Point of Order

Debate between Kevan Jones and Eleanor Laing

Tuesday 6th September 2022 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

I thank the hon. Lady for her point of order. I am sure that the whole House agrees with her that the National Security Bill is an extremely important piece of legislation and it is vital that it should be properly scrutinised by the Committee, but I have to say that I am little surprised at her surprise that there is a ministerial reshuffle going on. I do not think that is a surprise to anyone, not just in the Chamber, but across the country or indeed the world. When a change of Government is occurring, there is by necessity a change of Ministers. It is unfortunate that this important session of this important Bill Committee happened to be taking place this morning—the day on which there is a changeover of Prime Minister.

The hon. Lady says that the situation makes a mockery of the system. I would say to her that this is how our democracy works. It is true, as somebody once correctly said, that democracy is the most inefficient form of government, but I think that we would all agree that it is still the best and fairest. I have every sympathy with the hon. Lady’s frustration at not being able to get on with this important piece of work, but I am pretty certain that within 48 hours, if not 24, there will be a Minister in place—[Interruption.] Sorry, is the hon. Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith) interrupting me when I am answering a point of order? Would she care to make another point of order? If not, would she please not interrupt me while I am answering this one?

Clearly the Bill needs to be scrutinised. Nobody disagrees with that. While I understand the frustration felt by the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch), this is how our democracy works. I am sure that there will be a Minister in place in very short order. I hope that if perchance there is no Minister in place within the next two days, the hon. Lady will come back to the Chamber, so that we can address what by then will be a situation that needs to be addressed by the Chair.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am grateful for your explanation, but may I inform you that what we discovered in the Committee this morning is not what has been presented to you. The Minister said that he would resign but stay in place until the new Minister was appointed, so in effect we do have a Minister. We asked the Government to explain the position, but the Whip did not provide an explanation. The Committee sits again at 2 o’clock, because we objected to the process, and we will try again, but the Government must explain the current status of the Minister for Security.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I do not think the right hon. Gentleman needs me to explain to him that there are certain duties that fall to the Security Minister, which means that it would be unwise to have no Security Minister. What he has explained fits with that important duty, but he is obviously of the opinion that the Minister ought to be present in the Committee. Clearly, the Government have a different view. That is not a matter for the Chair. I take the right hon. Gentleman’s point, but that is not a matter for me to adjudicate. I have given the hon. Member for Halifax a proper answer.

Bill Presented

Energy Costs (Domestic Customers and Small Business) Bill

Presentation and First Reading (Standing Order No. 57)

Ed Davey, supported by Wera Hobhouse and Sarah Olney, presented a Bill to prohibit Ofgem from increasing the energy tariff cap above the level set for the period 1 April 2022 to 30 September 2022 before 31 December 2022; to require the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the merits of the Government providing funding to energy providers to mitigate the impact of this measure and on the merits of extending and backdating the Energy Profits Levy in order to pay for such funding; to require the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the merits of the Government providing grants to small businesses equivalent to 80% of the expected increase in their energy costs for the period 1 October 2022 to 30 September 2023, and on the merits of maintaining the rate of the Corporation Tax Surcharge on banks at 8% in order to fund such grants; and for connected purposes.

Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time on Friday 16 September, and to be printed (Bill 150).

Online Safety Bill

Debate between Kevan Jones and Eleanor Laing

Report stage
Tuesday 12th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

I am grateful to the Minister and I will be keeping a beady eye to see how far things go. The proposal would make a difference. It is a simple but effective way of protecting people, especially young people.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Very good, that was wonderfully brief.

Local Government Finance (England)

Debate between Kevan Jones and Eleanor Laing

Wednesday 9th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I do not disagree with the Secretary of State. County Durham is a wonderful county. It has some great towns and, more importantly, great people. But why did Bishop Auckland get that money as opposed to any of the other towns in County Durham? Well, it has a Conservative Member of Parliament. I doubt that it will be getting much funding in the future, following the recent antics of the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Dehenna Davison), with her criticism and plotting against the Prime Minister. She will be on the naughty step for a while, and will not get any future funding. The important thing is that this must be clear. I also question the bidding process. The problem with the process, as my right hon. Friend has said, is that it takes a lot of time and effort to take this through. Officer time is taken up, and councils are limited in the amount of officer time that they have. Then they have to go into some beauty parade, which is clearly rigged by the Government. The real issue in terms of levelling up is this—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. I did not want to jump in as a kneejerk reaction, but I have been considering what the right hon. Gentleman has just said. He has made a very serious criticism of a Member of this House. I just want to check whether he has given notice to the hon. Lady that he intended to criticise her on the Floor of the House?

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I am not aware how I criticised the hon. Lady, Madam Deputy Speaker. If you could illuminate and tell me how I did, I would be quite happy. I would not necessarily want to criticise her.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

The right hon. Gentleman most certainly made reference to another Member. My interpretation was that he was criticising her, but the point is that he made specific reference to her. I just want to check that he gave her notice of his intention to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I am sorry, but I do not know where in Standing Orders it says that you have to give notice. If a Member is criticising someone or raising a point, I agree with you, Madam Deputy Speaker, but when a Member is referring to a Member, which is what I did there—

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

The right hon. Gentleman can try to argue with the Chair for as long as he wishes. I am concerned about keeping good order in this Chamber, and my interpretation of what the right hon. Gentleman said was that it was a serious criticism of the hon. Lady. Perhaps the most subtle thing for him to do is to undertake to tell her that he criticised her on the Floor of the House and apologise for not having given her notice of his intention to do so.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I have to say, Madam Deputy Speaker, I am not known for my subtlety. I am not sorry. I do not quite understand the point. The point I made was in reference to what has been in the newspapers. I was not criticising the hon. Lady. Frankly, if she is working against the Prime Minister, I would congratulate more than anything, not criticise her. I do not think that it was a criticism—

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

We do not need any more of this. I have said what I have said. It is not for the right hon. Gentleman to argue with me. Will he please now continue with his speech?

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I will, and I will take this up further, Madam Deputy Speaker.

May I now come back to the main points? We are talking about some really serious things, and I am sorry that we have been diverted. As my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East said, if levelling up means anything, it means building up those communities. It is not necessarily about bricks and mortar, but about trying to pull the fabric together.

