(4 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberNo amendment has been selected, so I call the Minister to move the Second Reading.
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
The men and women of our armed forces are some of the most professional and capable people this country has. They risk their lives to keep us safe, uphold our values and support society whenever the call comes. I know the exceptional and often dangerous tasks that we ask them to do, and the war memorials sadly record the price of that sacrifice that they sometimes have to make. Our support for them should not be confined to the occasional act of remembrance, but should be real and should recognise the things that they do in our name.
In 2004, Phil Shiner, a lawyer, went fishing. He fished for stories, he fished for victims and he fished for terrorists. Phil Shiner and his company, Public Interest Lawyers, fished for people from whom he could make money and to accuse British troops of wrongdoing. By the time Phil Shiner and his like had finished, he had dragged before the courts 1,400 judicial reviews and 234 compensation claims against hundreds of troops. Alongside him on some of those occasions was another law firm that will be, I am afraid, all too familiar to some on the Opposition Benches—Leigh Day. From 2008, those types of firms hauled industrial levels of claims before the courts—never mind the fear and worry and the endless investigations triggered into the men and women of our armed forces. What mattered to the ambulance chasers was the money—the legal aid income, the commissions on compensation claims.
I agree with the Secretary of State’s comments about Phil Shiner, but I have asked his Department for the numbers of cases—as, I understand, have representatives from the Scottish National party—but it has not produced them. The explanatory notes say that there were 900 civil claims. When is he going to produce the figures?
They are in the Library. They were published last week and this is in the impact assessment, but I am very happy to write to the right hon. Member with the clear numbers. I can tell him now that overall, 1,130 compensation claims were brought between 2003 and 2009. One hundred and eighty-eight of the 244 claims put forward by Public Interest Lawyers were struck out by the High Court, and a further 32 lapsed due to inactivity, so we could say that they were found out and justice was eventually done, yet in the meantime, our troops had to endure repeated investigations, interviews and, in some cases, prosecutions.
The system as it stands provides an all-too-easy route for lawyers to spark repeat investigations and multiple claims, too many chances to earn fees and too many chances to drag yet another soldier through a witness box or an interview. If that all fails to produce a result, and most of them do not, there is always the opportunity to use the media to drum up more business, damaging our reputation across the globe with unsubstantiated allegations.
In theory, a veteran who served in Iraq and Afghanistan could have been involved in up to 13 investigations. The list is exhaustive: a coroner’s inquest; a commanding officer’s investigation; a service police investigation; the Iraq Historic Allegations Team, a judicial review, a service inquiry—the list goes on. Remember that in the middle of this are the men and women who risk their lives to ensure that we sleep safely in our beds.
I welcome the fact that the Bill has been brought to the House. The introduction of measures and safeguards are very important, and one reason why is the mental health and wellbeing of those who are potentially prosecuted because of things that perhaps did not happen. It is very important that the welfare of soldiers, sailors and airmen is protected, is it not?
The hon. Member makes a really important point. Under the Bill, there are steps where prosecutors will have to pay due regard to the impact on soldiers and sailors of that type of further action.
We have been told that this Bill is controversial. Some have gone as far as to say that it decriminalises torture or prevents veterans receiving compensation. Both allegations are untrue. I have to question whether those making such points have actually read the Bill in full. As the former Attorney General for Northern Ireland, John Larkin QC, has recently written:
“It is clearly wrong to say that the Bill would forbid prosecution of serious allegations of torture supported by evidence.”
The Secretary of State invokes the Attorney General for Northern Ireland, so I will invoke Northern Ireland at this point. He knows that of the 300,000 veterans who served in Northern Ireland, none can find comfort in this Bill, as it is about overseas operations. However, he also knows that when the Bill was introduced, there was an equal and comparable commitment given on 18 March that those who served in Northern Ireland would get equal protection. That Bill is yet to be introduced, but can he convince us this afternoon that that commitment still stands?
The hon. Member points to the statement made in the House, and the Government still stand by that. We will ensure that legislation comes forward as part of the overall package to address legacy issues in Northern Ireland.
Notwithstanding the Secretary of State’s comments, he knows that some people who are very close to the military consider the Bill to be extremely controversial. Indeed, the Financial Times today leads with a quote that it is an “international embarrassment”. Does he agree with General Nick Parker, a former commander of UK land forces, who was quoted in the Financial Times today as saying:
“We shouldn’t be treating our people as if they have special protection from prosecution…What we need to do is to investigate properly so that the ones who deserve to be prosecuted, are”?
First, that is what we are doing. I do not agree with the point about torture. I absolutely agree with the point by the former Attorney General for Northern Ireland on that subject.
I am going to make some progress. I know that there are lots of people down to speak in this debate and, although I am willing to give way as much as possible, I would like to make sure that other Members across the House get a chance to speak and make their points.
Let me set out what the Bill does and what it does not do. First, the Bill ensures that, in accordance with article 6 of the European convention on human rights, every member of the armed forces and Crown servant is
“entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
Not my words, not the Government’s words, but the actual words in the ECHR itself. Note the phrase “reasonable time”. That condition runs right through this Bill.
Clauses 1 to 7 introduce new conditions on prosecution for certain offences. In particular, clause 1 sets out when the presumption against prosecution measures will apply, including that the measures will apply only to alleged events that took place on overseas operations more than five years ago. Clauses 2 to 5 create new thresholds that a prosecutor is required to consider when bringing a case. That will give service personnel and veterans greater certainty that the unique pressure placed on them during overseas operations will be taken into account when decisions are made on whether to prosecute for alleged historical offences. The first threshold is that, once five years have elapsed from the date of an incident, it is to be exceptional for a prosecutor to determine that a serviceperson or veteran should be prosecuted for alleged offences on operations outside the UK.
When the Secretary of State’s Department consulted on the Bill in July last year, it suggested that there were two categories of offence that might be excluded from the Bill. One was sexual offences, and the other was torture. Sexual offences have been excluded; why has torture not been?
First, I took the decision that, if we look back at many examples of case law or challenges, the debate around torture and murder has often been about the excessive use of an action in doing something that is what a soldier may or may not think is legitimate. For example, it is an act of war to go and attack a target. It is, unfortunately, an act that a soldier may have to do, which is to use lethal force in defence. It is often a side effect or a consequence of an action that you detain people. Often, the legal debate around that has focused on whether the soldier has been excessive in that use of force. If a soldier uses an excessive amount of force in self-defence on duty, that is viewed as murder. That is where we have often seen challenges in courts around both investigations and decisions to charge.
What is not part of war in any way at all is sexual offences. It is not a debatable point. It is not a place where it is possible to turn on a coin and argue that there is a right and a wrong. That is why I took the view that we should exclude sexual offences from schedule 1 but in the main part of the Bill cover all other offences. It is not the case that, even after five years, someone cannot be prosecuted for torture, murder or anything else. It is absolutely clear that it is still possible to prosecute, and it is our intention, should new or compelling evidence be brought forward, to prosecute for those offences. The Bill is not decriminalising torture and it is not decriminalising murder in any way at all. I mentioned earlier the view of the former Attorney General of Northern Ireland, who is himself well practised in that type of law and an expert.
I think that this is an excellent set of proposals, which the Secretary of State has thought through with great enthusiasm and common sense. It is of course right that people should be investigated fully, and prosecuted if necessary, close to the event, but we want to avoid double, treble or quadruple jeopardy by money makers who should know better than undermining the reputation of our armed forces. I thank the Secretary of State very much for getting the balance right.
I do think we are nearly there on this point, but my right hon. Friend knows that it is important, because it has been raised by some very senior members of the armed forces. I have talked to his excellent junior Minister, the Minister for Defence People and Veterans, my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer), and we all want the lawfare that my right hon. Friend described, which is so outrageous, stopped. Mrs Thatcher brought in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which made it clear that torture of anyone, anywhere is a criminal offence. It would be very helpful if my right hon. Friend now made it clear, in addition to his response to the right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms), that it is never acceptable, under any circumstance, for any act of torture to take place.
I fully agree with my right hon. Friend: torture is not an acceptable part of what any soldier or any citizen of this country should take part in. Where former Governments, of all colours, have been found to have not upheld those standards, they have either been prosecuted or faced the consequences. No one is excluding that and no one is decriminalising it.
Does the Secretary of State accept that the primary problem is not repeated prosecution, but repeated reinvestigation? The Bill does little to rule that out. With the sorts of cases that he has outlined, the problem has been the innumerable investigations. They are what were so traumatic for the troops, not the tiny number of prosecutions. As the former Attorney General for Northern Ireland says:
“Nothing in the Bill limits the investigation of offences—even outside the period of five years…The Bill impliedly contemplates the possibility of multiple investigations.”
That, I am afraid, is where the Bill falls down.
First, the Bill deals with two parts of why often people are investigated. One is under civil proceedings, where they are investigated or interviewed, or involved in the inquest. Many of those personnel find themselves repeatedly interviewed, either as a suspect or, indeed, through constant summonses as a witness in an inquest. As we know from a number of cases, that has happened on multiple occasions. That is why the second part of the Bill deals with the civil route and the first part deals with the criminal bit.
On the criminal bit, one change is the requirement after five years for a number of thresholds to be gone through before a decision to prosecute is progressed. We think those thresholds are enough to make sure that investigators, or the prosecutor, before perhaps embarking on a repeat investigation—for example, if there has already been one—have to have regard that this is important new evidence. In my experience, investigators do not just investigate for investigation’s sake; they investigate to reach a point of prosecution. If they feel that a prosecution is unlikely, they will not pursue it. I feel that will therefore reduce the number of investigations.
My right hon. Friend also makes the point, in regard to the critics, that the Bill does not prevent prosecution in certain circumstances of egregious crimes committed either against humanity or our treaty obligations at all. That is really important. We will never prevent new evidence from producing a prosecution if a crime has been committed.
I am now going to progress.
The second element of the first part of the Bill ensures that, when making a decision, the prosecutor must give particular weight to certain matters, such as the adverse impact of operations on our personnel and the public interest in finality where there has been a previous investigation and there is no compelling new evidence. If it is deemed that the case should proceed to trial, the third threshold requires consent before a prosecution can proceed. In England and Wales, for example, that will be from the Attorney General. In those cases, the Attorney General will be acting independently of Government, as guardian of the public interest.
Some groups such as Liberty have suggested that this is political interference. It is nothing of the sort. Given that the Attorney General already has decisions over prosecutions in statute ranging from the Auctions (Bidding Agreements) Act 1927 to the Theatres Act 1968, it is neither uncommon nor controversial.
If the hon. Gentleman is going to tell us about the Advocate General for Scotland—[Interruption]—or rather, the Lord Advocate in Scotland, who also sits in the Scottish Cabinet—and his role in directing prosecutions, I will be interested to hear.
Of course, the Advocate General for Scotland resigned just last week. I believe it is the case that the Department consulted the Lord Advocate in the Scottish Government. It is normally the case that the Government would not publish the advice of its own lawyers, but the Lord Advocate in Scotland is not a UK Government official; he is a Scottish Government official. Will the Secretary of State publish the opinion that the Ministry of Defence received from Scotland’s Lord Advocate?
We are not going to publish his opinion or anybody else’s.
We do not publish the opinion of our Attorney General. It is a long-held policy of most Governments not to publish the legal advice they receive, except in exceptional circumstances.
Part 2 of the Bill makes changes to the time limits for bringing claims in tort for personal injury or death and claims for Human Rights Act 1998 violations that occur in the context of overseas military operations. Clauses 8 to 10 introduce schedules 2, 3 and 4. Taken together, these provisions introduce new factors that the courts in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland must consider when deciding whether a claim for personal injury or death can be allowed beyond the normal limit of three years. The provisions also introduce an absolute maximum time limit of six years for such claims. These new factors ensure that operational context is properly taken into account, and they weigh up the likely impact of giving evidence on the mental health of the service personnel or veterans involved.
Clause 11 amends the Human Rights Act. This provision largely mirrors the changes that are being made for tort-based claims. It will change the rules governing the court’s discretion to extend the one-year time limit for bringing claims under the 1998 Act and will introduce an absolute maximum time limit of six years for human rights claims in relation to overseas operations. Again, critics of the Bill are trying to mislead veterans with tales that this somehow discriminates against our armed forces.
Let us put this six-year backstop into perspective. Currently, for claims in tort, where personnel may sue for personal injury in England, there is already a time limit. Mostly, that limit is three years from the date of the incident or knowledge of it. In other words, if a former soldier is diagnosed with PTSD 20 years after his service, the time limit starts then, not when the operation took place. The existence of time limits is commonplace and was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Stubbings v. the UK. The UK Human Rights Act itself has a 12-month time limit for claims from the event happening but does allow for further judicial discretion, and the armed forces compensation scheme has a seven-year time limit.
Finally, clause 12 will further amend the Human Rights Act to impose a duty to consider derogating from—that is, suspending our obligations under—the European convention on human rights in relation to significant military overseas operations. This measure does not require derogation to take place, but it does require future Governments to make a conscious decision on whether derogation should be sought in the light of the circumstances at the time. We want in future the ability, if necessary, to allow soldiers to focus on the danger and job in hand when on operations, not on whether they will have a lawsuit slapped on them when they get home.
I thank the Secretary of State for giving way. He knows that my views on these matters are sincere. I abhor vexatious claims against former service personnel. I have witnessed the training of armed forces on the laws of war at first hand and seen how seriously they and their commanders take it. He will be aware that derogation from that section of the ECHR is used in very rare circumstances, and it would be helpful to have more clarification on that. Many people have spoken out on the Bill, including a former Chief of the Defence Staff, a former Commander Land Forces, former Conservative Defence Secretaries and Attorney Generals and learned and gallant Members on both sides of the House. Does he accept that they are expressing those concerns sincerely? I urge him to listen to them as the Bill goes into Committee.
I certainly recognise that people have concerns. Some of those people were doing the job that I am doing when these things were going on, so I would venture to ask them why they did not do anything about it at the time. It is a fact that there has been abuse of this system; we all know that on both sides of the House. It is a fact that we need to do more, rather than just talk about it, for our veterans. It is really important to include measures to recognise the very unique experiences of and pressures put on the men and women of our armed forces when they go on operations hundreds of miles away.
I want to pick up on the point made by the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty)—I am glad to see him wearing his Royal College of Defence Studies tie; there are quite a lot of military ties in the Chamber today—about the application of the ECHR. The derogation that we are asking for and that the Bill recommends is not new; it was included in the initial treaty when it was signed in the ’50s, and other countries have already used it. We are talking about recognising the provisions of a treaty that we signed in order to allow the military to act in a military way, because this treaty was written by people who had fought in the second world war and knew exactly what they were talking about.
My hon. Friend makes a substantive point, and one reason we find ourselves facing these challenges is because there is a clear conflict between international humanitarian law in some areas, and international human rights. The encroachment and growing reach of ECHR into areas of combat has created a clash, in some sense, between things such as the Geneva convention and individual human rights. That is why when the authors wrote the ECHR, they included some of those carve-outs as a way of accommodating the international laws under which they had been operating in the mass conflict of the second world war. Indeed, when the Defence Committee was chaired by my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), it picked up on that very real clash, which is hard to resolve. In my view, some of the problems with lawfare is that people are exploiting that clash for financial gain. It is easy to hide behind a humanitarian law on one day and a human rights law on another, and we have a duty to try to make a difference.
We are not going as far as many countries under the jurisdiction of ECHR. Other countries in Europe have a statute of limitations on criminal offences. Germany and France both have a number of criminal statutes that are statutes of limitations. Other countries also do that, or have amnesties, but we are not going that far. We are trying to resolve that clash and see how we can ensure a proper threshold, so that there are no vexatious investigations and our men and women do not constantly find themselves the subject of them.
Surely, the debate of the past five or 10 minutes has exposed the truth of this matter, which is that it is easy to build consensus in the House on provisions relating to civil actions—there is very little exception to that. However, may I take the Secretary of State back to the answer he gave to the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell)? He is right in what he says about torture, but the logic of his argument is that torture should be listed in the first schedule to the Bill. He is right to put sexual offences in that schedule because, as the Government says, there are no circumstances in which sexual offences can be tolerated in war, but the logic of not including torture suggests that there are some circumstances in which torture is accepted. That is the logic. Will the Secretary of State tell the House what those circumstances are?
The right hon. Gentleman is a learned Gentleman and a former colleague of mine—
Well, he should be. Only a solicitor would argue the toss between a barrister and a solicitor; for us mere soldiers, they are learned gentlemen or women in this context. I am afraid that he is absolutely wrong in his assertion. Nowhere in the Bill prevents a prosecution for torture either under five years or over five years. If he can show me where in the Bill there is a decriminalisation or tolerance of torture, I would be delighted to hear which clause or subsection decriminalises torture. Will he show me the statute?
The exclusion of torture from schedule 1 raises the inference for any court that—and this is a matter of logic, not of law—there are circumstances in which torture is acceptable. All the Secretary of State needs to do is include torture in schedule 1, and the Bill would have no difficulty.
Does the right hon. Gentleman therefore venture that beyond torture there is murder? Should we include murder in that schedule as well?
Obviously not, because murder is dealt with by the common law of this country. The Secretary of State is perfectly aware that such a case could still be brought under the exceptional circumstances provisions. The problem he has is that there is no such thing as unexceptional torture.
I will crack on. The House has heard the point from the Liberal Democrat spokesman. I venture that I will side with the former Attorney General for Northern Ireland on his views regarding whether this provision does or does not prevent torture. I think his judge of the law is pretty succinct, although I have not always agreed with his views. [Interruption.] I shall carry on.
In conclusion, the Bill is about doing the right thing by our troops. Our soldiers and values must uphold the highest international standards. The Bill is not an amnesty, a statute of limitation, or the decriminalisation of erroneous acts. We will continue to protect the independence of our prosecutors and our service police, and we will investigate and, if necessary, prosecute service personnel who break the law. But what we will not accept is the vexatious hounding of veterans and our armed forces by ambulance-chasing lawyers motivated not by the search for justice, but by their own crude financial enrichment.
This House should reflect on how lawfare has ranged way out of control. All too often, the victims have been the very people who risked life and limb to keep us safe. The Bill is a measured step, making provision for the unique circumstances our troops find themselves in on operations overseas. I commend the Bill to the House.
I remind colleagues that many right hon. and hon. Members wish to contribute to the debate, so Back-Bench contributions will be limited to five minutes to start with. We will have to review the limit as we go to allow as many people as possible to participate.
I start by also paying tribute to the role, dedication and work of our armed forces. They face exceptional risks, give exceptional service and require exceptional skills. As we face as a nation a second covid crisis, they are likely to be called on again, more heavily, including overseas.
I am pleased that we have come to the Commons debate on this legislation. I thank the Secretary of State for the way he introduced the Bill. The first duty of any Government is to protect the nation and its citizens, and the first duty of any Defence Secretary is to protect the men and women who dedicate themselves to the service of their country. We have our own British way of doing this. Since the days of Churchill and Attlee, when Britain led the global efforts to establish the rules-based international order after the second world war, we have been the champions of democracy, freedom and universal human rights. Our British forces uphold, unequivocally, international law and conventions. By adhering to the highest standards of legal military conduct ourselves, we can hold other countries to account when their forces fall short. The Bill calls into question Britain’s proud commitment to the Geneva convention, our duty as a “permanent five” member of the United Nations to uphold international law, and our moral authority to require the conduct of other nations to meet the standards set by those international conventions.
Since the end of the 2000s, all parties in this House have upheld a strong commitment to the armed forces covenant, which declares that those from the armed forces and their families
“should face no disadvantage compared to other citizens in the provision of public and commercial services.”
The Bill breaches that covenant by denying troops who serve overseas the same employer liability rights as are held by the UK civilians they defend. Our aim with this Bill is, first, to protect British troops and their right to justice from the MOD, and secondly, to protect Britain’s reputation as a force for good in the world, upholding human rights and the rules-based international order. We will work to help forge a constructive consensus through the Commons and the Lords for the changes necessary to achieve that aim.
The right hon. Gentleman must recognise—I am sure he knows this well, having spoken to his opposite numbers in socialist or left-wing parties around Europe—that many other countries follow this system of derogation and have national caveats. France itself has a reserve of emergency powers it can use to defend its troops against vexatious or inappropriate litigation. Is he seriously suggesting that France is not a law-based state, or that it is in some way immoral and has no right to sit as one of the P5? Surely he is not suggesting that.
No, I am very clear that we want to and must protect our British troops against vexatious claims and repeat investigations. Important parts of the Bill are wrong; we can get them right and that is what I want to do. There has been a problem—I get that—arising especially from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as the Secretary of State said. The al-Sweady inquiry chairman, when he finally cleared the troops in 2014, spoke forcefully of the “most serious allegations”—of murder and mutilation—that
“have been hanging over these soldiers for the past 10 years”.
The family of an Iraqi boy, Ahmed Jabbar Kareem Ali, who drowned in a canal in 2003 with British soldiers directly implicated, had to wait until the Newman inquiry reported in 2016 before they got the truth and the MOD issued a full apology.
Long-running litigation, repeat investigations and judicial reviews are indeed the signs of a flawed system—a system that has failed British troops and failed victims under successive Governments. I get this problem, and it must be fixed, but it is important to see it in perspective, not least so that we can see clearly the problem that we are legislating in the Bill to fix.
My right hon. Friend was touching on an important point that Members on the Government Benches have touched on as well. The problem is, as it stands, the long investigations and the repeated investigations that allow double jeopardy not via the courts, but by intimidation of investigation. The Bill does nothing whatever to deal with some of those issues. Is that not a reason for the Government to go away and rewrite parts of the Bill or even issue proper investigatory guidelines to stop that kind of thing happening?
I sincerely trust that the Government will rethink and will be prepared to rewrite parts of the Bill. If they do so, I think they will find broad consensus for some of the changes that could be made to the Bill to help protect our troops and protect Britain’s reputation worldwide at the same time.
On that point, I have seen successive Governments overlook the armed forces, having been one of those people thrown on the pile to fend for myself. This Bill is a massive step forward for any veteran who has served on the frontlines. We are playing politics with this issue, and I plead for all Members to put that aside and focus on the massive step this Bill is for our armed forces.
I will come on to that matter in a moment, because the Bill does nothing for those troops who have served, as the hon. Gentleman describes, on the frontline overseas. It does nothing to deal with the past cases and the past problems.
On that point, the right hon. Gentleman is right about the armed forces covenant and the ability of members of the armed forces community to bring a claim for injury or death after six years. There is some concern about the unique deviation of the Limitation Act 1980 in the Bill that will place members of the armed forces community at a disadvantage compared with civilians. After six years, civilians can register a civil claim, whereas soldiers and Army, Navy and RAF personnel cannot.
In his typical way, the hon. Member puts his finger on an important point. He understates his argument, as there is more than just some concern; there are, for instance, according to the Royal British Legion, very clear grounds for concern that the provision breaches the armed forces covenant, and I will come on to that point.
