Risk and Resilience: Annual Statement

Debate between Julian Lewis and Rosie Winterton

Monday 4th December 2023 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I remind colleagues that a lot of right hon. and hon. Members are hoping to participate in the next debate. As such, it would be very helpful if questions were brief, so that the Deputy Prime Minister can be concise in return.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

How would a future pandemic be different from the previous ones in terms of strategic stocks of protective equipment, and vaccine research, manufacture and distribution, should we be visited with such a disaster by a Chinese wet market or even a laboratory?

National Security Bill

Debate between Julian Lewis and Rosie Winterton

Consideration of Lords message
Monday 26th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order. Before I call the next speaker, let me say that I am conscious that the debate has to finish at four minutes past 9. I know that the Minister will want five minutes at the end, and we also have to hear from the Scottish National party, so I ask people to take that into account.

I call the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, Sir Julian Lewis.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Lords amendment 22B, accepted by the upper House last Wednesday, 21 June, requires a UK-registered political party to publish a policy statement ensuring the identification of foreign donations and providing the Electoral Commission with an annual statement showing the foreign donations received. This is the second time that the other place has amended the Bill to include such a clause. On behalf of the ISC, I spoke in favour of the previous version of the amendment when the Bill was last in the Commons, and, as Lord West stated on Wednesday, the ISC’s position remains the same: we firmly support the introduction of this provision. It is deeply concerning that the Government continue to oppose it.

In 2020, the ISC’s long-delayed Russia report highlighted the risk of foreign state-linked financial interference in UK politics. There is clearly a threat that needs to be tackled. The Committee on Standards in Public Life, in a major 2021 report on regulating electoral finance, concluded that

“the current rules are insufficient to guard against foreign interference in UK elections.”

That committee also observed that, since 2018, the Electoral Commission has supported the introduction into electoral finance regulation of risk management principles that are used for anti-money laundering checks conducted by companies. This amendment falls into that same category.

Members from both sides of both Houses have previously spoken strongly in support of the Lords amendment and, together with the evidence provided by the ISC, the Committee on Standards in Public Life and the Electoral Commission, have clearly set out why it is needed and why the current safeguards in our law are insufficient. By refusing to accept the need to update the law, the Government are rejecting the non-partisan conclusions of both Parliament and the Electoral Commission. They are inexplicably rejecting the opportunity significantly to improve the transparency and accountability of our political system by requiring political parties to take modest but important steps to identify and disclose donations received from foreign sources and states.

The Government claim to oppose this Lords amendment on the basis that the existing protections within electoral law are sufficient; that the amendment would not work in practice; and that it would place an undue burden on grassroots political organisations. Almost everyone else disagrees. The Government rely on the fact that existing electoral financing law requires political parties to check that a donor is “permissible”. Yet that misses the central point: the lack of any requirement for a political party to check the source of the funding.

There is currently no rule that political parties must conduct adequate due diligence on donors—not even donors operating in high-risk countries. Citizens domiciled abroad and companies based in the UK can donate to a political party with no questions asked about the source of the money. That applies even to companies that are making no operating profit. Why should a UK charity, or a UK company, have to undertake enhanced due diligence, under money laundering and terrorist financing law, where a donor is linked to a high-risk country, whereas a political party is exempt from that duty? Political parties surely require the highest level of protection.

National Security Bill

Debate between Julian Lewis and Rosie Winterton

Consideration of Lords amendments
Wednesday 3rd May 2023 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

It is clear from the opening contributions of both Front Benchers that there is a considerable degree of common ground on this legislation, and I would like to congratulate both of them on the way they have made their presentations. The Intelligence and Security Committee strongly welcomes the National Security Bill. The Committee has long called for reform of the Official Secrets Acts regime and highlighted the grave dangers posed by hostile state actors to the UK’s national security. Most recently, as we have heard, the ISC’s Russia report of 2020 made it clear that the Official Secrets Acts regime was outdated and not fit for purpose. It recommended that new legislation be urgently introduced to provide new tools to help our law enforcement and intelligence community, who work tirelessly to defend the UK’s national security.

