Liaison Committee Report

Debate between Kelvin Hopkins and Lord Beith

Thursday 12th December 2013 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Beith]

That is a very interesting argument, which I would like to discuss with the hon. Gentleman at greater length some time. Both voluntary co-operation and the exercise of power seem to me to exist in both the public and the private sectors.

[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

I am pleased to endorse what the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) said and welcome his statement, and I am pleased to follow the Chairman of the Public Administration Committee, of which I am a member. Will there be no prescription in the terms of reference for the inquiry and will it have a broad canvas and be capable of taking views such as mine? I am a traditional supporter of the Northcote-Trevelyan-Haldane civil service. On that broad canvas could we look at the role of special advisers, the potential politicising of civil servants and other issues?

[Sir Alan Beith]

The hon. Gentleman raises some important issues, which have been discussed in the context of the Government’s own more limited reform, which they have canvassed hitherto. These are certainly issues that need to be looked at by such a commission. If it is the Government’s belief that there needs to be more personalisation of senior appointments in the civil service—I believe that is their view—that raises issues arising out of the traditional role of the civil service that ought to be considered carefully and be embarked upon with the authority of both Houses of Parliament in the kind of context that such a commission could set.

European Public Prosecutor’s Office

Debate between Kelvin Hopkins and Lord Beith

Tuesday 22nd October 2013 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

I would like to join the hon. Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins) in giving credit where credit is due. This debate is taking place on the basis of the report and reasoned opinion of the European Scrutiny Committee. The Government agree with that reasoned opinion, but it is very much that of the Committee. In my capacity as Chairman of the Liaison Committee and the Justice Committee, I think that the European Scrutiny Committee is entitled to the credit. If there is something wrong with our procedure, it is that it does not fully recognise that process. However, the outcome is a happy one because pretty well everybody agrees that the reasoned opinion is correct, and it accords with the Government’s view.

The proposal for a European public prosecutor offends against the subsidiarity principle. One of its primary objectives is to strengthen the protection of the European Union’s financial interests. That is a perfectly reasonable objective to pursue, but it does not have to be achieved through the creation of a European public prosecutor. Indeed, it would not necessarily be best achieved in that way. The other limb of the general argument in favour of the European public prosecutor is that it is a further development of the area of justice. That provides the hint that subsidiarity is in danger of going out the window.

There are many ways in which the European Union could improve the way in which it deals with fraud. If national Governments fail to take the actions that they should take, they should be shamed into doing so. We also have to be a little careful about using percentage figures on the success of prosecutions. There is considerable danger if anybody thinks that the target of a justice system is to have 100% success in prosecutions. Courts will sometimes find people not guilty because the evidence has not been brought forward or sustained. The 100% target is a rather dangerous principle to import into this debate.

It is often pointed out that the European Union could do a lot more to resist fraud if it designed its schemes and its disbursement of money in ways that lent themselves to fraud a great deal less. Nothing is fraud-proof, but schemes can be designed that are less susceptible to fraud than many of those that have been developed over the years by European institutions.

Many elements of the proposal offend against subsidiarity. The European public prosecutor would have investigative powers, search and seizure powers, and interception and surveillance powers. To have those powers in operation at a supranational level would be a pretty significant change.

The proposal would take away the role of the Director of Public Prosecutions in prosecuting decisions in matters relating to EU fraud. It would have a similar effect on the roles of the procurator fiscal and the Lord Advocate in Scotland. The proposal would ignore the deliberate separation of decisions on investigation from decisions to prosecute in England and Wales, which is a long-standing element of our system. We can argue about whether that barrier should be retained, but we should have that argument in the context of our legal system and not allow it to be forced on us by the introduction of the European public prosecutor.

I am convinced that in the minds of some people, the creation of a European public prosecutor is a route to a prosecution role that goes wider than EU finances. I am not always tempted by slippery slope or Trojan horse arguments, but some of the same people have advanced the case for a prosecutor to deal with EU finances and a wider role for such an office.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

The right hon. Gentleman must accept that there has been constitution creep for decades in the European Union. Surely that is what we are trying to stop.

[Sir Alan Beith]

There have also been many advances in the way in which European nations use the European Union to achieve highly desirable objectives, such as through co-operating to deal with international crime. An intrinsic problem with the way in which the European Union was constructed, which is quite understandable given the way in which it was constructed, is that there is a belief in the Commission that the way forward is always to create further powers and jurisdictions. We have created a system that has that element within it. However, those who worry about Britain’s membership of the European Union have a tendency to underestimate the benefits and the value that have been achieved through many of its processes.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) pointed out that there is a close relationship between this proposal and the issue of Eurojust. Unhelpfully, it would compromise the acceptability of Eurojust to many people if the European public prosecutor was located within Eurojust. There are other aspects of interrelationship between the two issues. I regard Eurojust as an extremely valuable institution that has many processes that are of great advantage to British citizens. It has an important role in the prevention and detection of crime against British citizens and British interests. But again, even within the Eurojust proposals that we will be looking at again shortly, the role of the national members of Eurojust in the Commission’s proposal to order investigative measures changes the relationship between law enforcement and prosecution that is so firmly a part of our system.

There is, of course, another feature of the proposals that I am glad has not attracted the attendance of some of my hon. Friends on the Conservative Benches: if we went ahead with it, it would trigger a referendum. That might make it attractive to them to vote against the motion tonight, or whenever we have a deferred Division. I should not really tell them this, because it might inflame them in a way that I do not want. Basically, I think we all agree that establishing a European public prosecutor’s office is not the direction in which we ought to go and that it offends the principle of subsidiarity, as is extremely cogently argued in detail by the European Scrutiny Committee.