Let me deal with getting this problem, which does exist and must be fixed, in a proper perspective. My right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) was absolutely right about how hard it is to get hard, clear information out of the Government. Over recent months, I have had to prise figures out of the MOD. There is a deep resistance to releasing full, open information. The first important figures to give a broad perspective are these: over the past 15 years, there have been 25 cases brought by injured British troops against the MOD for every one case brought by alleged victims against our troops. You can see why, Madam Deputy Speaker, some of the veterans I have talked to about this Bill reckon it is more about protecting the MOD than it is about protecting troops. Britain deployed 140,000 troops to Iraq over six years. The Government cite—the Secretary of State did so today—1,000 civil claims, all against the MOD, not individual service personnel, as evidence for the Bill to end vexatious legal claims. One third of those cases—330—have had the MOD pay compensation. Clearly, they were not vexatious as the MOD rightly insists on only settling cases in which it accepts liability. [Interruption.] The Secretary of State says, “No, we don’t,” but if he looks at the annual report on the cases that the Department publishes and takes, he will see exactly that commitment and clarification. It does not have the power to settle claims where it judges that it would not be found liable in a court. However, one fifth of the cases—217—have been withdrawn or struck out. They may well have been vexatious cases—they were certainly baseless. They may have taken too long, but the system, even as it stands, has dealt with them.
Two fifths of the cases—414—are ongoing, according to the MOD, although that definition could mean that those cases are settled and the MOD has agreed to pay compensation, but there may still be outstanding arguments over legal costs. Those cases may again be long-running, but they are hardly vexatious if they have not been struck out by now.
On the criminal side, the Government cite 3,400 allegations. The Secretary of State referred to the Iraq Historic Allegations Team that looked into them. Despite deep flaws in that investigation, 70% were ruled out as there was no case to answer or no proportionate grounds for a criminal investigation. In other words, those allegations did not warrant a full investigation so got nowhere near the point of decision about prosecution. They would have been wholly unaffected by the Bill if the measure had been in place because, as the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) said, it does not deal with investigations—as it should—but only with prosecutorial decisions and process. By the way, just seven prosecutions have been brought against British soldiers from the remaining allegations and investigations, and all but one have now been dropped.
On Afghanistan and criminal cases, the Operation Northmoor investigation in 2014 examined 675 criminal allegations from 159 people. The investigation closed and no charges have followed. Indeed, the investigation concluded a year before the MOD confirmed in public in June that it had closed.
On judicial review, the Government have cited 1,400 JRs of civil and criminal Iraq and Afghanistan cases as justification for the Bill. I can only find evidence that two judicial reviews are continuing. The court gave the MOD permission to strike many of the others out three years ago. Yet in April, the Minister told me in answer to a written parliamentary question that the MOD had still only notified fewer than half—630—of the court’s decision not to take the investigations further.
To put the matter in perspective, certainly some vexatious claims have been lodged and the current system has taken too long to weed them out, but the bigger, more serious, more consistent problems lie in the system of investigations, which lacks speed, soundness, openness and a duty of care to alleged victims and to the forces personnel who may be in the frame. Those are the problems, which occur well before the point of decision about prosecution, which is the point at which the Bill starts to operate. They are what the Bill should and can deal with. Our aim during its passage through Parliament is to help ensure that it does.
To pick up on the point made by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West (Stuart Anderson), I must confess that when I first looked at the Bill, I thought that it was designed to draw a line under the cases still caught up in the problem of so-called lawfare. The first paragraph of the explanatory notes gives the same misleading impression. It says:
“This Bill aims to provide greater certainty for Service personnel and veterans in relation to vexatious claims and prosecution of historical events, that occurred in the uniquely complex environment of armed conflict overseas.”
But this legislation will have no impact on any past or any continuing cases, and clause 15 on commencement makes that clear, so it offers no hope and no help of faster resolution either for the troops or for the alleged victims, who may still be involved in long-running litigation or in repeat investigations. I want to make sure that no one in this House and, much more importantly, in the armed forces and the veterans community is misled by what they may have heard or may have understood before now.
Similarly, nothing in this Bill applies to Northern Ireland, despite the same commitment in the Conservative manifesto, similar concerns on the Government side about drawing a line for British troops who served in Northern Ireland and the Secretary of State’s letter to all MPs last week in which he confirmed his eagerness
“to ensure also the equivalent protections of our veterans who served in Northern Ireland.”
The Secretary of State’s speech looked back, but we now legislate for the future. The Bill is not a framework fit for the future point when Britain must again commit its forces to armed conflict overseas. The Government have got important parts of the Bill badly wrong, and I want to see Ministers work with all parties in both Houses and with groups beyond Parliament who have expertise to offer on this—from the British Legion to Liberty—to get this legislation right.
There are problems. The Bill is silent on the command responsibility and the role of commanders in some of these cases. There is a problem, I think, with the Attorney General’s consent, as it risks political factors coming into prosecutorial decisions. There is nothing on the disclosure rights, responsibilities and duties of the MOD. Let me summarise our biggest concerns about the Bill.
I agree with many of the points the shadow Secretary of State has made during his very valid contribution. Does he agree that one of the fundamental weaknesses with the Bill was put forward by the UK’s most senior military judge, who has argued that the consequence of the legislation is that UK military personnel are more likely to find themselves in front of the International Criminal Court?
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for conceding that I am making some valid points. His point is certainly valid, and it will be a point of central argument, probably in the debate today, but certainly as the Bill passes through both Houses.
Let me return to the biggest problems in the Bill. Part 1, as the Secretary of State said, introduces what the Government have called their so-called triple lock to make prosecutions for the most serious crimes harder. The presumption against prosecution for all crimes except sexual violence clearly creates the risk that the very gravest crimes, including torture and other war crimes, go unpunished if an incident does not come to light for five years or if the investigations are drawn out beyond that deadline.
My right hon. Friend is making an extremely constructive and compelling speech, and I hope that all Members on both sides will listen to what he is saying. On that specific point about torture, may I commend to him the article by our hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), who has very clearly set out today the objection he has, as I do, to vexatious claims and vexatious investigations? He is also very clear that the prohibition on torture is absolute: there are no exceptions. We as a country are a signatory to a whole series of international conventions on that very issue, and the derogations we talked about under the European convention make it very clear that we have to comply with those international obligations.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for a very succinct and spot-on point, and I look forward to the contribution that I hope my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) will be able to make in the debate.
Will the changes the shadow Secretary of State wants to make overall give more protection to our veterans, or will they actually reduce the protections in this legislation?
The changes will give protections that are fit for the future. They will give protections that are required, and they will avoid parts of the Bill that at the moment put at a disadvantage in a unique fashion those British troops who serve overseas, which is why we argue that it breaches the armed forces covenant.
To come back to the presumption against prosecution, in the explanatory notes the Government maintain:
“Nothing in this Bill will stop those guilty of committing serious criminal acts from being prosecuted.”
That is a point the Secretary of State made, but many legal experts disagree and say that the Bill, as it intends, will be a significant barrier to justice. The Law Society’s briefing on this debate says:
“The Bill creates…a limitation period for a select group of persons in specific circumstances, i.e. armed forces personnel alleged to have committed offences overseas.”
Alongside the extra factors for prosecutors to take into account and the requirement for the Attorney General to give the go-ahead for such prosecutions, that clearly risks breaching the Geneva convention, the convention against torture, the Rome statute, the European convention on human rights and other long-standing international legal obligations. Where the UK is unable or unwilling to prosecute, the International Criminal Court may well act. So rather than providing relief for the troops accused, the Bill also risks British service personnel being dragged to The Hague, the court of Milošević and Gaddafi, instead of being dealt with in our own British justice system.
Let us just step back a moment from the technical detail. This is the Government of Great Britain bringing in a legal presumption against prosecution for torture, for war crimes and for crimes against humanity. This is the Government of Great Britain saying sexual crimes are so serious they will be excluded from this presumption, but placing crimes outlawed by the Geneva convention on a less serious level and downgrading our unequivocal commitment to upholding international law that we in Britain ourselves, after the second world war, helped to establish.
What is appalling is the straw man being put up time and again by a Labour party half-funded by these ambulance-chasing lawyers. That is going to damage our reputation. No apology for the money they took from a number of them—no apology whatever. What we should recognise is that many of—[Interruption.]
Order. Do not shout in the Chamber.
Much of the mess we are having to come and clean up today is because of your illegal wars, your events in the past and the way you have run the safety of our forces. To put up straw men and make wild allegations that are wholly inaccurate, and disputed by people much more learned than the right hon. Gentleman, does a disservice to our troops and is all about making an excuse for not supporting the Bill. We will see tonight whether or not he supports the Bill.
That is not worthy of the office of the Secretary of State for Defence. We are dealing with matters of torture, war crimes, MOD negligence, compensation for injured troops and compensation for the families who have lost their loved ones overseas. This is too important for party politics. It should be beneath the Secretary of State to reduce this to party politics. We on the Labour Benches will work with the Government to get the Bill right.
This is embarrassing.
Order. When you speak, you speak standing up not sitting down. Now, we will just have a drop in temperature while we consider the facts of the Bill and let the emotions settle down somewhat.
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. The facts of the Bill are that it places torture and other war crimes on a different level to crimes of sexual violence. That is not embarrassing; that is unconscionable for a country with a proud record of upholding unequivocally the international conventions that we helped to draw up.
No, I will not at this point.
Ministers must think again. No wonder that the former Chief of the Defence Staff, Lord Guthrie, says that the Bill as it stands would be a stain on Britain’s standing in the world. Ministers must think again. They must remove torture and other war crimes from the Bill. There are better ways of protecting our troops and Britain’s good name.
Part 2 creates a higher hurdle for civil cases after three years, as the Secretary of State said, with extra factors that a prosecutor must take into account, and a hard block on any case after six years. For British troops serving overseas with claims to make against the MOD, that does breach the armed forces covenant—a point that I made to the Secretary of State early in the summer, reinforced today by the Royal British Legion in its briefing for this debate, which says that in removing “the ability of members of the armed forces community to bring a claim for injury or death after six years, the Government will create a unique deviation from the Limitation Act 1980.” It denies those who serve our country overseas the same employer liability rights as the rest of us enjoy at home. It creates circumstances that allow the MOD to avoid claims when it fails properly to equip our troops or makes serious errors that lead to the death or injury of British troops overseas.
It is plain wrong that those who put their lives on the line for Britain overseas should have less access to compensation than the UK civilians they defend, and, since 2007, there have been at least 195 cases of troops who would have been caught by the Bill. Ministers have tried to play that down by saying that the clock on that deadline starts only at the point of diagnosis, but that is misleading because diagnosis is not in the Bill and the point of knowledge is in the Bill. That is another important provision that we must put right.
ln conclusion, we believe, and I believe strongly, despite what the Minister for Defence People and Veterans is chuntering under his breath, that the Government, Labour and the armed forces ultimately all want the same thing: we want to protect British troops and we want to protect British values, and that should not be merely a matter of party politics.
I say to the Secretary of State, during the Bill’s passage through Parliament we want to help forge a constructive consensus on the changes needed to overhaul investigations, to set up safeguards against vexatious claims that are entirely consistent with our international obligations, and to guarantee troops the right to compensation claims when MOD failures lead to the death or injury of our forces overseas. It is not too late for Ministers to think again about the best way to protect service personnel from vexatious litigation while ensuring that those who do commit serious crimes during operations are properly prosecuted and punished. As the Bill begins its passage through Parliament, I urge the Secretary of State and his Minister to work with us to ensure that it does just that.
The House will be aware that a great many people would like to speak this afternoon—far more than the number of people who are currently able to be in the Chamber. We have a waiting list. We therefore start with an immediate time limit of five minutes.
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I wish to make a declaration of interests. I am a current member of the armed forces and I did serve in Northern Ireland.
I very much welcome and support the Bill; it is a step in the right direction. We do not seem to have many opportunities to praise the armed forces; there are not enough relevant debates in this place. I am pleased that so many Members are speaking here today.
I join Members on both Front Benches in paying tribute to our entire armed forces community. They help define what this nation believes in and stands for. The versatility of our armed forces is reflected not only in times of conflict, but also when there are needs and challenges closer to home. I am pleased to see the Prime Minister instigate Operation Temperer, inviting the armed forces to support our constabularies. We will not be seeing the 4th Battalion the Rifles Regiment enforcing last orders at the Dog and Duck just yet, but we look forward to their supporting us as we tackle the pandemic.
The UK’s are volunteer armed forces. The gene pool from which we recruit is society itself, and we want the best and brightest to step forward and join the ranks of all three services. For that to be successful, we must not only train, equip and house them well, but provide the best possible care for the injured, for the bereaved, and also when members of the armed forces finally retire and rejoin our civilian society.
I turn to the Bill itself, the billing of which has been quite something, promising to end the vexatious witch hunts that have plagued service personnel who have served in Iraq, Afghanistan and Northern Ireland. I began by saying that that was a step in the right direction, and that is absolutely the case.
This issue was first raised back in 2013 by the former Defence Committee Chair, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis). We have had the Iraq Historic Allegations Team put together by the MOD to deal with this matter, and we have also had consultation by the Government to see how we should move forward. One thing our soldiers are good at is smelling a rat. You learn that pretty fast when you are in the military. Do not attempt to try to bluff them: they will see you out, whether you call it political spin or otherwise. Let us be upfront, no matter how brutal the truth is, on what is the way forward and what we achieve here today. I politely ask the Government to follow this practice and not to over-promise.
Let us be honest: this Bill, as it currently stands, will not help any veterans who are currently under investigation. It is not retrospective, and it will not help anybody who served in Northern Ireland, as my Defence Committee colleague, the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson), said. It focuses on supporting those currently in uniform. However, it provides greater certainty, we hope, for service personnel in relation to crimes that may be committed in future to ensure that they are properly prosecuted. We understand that those who serve our country are not above the law—far from it—but we do ask those who stand in harm’s way on our behalf to do something quite extraordinary in making the toughest of decisions about the utility of lethal force. We cannot have any commander hesitate in carrying out his or her legitimate orders, and we cannot have any soldier hesitate in the heat of battle.
How did we get here? There seems to be a clash between international humanitarian law traditionally governing armed conflicts and human rights law, which is increasingly now applied in armed conflict situations— exactly what Phil Shiner choose to exploit. I ask the Secretary of State to clarify when the Northern Ireland legislation will come through. In choosing the last resort of war, we must follow, and be seen to follow, the rules of international law. If any British armed forces personnel ever fail to uphold these standards, it is entirely appropriate that their actions—potential war crimes—are properly and fairly investigated.
We are immensely proud of our armed forces. They may leave active duty, but they never leave the armed forces community. We must watch their backs if we are to ensure that the next generation of warriors step on to the parade square and wear their uniform with pride. I am pleased that this Bill is, in that sense, a step in right direction.
I, like others, pay tribute to the armed forces, not least for the work they have done during the coronavirus crisis, particularly in erecting the extraordinary construction of the NHS Louisa Jordan Hospital in my own home city of Glasgow. I know they have done much in Members’ constituencies all across the UK, and I am sure we will expect more of them in the times to come.
I acknowledge at the outset of my remarks—this will probably be the only bit that pleases Government Ministers and Conservative Members—the sincerity with which Ministers have approached this, in that they recognise the problem and sincerely wish to fix it. Indeed, the Minister for Defence People and Veterans, the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer) was a jolly advocate of getting this done way before he became a Minister, and I think I am right in saying that the Secretary of State himself was raising this when he was a Member of the Scottish Parliament in the first Parliament of 1999. I acknowledge their long-standing desire to fix these issues, but I am afraid I do not believe that this Bill does it.
Those who risk their lives for their country do so in some of the most unimaginable circumstances. There are gallant Members here who have gone through that. I certainly have not. Far from home, they are often surrounded by danger at the behest of this Parliament, and they have to make split-second decisions under circumstances that, as I say, I cannot imagine. Sometimes those decisions are wrong, and when they are wrong, there needs to be a means by which that can be righted and justice can be done. Sometimes many years later these incidents rear their heads in the form of legal claims that force claimants and former service personnel to relive some of those dark days in a search for answers, but no one, least of all service personnel and veterans of the armed forces, deserves to be accused of a crime that they did not commit, and far less to be harassed by investigation after investigation. As the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee and former Chairman of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) has said, the Bill does not achieve that.
The Secretary of State has mentioned Phil Shiner, and other firms have also sought to cash in on this kind of behaviour. I do not deny that they have done so, and they are to be deprecated for it. Indeed, I believe that they are deprecated on all sides of the House. However, this legislation is not the way to deal with this. It is using the proverbial sledgehammer to crack a nut. I accept that the nut is deeply problematic, but I have to say that this looks like a Bill designed more to protect the Government, and in particular the Ministry of Defence, rather than anyone who dons a uniform. Indeed, it was the Minister for Defence People and Veterans, who we will hear from at the end of the debate, who said that
“one of the biggest problems…was the military’s inability to investigate itself properly and the standard of those investigations…If those investigations were done properly and self-regulation had occurred, we probably wouldn’t be here today”.
The Bill makes no provision whatsoever for an independent investigative body or for reporting accountability mechanisms of the kind that would help to address the historical claims that I believe we all want to address. We are asked to hope by the Government, and to trust and believe that a real solution will come later, after we vote to undermine international law and the rules that keep us safe. That is a promise that seems to be being made with increasing regularity from the Government Benches. That is why I believe that this Bill is bad, not just for our rules and laws but for the armed forces as well.
If we can agree with the Minister for Veterans, as I do, that the investigations process in the Ministry of Defence is flawed and needs fixing, let us bring forward a Bill to do that. If that does not require legislation, let us bring forward those proposals. Let us have that discussion first. Passing the Bill in this form or a form close to it would be to put the cart before the horse. If the Government truly want to protect the UK armed forces from legacy allegations of war crimes, they must create mechanisms for allegations, both contemporaneous and historical, to be properly addressed by independent investigators. I am horrified, as I am sure other legal minds in this place, the other place and outside Parliament will be, at the extraordinary powers that the Bill invests in the Attorney General, who is not an independent Law Officer of the Government, but a political appointment and part of the Government.
We believe that the ways that I have just outlined are the ways to ensure that we can deal with this properly, but instead, the Government have offered a Bill today that does not help the victims of these cases—by which I mean service personnel, veterans and their families—who feel that the courts are their only recourse to justice. I would argue, as do other Members, that this exposes UK forces more to the International Criminal Court. And I can tell the House what will happen then: Tory Back Bencher after Tory Back Bencher will be on their feet complaining about foreign judges intervening in UK justice. How long would it then be before someone made it mainstream within the Conservative party that the United Kingdom should withdraw from the ICC? I can see the start of a very slippery slope indeed.
Is it not part of the problem that, where suspicion exists, there requires to be an investigation, and that if that investigation produces evidence, there should be a prosecution? By putting barriers in the way of prosecution, we do no favours to those who are accused of criminal acts in the first place, because no line is ever drawn underneath it for them.
The right hon. Gentleman is correct, so I do not need to expand on that. I am conscious of your points about time, Madam Deputy Speaker, but he is correct in what he says.
I want to go through some of the senior military, legal and political opinion that has come out against the Bill. I can accept that Conservative Members, probably those on the Front Bench, think that the Opposition—if not the entirety of it, my party—are just Guardian-reading, lentil-munching sandal wearers, but that can hardly be laid at the feet of Nicholas Mercer, can it? Nicholas Mercer, the former command legal adviser during the Iraq war, has pointed out that this Bill
“undermines international humanitarian law while shielding the government”.
The Bill serves one body, and that body is the Ministry of Defence.
I can also point to some other opinion against the Bill—indeed, one of the Secretary of State’s predecessors, Sir Malcolm Rifkind. The Secretary of State has managed to unite Sir Malcolm Rifkind with the Scottish National party, and he was a leading nat-basher-in-chief back in his day. He has said that the Bill risks
“undermining the UK’s position as a champion of the rule of law”.
That might be fashionable on Government Benches these days, but it is something that we in the Scottish National party will not stand for.
You could also quote the former Attorney General, Dominic Grieve. I hear the Government Front Bench often praying in aid the Attorney General for Northern Ireland. For a Bill that does not concern itself with Northern Ireland, you seem awfully keen on the Northern Irish Attorney General. As the shadow Secretary of State mentioned, we were told by the Secretary of State in a letter that he sent to all Members of the House that the Bill will be equivalent to what is brought forward in Northern Ireland. Well, good luck with that one!
We can also quote Field Marshal Lord Guthrie, although I understand he has taken some of what he said back. Again, he is hardly a lentil-munching leftie. He said:
“There can be no exceptions to our laws, and no attempts to bend them. Those who break them should be judged in court.”
He also stated:
“These proposals appear to have been dreamt up by those who have seen too little of the world to understand why the rules of war matter. If we start down the slippery slope of arguing that rules apply to others, but not to ourselves, it is we who will suffer in the end.”
To make a small point of clarification, Field Marshal the Lord Guthrie has rethought his words, having spoken to the Chief of the General Staff.
I do not believe that anything I read out is what he has withdrawn, however. If I am wrong on that, I am happy to be corrected. I thought I was going to be told that he was indeed a lentil-munching Guardian reader, but clearly not.
To come to how the Government are approaching this, I have listened to many of the sedentary chunterings that have come from the Treasury Bench this afternoon, and I had a call with the Minister for Veterans yesterday—he told me that he was not the “king of good ideas”, but I did not need to be told that—but all I have seen is arrogance. Any objection, whether adumbrated by people outside or inside the House—including people on his own side, by the way—is all met with, “Didn’t read the Bill”, “Doesn’t understand it”, “This is embarrassing”, or “It’s this way or no way.” I am afraid that unless we can amend the Bill within an inch of its life, beyond any recognition of what appears before Members this afternoon, there is no way that my party can support the Bill in this form.
I will say this, however: if the Minister wants to get the issue solved—which I believe we both do, as I said at the start—
I will once I have completed my peroration. Scrap the Bill and let us have a discussion about the way in which the Ministry of Defence investigates these things internally. I am more than happy to engage in that discussion with the Minister and with the Secretary of State, but to ask us to vote for a Bill so roundly condemned by senior legal, military and political opinion is something that we will not contemplate.
As ever, the hon. Gentleman makes reasoned points and a good speech. First, he has not mentioned it yet, but he will be aware that there was something called the Lyons review, which was the service justice review that has reviewed and continues to review. We are in the middle of implementing some of its recommendations on improving on exactly the points he makes about service justice.
Secondly, before the hon. Gentleman finishes his speech, I ask him within what parameters we should work when trying to come to a consensus with the Scottish National party. For example, does he except that in cases of civil law there is a need for tort limitations? Does he accept the statute of limitations on civil pursuit—that many of those cases should have a time limit? Does he also accept the line in the relevant article of the European convention on human rights that says people are entitled to
“a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time”?
If he accepts both those parameters, perhaps we can talk.
I have not disputed any of those things. I am willing to have that conversation, but the Secretary of State has introduced a Bill that is so egregious he makes it impossible for me to support it. Look, he has his majority so he will get it through in whatever form he wants, but if he wants to have, as we often do in defence discussions in this Parliament, a degree of consensus that most people outside this place probably do not think exists, it cannot come on the back of a Bill like this one. I understand that the review he mentioned at the start of his intervention is taking place; why not pause the Bill and let that review report first? Let Parliament debate it and then see what we can fix.
I have a lot of time for the hon. Gentleman and recognise his allegations of how I have ridiculed some of the approaches. The reality is that we on the Government Benches have to deal in what is actually in the Bill and the reality of operations. We have a duty to these people. We have engaged both the hon. Gentleman and the shadow Secretary of State in trying to improve the Bill, and not once have you come forward with something with which I can improve the Bill. The Bill is moderate, fair and down the middle. If you are on the wrong side in the Lobbies tonight, you are clearly on the wrong side of history.
