Human Rights Abuses: Magnitsky Sanctions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 8th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

It has two effects. First, anything to do with any finance or movement or visitations to the United Kingdom are immediately ruled out and the seizure of financial entities can take place. Secondly, it influences other countries to do the same. America may work with us on that, too. Two of the greatest financial markets are then shut to an individual, who may be part of a Government, thus making it highly difficult for them to operate, or to come and enjoy themselves—a lot of that is done. They become pariahs internationally and that has a huge effect, because it influences what others near them will do when they realise they are about to lose their access to very important areas—cities and financial markets. It has already shown to have had a massive knock-on effect.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend explain to the House who actually does the research that leads to people being identified for sanctioning, whether there is resistance in such places as the City of London, which no doubt could make enormous financial profits from having illicit money deposited there, and whether such places are incentivised to turn a blind eye when attempts are made to camouflage the real sources of the dirty money flowing in?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Many groups are doing that research at the moment, some of them private and voluntary organisations, but the Foreign Office itself is meant to be doing it. I am struck by the fact that it does not always check everybody’s backgrounds. The reality is that it must be much more intense and we must start going after these people. The City of London had a bad reputation for dirty money. A lot of that has stopped now as a result of the Russian sanctions. More importantly, individual sanctions also helped to end that. We need to be much more particular about where that money is coming from and how, and who are the individuals who are behind the use of that money. My right hon. Friend is quite right about that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lloyd Hatton (South Dorset) (Lab)]

I thank the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for securing this important and timely debate. I pay tribute to him for the persistence that he has shown in campaigning on this issue over many years, and for his work in this place helping to make and win the argument for deploying Magnitsky-style sanctions.

I would like to start by welcoming three successes of the Government regarding our sanctions regime: namely, decisive action against Putin’s regime, action against people-smuggling gangsters, and action against kleptocrats the world over. The Government have shown that they are prepared to make bold and decisive use of sanctions to crack down on serious human rights abuses, corruption and breaches of international law.

First, I welcome the Government’s sustained tough action against the Kremlin, introducing the largest package of sanctions since the early days of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. I firmly believe that this county must never again act as a safe haven for Russian dirty money, and the City of London must never again be seen to be a secure, out-of-the-way piggy bank for Putin’s cronies to stash their wealth. It is only right that we continue to expose and disrupt every enabler of Russia’s war machine, which has been terrorising the Ukrainian people for close to four years now. That must include ramping up the pressure on Putin’s energy revenues.

The Government’s sanctions measures have also gone a long way toward sinking Russia’s shadow fleet, which we all know is a vital source of funding for Putin’s war in Ukraine. Since the start of the invasion, Russian oil companies have established a shadow fleet of cargo ships charged with transporting sanctioned crude oil to third countries. Those vessels are usually owned by anonymous shell companies to shield the ships from scrutiny and sanctions. The fleet is then used to perform illegal ship-to-ship oil transfers at sea, making it much more difficult to monitor the final destination of Russian crude oil. This decaying and dangerous shadow fleet risks oil spills, which could then cause damage on the UK’s shores—spills that, I remind the House, the British taxpayer would be liable to clean up.

The sanctions designations brought forward by the Government mean that a total of 545 ships have been sanctioned by the UK. Almost half the Russian shadow fleet’s overall capacity has been forced off the seas by sanctions from the UK and our partners, with many ships now dead in the water.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

In support of what the hon. Gentleman is saying, does he agree that it is significant how important even a single ship of this fleet is to the Russian authorities that in desperation yesterday, in a final attempt to stop it being seized, they allowed the Russian flag to be put on one of the vessels, in the hope that that would deter the Americans from gaining control of it? Fortunately, it did not.

[Lloyd Hatton]

I agree with the right hon. Member’s remarks. I think that the actions of the previous Government and this Government to tackle the shadow fleet are starting to bite. The measures are hitting the Kremlin war machine and will slash the revenues that Putin desperately relies upon to continue to wage war in Ukraine.

Secondly, I welcome sanctions against organised criminal gangs that are currently perpetrating the vile trade of people-smuggling. This action by the Government is a world first, and it targets ringleaders, key intermediaries and the suppliers of people-smuggling equipment. The sanctions help to disrupt the flow of money and materials, including by freezing property, bank accounts and other assets. It will help to disrupt a range of different activities—from supplying small boats for smuggling to sourcing fake passports, middlemen facilitating illicit payments, and people-smuggling via lorries and small boats. It also sanctions the very gang leaders themselves. The people-smuggling gangs operating on the English channel are attempting to make a small fortune. It is essential that this Government continue to use sanctions and every lever at our disposal to disrupt and destroy the gangs.