County Durham has high levels of deprivation, with people more likely to need social care and intervention by the health service at a lower age—in their 50s—than in most places. There are huge demands on adult social care. One thing that makes me very angry is the fact that in the last 10 years, life expectancy in County Durham has actually been falling. The idea that there is a part of this wealthy country where our citizens’ life expectancy is falling is deeply disturbing and wrong.

This brings me to the issue of public health. I give full credit to Amanda Healy, the director of public health in County Durham, and her officers, who have worked tirelessly, and I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East that if we had given test and trace to them, they would have made a damn sight better job of it than the billions that were wasted nationally. We now have a situation where we have a cut in the public health grant. The last time the Government were consulting on the public health grant, County Durham was going to lose 40% of its funding. The problem is that if we really want to tackle the inequalities, we have to do it in terms of public health. It is no good trying to shy away from that.

We now have a situation whereby, as part of the levelling-up agenda, everything seems to be tied to changing the local government arrangements. County Durham has been offered a county deal. I do not understand why the Government are looking at changing the local government structures of an area—[Interruption.] I am sorry, Madam Deputy Speaker. You are interrupting what I am saying. I can’t hear myself think.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will simply withdraw what he has just said.

[Mr Jones]

I will, but it is just irritating, Madam Deputy Speaker.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I am sure that it has irritated the right hon. Gentleman, and I am sure that he has never irritated anyone himself. Irritation is something that is allowed in this Chamber; indeed, it is endemic.

[Mr Jones]

I am glad it is, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Turning to the devolution deal, one of the bare minimums that we have looked for is a replacement for the money that we would have received from the European Regional Development Fund. The Government gave a clear pledge that, once we left Europe, that money would be matched, but it is quite clear from looking at the Treasury Red Book that it will not be. That money is important in County Durham because it allows us to fund programmes such as DurhamWorks, which works with young people who want to get into work. It has been a tremendous success, but its funding ends in 2023 and there is no more after that, so it is important that at a bare minimum we get the equivalent of that funding. However, if we have to bid for it, the bidding process will take up the time and effort of our officers, and there is also the question of the transparency of the process.

I will turn now to the White Paper, which I have read. I actually like the Secretary of State; he is a thinker. It was certainly a loss when he was demoted from the post of Justice Secretary, because he had some great ideas around how to reform the justice sector. I plead with him to take some of the ideas in the White Paper, ensure that we have the funding review that has been put alongside it, and stop this nonsense of tying resources to a requirement for devolution or to messing and tinkering around with the governing structures locally. He must then ensure that that system tackles these issues and puts back what is needed in the formula, which is a needs-based assessment.

As I have said, County Durham has more than 900 children in care. That is not cheap and it has led, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East said, to adult social care and looked-after children gobbling up nearly 70% of the budget. That is not sustainable over the long term for doing the other things that my right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley mentioned, when he talked about ensuring that everything else that people expect—parks, services and basic communities—is there.

There is an opportunity here, and one thing we can say about the Secretary of State is that he is a thinker and he wants to drive change. I think he was out of the Chamber when I said that the main themes in the White Paper are correct. It is about not getting bogged down in the detail of governance, deals and devolution that does not actually mean devolution; it is just about trying to get the funding in place.

I have been a leader in local government and also a Minister, and I think that if the Secretary of State looks at some of the innovation taking place in local government, he will see that the quality of some of the officers in local government is fantastic—there are some great people there doing some great things. What we have to do is free up their time, give them credit when they are doing things and support those politicians who are actually there. Let us get away from the idea that mayors are the answer to everything or that these people do not have the responsibility. This issue affected our Government as much as it has affected his. The Treasury just does not trust these people, but frankly it should, because in local government we have some great innovators. We have people who will tackle the real issue, which, as I say, is not just about bricks and mortar; it is about making the real change that happens at a local level.

I wish the Secretary of State well in his ambitions. I hope he has a good fight with the Treasury, to ensure that he gets the resources so that if we are going to make real change at the local level, we will actually make a real difference. We have political differences in this place, but we do actually want what most people want, which is the best for their local community.

School-based Counselling Services

Debate between Kevan Jones and Eleanor Laing

Tuesday 9th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Call me old-fashioned, but I thought that in a wind-up the Minister was supposed to respond to the debate. He has now been on his feet for seven or eight minutes, and all we have heard is a pre-prepared, read-out speech.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

The right hon. Gentleman knows that that is not a point of order for the Chair. If he does not like what the Minister is saying, he is at liberty to intervene on him and suggest that he says something else. The Minister also has plenty more time to make plenty more points.

G7 and NATO Summits

Debate between Kevan Jones and Eleanor Laing

Wednesday 16th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

We will manage to get everybody who is on the list in. I thank people for being succinct and the Prime Minister for also being brief. It is wonderful.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

The Prime Minister delivered his statement on the Australian trade deal in his usual sunny, optimistic manner. Like all his statements, however, once we look at the detail, it comes with a nasty after-smell, the source of which will be familiar to many British farmers. May I ask him in detail how this deal will affect the livelihoods of farmers in my constituency of North Durham and across County Durham—particularly hill farmers, who not only produce good-quality British food, but are the custodians of some of the most beautiful land in this country?

Point of Order

Debate between Kevan Jones and Eleanor Laing

Tuesday 8th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Last month, I received from a constituent some serious allegations about the conduct of individuals in the cosmetic surgery industry. The allegations involved a surgeon who had been struck off the General Medical Council register in this country, but who was conducting consultations with UK patients via Zoom, from a private clinic overseas. A separate allegation was that a doctor in the UK continued to refer patients to the struck-off surgeon, and that his services were being advertised on UK-based websites.

On 20 May, I wrote to the Minister for Patient Safety, Suicide Prevention and Mental Health, the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire (Ms Dorries). On 3 June, I received a direct response to my letter. Lo and behold, it was not from the Minister, but from the CEO of Transform Hospital Group, a private company. I know that it was a direct response because the CEO actually states that he had received my letter directly from the Care Quality Commission.

