European Union (Approval of Treaty Amendment Decision) Bill [Lords]

Kelvin Hopkins Excerpts

Monday 3rd September 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Clearly, the economic crisis in the eurozone—“implosion”, as my hon. Friend terms it—affects us enormously, but so do many other things in the world such as the deficit of the United States and the economic policies of China. What we are dealing with is the approval of one change to article 136—a change that concerns eurozone countries and gives certainty to the creation of a treaty purely for those countries. It has an additional benefit for the United Kingdom, to which I shall come in the course of my speech.

I do not pretend for a moment that the ratification of the decision or the establishment of the ESM alone will solve the eurozone crisis. As the present situation shows, many other things are needed for that solution. For the long term, sustainable public finances and globally competitive economies in all the eurozone’s member states are needed. Those tasks are vital not just for eurozone countries to succeed but for the United Kingdom as well, and are at the heart of this Government’s programme.

[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

I thank the Foreign Secretary for giving way. He has talked about resolving the eurozone crisis, but the measure will just pour good money after bad. Will not the ultimate resolution of the eurozone crisis come only when certain countries are allowed to leave the eurozone, recreate their own currencies and expand their economies again?

[Mr Hague]

Different solutions can be advocated and the hon. Gentleman is advocating what he thinks would help as a solution. However, the point that he and I have to bear in mind is that those countries—their national Parliaments and democratically elected Governments—wish to stay in the eurozone. That position is different from the one that he and I have always taken on the United Kingdom, but that is their wish. Therefore in practice we are dealing with that situation. We want those countries to succeed in stabilising the eurozone.

Let us take the worst-case scenario—the hon. Gentleman’s assumption that the measure would pour good money after bad. What we are ensuring is that money from the United Kingdom taxpayer is not going after other money, good or bad, giving assistance to eurozone countries. The Bill provides solely for the parliamentary approval of an amendment to article 136 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, which makes it clear that the eurozone member states may, by means of a separate intergovernmental agreement, establish a financial assistance mechanism—the European stability mechanism, or ESM—without acting in contravention of their obligations as member states of the EU.

As the House will know, this is not the first time that this treaty amendment has been considered and approved by Parliament. Before the Prime Minister agreed to the treaty amendment decision in March last year, a motion in favour of the draft decision was passed by both Houses under the provisions of the previous legislation—the European Union (Amendment) Act 2008. Before our Act of last year, that was all the parliamentary scrutiny and control required for the Government to agree to a change in the EU treaties under the simplified revision procedure.

In our view, those provisions were grossly inadequate, so at that time my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe committed us to bringing the decision before the House again under the more stringent parliamentary scrutiny of what was then the European Union Bill. Indeed, we introduced an amendment to that Bill, now section 5(6), to enable the treaty change to be subject to the Bill’s provisions once it entered into force. That Bill has become the European Union Act 2011 and any use of the simplified revision procedure now requires an Act of Parliament for ratification. That is why this Bill is being presented to the House.

Having gained the approval of Parliament in March last year, the Prime Minister formally agreed to the decision at the following European Council. The decision must now be ratified by all 27 member states before the amendment to article 136 can enter into force. Eighteen member states have now done so. The target date for entry into force, as set out in the European Council decision, is 1 January 2013.

The scrutiny process under the European Union Act 2011 began in October last year, just under two months after its relevant provisions came into force, when I laid a statement before Parliament, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) has referred, under the provisions of section 5 of the 2011 Act. I set out in that statement why the decision does not trigger the requirements for a referendum set down in the European Union Act 2011.

The proposed amendment to article 136 applies only to member states whose currency is the euro. Consequently, it does not transfer further competence or power to the EU from the UK. The opinion set out in the statement was open to judicial review, but in the intervening 11 months no one has sought to challenge it in the courts. To ensure timely ratification of the decision, which is strongly in our country’s interests for reasons that I will now come to, the Bill was introduced in the Lords, where it was passed without amendment. Should the Commons now grant its approval, the Government intend to ratify the treaty amendment by the end of this year.