Order. I am not entering into the debate, but I shall merely say that all day today Members on both sides of the House have been using the word “you”. They have been calling the Prime Minister you and they are calling Members on each side of the House you. In this Chamber, you means the occupant of the Chair. It is really important, in order to keep the right sort of distance in an argument of this kind, that we use the phrase “the hon. Gentleman” or “the hon. Lady”, or something along those lines. Mr McDonald, you have not committed this sin.
That is because I know what I am doing, Madam Deputy Speaker, as you well know.
Let me say this to the Minister for Defence People and Veterans. We always try to find the maximum consensus, but I rather suspect that we just cannot agree on this Bill. He is not willing to change it to the degree I would like to see it changed, which in essence would mean scrapping it and letting the review come forward. When we table amendments in Committee, it will be interesting to see what they say; I am sure the Minister will be interested to read them, and it will be interesting to see how the Government approach them. As I say, we all know what is going to happen: the Government have a huge majority and are not going to accept anything that they feel they do not have to. We do not agree with them that the Bill is moderate at all, which is why we will vote against its Second Reading tonight.
The Minister for Defence People and Veterans is keen that we look at the Bill itself. Does my hon. Friend agree that the Bill creates a presumption against prosecution for a class of defendants, placing one group above the other in the eyes of the law? Does he agree that that is unprecedented in our domestic legal systems, whether we speak of England and Wales or the separate and independent jurisdiction in Scotland? That is unprecedented and that is what is objectionable about the Bill: it does away with the idea of equality before the criminal law, and that is wrong.
My hon. and learned Friend is absolutely correct in saying that. I would go further and say that actually, in terms of the whole scope of the Bill and how it protects the Ministry of Defence from claims coming from members of the armed forces themselves, as brilliantly illustrated by the shadow Secretary of State in his speech earlier, it is not welcomed by those people who need protection. We all agree that they need protection, but we cannot agree with the Government that this Bill is the way to do it.
The context is this: this Parliament has no power to prevent the Government from entering a discretionary conflict. There is no war powers Act. When Tony Blair took the country to war—a war that, in an interesting contribution earlier, the Defence Secretary said he now accepts was illegal, but which his party supported at the time—he at least came to this Parliament and held a vote. When the airstrikes in Syria took place in Easter 2018 under the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), that was done away with; that discretion was used without any parliamentary consent.
On the issue of special forces oversight or lack thereof, we stand out as unusual, even by comparison with a country such as the United States with zero oversight of special forces operations. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) said earlier, this Bill creates two levels of playing field for people in this country. This is all unwelcome and highly unusual. There is a reason that no other country has a version of this Bill on its statute book or before its national legislature. Members of the armed forces are rightly expected to perform to a high standard and members of the armed forces are right to expect a high standard of us in this House, but for the reasons I have outlined we will vote against this legislation tonight. Members of the armed forces are entitled to a better standard than this.
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Madam Deputy Speaker, and to follow my friend, the hon. Member for Glasgow South (Stewart Malcolm McDonald), who made some interesting points, some of which—forgive me—I am going to disagree with. He will not be surprised to hear that, because we have often entered into many civilised, and sometimes lubricated, conversations on these very subjects. These issues affect the whole House and have been discussed by many Members in here and in other places, because they really matter.
I declare an interest; I got into politics on leaving the Army, after writing a paper for Policy Exchange in 2013 called “The Fog of Law”, which covered these very subjects and highlighted many of the issues raised in this debate. I appreciate that there are difficult decisions and that it is hard to balance what the right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey) quite correctly said was the difference between the liability that a civilian employee could expect with their employer and that which a soldier on overseas operations could expect. I accept that that is different.
I accepted that it was different when I swore allegiance to Her Majesty and put on the uniform for the first time. I accepted it was different because the job that I had accepted to do was different; it was fundamentally different—different in every sense from any civilian job at all. Why? Because I promised, as the men and women of our armed forces still promise, to give everything even unto death. That is not something that any other employer asks of their team or their staff. Nobody who is not wearing the Queen’s uniform pledges to defend our people, our islands, our values, our country, our allies and our interests even up to their own life. That is different.
In recognising that that is what we need from our armed forces, we must also recognise that the law defending our troops and the law that applies to their terms of employment must also be different. It simply cannot be the case that civilian employment contracts are applicable to the invasion of Iraq or hard detention operations in Afghanistan, or even to training missions in other places that go wrong and become combat in ways that the people involved do not expect. Of course they must be different.
Will the hon. Gentleman accept that this is a distinction not just between the armed forces serving overseas and civilians, but between armed forces serving overseas and armed forces serving and based in this country? To that extent, this legislation uniquely disadvantages the latter and reduces their rights.
I will accept that this is an overseas operations Bill and that being on patrol in Helmand is different from bringing on guard at Buckingham Palace, and therefore the rights that troops should accept in different places under different terms should of course be different.
I have served, as have many of my colleagues in all parts of the House. Indeed, my friend and former comrade in arms the hon. and gallant Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) and I served in camps in places where the electricity could best be described as ropey and would fail any civilian investigation. We served in places where to walk outside the camp was to risk everything, from loss of life or limb to very real mental damage. We served in those places because the national security and the interests of our country—decided on by people here, by the way, not soldiers—was judged to be that important.
I listen with interest to what my hon. Friend says and to his example of unique circumstances. The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) made the point that this Bill makes some people less or more equal before the law—that it was an unfair application—but it does not prevent anyone from being prosecuted for a crime that they have committed, nor does it introduce special defences for people, so that some of these offences allow them to have an excuse. All it does is ask a prosecutor to have exceptional regard for the circumstances that those concerned may find themselves in and also, where an investigation has already happened, to think about the level of new evidence that should be applicable.
I agree with my right hon. Friend, and the important point about the Bill is that it recognises the difference between a crime and an error. We all know that crimes should be prosecuted, and we all know that the difference between a crime and an error is a difference of understanding and, on some occasions, circumstance. It is not necessarily a crime for a missile, sadly, to go astray and kill civilians. It can be an error; it may be a terrible, regrettable error; it may be an error that we should learn from a thousand times. But it cannot always be a crime, otherwise the invasion of Normandy could never have happened, because if it was always a crime for civilians to die in combat, the troops could not have prepared that battlefield to land on those beaches.
If that was a crime, it would always be a crime to use force in situations where we cannot be absolutely certain of the outcome of that force. Of course, that is never possible, because the reality is that if we put such blocks on any use of force, what we are saying is that force can never be used.
I am failing to follow this argument. Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman suggesting that torture is a crime that can be committed by error?
That seems to be what he is suggesting. But let us focus on what we are talking about here. We are talking about torture—[Interruption.]
That is simply not what I am saying, and it is quite clear that it is not what I am saying. What I am saying very clearly is that there is a fundamental difference between an error and a crime, and there is a fundamental need in military law to allow soldiers to take the risks that we need them to take if they are going to keep our country safe. If we do not allow them to take those risks, what we are saying, fundamentally, is that the weak must defend themselves and the strong can look after themselves; because the point about military service, soldiering and our armed forces, fundamentally, is that they allow the strong to defend the week. They put the use of force under the rule of law, and they allow this country to be strong and safe, and partnered with others around the world.
It is a great pleasure to follow my friend the hon. and gallant Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat). It is a great strength of the veterans community, both inside and outside this place, that we can debate these important matters and take a different view but do so with decency and humility.
I should declare an interest as a veteran. I know very well, and we have heard in the House today, the strength of feeling and the very high regard that Members from across the House have for those who serve in our armed forces. No one, whether they have served in the military or otherwise, deserves to be repeatedly investigated without good cause. If we allow that abuse to continue, we fail collectively in our lifelong commitment to support those who have sacrificed themselves for our country.
This Bill seeks to address such abuses, but however well-intentioned it is, it does require significant improving, otherwise it will be potentially damaging both to Britain’s standing in the world and to the reputation of our armed forces.
First, I wish to address the definition of “relevant offences” as laid out in clause 6. Subsection (3) states that an offence is not relevant
“if it is an excluded… by virtue of Part 1 of Schedule 1.”
The offences excluded are largely sexual offences. Although that is, of course, welcome, it is worrying to see the omission of other crimes against humanity and war crimes. I heard what the Secretary of State said earlier, but let us take torture as the obvious example. The prohibition of torture is absolute. There are no exceptions. Its use is illegal under numerous international treaties to which the UK is a signatory, including the Geneva convention.
Speaking as a commanding officer who has gone into the field, may I point out to the House that it is not just this Bill that we have to operate under? Let us take, for example, torture. Article 17 of the Geneva convention specifically prohibits torture, and we can be charged for that. I certainly used to make great emphasis of this point in training troops to go into the field. It is not just this Bill under which we operate.
My friend the hon. and gallant Gentleman raises a very important point. The reality is that, despite what we have heard from some Members today, if this Bill is passed in its current form, a decision to allow a prosecution to proceed following an allegation of torture after five years had elapsed would be made virtually impossible due to the threshold imposed by the triple lock. This is not the way to rebuild our reputation on the international stage. It would mean the UK reneging on our international legal obligations and could well put us at odds with the ICC. At a time when we are witnessing an erosion of human rights and leaders turning their backs on international institutions, it is more important than ever before that we uphold our values and standards and not undermine them.
Through this Bill, the Government are seeking to right a wrong, but not by addressing the root cause of the issue. In an interview last year—we have heard the quote already, but it is worth hearing again—the Minister for Defence People and Veterans said that one of the biggest problems with this was
“the military’s inability to investigate itself properly and the standard of those investigations. If those investigations were done properly and self-regulation had occurred, we probably wouldn’t be here today.”
The Minister is absolutely right, and the underlying problem is how we have ended up at this point, but nowhere in the Bill does it mention the need to review how military investigations are conducted. If we had a credible investigatory system that dealt with allegations in an effective, impartial and timely manner—one that allowed us to refer back with confidence—we would not be in the position that we are in now.
There is, though, plenty of support across this House for measures that will protect members of our armed forces. We all know, and I am sure we all agree, that historical prosecutions of our veterans is an emotionally charged subject and one that urgently demands a solution, because nobody—surely nobody—wants to see a repeat of the decades of legal wrangling, the delay and the misery that are still ongoing following investigations into the troubles.
I conclude by saying that the overwhelming majority of members of our armed forces serve with distinction and honour, and they follow the rules, but no one—not one of us—is above the law, and that principle remains true whether or not somebody wears a uniform. One of the best ways to protect our troops is to ensure that we apply the rule of law in every instance. There is much work to be done to improve this Bill, and I hope very much that Ministers will listen to the concerns that have been expressed today and work constructively to improve it in Committee and beyond. I hope that we all agree that we owe the brave men and women of our armed forces—the people who serve our nation—a massive debt. Diminishing their hard-won reputation by reneging on our legal and moral obligations is not the manner in which to repay it.
I greatly admire and respect the hon. and gallant Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), but I fear that it would require rather more than just an improvement to the way in which service authorities investigate allegations to solve this problem, because the problem derives in large part from the application of the Human Rights Act abroad.
The purpose of this Bill should not be to stop sound cases being prosecuted, and it does not do so. Its purpose should be to stop unsound cases being repeatedly investigated, and that, I fear, it fails to do. The hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Lloyd Russell-Moyle) seized on this point in his earlier intervention, in which he referred to intimidation by reinvestigation, and he is right; that is the nub of the problem. The Secretary of State conceded that only a small proportion of these many cases—most of them spurious—end up in a prosecution. He suggested that, if it were known that there would be less likelihood of a prosecution, there might be fewer rounds of investigation and reinvestigation, but I am afraid I do not find that wholly or, indeed, at all convincing. Something must be done to stop the repeated reinvestigations, which, in large part, happen because of the application of the Human Rights Act abroad.
I first became aware of the scale of this problem several years ago when I heard speeches from my hon. and gallant Friends the Members for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) and for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti). The effect of that was to interest me in trying to take the matter further during the two periods for which I chaired the Defence Committee. In those two periods, we produced three reports. The first inquiry was carried out by the sub-Committee under the chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer), now the Minister for Defence People and Veterans. That inquiry dealt with Iraq and reported in February 2017. The second one dealt with Northern Ireland and reported in April 2017.
The third one, dealing with the whole panorama of all these scenarios, reported in July 2019. That report warned that the European Court of Human Rights
“has gone far beyond the original understanding of the European Convention on Human Rights, and… its rulings have stretched the temporal and territorial scope of the Human Rights Act beyond Parliament’s original intentions”.
The report examined proposals by Professor Richard Ekins, now professor of law and constitutional government at Oxford University, in which he proposed to restore the former scope of the HRA and the application of the ECHR. As long as that legislation, which was never intended to be applied abroad when it was enacted by this House in 1998, persists in its extended application, we will not solve this problem.
Is my right hon. Friend aware that it is not only the United Kingdom facing an issue with the extraterritoriality of the ECHR? The French Conseil d’État —in which I must declare an interest, as my wife is a member—has also been investigating this, as has the German court, because this extraterritoriality was never envisioned by the signatories in the ’50s, nor was it envisioned by the then Prime Minister in the ’90s.
I absolutely accept that this is not a problem confined to us. It is something that has crept into the international scene. Law-observing democracies are finding themselves hamstrung because of the misapplication of what is essentially civil law to the battlefield. That is wrong. It was never intended to be the case, and until it is put right, we will not solve this problem.
It is true that the Government, in this Bill, are considering derogating from the ECHR; clause 12 encourages, but does not require, such derogations. That would help, but according to Professor Ekins, whose work with Policy Exchange I acknowledge, that would be no substitute for amending the Human Rights Act and providing that it should not apply outside the UK, or at least that it should apply only in strictly limited circumstances. Parliament should go back to what it intended in 1998. It would also be much better for Parliament to require the Government to derogate in relation to overseas operations and to amend the Human Rights Act so that it does not apply abroad.
With good will on both sides, the Bill can be improved, and I urge those on both Front Benches to work together in pursuit of an improved outcome.
I have been in the House for nearly 20 years, and I have always prided myself on being a strong advocate for defence and the support of our servicemen and women, both from the Back Benches and as a Minister. I am also no friend of unscrupulous lawyers. Older Members of the House will remember my campaign of the early 2000s against unscrupulous lawyers who defrauded my constituents who were claiming miners’ compensation. That led to the instigation of the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which took the disciplining of lawyers away from the Law Society. I am also, though, a strong supporter of the legal system and of the military justice system. I have served on the last three armed forces Bills as either a Minister or a Back Bencher, and I think I understand the system well and respect it.
Unfortunately, though, this Bill does not pass the Ronseal test: it does not say what it does on the tin. It excludes completely the arguments, with which I have a lot of sympathy, about prosecutions of those in Northern Ireland. The other issue is the need for the Bill. Its promoters give the impression that there is an army of vexatious lawyers out there who are pursuing veterans. I asked, in a parliamentary question, for numbers. I was told that they were not kept by the Department centrally. The explanatory notes say that there were 900 cases for Afghanistan and Iraq between 2003 and 2009; the impact assessment says the number is 1,000, but what they do not explain is the nature of those cases. How many were brought by vexatious lawyers? How many were compensation cases rightly brought by members of the armed forces or their families?
I accept the issues around the case of Phil Shiner. That individual was disgraceful, but I have to say that the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which was put in place by the last Labour Government, sorted that problem out. On the other main thing that has been raised today, I was a Minister in the Department at the time, and the problem was the way in which cases were investigated. The Bill will not address that.
The other point that I would like to address is my fear that the presumption, as outlined in the Bill at the moment, that prosecutions will not go forward outside a certain timescale will lead to members of our armed forces going before the International Criminal Court. That cannot be acceptable. If we had that presumption against prosecution, the court would perhaps conclude that the UK was either unwilling or unable to initiate a prosecution. I do not want to see that, and I do not think the Minister does either, but it is an unintended consequence of the Bill and it has to be changed.
I also have problems with clause 3, which says that prosecutors should take into account “exceptional demands and stresses” in cases after five years. If it is good enough after five years, why not before? There is no need for the clause, because that is already taken into account. The Judge Advocate General, in his letter to the Defence Secretary, outlined the case of Marine A, where evidence of unique circumstances taken at the first court martial and then at the appeal meant that the sentence was reduced to manslaughter.
Does the right hon. Member not agree that it diminishes the Government’s standing when they come to the House and cast to one side all these concerns from experts such as those he mentions, when there probably is a reasonable Bill that the House could gather around?
I think there is, but I also say that people should talk to those in the service justice system, because they do this every day of the week. They are an independent judiciary—that is recognised internationally. They do a job in ensuring that people get justice and I think that this Bill will complicate that. One of my fears is that this will undermine the military justice system, of which I am a passionate supporter. I know that some people want to do away with it, but I certainly do not. I also agree with the points that have been raised by the Royal British Legion and my right hon. Friend the Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey) concerning conditions around the ability of veterans to make compensation claims later.
I will not vote against the Bill tonight, because I think it can be improved. However, I will also not fall into the political trap that has been set, where it will be said that if someone is against the Bill or criticises it in any way, they favour ambulance-chasing lawyers over our armed forces. I am sorry but I take great exception to that, and I am in good company, along with a lot of other people, such as Field Marshal Lord Guthrie, Nick Parker, whom I have huge respect for—I worked with him in the Ministry of Defence—and the Judge Advocate General.
I respect the right hon. Member and sit with him on the Defence Committee. We have mentioned a lot of names today, but none of them is below General. I have served on operations with some of those people. None of the riflemen, junior non-commissioned officers and young officers has been mentioned, and their fear of ambulance-chasing lawyers and this lawfare should be brought in as well.
I do not disagree with the hon. Gentleman, but I am saying that these are people of higher rank, and others, who understand the command of that justice system. You cannot get a higher person than the Judge Advocate General. He was not even consulted on the Bill, which I find remarkable. The most senior lawyer in that system was not actually consulted.
Not really, no, because I am about to conclude.
The Bill is not perfect. It can be improved, but the Minister who is taking it through the House has to change attitude. He has to be open-minded to change. He has to not play politics on the basis that anyone who criticises the Bill is somehow against the armed forces, because we are certainly not, and I include myself in that.
I will finish on this point: in the letter that the Judge Advocate General sent to the Defence Secretary, he said:
“The bill as drafted is not the answer.”
I agree with him on that.
I have the greatest respect for the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) and I accept what he said, but I emphasise the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South West (Stuart Anderson) just made. He made the first reference to the people who are really affected by what we are talking about—that is, the young men and women who are normally charged. Let us remember, colleagues, how bloody awful it is to undergo some of these investigations time and again. Let us remember how dreadful it was when we saw those ambulance-chasing lawyers going after units and individuals in Iraq, and later in Afghanistan.
In my constituency, there are many people with mental health issues—indeed, one of my constituents, unfortunately, died just within the last month. Does the hon. Gentleman believe that the Bill can enshrine in law the support for those being maliciously and wrongly dragged through the courts, which definitely affects the mental health of those people in their service to Queen and country?
I hope so, but I am not sure that it can retrospectively. We all know that a lot of money was made—3,400 allegations were made about our servicemen and servicewomen, and 65% of those were made by Mr Shiner’s company, Public Interest Lawyers, which made a heck of a lot of money. With every accusation, the Ministry of Defence had to back it up with legal aid. The lawyers got four hours of legal aid; probably about £1,000 was given to these lawyers. Actually, the people who were under investigation did not have much support when they were going through it.
I have no particular love for lawyers, particularly of the grasping variety, with the right honourable exception of my colleague, my right hon. Friend the Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael). Does the hon. and gallant Gentleman agree that what he is talking about is ultimately counterproductive to recruitment to our armed forces?
Actually, I do not. What is counter- productive is if people joining the armed forces feel that they will be under this sort of pressure and they will be investigated unfairly. If they believe that they will be investigated fairly, that will encourage recruitment.
I am appalled by the idea that the Ministry of Defence had to pay out £40 million for fallacious claims and another £10 million on Operation Northmoor, which was about Afghanistan. I am pretty appalled that the Iraq Historic Allegations Team within the Ministry of Defence did what it did. It did not help our armed forces, and that is held against the Ministry of Defence. It should have sorted that out a long time ago. Obviously, most claims were fallacious. Shiner was struck off in 2017, but not before he, with 65% of the allegations, had done huge psychological and mental damage to our servicemen and servicewomen.
I am pleased that these two organisations have been closed down. It cannot happen again. That is the purpose of the Bill. It may not be 100% perfect, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South West said, it is what our armed forces want to happen. There are about 2 million veterans in this country and they want this to happen, and it will encourage, not discourage, people to join the military.
I did seven tours in Northern Ireland and I totally understand that Northern Ireland has to be dealt with. The Government have promised to deal with it this year, and will somehow get it sorted out. The Bill is not about Northern Ireland; it is about what happened overseas. I personally am delighted that the Bill has been brought forward. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer), although if he wants to continue as a Minister in the Ministry of Defence he should get a haircut. I think I have said enough. I will sit down.
It is a pleasure, as always, to follow the hon. and gallant Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart), whose hair is looking glorious this afternoon as well. I declare an interest because, as most Members will know, my husband is a veteran. [Interruption.] He is also an Ulsterman: I thank the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) for pointing that out.
I must pick the hon. and gallant Member for Beckenham up on one thing. It is not true to say that all members of the armed forces want this Bill, as that is not the case. None of us wants a repeat of the shameful Phil Shiner episode, and no person in this House would disagree that we need protections in place for our personnel and veterans. Unfortunately, however, the Bill is not the vehicle to do that. Our armed forces are the gold standard for militaries around the world and that must include the structures we have in place to deal with behaviour that falls short of our expectations.
Like the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), I have submitted a series of written questions to try to get a feel for the scale of this problem. I was hoping for a bit of information, but I have yet to have any answers to these questions. The Minister has not been in touch. Despite what the Secretary of State said— it is a pity he has gone now—about the Library impact assessment having all those numbers in it, it does not. It has numbers relating to part 2 of the Bill, not part 1. It is worrying that we are bringing forward legislation to tackle the industrial scale of vexatious claims, but we cannot get a handle on how many there actually are.
As we know, many conflicts involving our personnel are in parts of the world that are now experiencing a fragile peace. To put in place a statute of limitations on prosecutions assumes that normality and the structures of a democratic society will be promptly established post conflict. This, of course, is not the case. If we are to rely on investigations that have taken place, we must have confidence in those original investigations.
I appreciate the hon. Lady’s point about the confusion of post-conflict societies and therefore about the statute of limitations, but would she not accept that this goes both ways? There is also the difficulty people can have in defending themselves when evidence has been lost, burned or destroyed in exactly those post-conflict societies, and therefore time works both ways on this question. This is essential for the defence in justice, because justice must not only be for the prosecution, but for the defence.
There are two things: that is not unique to conflict—that happens in many things—and that is also why the original investigation must be carried out properly. If we want to minimise the opportunities for these vexatious claims, such investigations should be independent. They should be collecting accurate evidence, and without this we really do leave the door open.
