High Speed 2

Debate between Kelvin Hopkins and Frank Dobson

Wednesday 25th March 2015 Westminster Hall

[Kelvin Hopkins]

I am not yet a Privy Counsellor and I do not suppose that I ever will be, but the hon. Gentleman’s point about Curzon Street was absolutely right; I was coming to it myself. In my submission to the House of Lords Committee, which was titled, “Sensible alternatives to HS2”, I gave three specific alternatives that would cost a fraction of that amount but solve all the problems that HS2 might supposedly solve.

First, I suggested the electrification of the Birmingham Snow Hill line, via Banbury, to London. It currently goes to Marylebone or Paddington, but it could easily be linked—the tracks are already there, so all it needs is a bit of track work—to Crossrail going in both directions. If we had an electric train from Snow Hill in the middle of the Birmingham business district that went direct to Canary Wharf at 125 mph, someone could work on a laptop without changing trains and I bet that train would beat HS2 if otherwise that person had to get to Curzon Street and then get two tube trains at the London end. HS2 is a complete and total nonsense, but that suggestion would provide wonderful extra capacity.

That would also allow travel direct to Heathrow from the centre of Birmingham and it could be linked through from Leamington Spa on to the west coast main line, so we could have Birmingham airport linked to Heathrow airport with a direct, 125 mph, one-hour service. They could almost be hubs or satellites for each other. There could be trains from further north—from Manchester—coming down the west coast main line, joining the Banbury line and going directly from the centre of Manchester to Heathrow or Canary Wharf. It is possible for a tiny fraction of the cost of HS2.

[Frank Dobson]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is the benefits that the alternatives to HS2 would bring to other parts of the country that probably explain why there is a majority against HS2 in every region of this country, according to the opinion polls, even in the north-west, where people are most enthusiastic about it? Even there, the divide is 43% to 39%.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

My right hon. Friend has spoken wisely, as always.

Finance (No. 2) Bill

Debate between Kelvin Hopkins and Frank Dobson

Monday 15th April 2013 Commons Chamber

[Frank Dobson]

I never said for a minute that it started recently. It has been going on for donkey’s years. I am not sure about the Lib Dems, but I cannot remember an organisation when Labour was in government called Tories in Favour of Stopping Tax Avoidance. Perhaps the minutes will be produced by someone, but it seems extremely unlikely, because everything the Tories ever said when they were in opposition was about Labour being too nasty to the finance industry and proposing things that might damage it. So we trundled on, until the finance industry damaged the rest of us. It is worth remembering that the banks’ wrongdoing has cost us £700 billion in lost production since the crash. That is what we have all lost.

These British banks and firms of accountants are not just organising tax avoidance in the tax havens for all the swindlers. We now know—from prosecutions and from agreements that they have come to with the American authorities—that they have been organising money laundering from massive drug dealing, gun running, people trafficking and busting sanctions on places such as Burma.

I think the British banks should be doing something a bit different. I think they might possibly have done a bit of investing in this country. In the past, small businesses all over the country could go and see their local bank managers at one of the big banks and talk to them about their problems. They knew one another and knew what their prospects were. People could borrow money that way, and it worked. Then the banks started centralising all the funds, so nothing is left with the local bank manager and local firms now have to be interrogated by an algorithm—that is what it boils down to—in the banks’ headquarters. They have not been investing in this country. We have to ask ourselves why a large proportion of the industries that were privatised are now owned by foreign owners, such as Électricité de France or the Australian outfit that owns Thames Water. Could the British banks not have invested in British businesses? Was there not enough profit for them? Does that mean that the profits in the tax havens and from all sorts of derivatives activities were going to raise them more money? That may be so, but what has happened demonstrates just how awful the performance of the British banks and finance industry has been.