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[Mr Alexander]

I hope I can give my right hon. Friend the assurances that he seeks. The Opposition are far from indifferent about the future of the eurozone, not least for the reason that I have already explained—many British jobs and exports rely on the eurozone coming through the current crisis. His point highlights one of the delusions that is apparent among at least a few Members, which is that if Britain were to leave the European Union, the concerns that currently afflict the eurozone would somehow become remote from the interests of British jobs and workers. The eurozone will continue to be of absolutely fundamental interest to British manufacturers, exporters and jobs. The Prime Minister arrived at a recent summit lecturing the Germans and left being shouted at by the French, and that certainly does not seem to me to be how to secure the type of agreement that I sense lies behind my right hon. Friend’s question, which we want to see in the best interests of stability in the eurozone.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

Is it not the case that countries such as Poland and Britain have the great advantage that they can choose a parity for their currency that is appropriate to their own economies, rather than being forced to adopt a wholly inappropriate parity through the eurozone like Greece, Ireland and a number of other countries? Does my right hon. Friend agree that if Britain had joined the euro with the parity that existed at that time, we would now have a wrecked economy?

[Mr Alexander]

It is hardly a revelation that I strongly supported the five economic tests back in the years immediately following 1997, whether in relation to the convergence criteria or more broadly. In that sense, the Opposition’s position has not changed. It was an intriguing interpretation of history by the Foreign Secretary to attribute to his own conduct out of office so much credit for what the Labour Government did in office in keeping Britain outside the euro. However, he is right to recognise that there is broad consensus, which extends even to the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood), that there is no immediate prospect of British entry to the euro, for some of the reasons that my hon. Friend describes.

Let me be clear about some of the Opposition’s specific concerns, in a spirit of genuine concern about and mutual interest in the eurozone. First, we believe that the eurozone firewall needs to be bigger in scale and more flexible in operation than the ESM alone currently allows. Although the ESM is a key part of that broader firewall, an effective European Central Bank should also be used to enhance, and contribute to the establishment of, an effective firewall. Since the House last debated the matter, the ECB has announced its intention to begin buying bonds if member states comply with the relevant conditions regarding the management of their fiscal budgets. That is a welcome development, and we look forward to the ECB president Mario Draghi’s announcement this Thursday of how that new programme will work. The ECB must now deliver on its promise if it is to function properly as a lender of last resort and provide the necessary firepower to support the eurozone economies effectively under bond market pressure.

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[Mr Cash]

My hon. Friend is right. Those of us who argued that we should come out of the ERM were laughed at. But on that famous date, 15 September—

[Kelvin Hopkins]

Golden Wednesday.

[Mr Cash]

Indeed, although it is known by others as Black Wednesday. However it is described, it saved our economy then.

To come back to the unemployment that has been inflicted by treaties that are not meant to be changed—the single currency is regarded as irrevocable—the youth unemployment level in Spain has moved beyond 52%, as it has in Greece. Other countries are moving in the same direction and the quack remedy contained in these bail-out provisions does not have enough snake oil in the bottle to make it even half realistic.

There are those, such as the coalition Government, who claim that under the arcane procedures of section 4(4) of the European Union Act 2011, we should vote for this arrangement because it will solve the euro crisis and—miracle of miracles—will not affect us. That is but a harrowing indication of the pain of hopelessness in the face of proven experience. There have been at least 20 economic summits in the past 24 months and not one has come up with a rational solution. All they ever do is promise more and more money that they do not have, with the implicit assumption that if they do not have it they will print it, and break the rule of law—the law laid down through the European Union that we implement under the European Communities Act 1972. Although we are not members of the eurozone, it certainly affects us, and it certainly affects the other European countries.

The explanatory memorandum to the 2011 Act, which I and many other colleagues here voted against, put down amendments to and did everything in our power to prevent from passing, because it simply was not going to work, stated that

“an Article 48(6) decision does not apply to the UK merely”—

I repeat “merely”—

“because it may have consequences for individuals or organisations within the UK, such as UK businesses.”

Believe it or not, that is given as a reason why a referendum is not required—because it would “merely” have an effect on UK businesses. That is on the astonishing grounds that although it has consequences for the daily lives of our voters and their small and medium-sized businesses, it is a mere detail that under the 2011 Act the Government can swat away with reference to “the opinion of the Foreign Secretary”. And that opinion cannot be properly challenged. Anyone who knows anything about administrative law knows that where an Act of Parliament states, “In the opinion of”, it effectively bars challenge in judicial review. I would be extremely surprised, therefore, if it was possible to set up a judicial review—I noted that the Foreign Secretary said that none had been forthcoming. People might well assume that because those words are in the Bill—it has not been enacted yet—there is no point in seeking to upset it because it will only have effect when it becomes an Act of Parliament.