Thirdly, the Government have made innovative use of sanctions against kleptocrats and their enablers. Notably, the Magnitsky-style sanctions deployed against Isabel dos Santos, the daughter of Angola’s former president, for corruption and stealing public funds marked a pivotal moment in the fight against kleptocracy in Angola and helped to address long-standing corruption that had hindered development and worsened inequalities in the country. I welcome that action, as I am sure do Members on both sides of the House, but we must now look to deploy similar sanctions against other kleptocrats and those who enable their corrupt dealings.

While all those measures are achievements worth celebrating today, I fear that we are not going quite far or fast enough. Our use of Magnitsky-style sanctions to target human rights abuses has, to date, been a little too timid. Only 229 individuals and entities have been sanctioned under that style of sanction, which contrasts with the nearly 3,000 individuals and entities sanctioned under a single scheme specific to one country: namely, Russia.

As REDRESS and other civil society organisations have shown, too many individuals remain unsanctioned despite overwhelming evidence of their involvement in corruption and serious human rights abuses the world over. Despite high-profile designations, such as the targeting of Isabel dos Santos, the frankly limited number of Magnitsky-style sanctions imposed undermines their effectiveness. By focusing only on isolated bad actors, such narrow designations overlook key backers or enablers and they fail to adapt when entities rebrand, or disappear and then reappear, simply to sidestep sanctions.

To illustrate the problem, here are just three brief examples that highlight the gap in our use of Magnitsky sanctions, allowing those responsible for egregious human rights violations to act with impunity. For instance, just last month the UK placed sanctions on four senior commanders of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces—the RSF—suspected of involvement in heinous violence against civilians in the city of El Fasher. The civil war in Sudan, as has already been mentioned, is the world’s biggest humanitarian crisis, displacing some 13 million people. There is overwhelming evidence of heinous crimes, mass executions, starvation and the systemic and calculated use of rape as a weapon of war. Evidence compiled by the UN, experts and journalists has shown, as has already been cited, that the UAE and its officials have been secretly supplying weapons to the RSF via neighbouring Chad—a position that the Gulf state denies, but the overwhelming evidence suggests otherwise. Sadly, no action was taken against the RSF’s key military and diplomatic backer, the UAE, or against the chief commander of the RSF.

Similarly, the narrow scope of sanctions designations in Georgia also undermines our response to the human rights crisis currently under way. Georgia is increasingly finding itself subject to authoritarian rule. Since the highly disputed election in 2024, during which the Georgian Dream party claimed victory, there has been an escalation in the crackdown on protests and on independent media, including widespread violence and human rights abuses. The Georgian Dream party has now captured almost all Government branches and institutions. It has used its new-found power to aggressively suppress protests and all scrutiny of its actions, including hundreds of reports of arbitrary detention and even torture.

Although the UK has rightly sanctioned some of those responsible for violent attacks against journalists and protesters, key members of the pro-Russia elite were sadly absent from those designations. They include Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder and chairman of the Georgian Dream party, who was sanctioned by the Biden Administration in the United States for undermining democratic processes simply for the benefit of the Kremlin. The UK has yet to take the same steps in relation to Georgia, so will the Minister make decisive use of sanctions to crack down on the abuses, which only benefit the Russian Government and are entirely at the expense of the Georgian people?

Finally, although the UK imposed sanctions on four individuals and one entity involved in the deadly repression of Uyghur Muslims in China in 2021, it never acted on detailed evidence received from REDRESS and other human rights organisations, which identified the broader command structure behind the violent atrocities committed against the Uyghur people in China. We cannot continue to ignore the calls, already put forward today, for sanctions on senior Chinese officials, who must include the Chinese Communist party secretary in Xinjiang, who is considered the architect behind the human rights abuses committed.

Those three cases all show how limiting our use of Magnitsky-style sanctions undermines their effectiveness. Sanctions are a key tool in our armoury to crack down on the most egregious human rights abuses, but narrow designation overlooks the key backers or enablers of the worst atrocities.

Underpinning our sanctions with strong enforcement is also critical to their impact. We know that sanctions are only as strong as the enforcement behind them. In last year’s cross-Government review of sanctions, the Government rightly recognised that there are gaps in the UK’s sanctions implementation and enforcement, which they are seeking to address through new measures to increase the deterrent effect of sanctions and enhance our ability to take robust action against those who choose to break the rules.