Privilege (Withdrawal Agreement: Legal Advice)

Kevan Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 4th December 2018 Commons Chamber

[Alex Chalk]

Respectfully, that is not right. My hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford said at the time:

“I am deeply unclear—are you asking for publication of the final advice or of any legal advice in full that has happened during the entire negotiation? [Interruption.] With due respect, I am being asked for my vote regarding the motion on the Order Paper. Are you asking for what is on the Order Paper, which is,

“any legal advice in full”—

that is, during the whole negotiation?”—[Official Report, 13 November 2018; Vol. 649, c. 196.]

At that point, Mr Speaker rightly intervened to ask who my hon. Friend was referring to, and so it went on. The matter was not clear. Given the importance of these proceedings, and the potential impact on one or more individuals, is it not right that the House should be crystal clear about what is on the indictment, so to speak?

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I am following the hon. Gentleman’s argument, but will he answer the question that my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Gareth Snell) asked? If the motion was so unclear, why did he not vote against it and why did the Government not oppose it?

[Alex Chalk]

Respectfully, that is no answer at all.

[Mr Jones]

It is!

[Alex Chalk]

It is no answer at all; absolutely not. To take an analogy, if the prosecution were to bring proceedings against the hon. Gentleman for an alleged crime and if the court were satisfied that the proceedings were bad through duplicity or lack of clarity, the court would stay those proceedings because they would be improper proceedings. That is what has happened here. There are real concerns about these matters. In these circumstances, if the high court of Parliament wishes to act in a way that is proportionate and fair, the proper outcome is to refer the matter in accordance with the terms set out in the amendment. Those are my representations, Mr Speaker.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Philp (Croydon South) (Con)]

At the heart of our debate today is a question of Parliament’s powers and prerogatives. The right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) laid out a simple and clear case at the beginning of the debate. He said that the House passed a motion on 13 November compelling the Government to do something and that the Government have not done it. He said that it proceeds simply from those two facts that Ministers are therefore in contempt. I say that that analysis is too simplistic and is lacking in nuance, and that it presupposes that Parliament’s power, generally, is unqualified and unconstrained.

Indeed, two Members have made that point explicitly in this debate. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) described Parliament’s power as untrammelled, and the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), who is at the Bar of the House, also suggested that Parliament’s power is entirely without limitation. Without wishing to open up an enormous debate on those two points, I would suggest that those two assertions cannot be taken at face value as self-evidently the case.

For example, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European convention on human rights impose limitations on Acts of Parliament. Any Act of Parliament we pass must conform with human rights legislation and with the European convention on human rights, so there are limitations on what Parliament may do.

When I asked the hon. Member for Rhondda whether Parliament really has the right, for example, to trample on somebody’s personal liberty, he replied that Members of Parliament could be relied upon not to trample on people’s liberty in that way. Yet when one reads the great tracts on personal liberty, and particularly John Stuart Mill’s essay “On Liberty,” one sees that Mill urges that we should seek to protect individuals from what he describes as the “tyranny of the majority.” We need more than simply a reliance on good will to protect, for example, individual liberty.

My hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin), who is not in his place, also referred to the limitations on parliamentary authority by highlighting the distinction in the powers exercised by the Executive versus those exercised by Parliament as a legislature. There are all kinds of areas where the Government act with prerogative power and Parliament does not seek to usurp that power by essentially becoming the Government or becoming the Executive.

There are all kinds of areas where the limitations of parliamentary authority can, at the very least, properly be debated. The assertion that parliamentary authority is unlimited is not something one can take immediately at face value, attractive though it is to us as parliamentarians.

Of course, in no way do I wish to fetter Parliament’s ability to make its will felt. For example, our Select Committee colleagues were entirely within their rights to summon Mark Zuckerberg, and it is deplorable that the chief executive of such an influential company contemptuously refused to appear before a parliamentary Select Committee. I urge the Chairman of that Select Committee to use his good offices to compel Mark Zuckerberg to appear.

A question has repeatedly been posed by Opposition Members: “Why didn’t the Government oppose this motion when it was first put on 13 November?” I would suggest that the reason is that, in order to properly debate what parts of the legal advice might or might not be disclosed, the Government would have had to disclose the legal advice. We would have had to examine what the legal advice says before deciding what could or could not be disclosed. The very act of debating it would cause its disclosure, which is why when matters of disclosure arise in a court of law, they are decided by a judge in chambers, not in open court. The judge then decides what can be disclosed and what cannot be disclosed. No equivalent provision existed when the House debated this matter on 13 November; it would have been a case of disclosing everything and debating it openly, or disclosing nothing.

There is clearly a tension between Parliament’s desire to get disclosure and the desire of the Executive to protect the public interest. The question is: how do we balance those two competing considerations? A number of right hon. and hon. Members today have suggested that there are various appropriate forums in which that might occur, one of which, evidently, is the Privileges Committee or indeed some other Committee of the House. Such a Committee might, behind closed doors, look at the legal advice—

[Mr Kevan Jones]

The hon. Gentleman is talking complete nonsense with the idea that in order to vote against the motion on 13 November the Government would have had to disclose the evidence in that debate. Is it not a fact that the reason why they did not oppose that vote is that they would have lost it?

[Chris Philp]

The hon. Gentleman is engaging in speculation. The fact is that when matters of public disclosure are considered in other environments, for example, a court of law, an independent person, in this case a judge, in chambers, in private, decides what might publicly—

[Mr Kevan Jones]

rose—

[Chris Philp]

I must conclude, because Mr Speaker wishes to move on with the business. That independent person decides what gets publicly disclosed. No such device or mechanism was available to this House on 13 November and it strikes me that the Privileges Committee is a suitable forum in which the balance between the desire for disclosure and the public interest can be struck, and it is appropriate that that balance is struck in private. I will therefore be supporting the amendment. I know that you wish to move on, Mr Speaker, so I will conclude my remarks there.