If the conduct of our personnel is as we expect, why should anyone fear this transparency? This legislation undermines our international standard the more so because it includes, as Members have already mentioned, unlawful killing and torture. Judge Blackett, the Judge Advocate General of the armed forces, has warned:
“This increases the likelihood of UK service personnel appearing before the ICC in the future.”
Is this what any of us want?
Part 2 of the Bill has not had much mention this afternoon, and it should. It is ironic, when we have the Tory chest-thumping going on about protecting our brave soldiers, that part 2 is actually an attack on these very personnel. It removes many of the rights of those who have been injured through the negligence of the MOD to claim against it. Here is the nub of this Bill: it is about protecting the MOD, not personnel.
In the urgent question on 16 July, the Minister for Defence People and Veterans said:
“I will be honest that I cannot, off the top of my head, think why individuals would be diagnosed and choose not to do anything about it… I have not come across that in all my experience in the field, but I am happy to learn. If that is the case, I am happy to change the Bill”.—[Official Report, 16 July 2020; Vol. 678, c. 1675.]
Well, that is great, because it needs changing. There are many reasons why claims are not brought forward promptly, such as a culture in the military meaning that personnel may be told they cannot pursue a claim while serving or told by their chain of command they do not have a valid claim. If part 2 of the Bill becomes law, those injured through negligence will no longer have the full discretion of the court to allow a claim to proceed after the limitation period has expired.
Will the hon. Lady give way?
No, I am short of time.
Instead, those who have served overseas, potentially risking their lives, will have an absolute six-year time limit. Given that people can live with conditions such as deafness, asbestos poisoning and the impact of radiation exposure, with the severity increasing over years, how many personnel would pursue a claim within that time limit? The Government say this Bill will be beneficial to personnel and veterans, so perhaps the Minister can give us some real examples of how.
Personal injury claims are important not only in securing justice, but in holding the MOD to account. The unsuitability of Snatch Land Rovers would never have come to light if it had not been for bereaved families pursuing claims against the MOD. The Bill is contrary to the armed forces covenant, which is a promise by the nation to ensure that those who have served in the armed forces, and their families, are treated fairly. The removal of human rights protection is not treating armed forces personnel fairly.
It is a great privilege to be called so early in this debate, Madam Deputy Speaker. I might be new to this place, but I spent three decades in uniform. I have worked with many veterans charities across the UK, not least in my previous role as commander of the Army engagement group at Sandhurst and in my Bracknell constituency where our armed forces champions are working wonders.
The Bill needs to be considered for what it is, not for what it is not. Given that it is groundbreaking, it needs to start somewhere and is therefore bound to attract negative interest. For those who have not noticed, the architect of the Bill is a veteran. I cannot think of a single Minister who has invested so much of himself against such a tough backdrop and I commend the Minister for Defence People and Veterans, my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer), for everything he has done this far. He has fulfilled his promise, to date, to our veterans and it is incumbent on us in this place to be objective, because we will not be forgiven if we fail. I do not believe that anybody can be a supporter of our armed forces and vote against the Bill.
I will not have that. The armed forces look to this place to get this right—the hon. Gentleman is correct on that—but they expect and deserve a better standard than the comment he has just made. I know he is new, but I like him and I just ask him to withdraw it. Please withdraw it.
I am a great fan of the Bill and the Bill is right. We need to put it through.
At its simplest level, the imposition of a presumption in law against prosecution after five years will provide greater certainty for our service personnel. Since 2002, the MOD has faced 1,400 judicial review claims and over 2,000 civil claims relating to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan alone. Many are valid, but about 3,400 allegations of unlawful killings have also been received by the Iraq Historic Allegations Team, of which at least 70% have been filtered out as being spurious. Members will also be aware of the al-Sweady inquiry, which cost the taxpayer £31 million and was proven to be based on
“deliberate lies, reckless speculation and ingrained hostility”.
That was just the tip of the iceberg, and it is right that public interest lawyers, such as Phil Shiner, should have been struck off. But that is nothing compared to the anguish of our veterans, many of whom are innocent.
Does my hon. Friend agree that the measures in the Bill will reduce the uncertainty and anguish of both current armed forces personnel and veterans?
I agree very much. The bottom line is that veterans I have spoken to over the years are worried about the next knock at the door. I believe that the Bill will give certainty to the current generation and to who those come afterwards.
To tackle the conjecture, if I may, the Bill does not absolve any member of Her Majesty’s forces from the obligation to operate within the law. It does not impact on criminal investigations and it does not create, or come close to creating, any de facto immunity for service personnel, as the few bad apples will always be brought to justice. As for the downright fabrication, the Bill does not place our troops on a collision course with the Geneva convention or The Hague, and it does not break international law.
I have read the Bill.
In fact, I cannot think of a more robust institution than the MOD for upholding the law, and the UK has a proud record of overseas military service which is to be applauded, not undermined.
As for part 2, I comfortable that the six-year long stop of civil claims for personal injury and death is about right given that 94% of all claims since 2007 have been settled within five years. However, we have Committee stage to unpick that further if we need to. I also understand that the long stop applies to the point at which legacy issues, such as hearing loss, PTSD and physical illness first come to light, therefore providing a safety net.
Most important for me, the Bill requires that, when making legal judgments, the courts must consider the unique circumstances of overseas operations and any adverse effect on our personnel. Those who have served will know that warfighting is dangerous and terrifying, with confusion all around, friends falling beside you, sweat dripping into your eyes, the ground exploding, people moving in every direction, images of family flashing before your eyes and abject terror everywhere. What would you do? Fortunately, the training is good, the loyalty and camaraderie in HM forces are unparalleled and our soldiers do operate within the law of armed conflict. I salute all those who got closer to danger than I did.
Despite what others would have us think, the Bill does not provide blanket immunity for soldiers to commit war crimes. Indeed, the suggestion in some of what I have read that the best trained and best led armed forces in the world are somehow predisposed to inflicting torture or sex crimes on operations is ridiculous. It is deeply offensive to those who serve, and the people who peddle this nonsense just need to stop. [An Hon. Member: “Nobody has said it.”] I have seen it.
To those who seek to judge our veterans after many years of service from the sanctity of their courtroom or the comfort of their armchair, I say, “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, whatever notion you have of idealism, it may be that you just don’t get it.” That is why the Government need to provide the protection in law.
To conclude, I pass on three messages on behalf of many of our 2.2 million veterans who have contacted me to offer support. First, to the esteemed figures who have chosen to unpick the Bill by writing divisive articles for the national media, I regret, you do not speak for me. Secondly, I say to those dishonourable lawyers who have pursued the victims of a witch hunt into their later years, “You need to be struck off.” To my esteemed colleagues on the Opposition Benches, I say, “Please pay heed today, to stay on the right side of this. Unlike the thousands of soldiers I was proud to serve with, your constituents might not be quite so forgiving.” Let us do the right thing for those who have endured so much for so long and put the Bill through.
My constituents clearly live in a very different country from the hon. Member for Bracknell (James Sunderland). I declare an interest, as it seems that everyone else is, in that my brother is a member of the armed forces, as is my nephew. Unlike the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West (Stuart Anderson), a fellow member of the Defence Committee, they are not generals, members of senior command or part of the officer corps. [Hon. Members: “Not yet!”] Yes, hopefully in an independent Scotland.
Let us start with what we do agree on. Those of us who have close family members who have put themselves in harm’s way overseas, such as in the illegal war in Iraq that the Secretary of State mentioned earlier, know the feeling of dread when that loved one leaves and the utter relief when they come back. The very idea that that dread should be extended long after they have left the battlefield simply on the whim of vicious lawyers is unconscionable. I think we all agree about that. Vexatious claims are rightly illegal, not only because of the psychological duress they inflict on the veterans they target, but because they seek to paint the actions of those who serve and the overall conduct of our armed forces in a negative light purely for profit.
Let us also be clear that while those instances of serving UK personnel breaking international human rights law are well documented, as they should be, they are exceedingly rare. The improvements that the Army in particular has made in the past few decades in ensuring adherence to international human rights law and the rules of engagement should give a sense of genuine achievement and be a matter of pride. Hard fought for, through conventional and non-conventional conflicts, those advances should be jealously guarded by the Government.
However, the fundamental divergence between me and Conservative Members is about how we deal with an intractable issue. Her Majesty’s Government believe that issue is best solved by putting members of Her Majesty’s armed forces beyond the law. Perhaps it is the working-class boy in me—or the fact that I am from a socialist tradition —who thinks that it would be better spent examining the rare lapses of leadership, failures in the chain of command and imbalances in the power structures that led to the crimes being committed in the first place.
I can think back to when I brought forward a ten-minute rule Bill on the formation of an armed forces representative body. I see the former Chair of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) in his place, and he will know a lot about that. For many veterans I have spoken to since and for many civilians, the principle that serving members of the armed forces deserve the same rights as civilians was self-evident. Just as NHS workers and the police on the frontline protecting our security have certain obligations that cannot be abrogated, so do the armed forces.
When I introduced that Bill, what surprised me was the lack of understanding among Government Members of the idea that there might be a better way to fulfil the solemn contract that a state has to those who place themselves in harm’s way to defend that state. I think that Ministers would agree that this state has not always done that in the best way possible. At the same time as the number of those with experience of military service is at a historic low, as therefore is the number of people like me with direct family experience, too, this Government have consistently taken the path of creating a discrete military caste remote from the communities they have sworn to protect.
I and those I have spoken to in my party wish to see a country where veterans and serving personnel are given top-class medical care because top-class medical care is available to all. We want to live in a country where veterans and serving personnel can access affordable and liveable housing for their families because that is available to all. That also means a country where veterans and serving personnel are accountable for their actions in the line of duty, because we are all accountable for our actions in the line of duty.
I stand here as a veteran. Under current legislation, hypothetically, I could be investigated for spurious claims made against me for my service in the Army back in the ’80s. I therefore have a personal interest in the Bill. I have also spoken to many veterans at surgeries, breakfast clubs and legions, and I am acutely aware of the pressures our veterans are placed under and the injustices they feel right now. Many of the veterans I have spoken to were junior ranks, and I concur with the statement of my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South West (Stuart Anderson).
The Bill represents a huge milestone for military personnel. To be incorrectly accused of wrongdoing is an unacceptable burden. For our veterans and our veterans of the future, the Bill represents an opportunity to combat that cycle of reinvestigation and vexatious claims and to support our service personnel, who have risked their lives to defend our country and our freedoms overseas. I thank the Secretary of State and the Minister for Defence People and Veterans for bringing the Bill to the House today.
I would like to address the first part of the Bill. For me, the triple lock is the most crucial part of the Bill. The presumption against prosecution for alleged offences committed more than five years ago will both curb the often baseless claims made against veterans and stop lawfare by those who seek to abuse the legal system. Critics of the Bill cite that that provision will protect service personnel from wrongdoing. The Bill does nothing of the sort. There is no debate in this House, nor should there ever be, about the fact that if service personnel commit a crime, they must be called to account. The Bill does not give service personnel de facto immunity from prosecution. There are still provisions to allow for prosecutions of historical cases where there is compelling evidence.
I have had conversations with veterans living life on the edge, with constant anxiety, thoughts and fears that engulf their post-service lives and the lives of their families. We have lost too many veterans to incapacity and suicide. I am committed to veterans’ health and wellbeing, and I know the veterans Minister is, too.
I hesitate to interrupt my hon. Friend’s compelling and persuasive speech, except to say that she is absolutely right: the Bill is a huge leap forward and the Minister and the Government deserve great credit. As she may know, I am the champion of and have led the parliamentary campaign on behalf of the British nuclear test veterans. Will she ask the Minister to give an absolute assurance that those who fought a long time ago, if evidence emerges that they were damaged through that service, will not be disadvantaged by the provisions of part 2?
I thank my right hon. Friend for that intervention. I think the Minister heard it loud and clear.
I am passionate about veterans’ health and wellbeing, and the Bill goes a long way to offering security and peace of mind. The requirement for prosecutors to consider the circumstances of warfare is a welcome element. War is not black and white; it is grey and involves instant judgments and assessments under life-threatening pressure. It is right that the law reflects that reality. Although I am extremely supportive of the Bill, I accept that there are certain limitations. I would welcome further reassurance from Ministers on how we ensure that rogue lawyers do not bypass the legislation in favour of the international criminal courts to have claims heard. How will the Bill affect service personnel and veterans who are already subject to claims? The six-year longstop in part 2 has drawn criticism. Will the Minister assure me that that will not disadvantage the armed forces community compared with civilians?
We in this House are responsible for sending young men and women into harm’s way, and we rightly expect them to uphold the highest standards of the British armed forces. Despite limited reservations, the Bill will protect our service personnel in the future. It is wrong that servicemen and women we send into conflict should be hounded for years after their active service is over. I understand this legislation will not apply to Northern Ireland, but I am grateful for the Government’s commitment to pursue that separately in Northern Irish legislation. For the current and future service personnel and veterans of my Wrexham constituency, I will support the Bill today. To vote against it would be to deny our service personnel the support of their politicians and this country.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Wrexham (Sarah Atherton), not only because she made an eloquent speech but because it has been a pleasure to serve with her on the Defence Committee for the past few months. She is a welcome addition to our group. She followed the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire (Martin Docherty-Hughes). Although our opinions on the Bill may differ throughout our proceedings, it is right to acknowledge that on the Defence Committee, there is great sense of collegiality and a great degree of cohesiveness. We work well and sincerely in the interests of our armed forces and all those who serve our country.
I see the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) in his place smiling at me. A former Chair of our Committee, he expertly navigated the way through two of the three reports published by the Committee. I was a member of the Committee during the passage of the two substantive reports, and I commend them to Members, not just in relation to the Bill but in relation to future provisions that we hope to see apply to Northern Ireland, because they outline the complexity of the legal arguments that are engaged. Not once have we heard mentioned in the debate thus far the rationale for Northern Ireland not being included in an overseas operations Bill. It is not because it is expedient, but because we operate in entirely different legislative frameworks. International treaties and the Geneva convention do not apply to domestic deployments.
I listened very earnestly to the hon. Member for Bracknell (James Sunderland) and thought that he made a good speech, but he wanted to focus on what is in the Bill rather than on what is not in it, and I am afraid I cannot do that. I cannot say to the 300,000 veterans who served in Northern Ireland during Operation Banner —the longest continual deployment in our country’s history—that they do not count today. I recognise that those 300,000 do not all live in Northern Ireland. In fact, the majority live in constituencies in England, Scotland and Wales. Yet they are hearing us debate issues about protecting those who protected us without recognising fully that they are not included.
I am very pleased to hear the hon. Gentleman talking about this because it matters so much to many of us. But there is a difference, surely, between overseas operations and domestic operations that he has touched on. The very nature of what we are dealing with, with citizens of countries from around the world rather than citizens of the United Kingdom, means that the legal framework must be different. While I appreciate that he is absolutely right that the Bill should go further, or indeed the Northern Ireland Secretary should bring forward a Bill that covers similar issues, does he not recognise that it at least addresses part of the lacuna, even though not the whole?
I have enormous respect for the hon. Gentleman, and he is right that there is a different legal framework. That is the point I was making, and I acknowledge it. However, I am not prepared to let this Second Reading debate go by without saying that there is a compelling and equal argument that needs to be made for those who served in Northern Ireland: his constituents and mine. When this Bill was introduced for its First Reading on 18 March, a written ministerial statement was also tabled in this House giving equal provision and commitment to the people who served in Northern Ireland. If that was necessary on the day of its first introduction, the very least we could ask is that we would today have had clarity and further sight of that, and potentially its introduction, so that there was some parallel progression of the commitment that was in the Conservative party’s manifesto, and veterans are looking to see how it will be brought forward.
As I have mentioned in this place before, both my brothers-in-law served in the Ulster Defence Regiment. The risk to life was as great for them, if not in some ways greater, than in overseas operations. I can remember them both having to shine a torch under the car every morning. I just make that point for the record. It needs to be remembered.
That is an absolutely compelling point, and I am glad that the hon. Gentleman made it. There has been no progress on the commitment that was given for veterans who served in Northern Ireland, and I am concerned that that commitment is being watered down.
We are very clear that we will not leave Northern Ireland veterans behind. The commitment of equal treatment in any Northern Ireland Bill that comes forward will be absolutely adhered to. This Government will not resile from their commitments to those individuals. We recognise, value and cherish the service and sacrifice of everyone who served in those operations.
The Minister will probably make points like that when he concludes the debate. There has been no progression for Northern Ireland today. The right hon. Member for New Forest East—and, indeed, the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Lloyd Russell-Moyle); I rarely agree with him—were absolutely right that nothing in the Bill will frustrate investigations. That process is so burdensome and cumbersome for those who are subjected to it, with repeated inquiries and repeated investigations. Veterans in their 70s and 80s have had their doors knocked in dawn raids or, on one occasion that I can think of, have been taken from their home and flown to Northern Ireland to answer questions for investigatory purposes about an incident on which they have been through two or three investigations in the past. In considering what will come for Northern Ireland, and as fundamentally part of the Bill, we do not believe in the conferment of an amnesty, and I do not believe that what is contained in the Bill does that. I am pleased that that is the case.
When we consider the principles underlining statutory protection for veterans, we must understand that such protection should always be given in a case where there has been a satisfactory investigation previously and, in our domestic context, where the state has discharged its duty under article 2 of the European convention on human rights. I am therefore slightly concerned that clause 4(1)(c) envisages circumstances where an investigation may have commenced previously but not concluded. That should be reflected upon in Committee. It is unwise to offer levels of protection through a presumption of no prosecution, on the basis that an investigation may have commenced but resolved no outcome whatsoever.
I highlight that issue now because it is worthy of further exploration but, in principle terms, having highlighted the need for more progress for Northern Ireland veterans, no amnesty and no equivalence with paramilitarism, which is another concern this evening, I will give my support to the Bill this evening.
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson). As he said, I too am honoured to sit on the Defence Committee. We have a very cohesive Committee, which is doing some fascinating work on behalf of our armed services.
May I point out to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) that once a commanding officer, always a commanding officer—of course I refer to the mention of the hairstyle of the Minister for Defence People and Veterans, my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer). I thank the Minister while he is sitting on the Front Bench, and the Secretary of State, for the huge amount of work that they have both done to get the Bill before the House. I would like to show my appreciation for all the armed service personnel in another country, and to those in South Dorset in camps such as Bovington and Lulworth, the headquarters of the armoured force nowadays. There are many thousands of troops and their families who serve with great distinction and honour, in Dorset and around the world, and we owe them a huge debt.
It is those of us in this House who send troops to war—no one else; we do. We sit here on these green Benches, or at home in our comfortable armchairs, armed with a gin and tonic perhaps, watching the men and women we sent fight for their lives in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Can we possibly, with few exceptions—honourable exceptions—really understand what they have gone through and are going through? I do not think we possibly can.
The law had until recently covered warfare very well. Things like torture and sexual assaults and so on are already covered by international law, under which our troops serve. Unfortunately, other laws have crept into military law and are being exploited, as we have heard, in some cases by unscrupulous lawyers, and even scrupulous lawyers who genuinely feel that they have a legal duty to protect their clients’ claims and investigate them.
The Bill, we have heard, gives immunity to those who commit crimes—or, some have said, amnesties. Hon. Members may remember the case of Marine A, Alexander Blackman; I sought his permission to mention his name today. I was honoured and privileged to form part of a small team that fought for him for three years to get his conviction for murder reduced to manslaughter. In that case, if hon. Members remember, he shot a member of the Taliban while serving in Afghanistan. He was convicted of murder and sent to jail for 10 years. Under a very able QC and his team, we took the case to the Appeal Court, where it was reduced to manslaughter with diminished responsibility.
What I find encouraging in the Bill is that—if I may read the notes that I was helpfully given by the Minister—it will require prosecutors, when deciding whether to prosecute, to take into account the unique circumstances of “overseas operations” and the “adverse effects” that those can have on personnel.
In the Appeal Court, five of the top judges in the land listened to the case that I have mentioned and decided that it was not murder. So, having served four years of his life, and having served 16 years with great distinction and honour for Queen and country and for us, Mr Blackman was released.
I will not give way, because 70 Members wish to speak, and the hon. Gentleman has had plenty of time to say his bit.
The point I am trying to make is that this man did not get away with it. He was convicted for four years of his life. He paid for a terrible mistake in the heat of battle after a long tour. When the circumstances were investigated by the lawyers at the Appeal Court and the experiences that he and others had been through came out, and the psychiatrists had their say, it was discovered that this man had been pushed to a point that none of us in this place can understand.
Next time—and there sadly will be another time—we send our men and women into harm’s way, we must remember what we are sending them to. This Bill, which I totally support, is being introduced to protect them from new aspects of law that our forebears in world war two and other battles did not have to cope with. I shall be voting with the Government tonight. I thank the Minister and the Secretary of State for bringing this Bill to the House, and I look forward to the Northern Ireland Bill coming to the House before Christmas.
This is the second piece of legislation that the Government have brought forward this week that is predicated on breaking international law. It is alarming that this is the global Britain that was promised in such glowing words by the Prime Minister and his allies over the last few years—a Britain that alienates itself on the world stage and is driven by bluster, tub-thumping and a form of nationalism that endangers both our armed forces and civilians around the globe.
The Defence Secretary has boasted about going to war on lawfare, but preventing acts of torture is not some burdensome red tape. The UK military has opposed torture for decades, and that principle is enshrined in the Army field manual and the Ministry of Defence doctrine, yet the Government wish to provide a triple lock amnesty which would ensure that acts of torture cannot be prosecuted if they took place more than five years ago. The Bill would also enshrine direct political interference from the Attorney General in such cases.
Many human rights groups, including Amnesty International, Freedom from Torture, Liberty, Reprieve and Rights Watch UK strongly oppose the Bill on the grounds that it contravenes international humanitarian and human rights law. The organisation Redress warns:
“The Bill risks creating impunity for serious offences including torture, and thus will result in the UK being in breach of its international treaty obligations… The Bill makes the mistake of assuming that all victims are fake, and that British soldiers are always in the right. That is not borne out by history.”
Indeed, it is believed that thousands of allegations of torture and mistreatment from Iraqis and Afghanis have been lodged against British soldiers serving in the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. Earlier this year, the International Criminal Court prosecutor determined that there was a basis to allegations that the UK armed forces committed war crimes against detainees in Iraq. Rather than face up to any wrongdoing, the Government now wish to silence victims by introducing time limits for civil claims in connection with overseas operations.
The Bill would also place a duty on all future Governments to consider deviation from the European convention on human rights in relation to significant overseas military operations. That reveals what this legislation is truly about: slashing away crucial protections on human rights under the guise of macho patriotism. Even if we agree with the Government’s argument that those involved in controversial overseas operations should not be left in uncertainty for years, the solution is not to issue a blanket amnesty for potential war crimes.
We have 70 people speaking in this debate.
The solution is for the Government to reverse their severe budget cuts to criminal investigations and to increase accountability and scrutiny of their military interventions.
The Government claim to be standing up for British troops, yet the erosion of global rules against torture would put UK personnel at risk by endangering British soldiers who are detained by foreign forces overseas. Not only that, but the Bill breaches the armed forces convention by preventing British armed forces personnel from holding the Ministry of Defence to account for negligence, personal injury or death. Therefore, despite all the Government’s bluster, this legislation does much more to protect the Ministry of Defence than it does service personnel.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. The hon. Lady may have inadvertently misled the House, and I would not want her to do that. She made the point just now that the Bill meant that serving personnel could not be prosecuted for war crimes. That is fundamentally untrue, as the Minister no doubt will confirm. If she withdrew that remark, we could all make some progress.