The Bill modernises the Official Secrets Acts espionage regime and creates important new offences such as sabotage, foreign interference and assisting a foreign intelligence service. As recommended in the ISC’s Russia report, the Bill also creates the long-awaited foreign influence registration scheme. That must be a cause of particular satisfaction to the Minister for Security, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), who strongly promoted that policy during his very successful term as Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Together, these changes will increase the transparency of those threats and help to make the UK a more difficult operating environment for foreign intelligence services to act. They will help to deter hostile foreign powers from undertaking harmful activities and disrupt them at a much earlier stage. There have been several justified concerns about the way in which the Bill was handled, but after considerable scrutiny, especially in Committee and in the upper House, it has been greatly improved.

Manchester Arena Inquiry: Volume 3 Report

Debate between Julian Lewis and Rosie Winterton

Monday 6th March 2023 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

On behalf of the ISC, I extend our deepest sympathy to the families and individuals so dreadfully affected by this terrorist act.

I welcome the publication of the third volume of the Manchester Arena inquiry report, and I express my strong appreciation for the work of the inquiry team. Of course, the Committee will carefully consider the report and Sir John Saunders’s request that we should monitor the implementation of the inquiry’s recommendations. In the meantime, do the Government acknowledge and accept that the ISC is the only Committee of Parliament equipped with both the facilities and the clearances fully to undertake this type of classified scrutiny?

Integrated Review: Defence Command Paper

Debate between Julian Lewis and Rosie Winterton

Monday 22nd March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, Dr Julian Lewis.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

On the threats from Russia and communist China, will my right hon. Friend acknowledge that conflict in the grey zone is the modern equivalent of the old cold war—in both cases, hostile moves were deliberately kept below the threshold for open warfare? So does he accept that those who warn against cold war containment policies should seriously reflect and reconsider their position?

Points of Order

Debate between Julian Lewis and Rosie Winterton

Monday 22nd March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving notice of his point of order. I cannot speak for the business managers, and I am not aware of notification of a statement, but I am sure that Government Front Benchers will have heard what he has said about the desirability of notice of a debate on such matters.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Further to the point of order raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Wealden (Ms Ghani), I do not think that it is a case of whether one feels intimidated; surely it is a case of somebody attached to a foreign embassy sending an electronic message directly to the Twitter account of a parliamentarian that would make anybody feel intimidated. I do hope that you and Mr Speaker will consider whether some representations can be made about conduct, or misconduct, of this sort.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

As I think I made clear, it is extremely important that members of Committees or Members of Parliament in general do not feel threatened. As I say, I would suggest that any further representations should be made to the House authorities if there is a feeling that this is in any way continuing or has not been resolved in a satisfactory manner.

I will now suspend the House for three minutes for arrangements to be made for the next business.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Julian Lewis and Rosie Winterton

Consideration of Lords amendments
Wednesday 24th February 2021 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

We have until 6.56 pm to conclude proceedings on the Bill, so if Back-Bench contributions were less than five minutes long, that would enable us to get as many Members in as possible. I do not want to impose a time limit, but I hope that colleagues will be considerate of one another. I call Dr Julian Lewis, Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Right from the outset, the Intelligence and Security Committee has supported the principle behind the Bill, although we have also welcomed attempts by Members in both Houses to improve it. It is a very important Bill. Covert human intelligence sources or agents provide vital information to assist the security and intelligence agencies in their investigations. They save lives. As the head of MI5 recently said, without them, many of the attacks foiled in recent years

“would not have been prevented.”

In working undercover, CHIS need to be trusted by those they are reporting on, so that they can gain the information that the authorities need. CHIS may therefore need to carry out criminal activity to maintain their cover. Their handlers must be able to authorise them to do so, in certain circumstances and subject to specific safeguards. The Bill places the powers that certain organisations have to authorise such activity on an explicit statutory basis—something that we should all welcome.