I take an extremely dim view of my correspondence with the Minister being passed on to a private company without my knowledge or consent. I consider that a major breach not only of confidentiality, but of my trust and that of my constituent who made the complaint in the first place. I do not think a Minister’s correspondence should ever be shared with a private company, breaking the bond of trust that we have with our constituents. I seek your advice, Madam Deputy Speaker, on how I can rectify this and ensure that it does not happen again.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for having given me notice of his intention to raise this point of order. Mr Speaker shares his concern that sensitive correspondence appears to have been passed from the Department to a private company for a response, and Mr Speaker will be drawing this matter to the attention of the Leader of the House to ensure that these important issues are understood across Government and not only by the people who are paying attention to this particular point of order this afternoon.

The 2016 guidance produced by the Cabinet Office on the handling of parliamentarians’ correspondence goes into some detail, which I will not quote in full now, but the right hon. Gentleman is right in pointing out that that guidance says that

“departments should treat correspondence with great care to ensure that confidentiality is not broken.”

It also states that

“official replies to letters from MPs should only be authorised in exceptional circumstances”.

It would appear that guidance has possibly not been followed in this case.

I would have said to the right hon. Gentleman that I would make sure that the Minister gives an answer, but I am delighted to say that the Minister in question is here in the Chamber, so I shall call her to respond to the point made by the right hon. Gentleman.

Council Tax: Government’s Proposed Increase

Debate between Kevan Jones and Eleanor Laing

Monday 25th January 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

We are not taking bogus points of order right now, because it is not fair for people who are not here in the Chamber. If the hon. Gentleman has a real point of order, I will listen to him.

[Mr Jones]

The right hon. Member does have a point, because what the Minister has just done is inadvertently misled the House—

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. No, no—

[Mr Jones]

Durham County Council is not doing—

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. This is a debate; there are, therefore, differing points of view on either side of the House—[Interruption.] Do not shout at me in the Chair.

National Security and Investment Bill

Debate between Kevan Jones and Eleanor Laing

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Wednesday 20th January 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I supported the Bill on Second Reading and continue to do so, because, of course, in terms of putting on the statute book the protection that we need, it is a vital piece of legislation, but, as the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) said, it is possibly some seven years late. That highlights the conflict that takes place within not just this Government, but all Governments, between wanting national prosperity and national security. We had this during the coalition Government—the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), I think, referred to it as the “golden age”, or, as the Australians would call it “a Government full of panda huggers”—but that has clearly changed. What has also changed since even 2013 is that we have a better understanding of how states are using their economic power not only for defence purposes, but to project their power to change the international world order.

It has come as a great shock to many people that, in the past few years, the international rules-based order, which we have all accepted since the second world war, has come under threat not only from hostile states, but from individuals who basically want to throw everything up in the air and see what lands.

Clearly, when it comes to China, to mention one nation, its investment strategy, including belt and road and other initiatives, is clearly being used not just in terms of projecting its economic power, but for geopolitical reasons. If we look at the long list of Chinese individuals on various standard-raising bodies—whether it be UN bodies or standard setters in the telecoms industry—we can see which areas they want to influence. The Bill is very important in ensuring that we protect that critical national infrastructure. There will be that debate—as Members will see if they read the ISC’s report, in 2013—between prosperity and security. For me, security has got to be the key cornerstone of this legislation, but it will, I think, lead to some very difficult decisions having to be taken.

As I say, I broadly welcome what is being put forward in this Bill, and I will come on to some of the new clauses in a minute, but can I first refer to new clause 7? It has already been spoken to by the Chair of the ISC, the right hon. Member for New Forest East, in terms of oversight. The ISC is not looking for work, I can tell hon. Members that. I have been a member of it for a few years now, and we have a lot on our plate. We do not actually want to be a regulator or in any way to have to decide what should go ahead and what should not—that is the role of Government—but I think it is crucial that those decisions, some of which will be very controversial but taken for perfectly good security reasons, do need to have oversight from outside the Executive.

As the right hon. Gentleman has outlined, that cannot be done by the BEIS Committee. Again, I would not want to take away from any of the work it is doing, but we are the only Committee of all the Committees we have that has the levels of security clearance—it has STRAP clearance—to look at the evidence that will have to be put forward for taking these decisions. I think this would give the public confidence in the Bill, and when such decisions are being taken in future, the public can actually have confidence that there is some oversight of the reasons why they are being taken. So I do support new clause 7, but I accept what my Chairman says about wanting some indication of the Government wishing to take this on board. May I also raise the fact that this is not just for this Bill? I am also serving currently on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill Committee, and it is an issue—exactly the same issue—there as well.

I think the Minister is sympathetic to this, but I can tell him now—and I do not want him to admit it—that he will be getting a lot of pushback from the Cabinet Office, because the Cabinet Office somehow sees it as its role to prevent the ISC from seeing anything. As the right hon. Member for New Forest East said, it hides behind the Justice and Security Act 2013, but as he very eloquently outlined, there is already a mechanism to allow us to look at this. This is going to be an increasing problem. If hon. Members read the Act, they will see that it does not actually say that it is about actual Departments; it is about access to sensitive and secure information. That is going to be an increasing issue, whether for this Government or future Governments, because, as that is used by more Departments, it is important that Parliament and the public at least have some oversight of it.

I do not want to bash the Cabinet Office, but hon. Members will remember, if they look at the 2013 ISC report, that it is the same Department that, even though it was told by BT that BT was going to contract with Huawei, somehow conveniently forgot even to tell Ministers until much later. So, I think it is important to ensure that we have robust oversight. I look forward to the Minister’s response on whether he is going to agree to this letter. If he can give such an indication today, or even when it goes to the other place, that would be welcome, and if that is the case, I think it would be quite right not to press new clause 7. I think this is something that is missing from the Bill.

May I now refer to other new clauses? New clause 4 stands in the name of the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling and others, and I congratulate his Committee on its report. I accept what the hon. Member for South Ribble (Katherine Fletcher) has just said about defining national security. Putting that on the face of the Bill, as new clause 5 does, limits what can be done, although it is good to have a debate on this. New clause 4 is slightly different, however, because it sets out a framework within which these decisions can be taken.

The Bill does not define national security or the list, and I understand why: because we cannot list the entities, and, as the hon. Lady said, something might come up in the future that is critical national infrastructure but that we have not yet thought about. We need sufficient flexibility to be able to address such situations.

New clause 4 also covers the following important area:

“(g) the potential of the trigger event to involve or facilitate significant illicit or subversive activities, including terrorism, organised crime, money laundering and tax evasion; and

(h) whether the trigger event may adversely impact the safety and security of UK citizens or the UK.”