I appreciate what the right hon. Gentleman is saying, but he knows that it is not a point of order for the Chair but the very point that we are debating. The hon. Lady thinks one thing, the right hon. Gentleman thinks another.
I guess I now do not have the time.
If the Government really cared about the wellbeing of veterans, they should pledge today to invest in mental health services and tackling the scourge of homelessness, which affects 3,500 veterans. According to the No Homeless Veterans campaign, this legislation also increases the likelihood of UK service personnel being tried at the International Criminal Court in The Hague, instead of being dealt with in our British justice system.
The hon. Lady has exceeded her time.
My constituency has a proud history of supporting our veterans. I would like to start by congratulating VetRun 180, a veterans charity based in Mirfield, on raising a significant amount of money for injured servicemen following its 13-day expedition from John O’Groats to Land’s End. Mirfield is also home to what is reportedly the largest remembrance parade outside London, with Dewsbury not far behind and large services also held in Kirkburton and Denby Dale. I hope that Ministers will give assurances that remembrance services, albeit with smaller numbers, can go ahead this year, so that we can show respect for the war dead and our veterans.
I am pleased that the Bill has been introduced, as it delivers on our manifesto pledge to tackle vexatious claims against armed forces personnel. We owe it to our veterans to ensure that they are protected against these claims and that the circumstances of their judgments are taken into account.
I have seen at first hand the impact that serving in conflict zones can have on someone. When I was a teenager, a friend of mine joined the Army and went on to serve in Northern Ireland during the troubles. Having seen his colleague and friend killed in front of him, he came home and looked a shadow of his former self, clearly affected by that traumatic experience. As a result, he distanced himself from our friendship group and could only seek solace and comfort from his Army colleagues. I cannot begin to imagine what my friend went through during his time in the Army, with his life constantly under threat and having to make snap decisions under extreme circumstances.
Of course, the Bill does not deal with Northern Ireland, and I echo the sentiment expressed by the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) in his speech earlier. However, I expect the Government to honour their manifesto commitments and bring forward legislation relating to Northern Ireland veterans in the not-too-distant future.
That aside, those on overseas operations will have endured similar trauma to my friends. Such experiences can affect people’s judgment and I would be hesitant to criticise people who have made decisions in such gruelling circumstances when I have not been in such situations myself. It is absolutely right that the Bill will ensure that such conditions are taken into account when prosecutions are considered.
I am satisfied that five years is a sufficient period within which to bring forward a prosecution. The impact on veterans of the looming threat of court action can be horrific and they do not deserve to be hounded for many years after they have left service. Many of the inquiries and organisations set up to investigate allegations found little basis in the vast majority of them. Operation Northmoor discounted 90% of investigations into the allegations it received, and none were referred for prosecution. The sort of vexatious claims that prompted many of the investigations could ruin the lives of veterans, placing an enormous burden on their mental health.
It is important to recognise that the Bill includes a presumption against prosecution, not a total exemption. Many of the scenarios put forward by the Bill’s critics— including gruelling torture, which has been discussed by many Members—would certainly still be dealt with, and rightly so. We have a top-class military with dedicated personnel who put their lives on the line in circumstances that many of us will have little understanding of, and we owe it to them to provide the support and peace of mind that they need. That is why I fully support the Bill.
From the point at which I first became aware of its proper formulation, I have been a supporter of the military covenant. It has always seemed to me to be a statement of decent common sense. The covenant has been important for the past two decades because of the way in which it has shaped and, indeed, changed the debate in politics on matters relating to the military. It has given us something around which we can all unite and is a common starting point for us all. The debate in this House and in the community at large has been much the better for that.
It is for that reason that I have particular regret about the way in which the Bill has come to the House today and—I have to say—about the way in which we have debated it. There has been a degree of heat and asperity in this debate that does not serve this House, or those in our armed forces whom we seek to protect, well. I ask the House, and not just those on the Treasury Bench, to reflect on that. I am aware that I may even have been part of it myself, but on reflection I think those who serve in the armed forces deserve better than this.
As I said to the Secretary of State, there is an easy consensus to be built around taking action against vexatious civil dreams. Unfortunately, what we have heard in support of the Bill does not really build that consensus; we have heard a conflation of civil and criminal procedure, with a view to justifying the otherwise unjustifiable changes to criminal procedure. I have very little problem with the part of the Bill that relates to the regulation of claims. What Phil Shiner did was absolutely unconscionable. If we want to stop that sort of thing, the first point ought to have been to call in the regulatory authorities in the legal profession. If we really want to address that problem, that would be the first place I would start to look.
I wish to put on record the concerns that my right hon. and hon. Friends and I have about the Bill. First, there is the question of a presumption against prosecution. The Secretary of State said earlier that I was a right hon. and learned Member; he was not quite right: I was but a humble solicitor. In fact, in the early stages of my legal career, I served as a prosecutor—as a procurator fiscal depute—and it was useful experience. I cannot think of any other example of this presumption in legislation, and I counsel the House that it is a dangerous one.
I want to focus on the use of torture, because this illustrates very well the lack of logic in not having torture in schedule 1 to the Bill. Where there is evidence of torture, no prosecutor sitting in his or her office should say, “Well, there is clearly evidence of torture, but it is presumed that we will not prosecute it.” What sort of signal does that send? But if we read the Bill, we see that its architecture is such that torture is clearly designed to belong in schedule 1, along with sexual offences. That makes perfect sense. As I have said, that is a matter of logic, not of law. The provisions in schedule 1 cover eventualities whose use is never in any circumstances acceptable, so surely that is where torture belongs. Not to put it there suggests that the use of torture in warfare is in certain circumstances acceptable, and that is a proposition for which there should be no support in this House. In suggesting that, we risk doing ourselves serious damage and, worse than that, we ill serve those whom we seek to support and to help through the passing of this legislation. The people who will be most damaged by the application of that presumption against prosecution in relation to torture are those who serve and have served in our armed services. As I said in my intervention on the hon. Member for Glasgow South (Stewart Malcolm McDonald), the purpose of prosecution is to prove beyond reasonable doubt that something has or has not happened. This presumption will work against that, and at the end of the day, the people who will lose as a result are those against whom suspicion exists.
After the next hon. Member to speak, the time limit will be reduced to three minutes so that we can try to give an opportunity to as many people as possible to participate in this important debate, but now I call Stuart Anderson to speak for five minutes.
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for the extra few minutes. I declare an interest as a veteran who has served on multiple overseas operational tours and successfully taken the Ministry of Defence to court over injuries sustained in my time. In my maiden speech I spoke about what was best described as a hatred of this place and the decisions that were made here. After those decisions were made, I had to go and fight in those conflicts and saw them at first hand. But I think we need to move on from that and say, “There are new Members in; let us help to educate the House from our perspective”. We do not all have the same views, but we have been given that opportunity, so I want to show hon. Members a day in my life as a young soldier.
At the age of 22, I had been shot, rehabilitated, learned to walk again, returned to active duty, spent several years on different operational tours, gained promotion and got married. Then Kosovo erupted. We were chosen to go at the start of the conflict, so on returning from my honeymoon, I kissed my wife goodbye and said, “See you in six months.” As we entered Pristina, we did not know what awaited us. I was a proud junior NCO—that meant I could read a map—with the formidable R Company of the 2nd Battalion the Royal Green Jackets. I worked alongside professional, battle-hardened men, and we knew our job and did it well. There was no proper accommodation when we arrived, so we put our doss bags down in what could best be described as rat-infested, disease-ridden derelict buildings. We worked all hours round the clock, so sleep was a real bonus if we got it. Within a couple of weeks of the tour starting, it was clear that we were stretched thin, had unsuitable kit and lived in the worst conditions imaginable. We did not complain. We got on with it.
One evening, I was a quick reaction force commander, and our temporary base was burned down. It would have been a blessing to get rid of the place if my friends had not been so badly burned in it. As we were trying to put the fire out, the conflict raged all around us. We had to go and deal with that, regardless of the fact that all our stuff was getting burned as we did so. My brief over the radio on the way to the incident was: “Several armed men have entered a house. Civilians inside. Serious threat to life. Deal with it.” That was the brief.
There are all kinds of ways of dealing with such situations in training, and loads of support agencies that can be brought in. Not one was available then, so I and three of my colleagues arrived at the location. I briefed the team by saying, “Make ready.” For those who do not know, that means put a round in the chamber and prepare to engage the enemy. We entered the building and had a split second to decide whether these men were armed. Were they waiting for us? Were they even in there? What were they going to do? We were sleep deprived, under pressure and had just watched our mates burn. We knew the rules of engagement. We knew what we could and could not do. If we made the wrong decision, we went to prison or we died.
On that occasion, we were able to get the men to surrender and prevented any loss of life. That incident is nothing unusual in the day of a soldier on operational tour. That is what they do—day in, day out. They never want to be held above the law. They do not want to be treated differently. They want to do their job without fear of being chased decades afterwards. If a crime is committed, they must be prosecuted and they all get that, but this lawfare culture is a disgrace to this country. It will damage the military and it must be stopped.
This Bill is a major step forward for veterans and soldiers. It will bring back reassurance for our troops that they can move in operations without that fear of prosecution. I welcome everything that my hon. Friend the Minister for Defence People and Veterans has done to get this legislation here. It is a major step forward. I also welcome the Northern Ireland Bill that is coming forward. We must see that through.
I just wondered whether my hon. Friend would like also to praise the Minister’s hair.
Like me with the long beard, the Minister has long hair; we are leading the game in this House.
I am new to this game. I have only been a politician since last year. As I said, I had never voted before 2015. I hated politics and the decisions made. I have watched some of the debates and have honestly found myself angry at some views, but I have to put that to one side because we have to debate this matter fairly. I have seen the impact of these issues on soldiers’ lives; some of my friends are not here now because they took their own lives. We have got to put that above everything else. I am asking the House to put egos and political parties aside, and to support this legislation tonight. We will be judged by our actions, not our words.
It is right that we protect our armed services personnel and veterans. These men and women have served us and our country, and it is only right that we serve their needs. It is our duty to prioritise their welfare and mental health, and to support them and their families in every conceivable way, not just when they are in service, but after they return home—for as long as they need it.
It is our intention to work supportively with the Government to improve this Bill for the better protection of our service personnel and veterans. Unamended, the Bill leaves Army personnel with less power to protect themselves once they have completed service. What are the Government more concerned about—protecting the Ministry of Defence as a Department or protecting our honourable service personnel on the ground, who risk their lives day in, day out to make sure that the people of the United Kingdom and citizens across the world are kept safe? As it stands, the Bill does more to protect the Ministry of Defence than it does for our troops and veterans.
The Labour party is determined that we will absolutely stand up for our troops’ rights to justice from the Ministry of Defence should it fall short in protecting our forces. Members of the armed forces have given years of their lives and sacrificed memories with their families to protect us and our great nation. It is utterly unfair to place a time limit on their right to hold the Ministry of Defence to account if they develop later in life mental and physical disabilities as a result of their time in service. It is well documented by numerous organisations and armed forces veterans themselves that, in many cases, duty-related ailments, injuries and mental health issues do not develop until years after they have left service. Many service personnel and veterans have spoken out about their horror at the Bill’s intention to introduce a six-year time limit on claims for personal injuries and/or death. Will the Minister accept that one reason for a delay in soldiers bringing cases can be the impact of trauma? As we know, tragically, there can be extremely high rates of PTSD in the military. The Bill penalises our wonderful service personnel and is a flagrant breach of the covenant.
There is no reason why we should be under-protecting our service personnel and veterans, who have sacrificed so much to protect us. Personal injury claims are incredibly important not only in securing justice for injured people or bereaved families, but in holding the Ministry of Defence to account.
As I mentioned, our intention is to work with the Government and to strengthen the Bill. The Government can do that by increasing protection for our own forces while, crucially, still adhering to international obligations and frameworks that determine best practice of behaviour and standards for all armed forces across the world. As an MP for many service personnel and veterans in Coventry North West, I am here to protect them, to speak up for them and to stand up for them. We should focus on looking after them on their overseas missions and when they return home, when many face an uphill battle to survive. We must protect and uphold their rights when they return home from service, and provide them with the dignity and respect that they deserve.
I welcome the Bill, as it delivers on our election manifesto promise to deal with a long-standing injustice. It paves the way to a new framework that puts justice at its heart.
I have always been proud of our armed forces. My late father was in the Royal Scots Greys and the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, and my husband, my hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti), is an Army veteran who served in Afghanistan. I am also very proud of how my constituency supports our veterans, especially the Royal British Legion in Morley, where Gail and her team of volunteers raise tens of thousands of pounds per year for our veterans. Veterans are part of all our communities and it is crucial that we value their contribution to this country. We must seek to protect them as they put their lives on the line to protect us and our country.
The Bill finally finds a solution to end the injustice of vexatious claims. For too long, veterans have been the victims of lawyers’ profiteering ventures, in which profits were made from the constant threat of reprosecution. A new five-year limit on the time in which our troops can be subject to legal claims, apart from in exceptional circumstances, will help to stop unfounded allegations.
We ask much of our armed forces, yet, as things stand, they face an unending trauma from persistent reinvestigation. In essence, the Bill acts to remove that injustice and creates a new legal framework that puts justice at its core. The Bill will achieve that with a triple lock to protect and secure the welfare of our armed forces personnel.
My hon. Friend, as ever, makes a strong case. Will she confirm that, far from the irresponsible, scurrilous and unpatriotic claims of the hon. Member for Leicester East (Claudia Webbe), the Bill does not mean that soldiers can do as they please? It simply protects them from those very malicious and vexatious charges long after they have served, which they have been plagued by for too long.
I thank my right hon. Friend for his comment. That trauma has been inflicted on veterans by disgraced lawyers should be a source of shame to us all. Many veterans’ lives have been put into a state of unending misery.
The Bill will require that prosecutors take into account the adverse effect that overseas operations can have on service personnel. It recognises that, in the interests of justice, there should be reasonable and swift resolution of cases that have already been investigated and in which there is no compelling new evidence. There is justice in having certainty about the future for our armed forces—they deserve that. This is a legal framework that provides clarity in dealing with these allegations. I welcome the Bill not only for removing the injustice of repeated investigations, but for being a measured step—
No, I am running out of time.
The Bill will not put our armed forces in any legal privilege. The same laws, both domestic and international, will always apply. The Bill’s statutory presumption against prosecution does not prevent justice being served in cases where armed forces personnel have committed genuine crimes. This is a Conservative party manifesto promise and, as a party, we will always stand up to fight for our servicemen and women. Most importantly, however, the Bill ends the blight on the lives of our veterans with sensible and fair measures. My constituents will welcome its contribution to guaranteeing justice for those who have protected our freedom.
I am pleased to follow the hon. Member for Morley and Outwood (Andrea Jenkyns) and I share her objective of ending vexatious claims. But it is to our shame that Governments of which I was a member, in circumstances that we still do not fully understand, participated in rendition leading to torture. That should not have happened and it must not be allowed to happen ever again. That is the aim of the all-party group on extraordinary rendition, of which I was recently elected Chair. I am afraid that this Bill will not help with that shared objective. I am troubled, for example, that, in the Bill, the presumption against prosecution will extend not just to the battlefield, not just to the sort of circumstances that the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West (Stuart Anderson) very powerfully explained to us a few minutes ago, but to peacekeeping operations and to a worryingly undefined category of operations dealing with terrorism. We could so easily slip back to repeating what went so badly wrong before.
The House’s Intelligence and Security Committee has carried out two investigations on extraordinary rendition. There is still a great deal that we do not know, but the Committee has identified hundreds of cases linked to the UK. Many of the people involved still do not know that the UK was involved in what happened to them, and it would be quite wrong to cut them off now from any legal redress. There will one day need to be a judge-led inquiry into what happened with that extraordinary rendition, but, for now, the Government seem to have set their face against that. It may well fall to the Front Bench of this party to do the right thing, but let us not now choose to downgrade the seriousness with which we regard acts of torture. I asked the Secretary of State why, having floated the idea of excluding torture from the remit of this Bill along with sexual offences, the Department did not exclude torture. Sexual offences, I am pleased to say, have been excluded. The Secretary of State did not give an answer. He simply said that that was the decision that he had made. In the case of sexual offences, it is absolutely right: those are not acceptable in any circumstances. Surely the same is true for torture. That must surely be the view of this House and of the British Government as well.
I must declare an interest, as I am a member of the Royal British Legion. I will be brief as I know that time is short. I pay tribute to the work of the Secretary of State for Defence and the Minister for Defence People and Veterans for their unwavering support for the veteran community both nationally and in my home constituency of Blyth Valley.
Blyth has a long history of supporting our armed forces. Members of my own family have served in both the regular and the youth branches of the Army. My father served in the RAF in the post-war years. The Blyth shipyards built many ships for the Royal Navy, including the first aircraft carrier, HMS Ark Royal. During both world wars, the port of Blyth served as a submarine base and today it plays host to the 203 Elswick Battery Royal Artillery and Army reservists and many of their families.
I am a proud member of the Royal British Legion, which ensures that ex-service communities have a voice here and their concerns can be heard by the Government. With this Bill, the Government have shown that they have listened to our veterans and serving personnel and have taken their concerns seriously. Our armed forces perform exceptional feats in incredibly difficult circumstances to protect this country and I am proud of the fact that they uphold the highest standards when doing their job overseas.
We have some of the most committed and professional service personnel in the world, who not only adhere to the rule of law, but promote it through their conduct while on operations and we should not second-guess their actions from this House. There seems to be confusion in much of the reporting about the difference between investigations and prosecutions. This Bill does not give free rein to our forces to behave in a way that would bring our services into disrepute and it will not prevent the prosecution of any service personnel found to have committed illegal acts on operations overseas. Despite suggestions by Opposition Members, it does not provide immunity from torture, but it does make provision for the prosecution of any service personnel found to have been involved in such acts.
The Bill does not act as a pardon, amnesty or statute of limitations. Prosecutors will have the ability to prosecute for criminal offences, including torture, taking into account factors such as sufficiency of evidence and public interest. Furthermore, service personnel are subject to criminal law in England and Wales and to the disciplinary framework of service law, and have a duty to uphold both wherever in the world they are serving. Indeed, the people we have failed in recent years, whom we now deny the protection of law, have—
Order. I am terribly sorry, Ian; we have to leave it there.
As co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on human rights, my comments will be heavily focused on human rights. Perhaps not surprisingly, when I see a Bill come forward from this Government that seeks to achieve a derogation from the ECHR, I am sceptical about its intentions. This Bill is another example of the Government trying to get around our international legal obligations in a specific and limited way, and in so doing opening up a whole can of worms for our armed forces personnel overseas.
There can be no doubt that our armed forces carry out incredibly sensitive and dangerous work overseas, and they have our gratitude for doing so. They do not deserve to be repeatedly investigated for vexatious claims against them. The internationally agreed rules of warfare simply must be adhered to. That includes prosecuting war crimes and crimes against humanity when there is evidence to suggest that those serious offences have been committed in the course of armed conflict. Doing so not only upholds our commitment to the rules-based order but offers armed forces personnel crucial protection from torture and abuse themselves. It is hypocritical of us to demand of others that they should obey international law if we do not follow it ourselves, and the consequences for serving personnel on the battlefield are serious if we undermine our commitments to human rights.
I have considerable concern about the impact that clause 12 will have on our human rights obligations. In its current form, the Bill enables the Secretary of State to derogate from article 15 of the ECHR under certain circumstances, even though article 15 is one of the provisions of the ECHR where derogation can take place. I am concerned about the concentration of power in the hands of the Executive on matters pertaining to states of emergency, especially as the clause only places a duty on the Secretary of State to consider whether an overseas operation is significant enough to merit derogation. At the very least, additional parliamentary oversight is required before such a derogation is made, given the existing notification requirements to the Council of Europe for such a derogation to take place.
Our armed forces deserve protection but should not be above the law. Unfortunately, the Bill creates far too many unintended consequences for the UK’s reputation as a country that upholds human rights and the rule of law. I do not believe that the Government have adequately addressed those issues in the Bill as it stands, and it is for that reason that I will join my colleagues on the SNP Benches in voting against the Bill tonight.
My constituency is home to many veterans. Their service to our nation is valued by me as their MP and by the overwhelming majority of the local community. For their service, we owe them a great debt of gratitude, and central to that gratitude is the full implementation of the military covenant right across the United Kingdom—something on which we in Northern Ireland still have a way to go.
At the core of that covenant—that promise between society and our military family—is the principle of fairness, and I believe that the Bill before us is no different. At the heart of this should be fairness. Is it fair that our military personnel are targeted through vexatious actions that are proven to have no legitimacy when they reach a court but, in the period up to that point, come at a mental and financial cost that is a heavy burden to bear? Likewise, would it be fair for those who have committed wrongdoing to be able to escape justice? Would that be fair on victims? Absolutely not.
I am conscious of the concerns raised both by hon. Members in this House and by constituents that this Bill could exempt soldiers from justice in relation to heinous acts such as torture. No one wants that. At all times, the punishment, whether or not the alleged offence is within a five-year period, must fit the crime. There should be no amnesty for those who abuse the uniform when serving Crown and country.
One area that still remains unresolved by this Bill, despite a promise and platitudes from the Government, is the vexatious prosecution of those who served in Northern Ireland. These veterans must not be left behind.
There are still many veterans who are awaiting the knock on the door. As has been mentioned, 80-year-old men are receiving a knock on the door. When the Minister is summing up in winding up this debate, will he give assurances on the progress of implementation and forward movement of inclusion within the Northern Ireland Bill?
I thank my hon. Friend, and I agree entirely with his sentiments.
On 18 March, in a statement to this House, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland did give a commitment that there would be equal treatment for Northern Ireland veterans, yet today we have no sign of a Bill that will give that equal treatment to the veterans who served in the streets and laneways of Ulster. Such delays create suspicion, so I urge the Minister to commit that, before this Bill becomes law, veterans in Northern Ireland will have that equal treatment.
Order. I am sorry, Mr Shannon, but you cannot make an intervention from there.
Take 2! Mr Shannon, you must come here more often and you will find out how this place works. [Laughter.]
It is always a learning curve, Mr Deputy Speaker, and I am still learning.
On the issue our veterans in Northern Ireland—I declare an interest as one of those veterans, having served in the Ulster Defence Regiment in Northern Ireland—the Minister gave a commitment previously that, by the end of this year, a Bill would be coming through on Northern Ireland veterans’ issues. Does my hon. Friend, like me, want to see the Minister committing himself at the end of this debate to giving veterans in Northern Ireland the same protection as those here on the mainland?
I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, and I wholeheartedly agree with him. I think the Minister will have got the message loud and clear from the Ulster Benches that we want that clarity today. Those who served in Operation Banner, who stood firm against terrorism and who defeated those terrorists must not be left behind as prey for unscrupulous lawyers, emboldened by smears and innuendo from self-styled rights activists, republican politicians or investigative journalists. To do so would be wrong.
