgency. President Obama and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister have set a time limit for the current surge. British troops, as we have heard many times today, will no longer fight after 2014. By then, the Afghans should be self-sufficient. That is the theory, but as we all know, the key question is, “What if they are not?”

Is there a third way to be found between full-scale counter-insurgency campaigning, which is what the generals have been doing all along, and total withdrawal when the deadlines are reached? In other words, instead of countering or quitting, should we be containing? Some say, and I have heard it said this afternoon, that the long-term use of special forces will be enough by itself to underpin a post-surge Afghan Government. That seems to me inherently improbable. As I have argued before, and as I continue to argue—completely unavailingly in the United Kingdom, but perhaps with a degree more resonance on the other side of the Atlantic—what is required when the surge concludes is a strategic base and bridgehead area, or SBBA, to secure our strategic needs permanently.

There are only two sound reasons for NATO’s military presence in Afghanistan: to prevent the country from being used again as a base, training ground or launch-pad for terrorist attacks, which has been mentioned many times today, and to assist next-door Pakistan in preventing any possibility of its nuclear weapons falling into the hands of al-Qaeda or its imitators, which I do not believe has been mentioned today. The following three objectives, though desirable, are not adequate reasons for our presence in Afghanistan: the creation of a tolerant and democratic society, the prevention of drug production, and the advancement of the human rights of women. Full-scale counter-insurgency campaigning, often referred to as war down among the people, involves micro-management of the threatened society. As such, it enables the pursuit of worthy goals such as those. By contrast, a strategic base and bridgehead area cannot secure such goals, but it can achieve both of our genuine strategic interests. During the period of grace provided by the surge deployment, an existing base area should be selected, or a new one constructed, in a remote area out of sight and largely out of mind of the Afghan population.

It is often said—in fact, I have lost count of the number of times it has been said—that there can be no purely military solution in Afghanistan, and that eventually a political deal must be done. Yet there is no basis for such a deal under our existing strategy. The deadlines for scaling down and ending our military presence will certainly put pressure on the Afghan Government to compromise with reconcilable elements of the Taliban, but they will have the opposite effect on the insurgents. The creation of an impregnable, long-term SBBA would enable pressure to be applied equally on both sides, and would confer many benefits, which I will summarise very briefly.

First, any return of international terrorists could be punished without having to re-invade the country. Secondly, any assistance needed by the Pakistan Government to secure its nuclear arsenal could be provided via the long-term strategic base. Thirdly, NATO would be almost completely disengaged from Afghan society, thus removing the constant irritant of a uniformed infidel presence in the towns and countryside.

Fourthly, the ending of micro-management would do away with the need to send service personnel out on vulnerable patrols, along predictable routes, which can easily be targeted. Fifthly, the balance of political and military forces in Afghanistan would be allowed to find its own level. If the worst happened and the Taliban took over, we would still have the strategic base and bridgehead area as a safeguard. Sixthly, the prospect of an SBBA would make it more likely that the Taliban would reach a deal with the Government. If the eventual outcome were nevertheless a more radical regime than NATO would like, that would be a matter for the Afghans alone as long as they offered no support to international terrorists. Finally, an SBBA could be garrisoned by as many or as few service personnel as the political and military situation dictated. Too remote to attack, it would be a deterrent to extremism and a bridgehead for easy entry and operations if, regrettably, they become necessary under a policy of containment.

It suits al-Qaeda to embroil us in Muslim states, as it did most calculatedly in Afghanistan in September 2001. That was why, 48 hours before the attacks in America, General Massoud was assassinated by al-Qaeda. It wanted us to, and knew perfectly well that we would, respond by invading Afghanistan. That was why it removed him.

Costly counter-insurgency cannot be our answer every time our enemies establish a presence in a different country; but there is an alternative to the extremes of micro-management, which is what we have been doing, and total withdrawal, which is what we say we are going to do next. That alternative is containment, and the means of doing it is a strategic base and bridgehead area.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alistair Burt]

I wish to make some progress. A lot of colleagues were able to give up two and a half hours to this debate and I would rather concentrate on the issues they raised, rather than on the hon. Gentleman, who came in very late—I hope he will forgive me.

Good progress is also being made on the expansion and improvement of the Afghan national police, and that is also a key part of ensuring security for the future and transition. The UK has funded the construction of 12 new police stations in Helmand province, and since its establishment in December 2009 more than 1,000 patrolmen have graduated from the Helmand police training centre. I have had the good fortune to see for myself the work being done in Lashkar Gah at the police centres and to spend time with Bill Caldwell talking about the training of the national security forces. Progress is being made and there is a growing confidence about this process, but, as with all things relating to Afghanistan, progress is never linear. This is not something that will go smoothly all in one direction; and there will be setbacks and we will take steps backwards before we move forward. However, genuine progress is being made, and the House is entitled to take note of it and feel some pride in it because of the work that has gone into creating that situation.

On security and draw-down, the Government welcome President Obama’s recent announcement on the draw-down of US troops from Afghanistan. We agree that substantial progress has been made towards the international community’s shared objective of preventing international terrorists, including al-Qaeda, from again using Afghanistan as an operating base. This is not simply about whether al-Qaeda is operating there now. The issue is: can the area be made sufficiently secure to ensure that al-Qaeda does not come back in future? That progress has been hard won and the announcement is a sign of success.

As was mentioned by a number of Members, including in interventions that I appreciated from the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty) and my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), that draw-down has coincided with the notification of draw-down made by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. He made a further comment today about reducing our force level by a further 500 to 9,000 by the end of 2012. The decision has been agreed by the National Security Council on the advice of our military commanders, which reflects the progress that has been made in building up the ANSF. For the benefit of my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border, let me simply say that the Prime Minister said this afternoon:

“This marks the start of a process that will ensure that by the end of 2014 there will be nothing like the number of British troops who are there now, and they will not be serving in a combat role. This is the commitment I have made, and this is the commitment we will stick to.”

This afternoon, there has been discussion about what the draw-down means and about whose incentive is greater. Our assessment is that the incentive for the Taliban to get involved in reconciliation is very clear, as the greatest imminent threat is faced by those who stay outside the process and continue to conduct operations against ISAF forces. The incentive is there for the Afghan security forces to continue the preparation work they are doing. That is the reason for draw-down dates and our sense is that steady progress is being made that vindicates the dates that have been given.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I understand the incentive while drones are still killing Taliban in the run-up to the end of 2014, but what incentive will the Taliban have to stick to any deal that is reached or to go through with a deal after 2014? Are we going to be firing drones from outside the country?

[Alistair Burt]

My hon. Friend is taking far too little notice of the improvement and strength of the Afghan national security forces in their own right. It is they who will carry on the fight on behalf of their people against those who threaten their state. To assume that this is a practice that only we are engaged in and that only we can be engaged in is unfair to the growing success and strength of the ANSF. That is the incentive for the future.

It is vital to recognise that the absence of combat troops does not mean a lack of interest from those who have created the conditions for what we hope will be a secure—