I do not think this Finance Bill, any of the proposals the Government have put forward or even the one or two they have started implementing reflect the scale of wrongdoing that needs to be put right—the swindling that involved British companies and the damage that does to us as a trading nation with, until recently, a reputation for honesty and fair dealing. At its core—I say this with some care—this is a corrupt set-up. We have a banking industry and an accountancy industry that are involved in criminal and semi-criminal activity all over the world, yet we say to countries such as Bangladesh, “There’s too much corruption in your country.” If we are going to start trying to sort out corruption in other places, it is about time we did it here and where British companies are operating. We need transparency, and we certainly do not need tax havens, especially those that fly the British flag. Their objective is not transparency but the complete opposite: it is to be as obscure as is humanly possible in order to keep the tax authorities out.

Another point that is constantly made is that, if we were to change the rules on banking and accountancy, the very clever people in the City would simply get round them. That is unacceptable. Why should such behaviour be acceptable in the finance industry? We would regard it as totally unacceptable if the building industry said, “You can rely on us to get round the building regulations,” if the aviation industry said, “We can get round the safety rules,” or if the pharmaceutical industry said, “We won’t carry out the proper checks that are required. We can get round those rules.” We ought to regard it as totally unacceptable when people representing the finance industry say, “Whatever you do in the House of Commons, we’ll get round your rules.”

[Kelvin Hopkins]

The hon. Member for Redcar (Ian Swales) suggested that some people ought to go to prison for such behaviour. Does my right hon. Friend agree that that might concentrate a few minds?

[Frank Dobson]

It certainly should. I am astonished that no one in this country has yet been prosecuted for the fraud involved in the LIBOR rate-rigging, including the British Bankers Association, which was, after all, running the LIBOR system. People were defrauded, so why has no one been prosecuted? I do not know, but someone should be.

Another excuse for not sorting out the problems in our banking industry is that we must not go it alone because that would put the industry at a disadvantage compared with others. We are told, for instance, that we cannot possibly be the first country to introduce a financial transaction tax—a Tobin tax, a Robin Hood tax—because to do so would put our banks at a disadvantage. However, Germany and France have now proposed an EU-wide financial transaction tax, yet our Government still say no. What are they frightened of? The rate of tax proposed on derivatives transactions that the 11 countries led by Germany are establishing in Europe is 0.01%. Apparently, our financial services industry is so pathetic that it would be driven to ruin by a transaction tax rate of 0.01%.

In fact, we already have a transaction tax in this country: it is called VAT. Nearly every other business in this country is paying a transaction tax of 20%. If everyone else is deemed capable of paying 20%, why should the financial services industry be deemed incapable of paying 0.01% on its transactions, 85% of which are carried out within the industry, between its various constituent parts, rather than with anyone else. That is pathetic, and it is about time that we recognised that a substantial amount of money could be raised for the taxpayer in this country, even at a rate of 0.01%.

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[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

I cannot resist commenting on one of the points made by the hon. Member for Macclesfield (David Rutley). He suggested that businesses are somehow more competitive because we have a better tax regime, yet our trade deficit is in a terrible state, and getting worse. If everything is so brilliant, we should be doing better on international trade.

[Frank Dobson]

While my hon. Friend is commenting on the speech made by the hon. Member for Macclesfield (David Rutley), was he somewhat taken aback to discover that nurses, doctors, firefighters and police in Macclesfield are apparently not occupying real jobs?

[Kelvin Hopkins]

My right hon. Friend makes a good point: when we go to a hospital, we find that no one is there, because those in such jobs are not real people. Indeed, I might add Members of Parliament to that list.

The hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) was desperately trying to be positive about the Budget, but in the process he effectively damned the Chancellor with faint praise. If we had pressed him hard enough, I think he would have conceded most of our points.

The Bill will clearly do nothing to transform our economy. We are in a desperate state—an ongoing recession. The Chancellor says that his Budget is fiscally neutral, but when 2.5 million people are unemployed and we have low or negative growth, we do not want a fiscally neutral Budget. We should have had an expansionary Budget to promote growth, but of course even a fiscally neutral Budget could inject growth into the economy by raising taxes and spending more, rather than doing the opposite. If taxes on businesses and the wealthy are reduced, they tend to save their money—indeed, they put it in tax havens—whereas if ordinary people are given jobs, the first thing they do is to spend their money, and that money goes directly back into the economy and starts to generate demand through the multiplier.

The hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster was right that forecasting is difficult. I remember that in 1990—I am older than everybody else in the Chamber—when The Sunday Times carried out a survey of forecasting organisations, it found that the London Business School was bottom of the league, scoring nought out of 10 for its forecasts, although of course that was the forecasting body adored by the Conservative Government under Mrs Thatcher. The best forecasts were by the Cambridge Economic Policy Group, a left-leaning Keynesian group, which got six out of 10 to come top of the league. The then Government were so annoyed by the Cambridge group that they took away its Government grant because they did not like people telling them that they were wrong, although they were.

Demand for the things that people produce is a crucial factor if an economy is to succeed, because although Governments can cut taxes for businesses and introduce all sorts of supply-side measures, if no one is buying anything, the economy will not grow. An equally crucial factor for sustaining that demand is an appropriate exchange rate. Successive Governments have ignored the exchange rate at their peril, but there have been times when the depreciation of our currency has had dramatic results, and I can cite three examples under a Conservative Government. Following Golden Wednesday and the collapse of the exchange rate mechanism, the economy grew strongly after a substantial depreciation. By the time that 1997 came along, the Conservatives were still being condemned for the collapse of the housing market and the people voted Labour—thank goodness for that—yet the Labour Government benefited from the strong demand generated by that depreciation. In 1979 Mrs Thatcher was praised for her economic policies, but the 1979 Budget, masterminded, if I can describe it like that, by Geoffrey Howe, resulted in a catastrophic collapse in demand. A fifth of manufacturing disappeared and unemployment soared to 3 million. It was only when those policies were reversed that there was a recovery, and on Nigel Lawson’s watch—I do not necessarily agree with everything he did—the pound depreciated by over 30%. Again, the economy grew strongly and unemployment came down.

Going back even further into history, in the 1931 crisis, a Labour Government mistakenly tried to sustain sterling on the gold standard, and tried to keep its parity up. The Government fell apart, and effectively a Conservative Government with a nominally Labour Prime Minister came in straight afterwards. The first thing they did was take the pound off the gold standard and depreciate, and the recovery began. That was only part of it; other factors were necessary to sustain recovery in the 1930s. We had to spend a lot of money, and towards the end of the ’30s the country built thousands—indeed, millions—of houses, and that was how we recovered. That is what we ought to do now.

In other countries, Germany built arms and autobahns; in America, there was the new deal—spending money on all sorts of public works, which created the demand in the economy that brought about recovery. It was not fiddling around with tax rates and supply-side measures. That did not work then, and it will not work now. The exchange rate is therefore absolutely crucial, and the exchange rate at this time is too high. Part of our recovery should depend on a significant depreciation. An erudite and informed book by my friend John Mills has been written about this, and I have quoted from it in the Chamber. It makes a detailed case for such measures.

The trade statistics are disastrous, and some of us have been worried about manufacturing for a long time. Our manufacturing sector is about half the size of the German manufacturing sector as a proportion of our economy, which is disastrous. We should be a similar economy to Germany in many ways. Historically, we have been very similar in all sorts of ways, but our manufacturing has collapsed. That was partly because in 1997, when Labour came to office, there was at the same time a substantial appreciation of the pound, which began to damage manufacturing. We were sustained by an asset price bubble, which carried on, and thank goodness, we had a relatively strong economy for some time. However, manufacturing did not do well, because of the relatively strong pound. It was only the crisis of 2008, when there was a significant depreciation, that saved us. Had we been stuck in the euro, we would be like Spain now—it would be absolutely disastrous—so we must applaud my right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) for keeping us out of the euro, despite pressure from the then Prime Minister. I was one of those who supported my right hon. Friend very strongly at the time.

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Kelvin Hopkins and Frank Dobson

Monday 11th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Frank Dobson]

Yes, but if we are to get the changes we need, we also need to change the culture in both sectors.