In Northern Ireland, we have the ludicrous scenario where terrorists were freed from prison having served only 18 months for the murder of police officers and soldiers, yet we are here having to debate why we do not pursue elderly men who have served their country by standing against those very terrorists. These same terrorists now want to be paid compensation for the injuries they suffered carrying out their illegal and murderous deeds. I want to put a marker down in relation to this Bill: there can be no consideration and no legal framework to offer a level of equivalence between the perpetrator and the innocent victim.
In conclusion, this is a matter of fairness—fairness to our servicemen and women, fairness to victims and the fair application of the law of this land, but also fairness within the ranks of service personnel. Northern Ireland veterans must be treated fairly, and in that regard this Government must step up and live up to their prior commitment—no more lip service, no more delay.
I welcome the clear intention to support our service personnel, whom we send into harm’s way on operations overseas quite often these days, with this Bill. First, I would like to congratulate my hon. Friend the Minister for Defence People and Veterans on all the incredible hard work he has done on veterans’ issues and on the work he has done to bring this Bill before the House.
I would like to declare an interest as a veteran. I was proud to serve our country in Afghanistan on Op Herrick 9 as a mobilised reservist in the Royal Artillery. One of my sons, Michael, is currently serving in the Royal Artillery as a lance bombardier in 1RHA—1st Regiment Royal Horse Artillery—having just returned this week from a six-month deployment to Estonia. I am looking forward to catching up with him at the weekend and having a few beers.
While I anticipate the important legislation that will follow this Bill and address the great injustice of the treatment of our Northern Ireland veterans, I hope that this Bill will end the vexatious and repeated claims that some of our service personnel have had to endure following their service in Afghanistan and Iraq. I will support the Bill, although I have some questions about which I hope Ministers will reassure me.
Will the Minister assure me that the Bill will not lead to an increased risk that our people will be pursued through the International Criminal Court? We must be careful not unintentionally to give the impression that our armed forces do not operate to the highest possible standards, as we know they do, or that some sort of immunity exists for them while on operations. We must make that point throughout, and be clear that if a service person commits a crime on an overseas operation, they will be held to account legally.
Service personnel are taught about the law of armed conflict and their obligations under the Geneva convention, which they take incredibly seriously. Colleagues have drawn attention to the fundamental difference between an error in the fog of war, and a crime. Even with all the modern technology now available to our armed forces, sadly, we will never eliminate the risk of civilian casualties.
In a recent interview, General Sir Nick Carter drew attention to the need for better records to be kept on operations, and for service personnel to know that any incident that occurs on operations and leads to an investigation will be dealt with quickly by the MOD. As my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) said, it is not entirely clear that the Bill will be able to stop repeated investigations. I hope Ministers can assure me that once an investigation has closed, it will not be repeated unless there is more compelling evidence that specifically relates to that case. That will put an end to repeated investigations and interviews by various boards of inquiry that can drag on for many years, with both service and civilian police.
I was proud to serve on the Armed Forces Bill Committee, which enshrined the armed forces covenant into law for the first time and means that military personnel will not be disadvantaged by their service. Will the Minister reassure the House that the Bill will not inhibit the ability of any veteran who seeks legal action against the MOD?
It is a privilege to speak in this debate on an issue that is of great importance to me and my constituents. Indeed, it was a manifesto commitment, and I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer) on his considerable energy in delivering the Bill. Lincolnshire is the proud home of much of our air force and its heritage. Sleaford and North Hykeham is lucky to have a number of RAF bases, including RAF Cranwell, at which the next generation of officers are trained. Through the armed forces parliamentary scheme, I have seen at first hand how our armed forces personnel train night and day, so that they are fully prepared to protect us in the most difficult circumstances imaginable.
Although our armed forces put their lives on the line to protect us in conflict overseas, there has been a collective failure to protect them from vexatious claims when they come home. The strong emotions on that topic cannot be understated, and like many colleagues, I have received much correspondence about this issue, which is often raised in conversations with veterans, service personnel and families. I believe that the Bill cannot come soon enough, although tragically, for many veterans it will have come too late. In 2014, the al-Sweady inquiry found that the vast majority of claims made against the British military were the product of “deliberate and calculated lies.” Those lies came at a huge personal cost to soldiers who were victims of them.
Our brave men and women in the armed forces do not want to be, and should not be, above the law, and the Bill will not make them above the law. They want to be protected from vexatious claims, however, and we should ensure that they are. At the core of this issue has been the expansion of human rights law under the ECHR to apply outside the UK, and its conflict with international humanitarian law. The Bill will protect our personnel from vexatious claims, and I proud to see the Government fulfilling their manifesto commitment to protect the armed forces.
As other hon. Members have said, the Bill does not cover Northern Ireland veterans, but earlier in the debate I heard the Minister’s assurances in that regard, and I hope that further legislation will come forward soon. I welcome the introduction of the Bill, and will support it this evening. I look forward to the day our veterans no longer need to worry that their brave and honourable service for this country will be tarnished by repeated intimidation by investigation.
Let me say at the outset that although I did not agree with all his conclusions, I found the speech by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West (Stuart Anderson) to be stark, powerful and illuminating. I pay tribute to him for his service.
Chester is a proud garrison city. The hon. and gallant Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart), who is in his place, served as leader of the Cheshire Regiment and is still highly thought of there. Many of the men who served with him are now veterans, and I have a large veteran community in Chester. I seek to represent them because they served us, and we owe them a debt for that service. We owe it to them to look after them, which is why I have in the past called for measures to protect veterans from vexatious claims. Consequently, I will not vote against Second Reading tonight.
None the less, it is the role and the right of the Opposition to point out errors and holes in legislation and to try to improve it. I was disappointed by the response from the Secretary of State, particularly his outburst when my right hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State pointed out some of the holes and criticisms. There are clear reasons to include torture in the scope of the Bill, but that was rejected.
My hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Lloyd Russell-Moyle) and the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) both talked about the fact that the legislation will not prevent investigations, and in that respect there is a particular group I want to talk about. When there is a knock on the door at 7 o’clock in the morning, it is not just the veteran who suffers; it is his or her family as well. We need to remember the families of veterans.
I was especially disappointed when, in response to my right hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State, the Secretary of State tried to associate ambulance, tank or armoured personnel carrier-chasing lawyers with the Labour party. My right hon. Friend had taken a constructive approach and will continue to do so. I ask the Minister to consider carefully: these lawyers, who deserve obloquy, have no support from us. Those of us who represent areas where there are high numbers of honourable ex-servicemen want to find a way to protect them. The Bill may be the right way, but it needs to be considered carefully in Committee. I hope the Minister and his colleagues will take into account our genuine and heartfelt concerns about its failings, so that they can be amended during the Bill’s passage through Parliament.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for City of Chester (Christian Matheson), who made a reasonable and moderate speech. In our debate on the Bill today, we have heard some powerful stories based on personal experience, not least from my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South West (Stuart Anderson), as well as some fairly strong accusations based on the belief that the Bill will somehow undermine this country’s enviable legacy in respect of human rights.
I read John Larkin’s article, and I have to concur with the conclusion reached in relation to Felix Frankfurter’s tripartite test for deciding whether a law does what it says on the tin:
“1. Read the statute, 2. Read the statute, 3. Read the statute”.
The Bill does not give, or even approach giving, immunity to service personnel in respect of serious crimes. There is no special provision to prevent prosecutions for torture, and those who claim otherwise should be ashamed of themselves. We hear a lot of Opposition Members paying lip service to supporting our forces, and I believe that some of them genuinely do, but when asked to do so, some have demurred. Failing to support the Bill will be a serious breach of faith on their part.
What the Bill does is create a new framework for prosecutions of alleged offences that take place on overseas operations. It requires exceptional grounds for bringing such prosecutions, and factors relevant to overseas operations must be taken into account in deciding whether it is in the public interest to prosecute. Specifically, prosecutors must take into account the negative effects on mental health and decision-making capacity arising from being exposed to the overwhelming stress of continuous threat to life or commanding those who are so exposed, from seeing colleagues killed or maimed, or from the myriad other harsh realities of overseas service, which most of us in this place should be grateful for never having seen.
Can the hon. Gentleman tell me how those things are not already taken into account under current provisions in courts and when deciding to prosecute?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question, but if they were taken into account and taken seriously, we would not need legislation such as this.
What I described should dispel suggestions that the Bill will create immunity from prosecutions. The Bill only creates a test of exceptionality for prosecutions after a period of five years has expired. What is exceptional within the scope of the Bill is determined by an independent prosecutor, the Attorney General, who is still accountable to this place. It is clearly wrong to say that the Bill would forbid prosecutions of allegations of torture supported by evidence.
The Government are seeking with the Bill to provide some reassurance to service personnel that they are unlikely to be prosecuted many years on from events, where no new evidence has come forward. To paraphrase my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), we the powerful must protect the strong—
Only honourable? Very honourable indeed. We the powerful must protect the strong in order to protect the weak. In welcoming the Bill, I join others in the House and veterans in Heywood and Middleton, many of whom served on Operation Banner, in encouraging the Government to move quickly to provide similar protections for those who have served in Northern Ireland, where comparable prosecutions are a serious concern. I welcome the Government’s indication that legislation will be forthcoming before the end of the year.
I concur with my hon. Friend’s viewpoint. Veterans in Stoke-on-Trent, Kidsgrove and Talke have talked relentlessly about the need to bring an end to these vexatious claims, and especially veterans who served in Northern Ireland, where the Staffordshire Regiment was strong. I want to put on record my full support for his comments; we must have this Northern Ireland legislation soon.
My hon. Friend is entirely correct. I say with no shame that I am a law graduate, but I am extremely offended by the behaviour of some of my compatriots, and their wings need to be clipped quite severely.
A lot of people in this country are extremely grateful for the role that our armed services play. I would like to associate myself with them in saying that passing this Bill will go some way to ensuring that the dedication, patriotism and selflessness that our forces show are not undermined by those who seek profit in doing so.
Sadly, I rise to speak in opposition to the Bill, but at the outset, I place on record my enormous respect for all those who have served the UK in uniform and have acted in various theatres around the world with great honour and distinction, and from my perspective, for those who served under Operation Banner in Northern Ireland. In saying that, we have to recognise that at times things have gone very badly wrong in Northern Ireland, and there are legitimate issues around accountability and investigations in that respect.
The Bill is regrettable in its own terms, but we are seeing quite a lot of Members referring to the pending legislation regarding Northern Ireland, and I want to make a couple of comments on that at the outset. Dealing with the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland is an even more thorny and difficult issue than Brexit, to put it in some context. It is something that people have been wrestling with for over 20 years. We have had the basis of some type of agreement through the Stormont House agreement from 2015, which the Government have struggled to implement over the past five years. I want to say this very loud and clear, so that everyone is aware: if this Parliament acts unilaterally over one aspect of legacy in Northern Ireland—around veterans—they will destroy any prospect of an agreed way forward to deal with the contentious past in Northern Ireland. This has to be a rounded process, and it has to involve all the parties in Northern Ireland, the victims’ groups in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government. Those have not been the characteristics of what we have seen so far with the statement from 18 March.
The narrative of vexatious prosecutions is one that I do not recognise. We have seen many claims of this from Ministers and others, but we never hear any reference to particular cases, so it is a narrative. Indeed, it has been debunked on many occasions by eminent persons—most recently, by the Lord Chief Justice in Northern Ireland. I have to say, I am somewhat bemused to see the references to the former Attorney General for Northern Ireland, John Larkin, as somehow the intellectual force behind what is happening, because he has been far from infallible, as many people in Northern Ireland will recognise, over the past number of years.
The triple lock in the Bill will make things more difficult, because it undermines the whole legitimacy of the people who served in Northern Ireland and overseas. They feel they do not need the system to be rigged and changed to give them an advantage. They can stand on their legacy. They were serving to uphold democracy, human rights and good governance—the values we need to project around the world.
Does the hon. Gentleman think it might also cause difficulty because part of the triple lock is a political decision, which might, particularly with the balance in Northern Ireland, cause real mistrust?
Indeed. I see a lack of accountability around those measures. The checks are very ill defined. We have had a pattern of substandard investigations, and that is often what lies behind some of the concern arising around the narrative of vexatious claims: the standard of investigations catches up with that. There will, of course, be the opportunity for more rigorous investigations to happen sooner, when issues are raised, and hopefully that will address the issue. However, whenever I hear references to human rights potentially having to be compromised to get the Bill through and have a new basis for dealing with claims, we should all be extremely concerned.
It is worth recalling that one of the very few rights under the European convention that cannot be qualified in any circumstances is the freedom from torture. We should reflect very heavily on that. It is eminently possible for people to serve and have clear rules of engagement that can be respected without going into situations that compromise either human rights law or humanitarian law.
I am grateful to the Minister for bringing forward the Bill and for the fantastic work he does with veterans in our country.
Like many in this House, I have family who have served this country and put themselves at risk for our peace and security. In my view, it is essential that the Government take steps to protect our armed forces from a long shadow of vexatious claims. As our veterans return to the peace of home, we must ensure that they enjoy the peace of mind they deserve.
There has, sadly, been much misinformation circulating in advance of the Bill. The Bill is not a licence to torture. No one in this House would condone such behaviour. The is Bill is not an amnesty providing a window of immunity. The Bill has a very clear limitation period for the longstop of prosecution and litigation. Britain’s armed forces are held to the highest standards of conduct and international reputation. The Bill does nothing to undermine that, but simply serves to update the law in light of an increasingly litigious landscape.
As a lawyer, I have acted for both claimants and defendants in civil matters. Litigation is not an enjoyable process for any party involved. I can only imagine the distress, anguish and mental health problems that must arise in our veterans who are subject to claims long after they have concluded their duty and service. Just as they have protected us, and as they face increasing speculative litigation years after events, we must play our part to serve them and provide them with the peace that the Bill seeks to bring.
There will be those who worry, wrongly in my view, that the Bill will prevent genuine victims from using legal avenues of recourse open to them. That is not the case. As figures from the MOD reveal, over 94% of claims made within the past 15 years would have still been able to have been made within the time limits set down by the Bill. Our armed forces serve our United Kingdom with exemplary conduct in the toughest of situations. To suggest that the Bill will give them free rein to abuse established international treaties on conduct in warfare is dangerous and damaging both for our reputation and to our service personnel.
In conclusion, the Bill does not undermine the UK’s commitment to human rights, nor does it undermine our commitment to our international obligations. The Bill strikes a proportionate balance between the rights and wellbeing of our service personnel, and ensuring that genuine victims can access justice in a reasonable time. I believe we should support the Bill. I urge Members on all side of the House to support it and to show their support for our armed forces.
I have been in the House for 23 years, and the hardest decisions that I have had to make in voting have been when we have been asked whether we want to send our armed forces abroad to conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria or Libya. When making those decisions, I have known, as all Members have known, that our armed forces would have to put their own lives at risk, they may have to kill people and they may be killed themselves. We have had to think very carefully about the justification of such actions. As I say, those have been the hardest decisions that I have taken in the House.
As we consider this Bill, it is right to applaud what our armed forces do for us. They strive to keep peace, they strive to protect us as individuals, and they strive to protect the United Kingdom as a country. In the same way that we have rightly applauded our NHS workers and other vital workers recently, it is right to remember what our armed forces have done for us and continue to do for us.
It is also right to remember that, when our armed forces are acting on our behalf, they uphold very high standards, and that is right. The difficulty is that the people they are fighting against do not uphold those very high standards. They can be indiscriminate. They really do not care who they kill—men, women, children; innocent people. That puts our armed forces at a disadvantage. It is still probably right that we uphold those standards, but it is surely wrong that those soldiers should face vexatious claims many years afterwards, when they have been under such tremendous pressure.
I would say the same about our veterans who served in Northern Ireland. I served as Chairman of the Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs for seven years, and it greatly troubled me that our armed forces who served there were fighting against an enemy who called it a war. They used the term “war” so that they could excuse their indiscriminate murder of men, women and children, yet members of our armed forces had to abide by the yellow card—they had to abide by very strict rules. It is wrong that they are facing prosecution up to 40 or even 50 years after events, and even more of them may face prosecution. That is very wrong, so I urge the Minister to introduce legislation similar to this to cover Northern Ireland as soon as possible.
I will confine my comments to the presumption against prosecution for serious criminal offences contained in part 1 of the Bill. I believe that the way in which this is framed will make prosecutions close to impossible for some of the most serious crimes under international law. I am also concerned, as are many lawyers, that it will create a presumption against prosecution for a class of defendants, which is unprecedented in our domestic legal systems.
In cases where UK personnel have committed crimes such as torture, the triple lock will apply no matter how grave the conduct involved is or how detailed the evidence is. The Government claim that this measure is designed to protect soldiers, but in fact, it runs counter to everything that our military personnel stand for. I respectfully remind Government Members that many Opposition Members have family members who have served in the armed forces as well. My paternal grandfather served in the Royal Air Force.
After the second world war, our armed forces helped to update and expand the Geneva conventions, which protect captured personnel. Both the Army field manual and the Ministry of Defence doctrine explicitly forbid torture or cruel treatment. Torture has been prohibited in Scotland since the Treason Act 1708 and in England for more than 300 years, since the Long Parliament’s abolition of the Star Chamber. Even Margaret Thatcher—not somebody I am normally given to praising—fought to preserve the ban on torture, and in 1988 she made it a criminal offence, no matter who committed it or where it was committed. Right-thinking Conservative Members might wish to bear that in mind when considering the part of the Bill to do with the triple lock.
I know that the hon. and learned Lady has a much finer legal mind than mine, but I merely draw her attention to clause 3(2)(b), which refers to “no compelling new evidence”. Surely the Bill does envision the possibility that there could be compelling new evidence, and therefore this is not the absolute lock of which she speaks.
I have not said that it is an absolute lock. It does envisage some possibilities. But the bottom line is that you do not create a triple lock against something if you are expecting to encourage it or to allow it in. It simply cannot be right not to prosecute criminal acts of a crime as serious as that of torture if there is strong evidence that it took place. Torture victims have a right to see their tormentors brought to account, and there should be no time limit on justice.
This is not just a matter of domestic law. As we have heard from other hon. Members, our international legal obligations under the UN convention against torture and the Rome statute consist of recognising prohibitions against torture, which are absolute. That was the point of my intervention on the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat). The prohibition against torture in international law is absolute, and it ill behoves us to pass a statute creating one class of defendants in the United Kingdom wherein there is a presumption against them being prosecuted for that crime.
I have no time for vexatious litigation. I can say, as somebody who practised at the Bar for many years, and also someone who prosecuted, that vexatious litigation is a pain in the neck. What I am concerned about is the international reputation of the United Kingdom, for so long as Scotland remains part of it. Indeed, I will be concerned about the international reputation of England even when Scotland is no longer in a union with it. International law may not mean much to this Government, but they forget at their peril that it keeps all of us safe. If this is what the Government meant by their manifesto promise to update human rights laws, then we should all be very concerned.
I remind Members that if they intend to press the Second Reading to a Division, it would be very useful if the Chair got the names of the Tellers in advance, please
I have listened to the views of my constituents, the experiences of former service personnel, and various human rights groups, and I am of the view that this Bill fails in its primary purpose, in that it does not provide greater legal protections to forces personnel who have served on overseas operations. The Bill denies public transparency and accountability for military intervention overseas. There is an assumption within it that all allegations made against the MOD and UK forces are vexatious, and that the MOD and UK forces are always in the right. We know from history that this has not always been the case. Opposition to the use of torture is enshrined in the MOD doctrine, so why are the Government now trying to exclude the use of torture from the triple lock against prosecutions? As the human rights group Liberty has stressed, if this Bill goes through in its current format, it will result in the effective decriminalisation of torture and many other breaches of the Geneva convention.
We also need to look to the future. We know that this Government are no strangers to violating international law, and this Bill in its current form seeks only to diminish our global reputation further.
I am afraid I do not have enough time.
How can we as a nation criticise and hold states to account for engaging in torturous practices if we are happy to set laws that would allow us to do exactly that?
There are also issues with the part of the Bill that relates to civil matters. UK service personnel should be afforded the same employment rights as those they seek to defend. The Bill gives the MOD a free pass. Stress disorders can manifest many years after the original trauma. Therefore, the fact that the Bill allows a time limit on claims being introduced denies service personnel the ability to hold the MOD to account.
I listened to the argument made by the hon. Member for Bracknell (James Sunderland) that one cannot be a supporter of our armed forces and vote against this Bill. Frankly, that is extremely offensive: there is nothing patriotic about undermining and letting down our veterans. They have been let down by this and previous Governments for too long. The available care and services are just not adequate for those who have served this country. Ultimately, the Bill fails those who have served our country and seeks to further diminish our global reputation.
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in this incredibly important debate. I commend the Minister for Defence People and Veterans, my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer); his commitment to standing up for the rights of veterans has been evident ever since he became a Member of Parliament in 2015. The Bill reflects that commitment, which is shared by me and many parliamentarians from all parties, to better protect those who have served our country and to offer reassurance to those contemplating a career in our armed services that we are on their side.
One of my earliest conversations in Stoke-on-Trent Central during the election campaign was with local veteran Alan, who asked me to ensure that the law was changed to protect veterans from vexatious claims. He said, “Why would anyone sign up to serve their country if they thought that years later they would be hounded and threatened with legal action simply because they obeyed orders in a conflict? It is not right and it needs to stop.” I promised him that I would campaign for and back legislation to put this right. For Alan, and all those like him who want greater protection for our veterans and service personnel, I speak today in support of this much-needed Bill.
The measures in the Bill are a proportionate solution to the existing problem and strike an appropriate balance between victims’ rights and access to justice and fairness for those who have served this country. Time and again, we have seen investigation after investigation into the conduct of service personnel, but they have not led to prosecution. This supposed lawfare benefits the specialist legal firms that cynically profit from the misery caused. It is time that we redressed the balance.
The Bill is not intended to be an obstruction of justice; instead, it will be easier for families of victims to find out what happened to their loved ones. Access to family reports is vital in ensuring that that happens. The triple lock in the Bill, enforcing greater legal protections for armed services personnel and veterans, will provide certainty that the pressures placed on them while deployed will be considered when prosecution decisions about historical offences are made.
I am pleased that long-standing campaigners for veterans have praised the Bill’s objectives and the outcomes it will have. I know that the Minister has worked diligently to ensure that the balance between justice for veterans and for victims will be respected. I will be pleased to vote for the Bill.
There are two substantial parts of the Bill: the criminal part, which in my view puts an unnecessary burden on the prosecution of war crimes and other crimes; and the civil part, which protects the MOD more than it protects veterans.
The Royal British Legion and numerous others have said that great sections of the civil part need to be rewritten. My view is that so much needs to be rewritten that the Government should come back with another proposal. Let us be clear: there is currently a presumption of three years, but that can be extended; a hard line of six years for civil actions, with no ability to extend, will potentially reduce the ability of our veterans to take action and seek compensation.
As an example, let us use a scenario in which a veteran is slowly going blind. Blindness can sometimes take 10 years from the initial act. The blindness comes on, but veterans are patriotic; they do not go running to the courts immediately. Only 10 years down the line does the veteran realise that it has ruined their lives and that they need support or compensation, but it is too late. In my view, that is wrong and that provision is totally wrong.
I know that the hon. Gentleman speaks with passion, having worked with him in all-party groups. There is the timeframe to consider, but it is also about the point of knowledge. It was 15 years before it was recognised that I had post-traumatic stress, although I had seen the problems many years before that. Under the Bill, there would be time for me to take that forward.