The legislation goes further. Clause 1(3) explicitly states that the decision taken by the European Council on 25 March 2011 does not warrant a referendum, on the spurious grounds that it is the view of the Foreign Secretary, whose opinion once given cannot be effectively challenged, irrespective of the consequences for voters and UK businesses. I certainly concede that we are not part of the eurozone or directly contributing to the bail-out, but what is happening is having a devastating impact on our growth.

As I said in reply to an intervention a few moments ago and as I clearly demonstrated in an article I wrote for The Daily Telegraph on 14 August, I simply do not subscribe to the view that changes in planning law and ever-more Keynesian attempts to boost public spending will do anything if we do not sort out the problems with the single market. We are trading a monumental deficit with the EU, and it is doing immense damage to our economy. Trading with the EU is now like trading with a bankrupt company. The Bill will allow the drug of continual bail-outs, so heavily criticised by the President of the Bundesbank, with the involvement of the ECB, to drag Europe into an ever-deeper maelstrom. To then pretend that it does not affect us, when 50% of our trade is with the EU, is economic and political nonsense on stilts, which is why I voted against the proposals in 2011. Since then the situation has got worse and worse.

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[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Camborne and Redruth (George Eustice). I agreed with much of his speech, particularly his emphasis on the desirability and common sense of flexible exchange rates—not necessarily floating exchange rates, but flexible exchange rates, at the very least, so that countries can choose and negotiate currency arrangements that suit their economies. If all countries can do that, they are free to reflate their economies and to drive growth, so everybody benefits. That is the great advantage. Co-ordinated reflation was a slogan that many of us on the Keynesian left called for back in the 1980s. Indeed, co-ordinated reflation would be desirable now, but we have co-ordinated deflation—savage deflation whereby people wonder why the economies of the world are getting into difficulty. It is because Government after Government are cutting deficits, driving cuts and deflating their economies. There is quite a lot that we in the debate have in common.

I should make two points before proceeding. One is to emphasise my support for the strong view put by the Minister for Europe—and indeed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire South (Mr Alexander), the shadow Foreign Secretary—that civil servants should remain non-political. It should be Ministers who are accountable and Ministers who are political. Ministers, as well as Members of the House and politicians, should make political statements, not civil servants. The great tradition of non-political civil servants for whom Ministers are responsible should be preserved and given strong support. We should not accept the contagion of the officials in the European Commission, who are politicians in the guise of officials who drive policies themselves. Our civil servants are not like Commission officials, and we should not let them drift in that direction due to the contagion they experience in Brussels.

I shall not speak for long, but I want to emphasise that we are in serious difficulty—not just in Britain, but across the European Union. It is my view that the euro will ultimately not prevail and will not last simply because it cannot work. Countries cannot constantly deflate their way to success. There will come a point at which Greek people will realise that it is the euro that is their problem. Some on the left think that now, but many others will come to that view.

When Greece is able to escape from the euro, re-create the drachma and devalue substantially, people will find imports too expensive and what they spend will be directed to the domestic economy, which will help their domestic economy to grow. Greece’s exports include tourism and holidays, and when Greek holidays drop to half the price they are now, many more people will have holidays there.

[Mr MacShane]

I am following the argument, but will my hon. Friend explain why the British pound experiencing a severe devaluation of up to 25%, or perhaps nearly 30%, of its value in the past four years has led to a worsening balance of trade and an increased recession? If devaluation of a currency is the magic recipe, why has it not worked for us?

[Kelvin Hopkins]

There is a case that we still have not depreciated our currency enough, but demand for our exports is falling because there is deflation elsewhere, particularly elsewhere in the EU. We should consider the history of devaluations; the proper ones have invariably been very beneficial. After the escape from the exchange rate mechanism in 1992, the economy bounced back strongly and many Conservative Members would agree that, had they managed to stay in office for three or four more years, people might have realised that that big devaluation was driving economic growth and falling unemployment. We reaped the benefit of the collapse and what happened in the ERM, particularly in my constituency, which was the epicentre of housing repossessions and negative equity, which led to my having one of the largest swings to Labour in the country, simply because of the ERM.

I was one of the few people who wrote about economics in 1990 who were saying that the ERM would be a disaster. I predicted—I surprised myself, indeed—the precise course of that experience and said what would happen in the end: interest rates would go through the roof and eventually we would come out of the ERM and devalue, which we did. However, that is not the point that I am making tonight.

