Assisted Suicide
Debate between Kelvin Hopkins and Richard Ottaway
Richard Ottaway
The guidelines—about which I shall say more in a moment—are a model of clarity. They reflect the way in which the DPP is applying the existing law. I hope that, if a majority in Parliament endorses the guidelines today, they will be strengthened because the debate has taken place.
Until the Suicide Act 1961, suicide was a criminal offence, and some of those who attempted suicide were prosecuted. Most were discharged, but the records show that in 1956 some 33 were sent to prison. In 1961, Parliament caught up with public sentiment, and both suicide and attempted suicide were decriminalised. That was done not to condone suicide, but to recognise that it was primarily a medical rather than a legal issue, and therefore better dealt with by healthcare professionals than by the police. Assisted suicide was a new offence, designed to protect against abuse. It created a unique legal precedent in that this was a criminal offence of being an accessory to a non-criminal act. It carries a sentence of up to 14 years in prison.
What our predecessors did not do, however, was to distinguish between the types of assistance—between the person who irresponsibly and maliciously encourages a suicidal person, and the loving spouse who fulfils a dying partner’s request for help to die. This is the question we are addressing today: should both actions be treated equally under the law?
The problem was, in part, recognised by the 1961 Act, which gave the DPP discretion, so that even when sufficient evidence existed, prosecution would not automatically occur. That recognises the delicate balance that needs to be struck in respect of motive, compassion, coercion and circumstance.
Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)
I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on addressing these issues so clearly and in such a measured way. Does he acknowledge that some of us support people in situations like that of Diane Pretty, my former constituent, who died 10 years ago? She went to the highest courts possible—the House of Lords and the European Court of Human Rights—to seek the right to assisted suicide and was refused, but there was massive public support for her at that time. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that that public support should be taken into account in our deliberations?
Richard Ottaway
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right: there is huge public support, and I shall talk about that shortly.
Turning to the policy itself, records show that more than 180 Britons have travelled to Switzerland to die in the last 10 years. No one has been prosecuted for accompanying them or assisting them with their arrangements, even when there has been sufficient evidence to prosecute. However, before the 2010 policy document, precisely what criteria were used was never published—until Debbie Purdy asked for clarity.
Debbie Purdy has primary progressive multiple sclerosis. In 2009, she took her case to the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords. She wanted to know whether her husband would be prosecuted if he accompanied her to Dignitas in Switzerland. In their judgment, the Law Lords instructed the DPP to make clear the factors he took into account when reaching a decision on whether or not to prosecute. Lord Brown’s judgment made it perfectly clear what was required. He said that we need a custom-built policy,
“designed to distinguish between those situations in which, however tempted to assist, the prospective aider and abettor should refrain from doing so, and those situations in which he or she may fairly hope to be...forgiven, rather than condemned, for giving assistance.”
The DPP did just that, with a clarity and precision that is to be welcomed.
In February 2010, following extensive consultation, the DPP published the guidance. I have sent a copy to every Member of this House. The policy recognises the reality of prosecuting practice in cases of assisted suicide: that in certain circumstances, compassionately motivated assisters will not be prosecuted.
There are 16 factors weighing in favour of prosecution, including the assisted person not having mental capacity, and if the assister is a doctor or other professional caring for the assisted person. There are six factors weighing against prosecution, including that the assisted person made a voluntary, informed decision—in other words, they were of sound mind—as well as that the actions were of only minor encouragement or assistance, and that the suicide was reported to the police. The policy reiterates that there can be no immunity from prosecution before a crime is committed.