The banks have never competed with one another, or at least not in trying to get customers. Rather, they have tended to compete by copying one another. When one bank comes up with a wheeze that swindles money, the bosses of the other banks say, “Why are they getting all this money in through this swindle? Can’t we do the swindle as well?” That is presumably how PPI started off at one bank and then went to all the others. Interest rate swap agreements certainly started at one bank and were then taken up by the others, because people in those banks felt they had to compete with the other swindlers down the road.

These people—this collection of money launderers, gun runners, drug money launderers, people who swindle small businesses and people who lose billions in their normal day-to-day business—are still paying themselves huge amounts of money. I know that the Prime Minister has a difficulty with facts, but I did not realise that he had a problem with adjectives, because when the Royal Bank of Scotland announced that it was paying £600 million in bonuses this year, he commended it—this bank of losers —for its restraint. That is not my definition of restraint. “Excess” is probably a better word in the circumstances. Restraint involves cutting the benefits of poor people and the pensions of the police, the nurses and the teachers. Restraint involves capping the pay of public employees. They have certainly been losing out. In 2009, I said that the two banks that were being semi-nationalised should have the normal public sector pay policies applied to them, and I think most people in this country would agree with that.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

I am greatly enjoying my right hon. Friend’s speech, and I agree with every word of it. Does he not find it interesting that Lord Lawson has recently suggested that the Royal Bank of Scotland should be brought completely into public ownership? That would involve only a small amount of money, and we would then have a bank that was publicly accountable and responsible.

[Frank Dobson]

I entirely agree with that. I also agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw that it would be good to see the Halifax building society separated out from Lloyds HBOS, so that what was the country’s leading firm could be relocated and its decisions could once again be made in Halifax, rather than in the City of London.

Let us remember that while the people who are nursing the sick and carrying out operations in hospitals, the people who are teaching our children, the people who are policing our streets and the people who are risking their lives to fight fires are being restricted, HSBC is paying 204 people more than £1 million a year, Barclays is paying 428 people more than £1 million a year and RBS is paying 95 people more than £1 million a year. They are being paid those sums to play with other people’s money. That is all they are doing; if they lose but cannot go broke, they are clearly not playing with their own money. But not everyone at Barclays is getting £1 million a year; 100,000 people working for that bank are paid at a level that entitles them to child tax credit. What is more, it is people such as them all around the country who have been losing their jobs while that collection of losers at the top carry on.

Then we have the Prime Minister and the Chancellor, whose top priority in Europe is to prevent those horrible Europeans from imposing a limit on bankers’ bonuses. We used to be told that if we imposed such limits, the bankers would go elsewhere. We were told that they would go to Switzerland. Well, they will not be doing that since the referendum in that country, because they would now be worse off there than they would be here. Would they perhaps go to the United States? Some of them would have to think very carefully about that, because money launderers can be locked up over there, and that has indeed happened, even to Brits.

What all this boils down to is that the banking industry does not need mild tinkering; it needs a total worldwide transformation. Instead of acting as the back marker in the convoy, we ought to be out there banging a drum and getting a grip on the world banking industry, for the benefit of ordinary people in virtually every part of the world.

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[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

That was a fascinating speech by my good friend the hon. Member for Wycombe (Steve Baker). I cannot compete with his erudition; I have a much smaller speech on a smaller issue.

In 1983, I stood for Parliament on a manifesto that called for the public ownership of large sections of the banking system. It is an irony that large sections of it are now in public ownership, having been put there by people who profoundly disagree with and disbelieve in that process, but who were forced to do so or to let the system collapse. That is interesting. I certainly wish to see public ownership go further, as well as public regulation and accountability, as the risk in banking is being underwritten not by the borrowers but by the Government, by the state and by the citizen, and if risk is not and cannot be transferred, the ownership and accountability should be in public hands as well.

During the Minister’s opening speech, I mentioned audit and the appalling failures of the audit industry during the banking crisis. The hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) said that more needs to be done, and much more certainly needs to be done. I hope that some component of the Bill, when it is amended, might deal with audit.