We see good examples of states that are making strategic investments for geopolitical or security reasons or in order to acquire technologies, but, as came out in the ISC Russia report, many states are increasingly using fronts and other individuals to acquire such assets, and, having not an exhaustive list, but a framework that covers this would also flag up such matters to the Department.

We talk about critical national infrastructure being things such as power stations, electricity grids, gas mains and telecoms, but might we also say that our food distribution network, for instance, is a part of critical national infrastructure? In the early 2000s we had the fuel delivery lorry drivers’ strike, which led to a critical situation, and control of such events could fall under this. These things might be done not by a state, but by individuals related to it, perhaps acquiring large property portfolios in certain areas. Although new clause 4 is not perfect, it covers these matters.

I accept what my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) is trying to achieve in amendment 7. She wants this unit to have the resources to ensure that it can do its job, and that is very important. However, we also need to ensure that there are no untimely delays, because we do not want this to be a hindrance to business.

Amendment 7 also raises the issue of the personnel who are going to perform this task. I have a huge concern, which I have raised already in terms of the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, about the type of individuals we are going to get in that unit. It is vital that we have people with not only the necessary security clearances but also the right security mindset. Some reassurance on that from the Minister would be welcome.

Overall, however, I welcome this Bill. It takes a huge step in the right direction. As my Chairman, the right hon. Member for New Forest East said, it is strange that we wait for seven years and then get two Bills very quickly, and I also look forward—I hope in the near future—to a further Bill, the hostile state actors Bill, which is another recommendation from our Russia report.

I thank the Minister for the constructive way he has taken this Bill forward—and I will be cheeky and just say to him that if he can deliver extra vaccines in Chester-le-Street this week, that will be very welcome.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

We now go over to Sam Tarry—oh no, he’s here!

Exiting the European Union

Debate between Kevan Jones and Eleanor Laing

Tuesday 24th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Call me old-fashioned, but I thought that the usual convention for a winding-up speech is to respond to the debate. All the Minister appears to be doing is reading her civil service—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. That is not a point of order—it is a point about the content of the Minister’s speech, which is entirely a matter for the Minister, and she does not have very long, so we must let her finish.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Debate between Kevan Jones and Eleanor Laing

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Limitation of time for minor offences—

“No proceedings shall be brought against any person in relation to a relevant offence, where—

(a) the condition set out in subsection 3 of section 1 is satisfied,

(b) the offence is subject to summary conviction only, or is one in the commission of which no serious, permanent or lasting psychological or physical injury has been caused, and

(c) a period of six months has passed from the time the offence was committed or discovered.”

This new clause would dispose of minor allegations of misconduct by imposing a time limit similar to that which exists in relation to summary only matters in Magistrates’ Courts.

New clause 3—Access to justice for service personnel—

“Within 12 months of this Act coming into force, the Secretary of State shall commission an independent evaluation comparing—

(a) access to justice for members and former members of the regular and reserve forces and of British overseas territory forces to whom section 369(2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (persons subject to service law) applies, in relation to legal proceedings in connection with operations of the armed forces outside the British Islands, with

(b) access to justice for asylum seekers and prisoners seeking to bring an action against the Crown.”

New clause 4—Ability to conduct a fair trial—

“The principle referred to in section 1(1) is that a relevant prosecutor making a decision to which that section applies may determine that proceedings should be brought against the person for the offence, or, as the case may be, that the proceedings against the person for the offence should be continued, only if the prosecutor has reasonable grounds for believing that the fair trial of the person has not been materially prejudiced by the time elapsed since the alleged conduct took place.”

This new clause is intended to replace Clause 2 of the Bill. It replaces the presumption against prosecution with a requirement on a prosecutor deciding whether to bring or continue a prosecution to consider whether the passage of time has materially prejudiced the prospective defendant’s chance of a fair trial.

New clause 5—Restrictions on time limits: actions brought against the Crown by service personnel—

“Nothing in this Part applies to any action brought against the Crown by a person who is a member or former member of the regular or reserve forces, or of a British overseas territory force to whom section 369(2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (persons subject to service law) applies.”

This new clause amends Part 2 of the Bill so that it explicitly excludes actions brought against the Crown by serving or former service personnel from the limitations on courts’ discretion that the Part imposes in respect of actions relating to overseas operations.

New clause 6—Duty of care to service personnel—

“(1) The Secretary of State shall establish a duty of care standard in relation to legal, pastoral and mental health support provided to service personnel involved in investigations or litigation arising from overseas operations, as defined in subsection (6) of section 1.

(2) The Secretary of State shall lay a copy of this standard before Parliament within six months of the date on which this Act receives Royal Assent.

(3) The Secretary of State shall thereafter in each calendar year—

(a) prepare a duty of care report; and

(b) lay a copy of the report before Parliament.

(4) The duty of care report is a report about the continuous process of review and improvement to meet the duty of care standard established in subsection (1), in particular in relation to incidents arising from overseas operations of—

(a) litigation and investigations brought against service personnel for allegations of criminal misconduct and wrongdoing;

(b) civil litigation brought by service personnel against the Ministry of Defence for negligence and personal injury;

(c) judicial reviews and inquiries into allegations of misconduct by service personnel;

(d) in such other fields as the Secretary of State may determine.

(5) In preparing a duty of care report the Secretary of State must have regard to, and publish relevant data in relation to (in respect of overseas operations)—

(a) the adequacy of legal, welfare and mental health support services provided to service personnel who are accused of crimes;

(b) complaints made by service personnel and, or their legal representation when in the process of bringing or attempting to bring civil claims against the Ministry of Defence for negligence and personal injury;

(c) complaints made by service personnel and, or their legal representation when in the process of investigation or litigation for an accusation of misconduct;

(d) meeting national care standards and safeguarding to families of service personnel, where relevant.

(6) In section (1) “service personnel” means—

(a) members of the regular forces and the reserve forces;

(b) members of British Overseas Territory forces who are subject to service law;

(c) former members of any of Her Majesty‘s forces who are ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom; and

(d) where relevant, family members of any person meeting the definition within (a), (b) or (c).