That is why I used the example of blindness: the point of knowledge would be the first time that sight is lost, but total sight loss could take much longer. [Interruption.] The Minister for Defence People and Veterans can come back come in his usual style.
On the criminal part, I think the Bill threatens our service people with being more likely to be investigated by the ICC. I am not convinced that prosecutions would be sought in the ICC, but the very risk of investigation by the ICC defeats the whole point of this Bill, which in my view—I have said this a few times in the Chamber tonight—was to tackle a series of vexatious investigations. We need a system where cases, once they are fully investigated, can be closed and not reopened unless a significant bar is met. This Bill does nothing at all about that and fails in its very purpose. That is why it is a great shame that this wording—not the concept; I think we all agree this issue must be tackled—is what the Government have brought forward.
I also want to touch on the time limits. France has a 30-year time limit for serious crimes, while crimes under international humanitarian law are never given a time limit. In the USA, time limits are exempted for the law of war and also for serious crimes or murder. This Bill would put us at odds with how the French and American systems protect their veterans. It would seem extremely odd to take that approach. We should be learning from our allies, not trying to diverge from their approach.
I am extremely disappointed with the wording of this Bill. If it passes tonight, I will work extremely hard to try to amend it. I do not think it will ever be an amazing Bill, because it started from the wrong point and is answering the wrong questions, but I will work with others to try to get the best out of it. Given its drafting, however, I am not convinced that it deserves to go forward in its initial form. The Government should come forward with an alternative plan that hits the nail on the head, because this certainly does not.
I am terribly sorry to the 23 Members who were unable to get in, but I am afraid there was a lot of interest in this debate. I call Stephen Morgan to start the wind-ups.
I would like to start by paying tribute to our armed forces and joining colleagues from across the House in expressing gratitude to those who serve. They truly give us reason to be proud of our country.
There is consensus across the House today. Labour, the Government and our armed forces all want the same thing. We all agree that we must protect our troops from vexatious claims, and we all agree that we must defend those who serve our country overseas with courage and distinction. The Government promised to bring forward legislation to do just that in the first 100 days of government. Now, 284 days later, they have disappointingly got crucial elements of this Bill badly wrong.
The question we must be asking is: what does this Bill mean for our troops? It risks breaching the armed forces covenant and rolls back on their employment rights. It fails to properly protect against vexatious claims and undermines Britain’s proud adherence to international laws, such as the Geneva convention, that we helped to create. However, it is not too late. There is still time for Ministers to work with us to get this right.
A number of powerful points have been made in the House today. It would probably be unwise of me to single out any of them, but let me just mention my right hon. Friends the Members for East Ham (Stephen Timms) and for North Durham (Mr Jones), and my hon. Friend the Member for City of Chester (Christian Matheson), who all spoke commandingly on the importance of our nation’s national standing; my hon. Friends the Members for Coventry North West (Taiwo Owatemi) and for Jarrow (Kate Osborne), who spoke about ensuring that we always think about the impact of this Bill on our armed forces personnel and veterans; my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Claudia Webbe), who spoke about the need to invest in mental health services and tackling homelessness; and my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Lloyd Russell-Moyle), who spoke about the concerns raised by the Royal British Legion.
I also congratulate, and pay tribute to, the Chair of the Defence Committee on passionately saying that we do not want the Government to over-promise and that the Bill in its current form will not help a number of veterans. Finally, my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) said that Britain must uphold its commitment to human rights. I agree with him that we cannot afford to become an outlier among our allies by refusing to investigate allegations of some of the gravest crimes imaginable.
I am most concerned by the Bill’s potential infringement of the rights of Her Majesty’s forces. I share the view of the Royal British Legion—an organisation with an unwavering commitment to service personnel—that the Bill constitutes a possible breach of the armed forces covenant. I urge other armed forces groups to share their views on what the Bill means for our forces community. Our troops must be at the heart of this debate.
The Government’s introduction of a six-year limit for bringing civil claims will prevent troops who suffer injury from taking cases to court. As we heard earlier in the debate, over the past 15 years there have been 25 cases brought by injured British troops against the MOD for every one case brought by alleged victims against our forces. That means the main beneficiary of this Bill is the MOD, not our personnel. The Bill should be designed to protect troops, not the purse strings of Government. I put this to the Minister: if this Bill is for our armed forces community, why does it deny them the same employment rights as civilians?
Labour is also deeply concerned that this Bill does not meet its primary objective. It does not do enough to protect our troops from vexatious claims. Months of letters from the Defence Committee to the Defence Secretary —the Committee only received a reply yesterday—made the point that the Bill does nothing to prevent arduous investigation processes; it just protects from prosecutions. It does nothing to deal with the serious failings in the system of investigating allegations against British troops, something that Defence Ministers have themselves admitted. Had those allegations been dealt with properly and self-regulation had occurred, we probably would not be here today. Perhaps the toughest, most intrusive aspects of the vexatious claims process are not being dealt with in this Bill, and that is not the only way in which it leaves our troops open to so-called lawfare.
By going back on our commitments under the Geneva convention, the Bill risks dragging our people in front of the International Criminal Court. I put it to the Minister: does he really want to make it more likely that the ICC can open investigations against British troops?
There is also a set of wider issues. Vexatious claims are not the only problem that our forces face. Action on the issue is not licence-e to neglect others, such as low pay, 10 years of falling morale, a decade of falling numbers and a housing crisis across the tri-services. If the Ministers are serious about tackling the poor track record on defence, we need to see action on all those issues. The Bill presents an opportunity to turn the tide, to break the mould and to work with Labour to get it right.
In this country, we are proudly patriotic, and reinforcing that patriotism—that love of our country—is the high regard in which our armed forces are held. When we see Union flags on the shoulder patches of service personnel overseas, that means something: it means honesty, it means respect for the rule of law and it means justice. From Sandhurst to Britannia Royal Naval College, there is a reason that countries around the world send their officers to be trained in our military institutions.
This Bill puts all that at risk. It is at odds with the rules-based international order we helped to create. In its current form, the Bill would make Great Britain the only nation among our major allies to offer a statutory presumption against prosecution. As the previous Chief of the Defence Staff but also the ex-Attorney General and a former Defence Secretary have said, the Bill undermines Britain’s proud, long-standing adherence to the Geneva convention.
Great Britain has proudly stood and must stand against the use of torture and against the use of rendition. I urge the Minister: do not undo the work of Churchill, do not undo the work of Attlee and do not chip away at our nation’s proud reputation. I put it to the Minister: how can we expect Great Britain to speak with authority on international law to China, Russia and Iran if we go back on our own commitments? In years gone by, a commitment made by our proud nation meant something. Last week, the Government tarnished that reputation by breaking international law with the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill. I urge the Minister to commit to working with us to ensure that this Bill does not do the same.
Unfortunately, the Government have got important parts of the Bill badly wrong. In its current form, it risks damaging our reputation and failing to protect Her Majesty’s armed forces, but it is not too late. As I said, there is consensus in the House today. There is still time for Ministers to work with the Opposition to get it right. Protecting troops from vexatious claims does not need to be at odds with our commitments to international law. Labour stands foursquare behind our troops. We want to work with the Government to build the broadest consensus possible around a Bill tailored to support our armed forces and to safeguard human rights. Let us work together to get this right, protect our troops and their reputation, and our country’s international standing.
It is a pleasure to finally be able to speak in the debate. I have not heard such a lot of vacuous nonsense for a long time from the Opposition. They talk about protecting our troops while invoking a litany of things that I am afraid are not true. I started writing them down, but I got bored after about two hours: “almost impossible to prosecute”; “independent investigations”; “breaks the armed forces covenant”; “time limit on prosecutions”. None of that is in the Bill. I have written down those phrases word for word, and it is disgraceful that Opposition Members try to build on the back of our armed forces personnel a caricature of the Bill that is totally false.
We have heard some good speeches today and there were some challenges for me to take away as the Bill Minister. I will address some of those now. The Bill delivers a promise made to brave individuals that we will deal with the threat of prosecution for alleged historical offences many years after the event and help put an end to the vexatious civil claims that undermine our armed forces. It delivers that promise in a proportionate way by ensuring victims’ rights and access to justice on the one hand and fair treatment of those who defend our country on the other.
I will deal with a couple of detailed points. The question of Northern Ireland veterans was quite rightly raised on a number of occasions. We are clear that we will deliver our commitments to Northern Ireland. In a written ministerial statement on 18 March, we committed to equal treatment for those who served on Op Banner. We will not resile from that position.
Regarding any perceived disadvantages to service personnel and veterans, as I have said before I do not anticipate the measure having a significant negative impact. Let me address the point about the armed forces covenant. It was designed to ensure that there is no disadvantage for people who serve in the military. It was never designed to compare somebody who works in Tesco with somebody who is asked to go away, serve on operations and sacrifice their life. The Bill applies to both civilians and military personnel who are deployed on operations. I totally refute that it is any way a breach of the armed forces covenant—something I worked hard to produce and will be the first Minister to legislate for, next year in the armed forces Bill.
I have noted the concerns many hon. Members raised about part 1 of the Bill and the fact that it does not address the problem of reinvestigations. We could not run a Department if we did not take seriously every allegation that came in and investigated every single one. The problem comes when that is advanced further and starts impacting on veterans’ lives and way of life. That is why we have introduced a very low bar for prosecutors to get over. To say, as my friend the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis)—he knows he is a great friend of mine and I have a huge amount of time for him—said, that it is almost impossible to prosecute, is simply incorrect. It is a low bar. It asks for consideration of the circumstances under which the House asks servicemen and women to operate. It is asking for consideration of whether it is really in the public interest to prosecute repeat allegations with no new evidence, and it is asking for Attorney General’s consent.
No I will not give way.
Any allegation that has a very low quality of evidence will clearly be investigated. There is no time bar on murder. There is no time bar on any of the offences in the Bill. That is a low bar that we are asking prosecutors to get over. Unnecessary? Seriously? Say that to Lance-Corporal Brian Wood, who I was with yesterday. When his kid comes home from school, he goes upstairs and cries in his room. Why? He says, “Daddy, at school they’re all saying that you’re a murderer.” Every single one of those allegations was found to be completely false and generated simply to build the financial position of solicitors.
The shadow Defence Secretary made some comments about the Secretary of State. Let us get this absolutely clear and into the open. Many colleagues here have been very quick to declare interests seeking associations with the armed forces, but not with the lawyers who pursued them. The shadow Secretary of State failed to declare his interests when referencing the much criticised law firm Thompsons Solicitors, from which he received £2,000 for his direct mail campaign literature in 2017. In fact, since 2001 Labour and its MPs have received £229,000, including £80,000 from solicitors Leigh Day. It is all on the record, including tens of thousands of pounds to the shadow Attorney General, the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry).
I will not take interventions. Members have had hours and hours to whine away on these points.
The reality is that over a consistent period of time, the Labour party—
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. The Minister is not giving way, but he is making allegations about these firms that are simply incorrect. Thompsons Solicitors works exclusively for trade unions. Leigh Day has taken class actions against trade unions. Frankly, the Minister does not know what he is talking about.
That is not a point of order for the Chair; it is a point for debate. Let us have no more points of order on that subject.
It is not a point of order. It is yet another effort to waste time in a very important debate. [Interruption.] I hear the complaints about my attitude towards Opposition Members. Let me be absolutely clear. I have said in private a number of times that I will engage with the individuals who are so loud this afternoon. Not once have they chosen to do so, and not once have they come up with a proposal.
Absolutely not; I am not giving way.
It is very clear to me that this is the first Government to come to this House and not to say, “What a difficult problem this is, but we will hand all our soldiers off to the human rights lawyers.” This is the first Government who are actually going to do something to protect our servicemen and women. I am proud of that and I make no apology for it at all. [Interruption.] There really is no point in whingeing on at me because I am not going to give way.
I came to this place because I loathed the way it treated cheaply my generation of servicemen and women as we fought for the freedoms and privileges that Members of this House enjoy every day. Summer after summer, I served with what was and is this nation’s finest product—our fighting men and women—in some of the most testing circumstances that this House has deployed for generations. Yet when they came home, this House was not there for them. In those heady days, Members will remember the pain of our veterans’ families as they fought for decent prosthetics or effective mental health care. We are light years away from where we were—
“Absolute rubbish”, the Labour party says—amazing.
I still cannot describe what it was like sitting with the family of a young man who could not cope with the trauma that he suffered as a result of what we asked him to do on our behalf and who took his life. I cannot describe what it is like to visit the parents of a soldier who died in your arms 48 hours earlier, thousands of miles from home, and tell them that it is pointless. This Bill is different. It is fair, it is proportionate and it is balanced. It is good legislation. Members can match words with actions and vote for this Bill tonight.
Question put, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
I now have to announce the results of the deferred Divisions.
On the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Wearing of Face Coverings in a Relevant Place) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2020, the Ayes were 337 and the Noes were 6, so the Question was agreed to.
On the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (No. 2) (England) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2020, the Ayes were 340 and the Noes were 1, so the Question was agreed to.
On the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Wearing of Face Coverings in a Relevant Place) (England) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2020, the Ayes were 335 and the Noes were 6, so the Question was agreed to.
On the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Blackburn with Darwen and Bradford) (Amendment) Regulations 2020, the Ayes were 335 and the Noes were 1, so the Question was agreed to.
On the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Wearing of Face Coverings in a Relevant Place and on Public Transport) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2020, the Ayes were 334 and the Noes were 6, so the Question was agreed to.
On the Health Protection (Coronavirus) (Restrictions on Holding of Gatherings and Amendment) (England) Regulations 2020, the Ayes were 332 and the Noes were 5, so the Question was agreed to.
On the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Blackburn with Darwen and Bradford) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2020, the Ayes were 332 and the Noes were 1, so the Question was agreed to.
[The Division lists are published at the end of today’s debates.]
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesBefore we begin, I have a few preliminary announcements. Please switch all electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during the sittings. As I indicated before the sitting, please adhere to the social distancing requirements for the room. Date Time Witness Tuesday 6 October Until no later than 10.30 am British Armed Forces Federation Armed Forces Support Group Tuesday 6 October Until no later than 11.00 am Hilary Meredith Solicitors Limited Tuesday 6 October Until no later than 11.25 am Major Robert Campbell Tuesday 6 October Until no later than 3.00 pm Professor Richard Ekins, Policy Exchange Dr Jonathan Morgan, University of Cambridge John Larkin QC, Policy Exchange Tuesday 6 October Until no later than 4.00 pm Association of Personal Injury Lawyers Centre for Military Justice Tuesday 6 October Until no later than 5.00 pm Liberty Human Rights Watch Thursday 8 October Until no later than 12.15 pm Cobseo - the Confederation of Service Charities The Royal British Legion Thursday 8 October Until no later than 1.00 pm General Sir Nick Parker Thursday 8 October Until no later than 3.15 pm Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment Association Thursday 8 October Until no later than 4.00 pm His Honour Judge Jeff Blackett, Judge Advocate General
Today we will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication, followed by a motion to allow us to deliberate in private about our questions before the oral evidence sessions. In view of the time available, I hope we can take these matters without debate. I call the Minister to move the programme motion standing in his name, which was discussed yesterday by the Programming Sub-Committee for the Bill.
Ordered,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 6 October) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 6 October;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.30 pm on Thursday 8 October;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Wednesday 14 October;
(d) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 20 October;
(e) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 22 October;
(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:
(3) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 6; Schedule 1; Clauses 7 and 8; Schedule 2; Clause 9; Schedule 3; Clause 10; Schedule 4; Clauses 11 to 16; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(4) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 22 October.—(Johnny Mercer.)
Resolved,
That subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Johnny Mercer.)
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Cttee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Johnny Mercer.)
We will now resume our public sitting to hear evidence from Douglas Young from the British Armed Forces Federation and Michael Sutcliff from the Armed Forces Support Group. Both join the sitting remotely. May I confirm with Douglas and Michael that they can both hear us?
Douglas Young: Yes, I can, Chair.
Michael Sutcliff: Yes, Chair, I can hear you.
If at any point during the meeting when members of the Committee ask you questions you cannot hear them, please indicate so that we can make the necessary arrangements.
I remind all Members that questions should be limited to matters within the scope of the Bill. We must stick to the timings in the programme motion that the Committee has agreed. For this session, we have until 10.30 am.
Do any members of the Committee wish to declare any relevant interests in connection with the Bill?
To err on the side of caution, I should say that I have served on overseas operations. I have also made a successful claim against the Ministry of Defence for my injuries during service.
I am a former member of the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, who are one of the witnesses.
Will the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record? We will start with you, Douglas.
Douglas Young: I am Douglas Young, the former chairman of the British Armed Forces Federation. I am still a member and a member of its executive council. I have been asked by colleagues to present evidence today on behalf of the British Armed Forces Federation. We did submit detailed responses to the Ministry’s consultation last year.
Michael Sutcliff: Good morning, everybody. My name is Michael Sutcliff. I am the chairman of a small group called the Armed Forces Support Group, based up in Lancashire. Our worries are a conglomeration of things. We are a signposting group, and questions have been coming in regarding the Bill. Basically, it is déjà vu—we are here again. This has happened a number of times, and we would like to know how confident you are of getting these things through.
Thank you for introducing yourselves. I think there are some issues with the audio, because some Members are indicating to me that they cannot hear well what you are both saying. I propose asking Chris Evans to begin asking questions, and we will hope that we can improve the audio as we go along. If Members feel that the audio is unsatisfactory, we will pause proceedings to see what we can do.
Q
Both my questions are directed at both of you. The first question of the day is, does the MOD do enough to provide a duty of care to those service personnel who go through investigations and litigations at the moment?
Douglas Young: In our opinion, the answer is no. Undoubtedly, the MOD has improved steadily. A lot of work has been done, but we are simply appalled by the experiences of some people who have absolutely been through the wringer for many years. One case, in particular, has only just come to an end, with a report by the Iraq fatalities inquiry. You can absolutely weep at the experiences of Major Robert Campbell and others who have been subjected to repeated investigations. Baroness Hallett’s report was very clear that everyone involved in the British forces’ deployment was completely innocent, and yet people say their lives have been ruined. That is awful. It has been recognised that a lot of work has been done, but it has not helped people who were already in the wringer. We certainly very much welcome the stated aims of this legislation.
Michael Sutcliff: I have to agree with the previous speaker. There is a great disappointment, Mr Chairman, that over the years there has been absolute chaos with this. If you look at the situation where Phil Shiner was allowed to spuriously bring all those cases so many times, this begins to really rot the trust within the MOD. A lot of senior officers seemed to have sloping shoulders at one time. Hopefully, these things are getting better. I take the case of the Major who has, I think, been lined up 14 times—14 times he has been exonerated, and here we go again. As I said earlier, we seem to be looking at this situation that has been gone through a number of times, and hopefully this time will be successful.
Q
Douglas Young: We said that it should be 10—I think 10 is the absolute cut-off and the absolute longstop. That certainly was an option in the MOD’s original consultation. If you introduce shorter time limits, even more attention will have to be given to investigation and recording at the point that something occurs. I accept that this has been improved—I have no doubt that it has—but of course we are not currently subject to the intensity of operations, compared to the theatres where these cases first arose.
If you have a very short time limit of, say, five years, then there must be a huge effort in everyone’s interests— in the interests of potential victims, but also very much in the interests of the personnel involved—to absolutely record everything and to interview people. It can be an absolute pest, and it can be very grim going through all that, but it has got to be done at the time, rather than relying on people’s recollections afterwards, when, of course, they may have gone through a whole series of incidents during a six-month tour or longer and it can be very difficult to pick one out. So investigation and recording will be even more important than ever if you reduce the longstop time limit. I think we support the 10 years.
Michael Sutcliff: Just doing a quick poll, the team up here in the north seem to go for five to seven years, although I do not disagree with the previous speaker. But one of the dangers that there appears to be that, if you give it too long, the memories fade. We are struggling with memory-fade systems on the Bloody Sunday situation—that is a very good example.
If there is an accusation, it needs to be examined quickly and it needs to be sorted. But first of all—this is the difficult bit—somebody, somewhere, has to verify that it is real and it has not been made up by somebody, because there has been too much of that.
Q
Michael Sutcliff: I cannot give you any examples of that. Talking among the team that we look after here, I have not heard of or seen any association with that sort of behaviour, so it would be unfair for me to comment on something that I really do not know about.
Douglas Young: There certainly are a number of very legitimate reasons for delaying. One would be simple concealment—perverting the course of justice and deliberate attempts to withhold evidence. Another one is where victims or complainants become aware of some evidence only later on because witnesses have been moved by the exigencies of war—they are refugees in another country or they are in a refugee camp—and people never had the chance to obtain information until after a substantial delay.
Of course, the other side of that is that people are then vulnerable to stories that are not actually true. If something happens in a crowd, for example, bereaved relatives later become aware of different stories flying about among that crowd that may not be true. That is the other side of it. But there are legitimate reasons for possible delay, because we are always assuming that, following our well-intentioned intervention supporting another country in operations, there will then be a period of peace and organisation, which may not actually be the case.
Q
Douglas Young: References to the battlefield are sometimes misleading. A battlefield is a very specific thing. Quite often, when these sorts of issues have been discussed over the past few years, commentators talk about the battlefield in relation to everything that happens anywhere in the deployment area. There is no doubt that if you are deployed anywhere, you are in harm’s way, and your possibly peaceful base environment may actually become a battlefield at very short notice—there is no doubt about that. Being in harm’s way is different from normal life in the peaceful United Kingdom, but, quite often, commentators have discussed these issues as if everything consisted of fighting through the enemy objective, which is a very long way, for example, from injuries or illness that occur in barracks or in other areas directly controlled by the United Kingdom forces. I do not know whether that answers your question.
Michael Sutcliff: I agree. The term “battlefield” is often misleading. The battlefield could mean the backstreets of Basra or Belfast. It could mean the peacekeeping guys out in the far beyond place where we have them at the moment, where, theoretically, there is no war but where, sooner or later, the rebels will come out of the bush. Those are battlefields. Identifying a battlefield only as somewhere with tanks, aircraft, ships and everything else is incorrect. To answer your question, this should be very wide ranging—safely.
Q
Douglas Young: The aim is that fewer personnel and veterans will be dragged through them in the future. Personally, I have had limited involvement with individuals who have been supported by the British Armed Forces Federation, although I have certainly spoken to individuals. I have some experience myself that is sensitive and which I cannot go into.
There is no doubt that talk about being dragged into an investigation is accurate. However willing one might be to serve the ends of justice and truth, it is a strain, and it hangs over you for a very long time. It forces you to continuously go back over what at the time was a stressful, difficult and challenging event. It possibly causes one to have to review one’s own actions and decisions in a confusing situation, because nobody does everything absolutely right when things are going wrong.
One is faced with a mixture of getting approaches out of the blue—a phone call saying, “We’d like to talk to you about this, that or the other” or “Something is coming up,” which can come at you at any time—and also dates that you know about, such as a court hearing on a particular date. All that, even for a perfectly innocent witness, hangs over you for a very long time. That is part of criminal justice, and armed forces personnel are not the only ones who may have to face this, but it has a real cost. The fact that one is really only a witness does not get you off the hook.