The Bill before us has been improved since it was introduced in September, and that is a measure of the effective scrutiny of national security legislation by Parliament, including by the ISC. These are very serious powers for the state to exercise, and it is right that they be properly scrutinised. In particular, the ISC welcomes the provisions brought forward in the other place by Lord Anderson, the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, requiring all criminal conduct authorisations to be notified to judicial commissioners as soon as possible and within seven days. Judicial oversight is a vital safeguard, and this measure should give the public confidence that these powers will be used only when proportionate, necessary, and in accordance with the law.

The final amendments to the Bill that the House is being asked to approve today are sensible provisions that the House should welcome. The additional safeguards for children and vulnerable people are particularly welcome, and it is clear that the Government have listened to the strength of feeling in both Houses on this matter. Many of the changes made to the Bill will be reflected in an updated CHIS code of conduct, which I understand will be drafted over the coming months. This revised code of conduct will include new language emphasising the important oversight role of the Intelligence and Security Committee in relation to the use of these powers by the intelligence agencies. The Committee welcomes that, and I can assure the House that the ISC fully intends to exercise its oversight powers to ensure that criminal conduct authorisations are used appropriately.

I thank Ministers and those who support them for the constructive way in which they have engaged with the Committee on the Bill. I pay particular tribute to my right hon. Friend the Minister for Security, who unfortunately cannot be with us today. I wish him the very best for his recovery, and I look forward to working with him in future. Finally, I pay tribute to the men and women of our security and intelligence agencies and, most importantly on this occasion, to their covert human intelligence sources—individuals whom few of us will ever know, but whose bravery saves lives. We all owe them a great debt of gratitude for their courageous service.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Julian Lewis and Rosie Winterton

Committee stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons & Report stage & Report stage: House of Commons
Thursday 15th October 2020 Commons Chamber

[The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I remind Members that there are a number of colleagues down to speak in the debate. There will be three Front-Bench winding-up speeches, which will have to start just before 3.20 pm, and then I suspect there will be votes. I cannot introduce a time limit, because we are in Committee, but I am sure that Members will be considerate to one another. I call Dr Julian Lewis.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Ind)]

Thank you, Dame Rosie; I shall endeavour to be helpful. It is only by the good fortune, dare I say it, of there having been yet another statement on the covid crisis that many members of the Intelligence and Security Committee are able to take part in this debate at all. I have written to the Leader of the House about this, and I appeal to the Government’s business managers in future not to schedule legislation of this sort, which is directly relevant to the Intelligence and Security Committee, on the same day that it is known that the Committee has an immovable meeting. I am grateful to the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) for being willing to leave our main meeting early, so as to be sure that new clause 3 could be covered, and I will now make some remarks about that new clause.

The Intelligence and Security Committee, as was stated on Second Reading, strongly supports the principle behind this legislation. CHIS play a vital role in identifying and disrupting terrorist plots. They save lives, often at great risk to themselves. Sometimes they must commit offences to maintain their cover, and their handlers must be able to authorise them to do so in certain circumstances and subject to specific safeguards. We welcome the Bill, which will place the state’s power to authorise that conduct on an explicit statutory footing.

However, concerns were raised on Second Reading that the Bill does not provide for sufficient safeguards and oversight measures. The ISC agrees. There is a clear role for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, and it is absolutely right that the commissioner is able to use his judicial oversight powers to ensure that those powers are used only with due care and consideration by the agencies that authorise criminal conduct.

The Bill, as it stands, does not provide for any parliamentary scrutiny of the use of these authorisation powers, so the amendment that the ISC has tabled—new clause 3—proposes not to duplicate the role of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in any way, but instead to require the Secretary of State to provide the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament with an annual report of information on the number of criminal conduct authorisations that have been authorised by the agencies that the Committee oversees as well as on the categories authorised. All we are looking for is a simple table saying that these are the categories of offences that have been authorised, those are the totals in each category and this is the grand total.