(7) In subsection (1) “Duty of Care” means both the legal and moral obligation of the Ministry of Defence to ensure the well-being of service personnel.

(8) None of the provisions contained within this clause shall be used to alter the principle of Combat Immunity.”

This new clause will require the Ministry of Defence to identify a new duty of care to create a new standard for policy, services and training in relation to legal, pastoral and mental health support provided to service personnel involved in investigations or litigations arising from overseas operations, and to report annually on their application of this standard.

New clause 7—Duty of care to service personnel—

“(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person has been acquitted of an offence relating to conduct on overseas operations; or

(b) a determination has been made that an investigation into an offence relating to such conduct should cease under section (Judicial oversight of investigations).

(2) No further investigation into the alleged conduct shall be commenced unless—

(a) compelling new evidence has become available; and

(b) an allocated judge advocate determines that the totality of the evidence against the accused is sufficiently strong.”

This new clause would require a judge advocate of the armed services to determine if new evidence is sufficient to grant reinvestigation of armed forces personnel for alleged offences in which they have been acquitted or the original investigation was ceased.

Amendment 11, page 1, line 4, leave out clause 1.

Part 1 of the Bill introduces restrictions on prosecution for certain offences, including a presumption against prosecution. This amendment is one of a series that would remove Part 1 from the Bill.

Amendment 18, in clause 1, page 2, line 2, leave out “5” and insert “10”.

This amendment is one of two providing that the presumption against prosecution should apply after 10 years (instead of 5 years).

Amendment 19, in clause 1, page 2, line 4, leave out “5” and insert “10”.

This amendment is one of two providing that the presumption against prosecution should apply after 10 years (instead of 5 years).

Amendment 64, page 2, line 12, leave out clause 2.

This amendment, which would remove Clause 2 from the Bill, should be read together with NC4, which replaces the presumption against prosecution with a requirement on a prosecutor to consider whether the passage of time has materially prejudiced the prospective defendant’s chance of a fair trial.

Amendment 13, page 2, line 18, leave out clause 3.

Part 1 of the Bill introduces restrictions on prosecution for certain offences, including a presumption against prosecution. This amendment is one of a series that would remove Part 1 from the Bill.

Amendment 24, in clause 3, page 2, line 20, leave out

“(so far as they tend to reduce the person’s culpability or otherwise tend against prosecution)”.

This amendment would ensure that, in giving particular weight to the matters in subsection (2), a prosecutor may consider whether any matter tends to reduce or increase culpability, tending against or in favour of prosecution respectively.

Amendment 21, in clause 3, page 2, leave out lines 23 to 29.

This amendment is one of two that together would delete the requirement for a prosecutor to give “particular weight” in a prosecution decision after 5 years to the adverse effect on a person of the conditions the person was exposed to during deployment.

Amendment 25, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—

“(ba) the thoroughness, promptness and efficacy of any ongoing investigation into the alleged conduct or any relevant previous investigation, and the reasons for any delays in such investigations;”.

This amendment would ensure that the adequacy of any investigative process to date is given particular weight by a relevant prosecutor.

Amendment 26, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—

“(bb) the public interest in maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the Armed Forces;”.

This amendment would ensure that a relevant prosecutor gives particular weight to maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the Armed Forces.

Amendment 27, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—

“(bc) the nature of the alleged conduct, in particular whether it engaged the obligations of the United Kingdom under Articles 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights;”.

This amendment would ensure that particular weight is given by a prosecutor where the alleged conduct engages the UK’s obligations under Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, Article 4 (prohibition of slavery and forced labour) or Article 5 (prohibition of arbitrary detention) ECHR.

Amendment 28, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—

“(bd) whether the person had command responsibility for the alleged conduct, and to what extent;”.

This amendment would ensure that particular weight is given by a relevant prosecutor where the person had command responsibility for the alleged conduct.

Amendment 38, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, after subsection (2)(b), insert—

“(c) the quality and duration of relevant investigations.”

This amendment would require prosecutors to give weight to the quality and duration of relevant investigations when deciding whether to bring or continue proceedings against a person relating to alleged conduct during overseas operations.

Amendment 22, in clause 3, page 2, leave out lines 34 to 43.

This amendment is one of two that together would delete the requirement for a prosecutor to give “particular weight” in a prosecution decision after 5 years to the adverse effect on a person of the conditions the person was exposed to during deployment.

Amendment 14, page 3, line 1, leave out clause 4.

Part 1 of the Bill introduces restrictions on prosecution for certain offences, including a presumption against prosecution. This amendment is one of a series that would remove Part 1 from the Bill.

Amendment 15, page 3, line 15, leave out clause 5.

Part 1 of the Bill introduces restrictions on prosecution for certain offences, including a presumption against prosecution. This amendment is one of a series that would remove Part 1 from the Bill.

Amendment 31, in clause 5, page 3, line 29, at end insert—

“(c) where the offence is punishable with a criminal penalty by the law of Scotland, except with the consent of the Lord Advocate.”

Amendment 39, in clause 5, page 3, line 29, at end insert—

“(3A) Where the consent of the Attorney General is sought under subsection (2) or (3) above, the Attorney General must prepare a report containing his reasons for granting or withholding consent, as the case may be, with reference to sections 1 to 3 of this Act, and must lay a copy of this report before Parliament.”

This amendment requires the Attorney General to lay out their evidence and assessment as to why they granted or refused consent to prosecute.

Amendment 16, page 3, line 40, leave out clause 6.

Part 1 of the Bill introduces restrictions on prosecution for certain offences, including a presumption against prosecution. This amendment is one of a series that would remove Part 1 from the Bill.

Amendment 20, in clause 6, page 4, line 13, at end insert—

“(2A) An offence is not a “relevant offence” if it amounts to—

(a) torture, within the meaning of section 134 Criminal Justice Act 1988; or

(b) genocide, a crime against humanity or a war crime as defined in section 50 of the International Criminal Court Act 2001.”

This amendment provides that the presumption against prosecution does not apply to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or torture.

Amendment 32, in clause 6, page 4, line 13, at end insert—

“(3A) A service offence is not a “relevant offence” if it is an offence whose prosecution is required under the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations.”

This amendment would exclude the prosecution of serious international crimes (such as torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain war crimes) from the limitations otherwise imposed by the Bill.

Amendment 17, page 4, line 27, leave out clause 7.

