Peter Mandelson: Government Appointment

Debate between Julian Lewis and Alex Ballinger

Tuesday 21st April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Alex Ballinger (Halesowen) (Lab)]

I have come from the Foreign Affairs Committee sitting this morning, where we had the opportunity to speak to Sir Olly Robbins as our witness. I want to use my speech to pull out some of the pertinent points that we heard that I think are relevant.

Before I start, I absolutely agree with Members across the House who say that Lord Mandelson was a completely inappropriate and terrible choice for our ambassador, and that there has clearly been a failure in the process that ended up in his appointment and in the vetting. However, it is important that we look at what Sir Olly said in the witness statement today, because some of that contradicts what has been said in the House.

The first important thing that Sir Olly said is that no Minister—not the Prime Minister, not the Foreign Secretary, nor any other Minister—or any official in No. 10 was given sight of the fact that UKSV had declined Mandelson’s security vetting. They had no sight at all of any details of that vetting. He said that, justified that and defended that. No officials or Ministers should have sight of that vetting, because it is extremely personal and sensitive information. I went through that process myself when I worked at the Foreign Office, and we do not want to create any conditions that make people afraid to share sensitive information in the vetting process, thinking that at some point in the future it might be leaked, whether to politicians, to others in the line management chain or, as we have seen, to the press, because that undermines the integrity of the process as a whole. That reinforces what the Prime Minister said yesterday.

Secondly, Sir Olly disputed the characterisation that UKSV had failed Peter Mandelson’s vetting: that it was in some way a binary choice inside the Foreign Office. It is important that we explain—or that I try to justify—what Sir Olly was saying, because the FCDO has a slightly different process from that of other parts of Government. It is an overseas Department—a bit like the Ministry of Defence, for example—so people with seriously long careers and all sorts of different interests come into those roles. I am not suggesting that Peter Mandelson should have passed vetting, not at all, but it is not unusual for the FCDO rather than UKSV to make a decision on a borderline case. According to Sir Olly’s evidence, that is a normal process. It is important that we hold to that in future.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I am really surprised that the hon. Gentleman is swallowing this guff about this being a borderline case. It was quite clear that security vetting put this case in the red box, which meant “fail”. Sir Olly is being lauded to the skies now because he is the victim of ruthless prime ministerial politics, but he also has an angle on this: he massaged, shall we say, his own judgment because he knew the pressure on him from the Government. There was nothing borderline about this; he is saying that it was borderline only because he needs an excuse for having overridden it when he should not have done.

[Alex Ballinger]

I can speak only to what the witness told us in the inquiry this morning. Many Members made the same case that the right hon. Gentleman is making now: that it was a red box case, as we have seen in the evidence submitted. However, Sir Olly was clear that this was a borderline case, and it is usual for the Foreign Office to conduct such cases. The right hon. Gentleman can make up his own mind about whether to believe Sir Olly or other people.

BBC Monitoring Service

Debate between Julian Lewis and Alex Ballinger

Thursday 4th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Sir Julian Lewis]

Absolutely. The only good thing to be said about the propaganda of one’s adversaries is that sometimes, unwittingly, it gives us an insight into their plans and a forewarning of their evil intent. Let us ensure that we preserve the crown jewels and that we do not rely simply on fluctuations in licence fee income for that necessary task.

I have said that the Caversham estate was to be sold off, despite the amazing integration that existed there with the American counterpart of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which is now known more regularly as the OSE. It was therefore no wonder that the Defence Committee decided to entitle its December 2016 report “Open Source Stupidity: The Threat to the BBC Monitoring Service”. That was a pun on open source intelligence—and for those interested, it is HC 748, and it is still in print.

The then Defence Committee Chairman, whom modesty prevents me from identifying, pointed out—this is a long quote, but it is worthwhile—that:

“The Coalition Government was warned, in the strongest possible terms, not to leave the BBC Monitoring service unprotected by ending its ring–fenced annual grant and transferring this minor financial burden to the licence–fee payer. By doing so, it gave the BBC a free hand to inflict successive rounds of cuts, now culminating in the loss of the specialised and dedicated Caversham headquarters.

The vast increase in open source information in the recent past makes it one of the few tools still left in the Government’s arsenal which can provide almost real time information and analysis on global developments. To allow the BBC to change and shape it in a different direction is in contravention of UK national interest. It is especially bewildering when you consider the annual cost of BBC Monitoring is around £25 million.

The decision to evict BBC Monitoring’s US counterpart—Open Source Enterprise—from its UK base at Caversham Park and break the physical link between the two is short–sighted. The BBC’s strategy for BBC Monitoring will downgrade our contribution to open source intelligence sharing between the UK and the US at a time when European nations must demonstrate to President–elect Trump”—

as he then was, for the first time—

“that we are committed to paying our way in the fields of defence and security. As one of our witnesses said, ‘this is the height of folly’.”

That was a long quote, but it was true then and it is true today.

[Alex Ballinger (Halesowen) (Lab)]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Julian Lewis]

I will give way first to the hon. Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger).

[Alex Ballinger]

The right hon. Member is delivering an excellent speech. As the Defence Committee did in 2016, the Foreign Affairs Committee is now conducting an inquiry into disinformation, which covers many of the same areas that he discusses. Does he agree that the increasing spread of disinformation, increasingly in countries that are non-English-speaking but have a real geopolitical significance for the UK, makes the BBC Monitoring service even more important today than it was in 2016?

[Sir Julian Lewis]

I agree entirely, and before I give way for the next intervention, I will read what I had just been about to say.

The report’s main conclusion was that the Government should reinstate their previous model of funding BBC Monitoring through a ringfenced grant in aid, rather than allowing the funding to come from the licence fee. As a non-partisan, cross-party body, I doubt if today’s Defence Committee would take a radically different view. Indeed, we have just heard from the Foreign Affairs Committee representative that that view still has a great deal of validity.