There is a need for radical reform of the rules governing audit. The Financial Reporting Council is undertaking a consultation on the new rules that will compel auditors to write what is called a commentary, flagging problems, risks or disagreements with management at audited companies and institutions in clear and comprehensible language so that shareholders can understand. That will be seen as controversial by company management, but will be welcomed by shareholders and, by the same token, by bank depositors and customers.

We should of course remind ourselves that auditors, above all, represent shareholders—or at least they should. In reality, however, they are taken on by managers so power is effectively in the hands of managers and shareholders, or bank depositors, and customers simply have to trust them. When an audit contract comes to an end, auditors are unlikely to be critical of managers for fear of failing to be re-engaged. The inevitable cosy relationship between auditors and managers lies at the heart of what has gone wrong in the banking sector.

If auditors had been doing their job properly and their audit reports had not been so opaque and impenetrable, the financial crisis would not have happened as it did. The fact that banks were gambling with worthless bits of paper based on sub-prime mortgages was the fundamental cause of the banking crisis, and it is not over yet. Auditors did not do their job in relation to the practice of bankers such as those at Northern Rock before and until it collapsed. If they had, we might have prevented that catastrophe.

[Frank Dobson]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is a trifle irksome to listen to the radio or watch television and to hear someone from PricewaterhouseCoopers telling us what we ought to do for the future when PricewaterhouseCoopers audited Northern Rock and did not spot anything going wrong, or to hear about the famous Ernst and Young ITEM Club when the biggest item in the firm’s history is that it did not spot that Lehman Brothers were broke?

[Kelvin Hopkins]

I thank my right hon. Friend for that intervention, and I am just about to mention those great companies.

As if to reinforce the case for radical reform, on 22 February the Competition Commission published a report that was deeply critical of PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst and Young, Deloitte and KPMG—the big four—for a deep “misalignment” with shareholder interests. The commission made it clear that auditors and company executives had acted as a cabal to their mutual benefit and to the exclusion of the interests of investors. Under the definition of investors, we can include depositors and retail customers in the banking sector.

The commission concluded that the relationship between auditors and management has been too cosy and must be overhauled. The big four audit nearly 90% of all blue chip companies. One suggested remedy has been for the mandatory rotation of tendering so that after, for example, five years or so an audit company would have to relocate to other companies and could not be re-engaged. The companies engaging auditors would then be required to ask new auditors to compete for business. That would go some way towards breaking the unhealthy link between auditors and the companies they are supposed to be auditing.

Whatever new rules might be introduced, it is vital that auditors are compelled to ensure that their loyalties are to shareholders, depositors and customers and not to banking and company managers. Auditors failed to raise the alarm before the financial crisis and that must never happen again.

High-Speed Rail

Debate between Kelvin Hopkins and Frank Dobson

Thursday 31st March 2011 Westminster Hall

[Frank Dobson]

As I understand it, because Euston does not have a connection to Heathrow Express and Crossrail, it has been necessary to propose a parkway station at Old Oak Common that will have connections to those lines. That additional expense could otherwise have been avoided. As a result of the inadequacies of Euston, the parkway proposition for Old Oak Common—alias Wormwood Scrubs—had to be added to the proposal. Instead, the line could be brought into Paddington station, which already has links to Heathrow Express and will be on Crossrail. When I pushed that point, people from High Speed 2 said that Paddington could not cope with the number of passengers. Paddington has as many tube connections as Euston and, as I have pointed out, it will link to Heathrow Express and Crossrail. That excuse for not using Paddington appears to be of little relevance.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

Another point is that unlike Paddington, the Euston option would require expensive tunnelling to get through London. Once Crossrail is built, Paddington will have extra capacity for a platform for HS2, were we to go ahead with it.

[Frank Dobson]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. Another point is the connection with HS1. We are told that great strategists with vinegar-soaked towels around their heads came up with HS2 as the first stage of a great, high-speed rail network. They seemed not to notice that they had not proposed a connection with the only existing part of the high-speed rail network, High Speed 1, which comes into St Pancras station.