Part 1 of the Bill introduces restrictions on prosecution for certain offences, including a presumption against prosecution. This amendment is one of a series that would remove Part 1 from the Bill.

Amendment 33, page 6, line 4, leave out clause 8.

Amendment 34, page 6, line 15, leave out clause 9.

Amendment 35, page 6, line 26, leave out clause 10.

Amendment 23, page 6, line 38, leave out clause 11.

This clause would introduce a hard deadline for human rights claims and also includes detailed provision around the impact of proceedings on the mental health of Armed Forces witnesses. This amendment deletes this clause from the bill.

Amendment 60, in clause 11, page 7, line 23, at end insert—

“(c) the importance of the proceedings in securing the rights of the claimant.”

This amendment adds a further consideration to which UK courts must have particular regard when determining whether to disapply the standard HRA limitation period of one year so as to ensure that the claimant’s interest in having their claim proceed is not subordinated.

Amendment 46, in clause 11, page 7, line 30, leave out from “before” to the end of line 34 and insert

“the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date of knowledge.”

This amendment is one of a series that change the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing claims under the HRA arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 41, in clause 11, page 7, line 34, at end insert—

“(4A) The court may disapply the rule in subsection (1) (b) where it appears to the court that it would be equitable to do so having regard to the reasons for the delay, in particular whether the delay resulted from—

(a) the nature of the injuries;

(b) logistical difficulties in securing the services required to bring a claim, so long as the claimant was making all reasonable attempts to secure such services, or

(c) any other reasons outside the control of the person bringing the claim.”

This amendment introduces a discretion for UK courts to allow a Human Rights Act claim arising out of overseas operations to proceed in prescribed circumstances so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing such claims.

Amendment 29, in clause 11, page 7, line 36, leave out

“first ought to have known”.

Amendment 47, in clause 11, page 7, line 40, at end insert—

“(c) of the manifestation of the harm resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim; and

(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim under the Human Rights Act 1998 against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”

This amendment is one of a series that change the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing claims under the HRA arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 40, page 8, line 14, leave out clause 12.

Clause 12 would require the Secretary of State to consider making a derogation under Article 15(1) ECHR in respect of any significant overseas operations. This amendment would remove this requirement.

Amendment 37, in clause 12, page 8, line 20, at end, insert—

“(1A) No order may be made by the Secretary of State under section 14 following consideration under this section unless a draft of the order has been laid before, and approved by, each House of Parliament.”

This amendment would require significant derogations regarding overseas operations proposed by the Government from the European Convention on Human Rights to be approved by Parliament before being made.

Amendment 66, page 11, line 1, leave out schedule 1.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 16.

Amendment 1, in schedule 1, page 12, line 6, at end insert—

“(13A) An offence under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (torture).”

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 2, in schedule 1, page 12, line 40, leave out “or” and insert—

“(b) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(f),

(c) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(i)

(d) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(k), or”.

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 3, in schedule 1, page 12, line 42, leave out “or” and insert—

“(ii) article 8.2(a)(ii) (which relates to international conflict),

(iii) article 8.2(b)(xxi) (which relates to international conflict), or”.

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 4, in schedule 1, page 13, line 2, at end insert “, or

(iv) article 8.2(c)(i) (which relates to armed conflicts not of an international character) insofar as it relates to the offences of cruel treatment and torture,

(v) article 8.2(c)(ii) (which relates to armed conflicts not of an international character).”

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 5, in schedule 1, page 13, line 14, leave out “or” and insert—

“(b) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(f),

(c) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(i),

(d) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(k), or”.

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 6, in schedule 1, page 13, line 16, leave out “or” and insert—

“(ii) article 8.2(a)(ii) ((which relates to international conflict),

(iii) article 8.2(b)(xxi) (which relates to international conflict), or”.

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 7, in schedule 1, page 13, line 18, at end insert—

“(iii) article 8.2(c)(i) (which relates to armed conflicts not of an international character) insofar as it relates to the offences of cruel treatment and torture,

(iv) article 8.2(c)(ii) (which relates to armed conflicts not of an international character).”

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 8, in schedule 1, page 14, line 8, leave out “or” and insert—

“(b) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(f),

(c) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(i),

(d) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(k), or”.

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 9, in schedule 1, page 14, line 10, leave out “or” and insert—

“(iii) article 8.2(a)(ii) ((which relates to international conflict),

(iv) article 8.2(b)(xxi) (which relates to international conflict), or”.

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 10, in schedule 1, page 14, line 12, at end insert—

“(iii) article 8.2(c)(i) (which relates to armed conflicts not of an international character) insofar as it relates to the offences of cruel treatment and torture, or

(iv) article 8.2(c)(ii) (which relates to armed conflicts not of an international character).”

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 67, page 15, line 33, leave out schedule 2.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 33.

Amendment 48, in schedule 2, page 16, line 5, leave out

“the section 11 relevant date”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 30, in schedule 2, page 16, line 5, at end insert

“save for exceptional cases where the overriding interest of justice should be served.”

Amendment 42, in schedule 2, page 16, line 5, at end insert—

“(1ZAi) The court may disapply the rule in subsection (1ZA) where it appears to the court that it would be equitable to do so having regard to the reasons for the delay, in particular whether the delay resulted from—

(a) the nature of the injuries;

(b) logistical difficulties in securing the services required to bring a claim, so long as the claimant was making all reasonable attempts to secure such services, or

(c) any other reasons outside the control of the person bringing the claim.”

This amendment introduces a discretion for the courts of England and Wales to allow a civil claim for personal injury arising out of overseas operations to proceed in prescribed circumstances so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing such claims.

Amendment 49, in schedule 2, page 16, line 30, leave out

“the section 11 relevant date (ignoring, for this purpose, the reference to section 11 (5) in paragraph (a) of the definition of that term)”

and insert “the date of knowledge.”

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 50, in schedule 2, page 16, line 35, leave out

“the section 12 relevant date”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 43, schedule 2, page 16, line 36, at end insert—

“(2Bi) The court may disapply the rules in subsections (2A) and (2B) where it appears to the court that it would be equitable to do so having regard to the reasons for the delay, in particular whether the delay resulted from—

(a) the nature of the injuries;

(b) logistical difficulties in securing the services required to bring a claim, so long as the claimant was making all reasonable attempts to secure such services, or

(c) any other reasons outside the control of the person bringing the claim.”