I agree with the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) on many things, but I do not agree with him on economic policy. I doubt that many Conservative Members read the New Statesman, but in the last week or two it has featured a series of economists who initially signed a letter of support for the Government, but are now recanting, saying that they made a mistake and should not have called for deflation and cuts. They are implying that that situation ought to be reversed. I agree with them, and I was one of the few in the House who absolutely and profoundly disagreed with the Government from the beginning, quoting Paul Krugman and others, who said that they were going in precisely the wrong direction, towards the savage deflation that led to the 1930s’ depression.

We are in danger of going in that direction now. Countries have to find a way to expand their economies, and they will not do that when they are stuck in stupid arrangements such as the euro. We must have a deconstruction of the euro. There is much talk of an uncontrolled crash, but currency zones can be deconstructed rationally. When the Soviet Union collapsed, all the countries of the ex-Soviet Union created their own currencies. That was done fairly straightforwardly. When Slovakia and the Czech Republic separated as Czechoslovakia broke up, they created their own separate currencies. That worked. It can be done in a controlled and not-too-difficult way. I shall not say that it will be that easy, but it is not impossible and there are examples of such a thing happening. I suggest that, initially, Greece, and perhaps one or two other countries, ought to quit the euro and recreate their own currencies. That might mean freezing banks for a few days and so on.

[Mr Michael McCann (East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow) (Lab)]

I am following the argument closely, but can my hon. Friend explain himself? He is talking about countries that came from an impoverished state, so the only way was up. Surely the problem with the eurozone is that we are talking about countries that have experienced high standards of living. Ultimately, any break up would mean that those would go down.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

Standards of living ultimately depend on productivity. If a country produces wealth it can consume wealth. If those countries get into a position whereby they can start to rebuild their economies and expand growth—have more people going on holiday to Greece, for example—they will bounce back and become better off again. I have said many times, in writing and in the House, that strong currencies derive from strong economies, not the other way round. If a strong currency is imposed on a weak economy, it will drive that economy down.

Finding a way to get that economy to grow, which might initially mean a devaluation, means that the currency will ultimately strengthen. Indeed, the 1944 Bretton Woods conference made arrangements that allowed for countries to depreciate or devalue their currencies as necessary. Indeed, if Keynes had had his way, he would have had countries required to appreciate their currencies. I suggest that Germany ought to be appreciating its currency and not be allowed to get away with what it has done for decades, which is to undervalue its currency. That has meant that it has had a competitive advantage against every other nation in the EU, and indeed in Europe.

If the euro were to be deconstructed, a major consequence would be the new deutschmark appreciating quite substantially. There are now worries even in countries such as Denmark and Finland. Finland, which is in the euro, would be forced upwards to a currency valuation that it found uncomfortable. The Danes have chosen to peg their currency to the euro. They might think again about devaluing, but Germany has, effectively, an undervalued currency relative to all the other countries of Europe, which is a fundamental component of its economic success. That is an unfair way to operate and we ought to address it.

I am pessimistic about the future of the eurozone. At the moment, there is a kind of “quietism”. People in the EU are trying not to talk about all the terrible things that are going on, but as I understand it from my friends on the continent, what is effectively a giant building society in France was last week on the verge of having a run—going bankrupt and people taking their money out. The French Government effectively nationalised it and pushed €90 billion into it to save it. That has just happened to President Hollande, but people do not want to talk about it too much because they know that there are many other problems of that kind. There is a Franco-Belgian bank into which €50 billion has been pumped to keep it alive. Indeed, even German banks have lots of supposed assets that are not really assets; they are IOUs that will never be repaid. If I claimed that people owed me £100,000, but I knew that they were all poor people and would never be able to pay me, that would not be an asset of £100,000, but a worthless IOU. A lot of banks are stuffed full of worthless IOUs; that is the reality. It is only when countries start to manage their economies effectively on a national basis, with an appropriate currency value and appropriate interest rates, that they will start to recover. Many of the poorer countries will never be able to compete within the euro, and ought to get out fairly soon and re-establish their own currency.

Take the case of Ireland; I have many Irish constituents. The reality is that Ireland is part of the British economy more than anything else. It should be part of the sterling area, but it is overvalued relative to sterling. If it recreated the punt, devalued and came into line with sterling, Ireland would benefit enormously, because we are its major trading partner. I hope that will happen, because it will benefit many of my Irish constituents and their relatives in Ireland. I look forward to common sense ultimately prevailing, but I have a feeling that we will go through an awful lot of pain before that happens.