This amendment introduces a discretion for the courts of England and Wales to allow a civil claim for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations to proceed in prescribed circumstances so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing such claims.

Amendment 61, in schedule 2, page 17, line 5, at end insert—

“(c) the court must also have particular regard to the importance of the proceedings in securing the rights of the claimant.”

This amendment adds a further consideration to which the courts of England and Wales must have particular regard when determining whether to disapply the standard limitation period of three years so as to ensure that the claimant’s interest in having their civil claim proceed is not illegitimately subordinated.

Amendment 51, in schedule 2, page 17, leave out from beginning of line 35 to end of line 5 on page 18, and insert—

“‘the date of knowledge’ means the date on which the person bringing the proceedings first knew, or first ought to have known—

(a) of the act complained of;

(b) that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence or the Secretary of State for Defence;

(c) of the manifestation of the injury resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim, and

(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 68, page 20, line 1, leave out schedule 3.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34.

Amendment 62, in schedule 3, page 20, line 32, at end insert—

“(c) the importance of the proceedings in securing the rights of the claimant.”

This amendment adds a further consideration to which the courts of Scotland must have particular regard when determining whether to disapply the standard limitation period of three years so as to ensure that the claimant’s interest in having their civil claim proceed is not subordinated.

Amendment 52, in schedule 3, page 20, line 41, leave out

“the section 17 relevant date”

and insert

“the date of knowledge (see subsection (13))”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 53, in schedule 3, page 21, line 4, leave out

“the section 18 relevant date”

and insert

“the date of knowledge (see subsection (13))”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 54, in schedule 3, page 21, line 9, leave out

“the section 17 relevant date”

and insert

“the date of knowledge (see subsection (13))”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 44, in schedule 3, page 21, line 9, at end insert—

“(7A) The court may disapply the rules in subsections (5) to (7) where it appears to the court that it would be equitable to do so having regard to the reasons for the delay, in particular whether the delay resulted from—

(a) the nature of the injuries;

(b) logistical difficulties in securing the services required to bring a claim, so long as the claimant was making all reasonable attempts to secure such services, or

(c) any other reasons outside the control of the person bringing the claim.”

This amendment introduces a discretion for the courts of Scotland to allow a civil claim for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of overseas operations to proceed in prescribed circumstances so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing such claims.

Amendment 55, in schedule 3, page 22, leave out lines 12 to 17 and insert—

“‘the date of knowledge’ means the date on which the person bringing the proceedings first knew, or first ought to have known—

(a) of the act complained of;

(b) that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence or the Secretary of State for Defence;

(c) of the manifestation of the injury resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim, and

(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 69, page 23, line 38, leave out schedule 4.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 35.

Amendment 56, in schedule 4, page 24, line 5, leave out

“the Article 7 relevant date”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 45, in schedule 4, page 24, line 5, at end insert—

“(1Ai) The court may disapply the rule in paragraph (1A) where it appears to the court that it would be equitable to do so having regard to the reasons for the delay, in particular whether the delay resulted from—

(a) the nature of the injuries;

(b) logistical difficulties in securing the services required to bring a claim, so long as the claimant was making all reasonable attempts to secure such services, or

(c) any other reasons outside the control of the person bringing the claim.”

This amendment introduces a discretion for the courts of Northern Ireland to allow a civil claim for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of overseas operations to proceed in prescribed circumstances so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing such claims.

Amendment 57, in schedule 4, page 24, line 29, leave out

“the Article 7 relevant date (ignoring, for this purpose, the reference to Article 7(5) in paragraph (a) of the definition of that term)”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury out of overseas operations.

Amendment 58, in schedule 4, page 24, line 34, leave out

“the Article 9 relevant date”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 63, in schedule 4, page 25, line 5, at end insert—

“(c) the court must also have particular regard to the importance of the proceedings in securing the rights of the claimant.”

This amendment adds a further consideration to which the courts of Northern Ireland must have particular regard when determining whether to disapply the standard limitation period of three years so as to ensure that the claimant’s interest in having their civil claim proceed is not subordinated.

Amendment 59, in schedule 4, page 25, leave out lines 25 to 43 and insert—

“‘the date of knowledge’ means the date on which the person bringing the proceedings first knew, or first ought to have known—

(a) of the act complained of;

(b) that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence or the Secretary of State for Defence;

(c) of the manifestation of the injury resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim, and

(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

[Mr Jones]

For the sake of time, I will not speak to every single amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Johnny Mercer]

I just wish to intervene briefly. It is a litany of accusations and they are complete rubbish. Where have I ever said that I wanted to stop investigations in this Bill? That is what I would like the right hon. Gentleman to indicate to me.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. That is a perfectly reasonable question, but, although it is not exactly unparliamentary language, perhaps the Minister, speaking as he does with dignity from the Front Bench, might use a different phrase than “complete rubbish”—just something a little bit different.

[Mr Jones]

It is better than he did in Committee when he called me a hypocrite, Madam Deputy Speaker, but if he listens to what I am saying, he will know that I am not saying that. I know that his attention span is not very good, and he does not tend to listen. What he tends to do is just stick to what he has in front of him and his view of the world, rather than hearing what people are saying. The issue is—[Interruption.] Well, he can say “brilliant” and chunter as much as he likes, but this is the issue—the delays that are taking place because of the investigations.

I have referred to Judge Blackett, and the Minister was there when the evidence was taken. Judge Blackett is a just-retired senior judge of the service justice system, and he said:

“The Bill is effectively looking at the wrong end of the telescope. It is looking at the prosecution end, and you have got to remember that you do not prosecute until you investigate—and you have got to investigate. This will not stop people being investigated and it will not stop people being re-investigated and investigated again. Lots of investigations do not go anywhere, but the people who are investigated do not see that.”—[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 120.]

That came up when we took evidence from Major Campbell. I will put it on record again that his case was a disgrace, because it took 17 years, but this Bill will do nothing to speed up such cases or to ensure that reinvestigations do not occur. That is the key problem. The problem is not the prosecutions, because their number is very small.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

I defer to the hon. Gentleman’s knowledge of Northern Ireland politics, but I will say that this will not be solved by the promise that has been made. That again is not the issue.

I turn to new clause 3. It relates to the point that was raised on part 2 and is covered by an amendment tabled by Members on the Labour Front Bench. The issue is the stripping away of rights from veterans. I find it absolutely astonishing that, in this week of remembrance, we have a Government who have introduced a Bill that will actually take rights away from veterans. The longstop of six years will mean that veterans—and families—will not have access to section 33 of the Limitation Act, which allows people to bring cases out of time.

In Committee there was a lot of discussion about how many people would be affected. The Royal British Legion was very clear in its opposition to part 2 because, as Charles Byrne said in response to the Minister:

“I think it is protecting the MOD, rather than the service personnel”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 86, Q163.]

He said that the Royal British Legion thought it did breach the armed forces covenant. I agree, because the covenant states:

“Those who serve in the Armed Forces, whether Regular or Reserve, those who have served in the past, and their families, should face no disadvantage compared to other citizens in the provision of public…services”

and so on. I agree with that, but this strips away their rights under section 33, which means that if somebody brings forward a case after the six-year longstop, they cannot have recourse to section 33 of the Limitation Act, because the Bill will take those rights away. Those rights are open to every single Member in the House today, and to prisoners and asylum seekers—anybody who wants to bring a case.

The Minister said that 94% of cases were brought within the time limits anyway. That is irrelevant to me, because 6% clearly are not, and it is those 6% that will then possibly use the Limitation Act.

May I put this on record, as I did in Committee? Bringing forward a section 33 case is by no means easy. It pertains to a very small number of individuals who could not bring their case within the time limit because their circumstances were unique; and they have to go before a court and argue out the reasons. I have done it myself when I worked for a trade union on injury or disease cases that were out of time—although you would not take on such a case in the first instance if you thought you would not get anywhere. However, there are those important cases that you can take, and which do make a difference.

The case that was mentioned time and again in Committee was the Snatch Land Rover decision in 2016. The families took forward the case under the Human Rights Act, which I will come on to in a minute, on the basis that their loved ones had been killed and injured in Iraq because of negligence on behalf of the MOD.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. Just for clarification, in the silent exchange that the right hon. Gentleman and I have just had, I was trying to indicate to him that it would be helpful to the House if he concluded his remarks quite soon. I know it seems that he has not been speaking for very long, but it has been 22 minutes. I appreciate that he has taken a lot of interventions and this is important. I am requiring not that he finishes now but that he takes into consideration that there are many points of view on this Bill and that there are many people who wish to speak and, although we have a long time, we do not have long enough for everyone to take more than 20 minutes. He has some serious points to make, and I trust he will make them as quickly as possible.

[Mr Jones]

On one occasion, I spoke in Committee for an hour and 10 minutes.

[Miss Sarah Dines (Derbyshire Dales) (Con)]

Could the right hon. Gentleman take a moment to reflect on what he said in his opening remarks, when he said there was near silence from Conservative Members in Committee? I was there, and I did not hear silence, but his contributions probably put us to sleep. With respect, could he think about it again for one moment?

On our side, we had valuable contributions from Members of Parliament who have served this great country of ours, like my hon. Friends the Members for Wrexham (Sarah Atherton) and for Wolverhampton South West (Stuart Anderson). They know what they are talking about. Would the right hon. Gentleman care to think again about saying they were silent?

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. Let us get this straight. Interventions will also be brief this afternoon. We want interventions because there is a serious debate to be had. As I look around the Chamber, I see experienced parliamentarians and others who understand that this is a very important Bill, and much of it is very sensitive, so let us try to behave with sensitivity and consideration for others.

[Mr Jones]

I made a mistake this morning, because I was going to count the number of interventions. There were no speeches from Conservative Members in Committee, although I think there were six interventions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. I do not care how many interventions there were in Committee. This debate is not about Committee; it is about the important matters before us, and that is what we will stick to.

[Mr Jones]

Sorry, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I was being polite in replying to the hon. Member for Derbyshire Dales (Miss Dines).

The families took the case against the MOD on the basis that they did not know about the Snatch Land Rovers until the Chilcot inquiry reported. That was way past any time limit.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

It does. The Bill’s provisions will also mean that prisoners will have more right to sue the MOJ, for example, than armed forces personnel. The Minister said in Committee, “That’s terrible because you’re comparing armed service personnel with veterans”; no, I am not. I am saying that if the Bill goes through, prisoners will have more rights than armed forces personnel. That cannot be right. The Minister mentioned the 6%; I am sorry, but if even one veteran loses their rights under this Bill, I am not prepared to support that.

My next point is about the Human Rights Act. I support the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) and the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), because it is about how this looks in terms of our international reputation. There is derogation in the Bill; I accept that there cannot be derogation for torture, but it can and will be used to stop claims by MOD personnel against the MOD itself. The Snatch Land Rover case was brought under the Human Rights Act. Some people have the idea that the Human Rights Act is there to protect nasty foreigners and people we do not like; no, it is not. It is there to protect us all, including armed forces personnel. I am sure that that derogation will be used again by the MOD to deny the rights of individuals to take cases.

People should look at the Smith judgment on that case. What were the Government arguing? They were arguing that combat immunity, which is covered and was reinforced by the Supreme Court judgment, applied in that case because it happened in Iraq. No, that was not the case; the case was actually about the design and the decision to procure those Land Rovers and put them into theatre. The derogation will clearly be used in such a way.

I wish to make one final point, about our standing in the world. I am a supporter of the service justice system—it works well and we should be proud of it—but the problem with the Bill is this: do I want to see British servicemen and women tried in the International Criminal Court? No, I do not. I want them to be tried by their peers in a court in this country. As the Judge Advocate General, Judge Blackett, said in Committee, under this Bill there is a danger that if we have a presumption against prosecution and the issue around torture, we will get a situation whereby individuals will be tried not here but elsewhere. That would be terrible, not just for those individuals but for this country’s international reputation.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

I had been hoping to manage this afternoon’s proceedings without a time limit, but I do not think that is going to work; therefore, I am now obliged, in order to try to get a fair and equitable debate, to start with a time limit of eight minutes, but that will be significantly reduced later in the debate. If hon. Members who have eight minutes choose in an honourable way to speak for less than eight minutes, that would be remarkable.