I believe that there has been a lot of exaggeration in the language used about claims. People have often spoken about a vast number of prosecutions. I think all of us—lay people, ordinary soldiers—understand prosecutions as criminal prosecutions. In fact, there have been very few of those, which we all know about, relating to recent operations. Some of these so-called prosecutions are actually civil claims by members of the armed forces and veterans. We have to be aware of exaggerated language. However, it is a strain and a stress, and being caught up in long-running investigations can have an impact on one’s family as well.
Michael Sutcliff: My personal situation regarding this is that I act in my role here as the welfare officer. Without going into too much detail, I can tell you about two individuals who were both involved with serious fighting and who both caused death to the opposite number—in-house. The fact that they had been through the wringer a few times was fairly obvious when you listened to their options—it was either them or the other. At the end of the day no charges were made, but the pressure put on those two guys was appalling.
On the other side, I have two guys who, even today in their early 70s, are looking over their shoulders and sleeping not too well at night, waiting for a knock on their door. I do not think the knock is going to come, but nevertheless, this situation is out. That is in a tiny little place where I live, so what is happening out in the big wide world, I do not know, but it is not very satisfactory. I hope that gives you a reasonable answer, sir.
Q
Douglas Young: I think six years is a reasonable presumptive time limit for civil payment, and corresponds pretty much to the legal system in the different parts of the United Kingdom, but we would be concerned about the absolute longstop. As I mentioned before, claims of this type often originate during conflict or in post-conflict periods, when the claimants may be refugees or internally displaced persons. Perhaps a robust administrative payment system operating in-theatre would help to speed things up, because, clearly, some people have perfectly legitimate claims that should be met, and claims do not always imply criminal liability, which is what we are sometimes led to believe.
Imposing an absolute time limit places armed forces personnel claimants themselves at a disadvantage compared with civil claimants in ordinary life, where the court has discretion. Of course, the Minister has made it perfectly clear, absolutely correctly, that the time limit for this particular part of the Bill only starts to run at the point of knowledge. That is completely understood. That point of knowledge, diagnosis or whatever, could be many years later. Nevertheless, I would have a worry about an absolute longstop as proposed.
Q
Michael Sutcliff: I take your point there, sir. Funnily enough, I am ex-Navy, and a number of my colleagues now are beginning to pick up the old asbestosis problem—I cannot remember the posh name for it—
I can’t either.
Michael Sutcliff: They are being compensated for it, so you are right that if we had a very early backstop, they would have lost that. Not being the lawyerly mind, I do not know whether you can split the two things up. Let us just take the asbestos as an example, which is a workplace situation that was or is found particularly in the Royal Navy, and the difference between that and an action situation. I do not know whether you can divide the two, but on one side, I am looking at the fact that you do not want it to go on forever, and on the other side, of course, in the example that we are talking about, forever is needed before you suddenly find you have it. That is the best muddled answer I can give you.
Q
Douglas Young: Various aspects of the covenant may be engaged by this legislation. Whenever we mention the covenant, it is worth saying that the stated aim of the legislation is to improve the position under the covenant, or to be guided by the covenant in removing what is considered to be unfair treatment of members of the armed forces compared with other, ordinary people who are never subjected to quite the same lengthy legislation. But there is certainly the argument that restricting the right of armed forces personnel and veterans to sue their employer for an injury or illness caused by a fault during their employment is against the military covenant, so there are two sides to that.
Michael Sutcliff: I entirely agree. The covenant is fairly new, and as we progress and go through this, we will have to tweak it here and there. I see what is in front of me in the Bill as quite positive, but we need to look at these little things to ensure that service personnel are not limited or restricted any more than civilians should be. The idea of the covenant is to help and support you in the civilian life you have just entered, so having sticking blocks in it is not a good idea.
Q
Douglas Young: There is no doubt that the Bill and its principles have been widely welcomed. I think a lot of people will see the headline that, as promised by the Government, action is being taken to put a stop to the industrial level of claims. As I mentioned before, I think there is some exaggeration behind some of that, although there is absolutely no doubt that many have suffered disgracefully and that should never have happened. However, I have some doubts about the scale of what is involved.
The Ministry has at times understandably encouraged the idea of prosecutions and welfare, and some of it is claimed by members of the armed forces. Let us not forget, of course, that there are perfectly genuine and reasonable claimants who have sought compensation for something that did happen to them, but across the board I would say there is a qualified sigh of relief. A lot of people welcome it.
I have seen pretty strong views against as well, and these views are not all from, if you like, the usual suspects who are suspicious of the armed forces or not particularly sympathetic to the armed forces. Some of the criticism has come from people with a lot of relevant experience. For example, the field marshal and the general who wrote the letter were described by some as “meddling generals”, and they probably knew very little about the two individuals concerned, who certainly know what a battlefield looks like and the consequences of putting people in harm’s way. I want to encourage this Committee in its scrutiny of the Bill in case of unintended consequences, or even intended consequences, that might trick the Ministry of Defence but might not be quite what those involved are looking for.
Michael Sutcliff: From our point of view, it starts with a big hope. We have been here before, as I said at the start, as there have been several attempts. They all seemed to be Ministers saying, “We are going to do this, that and the other,” and then suddenly some bug is found somewhere and it never happens. There is a hope that this is going to go through. I take the great point just made to the Committee: please scrutinise the Bill as carefully as you can. Often the MOD is seen as the enemy of its men, which is the wrong way to see it and really is a bit of an issue. Do not let the Leigh Days of this world anywhere near it, because they will screw it up.
The object of the exercise is to look after your service and ex-service personnel in the best way you can. If you read the papers about a number of MPs voting against it, I hope you will see that there is concern out here in the big wide world and we are at your mercy—do a good job.
Q
Douglas Young: I think we have touched already on the dire mental health effects of repeated investigations, for example, and even simply of participation in combat operations. The British Armed Forces Federation has been involved in many of these issues. In campaigning about mental health in the armed forces in the past, we have given evidence to a parliamentary inquiry into healthcare for members of the armed forces. I have some experience myself, because I am a qualified caseworker and office bearer in a major national charity that supports armed forces personnel, veterans and their families.
Not all mental health problems among the armed forces and veterans are attributable to combat; there are many other factors. There can be a different pattern in illness between armed forces people and people outside. Obviously there is a huge overlap, but they can present slightly differently.
Years ago, not long after BAFF was formed, we had the case of an individual who had sought psychiatric support through the NHS. He had been assigned to take part in group therapy. In the group therapy he described the incidents to which he attributed his illness, but after a while he was asked to stop coming because he was making all the other patients worse. There is a need for targeted mental health support where people are willing to accept tailored support. Of course, some people may not wish to be in any way associated with the armed forces, even though their problems may be attributable to that.
We certainly support everything that has been done. Things have improved. The Ministry of Defence has been doing a lot in this area, as have charities such as Combat Stress, but there is always more to be done. I frequently meet people—not directly through that, but at veterans breakfasts and the like—who are clearly suffering. It is a huge problem, which we need to understand and perhaps not exaggerate. The vast majority of people who have served in the armed forces are very effective future employees, marriage partners and so on. They tend to do well. Our veterans are not all weighed down by problems.
Michael Sutcliff: To answer your question from my end, I have been doing this job for about 16 years now. I would put it this way: the stress from being in the armed forces is very different from that of the outside world. What does it do to marriages? In some cases, of course, it breaks a marriage, and it would be quite wrong to say that it does not. There are an enormous number of very supportive wives out there who help their husbands through. Certainly, if the family is mixed up and falling out, it affects the children.
I have to tell you that, from my personal point of view, I was not suffering from anything other than the fact that I joined the services at 15 and came out at 30-something into the big wide world. My wife and I were strangers—that was an example. It worried me so much some years ago that I have actually taken a course on service mental health, so that I can understand myself. [Inaudible.]
I agree that it is getting better. There are a number of groups out there that can help in this situation. The local NHS here is very good. We have some good doctors. We operate here in our little world. The door is open and we say, “If you have a problem, come and talk to us about it.” We get people who do that. We have dragged one or two back from the brink, which I am very happy about, but it is not thousands. Do not get too carried away with that. I have spoken to the local colonel and he said to me, “Everybody thinks that every soldier, sailor and airman has PTSD, and it works out at about 3% of us.” However, that 3% goes back to Cyprus and everywhere else—there is a lot in the 3%.
We are doing better, and we can do better. All of us are beginning to understand things better, and there are clever people out there coming up with good ideas every day. Hopefully that gives you the situation. But yes, obviously it destroys families and puts great stress and strain on them—there is no getting away from that.
Q
Michael Sutcliff: The quick answer to that from me is yes.
Q
Douglas Young: Given that endless investigations and the fear of prosecution—sometimes unfounded fear—have had an effect on individuals’ mental health and that of their families, it follows that if that at least can be reduced, then fewer people will suffer from the same deleterious effects on mental health.
Do you agree, Mr Sutcliff? I think you said yes earlier.
Michael Sutcliff: I agree 100%. They let these things run on and on forever, going round and round in circles. It is utter nonsense and has destroyed many people, so yes, they will be cutting out, and that is good.
Q
Douglas Young: [Inaudible.]
We did not hear the start of your answer, Mr Young. Will you start again? We had a technical issue.
Douglas Young: There have been very serious allegations concerning the approach taken by investigators earlier on, under the IHAT investigation. We do not know fully the truth of those, but certainly in cases investigators who had no actual police powers acted excessively. I do not believe—or, certainly, I have not been told—that that sort of thing has been happening more recently.
The Bill should not affect that, except perhaps by removing scope altogether, but it will not have a direct effect on the treatment by investigators arriving at the door. It is an important area, and the Ministry of Defence, in so far as it has not already done so, should certainly take that on board.
People who are being investigated or engaged as potential witnesses have said that they do not feel supported by the MOD. The MOD arranges them—in some cases, they have some legal support—but the MOD is not actually on their side. I can understand that—you cannot tell a witness what to say—but a number of people have written, and I have now heard it myself directly, about how they did not feel adequately supported by the MOD. Sometimes, if they were still serving, they were told, “Well, your unit should be supporting you,” but that unit might not be the one that they have a particular connection with. The question of support and attitudes towards potential witnesses and suspects requires close attention, but is perhaps not directly addressed by the Bill.
Michael Sutcliff: I have not seen that. We have had a couple of instances here. One guy had literally barricaded his house. He was worried about these guys turning up, but they never did. It took a while to calm him down. I have a couple of chaps who are still a little worried about a knock on the door, but they have not come. But I have not heard about these people knocking about for a while—at one time this was hitting the headlines quite often, but it is not at the moment. Of course it has an effect on people, and it is wrong. It is not being done properly.
Q
Douglas Young: I have no direct experience of a member of the British armed forces who has been accused of torture; I have no direct knowledge. I have personally interviewed a very recent victim. I say “very recent”; it was years ago, but he had very recently been tortured by foreign armed forces and I saw his injuries.
I have very serious concerns about torture being treated differently from sexual offences—that sexual offences have been singled out as not subject to the same time limits that torture is. I would say that the two broad areas of offence are very similar. They may take place for base motives. They are certainly inappropriate. They are about using power against someone who has no control over the situation. And they very often take place behind closed doors, so it may be very difficult to take evidence—if torture or sexual offences have occurred within a base, other people in the area may not know about it at the time. So I have very serious concerns about the exemption, if you like, for torture and it being treated differently from sexual offences. The suggestion is that that is for reasons of political correctness: “Sexual offences? Oh no, we must keep them aligned, but torture we won’t oppose.” I do have worries about that.
Michael Sutcliff: My answer is that I have absolutely no experience of it and have not heard any comments from any of my colleagues or visitors, so it would be unfair for me to comment.
We are tight for time, so I will call Carol Monaghan next, and then, if we can, we will squeeze in Liz Twist and Stuart Anderson, who have both indicated a wish to speak. Gentlemen, could you, at the other end, give short, sharp answers as well?
Q
Douglas Young: I cannot quantify it, but I certainly have seen a suggestion that a large proportion of actual claims has been on behalf of forces personnel—[Inaudible.] Only the MOD can really answer that. I have mentioned before my concern about some of the language. Lawfare actually exists and it is a threat, but many of the cases are not lawfare at all in the sense of being employed by bad or malicious actors in order to make things difficult for the United Kingdom. Many of the cases are not like that at all. If people feel that they have a claim, they will make a claim. It is exactly the same in this country. Why wouldn’t you, if you were in Basra or Helmand and you thought you had a genuine claim? People exaggerate. I have absolutely had experience of that in the Balkans. People tell stories and it is difficult to get to the truth.
Q
Douglas Young: “Industrial scale” refers to large numbers. The numbers mentioned by the MOD are high. I would like to see the breakdown and how many were settled, in which case presumably there was something in it, and how many were not by indigenous residents but by members of our armed forces.
Q
Douglas Young: I think six years is a reasonable presumptive time limit, but the absolute limit, the longstop, should be longer than that.
Q
Douglas Young: On the first point about coming to light, we are all right with that. The time limit only starts at that point. I do not have any experience of facts that came to light.
Q
Michael Sutcliff: The example I gave you is exactly that. I can see it for everyday injury, but when you are using equipment, machinery and things like that—this problem with asbestos literally only started raising its head many years ago. To be fair, the MOD dealt with that very fairly. There are always exceptions to the rule. You should be able to make a submission as something that arrives and is seen by the necessary medical people or scientists as an issue. I am not sure that that answers your question, but you cannot just shut things down like that, or else we would have been in trouble.
Q
Gentlemen, this will be the last question, so if you could both answer succinctly, that would be helpful.
Douglas Young: One thing about a shorter period is that, properly described by the MOD and by lawyers and others, a shorter time, if properly used, would actually remind people that the clock is ticking and that they need to get in. So there is that case for shortening that limit, but we should be careful.
Michael Sutcliff: I accept that. That is a reasonable comment.
Thank you to the witnesses. We have reached the end of the time. I apologise to the two Members who wished to put questions but were unable to do so. Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us and engaging with the technology successfully.
Examination of witness
Hilary Meredith gave evidence.
We are now going to hear from Hilary Meredith, of Hilary Meredith solicitors, who is joining us in person. We have until 11 am for this session. Hilary, could you introduce yourself for the record, please?
Hilary Meredith: Yes, I am Hilary Meredith.
Thank you. As you have seen from the previous session we have some logistical issues, because Members who wish to question you will have to move to a seat where there is a microphone, or we have a standing microphone just behind you. I hope that you will bear with us as we move forward with those logistics. The two Members who have indicated that they wish to question you during this session are Emma Lewell-Buck and Carol Monaghan. If there is anyone else—Sarah Atherton, I will take you as well. So, Emma.
I suggest that we might logistically arrange for people who do want to ask questions, or anticipate asking questions, to be at the table where they would have access to a microphone. It makes it so much easier. Emma Lewell-Buck, I call on you to start the proceedings.
Q
Hilary Meredith: No, I do not, and that is one of my issues with the Bill—that it mixes civil and criminal law together.
Q
Hilary Meredith: One of the issues with the Bill is that we need to look backward to find out how we got into the present situation, before we can cure it. Most of the criminal allegations arose out of civil proceedings by Iraqi foreign claimants against the Ministry of Defence. Great caution needs to be taken when criminal allegations arise out of a compensation cheque carrot being dangled. For that reason alone there needs to be a separation with the two—criminal and civil law.
Q
Hilary Meredith: I think that leads on to it: because many of the criminal allegations arose out of a civil compensation claim, great caution should have been exercised. I cannot believe that extra care was not taken, and under those circumstances I can quite see there should be a presumption against guilt. It was not helped by the Ministry of Defence then paying cash to civilians in Iraq by way of compensation, which almost indicated guilt. That led on to the criminal prosecutions.
Q
Hilary Meredith: I am against any cut-off, to be honest. I think the reason why the cases became historic is not the date of the accusation—any of the criminal accusations under human rights law, for example, came within 12 months of the incident taking place. It was the prolonged procedure that was bungled afterwards that made those cases historic. It is the procedure and investigation in the UK that need to be reviewed and overhauled, and not necessarily a time limit placed on criminal or civil prosecutions.
Also under that heading, I have an issue with the longstop applying to civil cases where personnel are overseas on operations and military personnel have a longstop placed on their claims as well. I understand that that has been put in on a equitable basis, so that if there is a longstop for a criminal prosecution, it also has to apply to civil law, but I am not sure about that.
Q
Hilary Meredith: The answer to that is that I do not actually know. I think that lawfare instance came mainly from one or two lawyers. Phil Shiner was a one-off. He brought civil claims for compensation first, and as a result of that the prosecutions followed. If we had a robust procedure for investigating those cases and, for example, an independent advocate who has the back of the individual member of the armed forces and supports them, many of those cases would not have been advanced to the point that they were, with the subsequent criminal allegations.
Thank you, Chair—I will leave it there so others can come in.
Q
Hilary Meredith: I think the overarching view of the Bill is correct, but there does need to be protection in place. When criminal prosecutions arise out of civil compensation cheques being dangled, there should be a presumption of innocence and no prosecution should really take place without extra care and caution.
I think that the time limit is a bit of a red herring, to be honest. We do not need time limits on it; most of the allegations were brought in a timely manner. I have searched to see whether our courts ever exercise their power of discretion under the Limitation Act for human rights allegations—they have to be brought within 12 months. I cannot find a single case on a preliminary investigation in which the courts have extended a 12-month time limit under the Human Rights Act. I can see one case where they have extended the date that time begins to run, and in multiple proceedings, that is not at the beginning of the process but at the end.
For example, under IHAT, it was only in June this year that we found out that of those 4,000 vexatious criminal claims, there was not a single prosecution. In those circumstance, if a member of the Armed Forces wishes to bring their own human rights claim for lack of a speedy trial, that time runs from June this year.
Q
Hilary Meredith: The investigations that took place following the civil claims were shambolic to be honest. I know that you will hear from Robert Campbell after me; he would have liked to have been heard in the European courts, because our system was so shambolic and went on forever. That is a very extreme viewpoint to take—we cannot investigate properly in this country.
The Royal Military Police need special training. You have to understand that they are investigating crimes overseas and in a war zone. It is extremely difficult. It may be that they take training from, for example, the Metropolitan police on investigating crimes. It is a very difficult area to investigate. We need to have a robust system of procedures to investigate crimes, rather than putting time limits on it.
Q
Hilary Meredith: For example, if I can use the case of Major Campbell, the investigation against him included a drowning in the river in Iraq. That allegation came within a year of the incident. He was told by his commanding officer not to worry about it because it would be cleared—it would be sorted. Then began a process where over 17 years, he was investigated 11 times for the same incident. That is the shambolic system of procedure that we are operating in this country and that is what needs to be reviewed and overhauled.
Q
Hilary Meredith: I think the original investigation was by the Royal Military Police. It was perceived that they were not independent enough, so the IHAT team was formed. Under the IHAT team, we then had this terrible form of investigation through Red Snapper, which Parliament has heard about before. Its methods of investigation and what it put those accused through was quite horrific. Had there been an independent advocate that had the backs of the individual members of the armed forces—not the Ministry of Defence, which cannot act; there is a conflict—there would have been a buffer between the Red Snapper team and the IHAT team and the individual person. I think that would have solved a lot of mental health issues as well.
Q
Hilary Meredith: There is a difficulty putting a time limit on the Human Rights Act—I do not even know whether we can do that constitutionally, because it is a European convention. If there is a six-year time limit on criminal allegations, I have concerns about that. I think most of those criminal allegations were brought well within time anyway; as I said, it is the process that was wrong.
For civil claims against the Ministry when people are injured or killed in service overseas, I do not think a longstop should be applied. There are tremendous difficulties in placing people in a worse position than civilians. In latent disease cases—diseases that do not come to light until much further down the line, such as asbestosis, PTSD, hearing loss—it is not just about the diagnosis. Many people are diagnosed at death. It is about the connection to service. That connection to service may come much later down the line, and by that time they will be out of time to bring a claim.
Q
Hilary Meredith: That is a really interesting point, actually. I had not thought of a time limit on investigations. Certainly under the Human Rights Act, there is a right to have a speedy trial, and that did not happen in these cases. There were no speedy trials. A limit on the time that an investigation takes would, I think, be really welcomed. Sorry, I cannot remember your second question.
Q
Hilary Meredith: Parliament had an inquiry into what support they were given. Basically, there was none. It is not so much the serving personnel, but the veterans—there was no telephone number for them to phone. At one point, I was told, “Phone the Veterans Agency.” The Veterans Agency deals with pensions. If you are arrested and in a police cell at midnight, you cannot phone a pensions department for help. The penny dropped when I said that to the Ministry of Defence.
If someone was appointed independently from the Bar Council or the Law Society, and it was freely advertised, even given to personnel before they go on operations, then they would have a telephone number to phone for support and advice. I think that is crucial. The process of the investigation may have been reduced if they had had an advocate in their corner, questioning why this was going on for so long.
Q
Hilary Meredith: I think that part 2, on the time limit, should be taken out and scrapped completely. It is the time limit for the procedure. It went on too long, with multiple investigations. We have not got our system right there. In fairness, the decision in the Al-Skeini case that opened the floodgates to the Human Rights Act applying overseas, outside our territory, took us all by surprise. It took the MOD and everybody by surprise. We were not geared up for the consequences of that.
Q
Hilary Meredith: I worry that it is not, actually. I think the Bill will have a rough passage if that part is not tailored slightly. There is a presumption not to prosecute where the allegations of crime arise out of a compensation cheque carrot being dangled, but in the majority of these cases the MOD are paying compensation. Payment of £145,000 was made to the father of the drowned boy in Major Campbell’s case, indicating in Iraq that there was guilt there. Why was that payment was made, who authorised it and why was it so much—it is a huge amount of money—when he was exonerated completely? Some 4,000 allegations of criminal activity under IHAT were completely dismissed, without a single prosecution. Why was the MOD paying out compensation?
Q
Hilary Meredith: I think those payments fuelled the allegations of crime. Maybe there should be a review of why large amounts of money are paid in compensation when there is no guilt there.
Q
Hilary Meredith: I am not quite sure I understand the question.
Q
Hilary Meredith: I think there are two issues. The Human Rights Act civil cases were brought for abuse and detention. When you look at the charge sheet, there are masses—hundreds—just as abuse and detention. The civil human rights were brought by the Iraqi civilians against the Ministry of Defence. That, then, culminated in human rights criminal activity against individual members of the armed forces. Which takes precedent? I think you will have to ask a constitutional lawyer, but my concern is that if we are putting time limits on the Human Rights Act 1998, I am not sure if in the UK we have the power or authority to do that. A constitutional lawyer would be able to advise you better.
Q
Hilary Meredith: Nobody.
No one.
Hilary Meredith: No, there was nobody there to help them.
Q
Hilary Meredith: No, and I think one of the issues that the members of the armed forces have is that they have to step out of the military environment into civvy street and find a civilian lawyer or even know that they are allowed to find a civil lawyer, there was no information there for them. That is why I am suggesting there should be an independent civil advocate from the Bar Council or the Law Society with criminal knowledge to help them.
Q
Hilary Meredith: I do not know. I am not a criminal lawyer, but I think that many of those—imagine that you are completely innocent and you are accused. First, there are so many different laws now that affect you on the battlefield, so many different conventions, and then throw in human rights as well. It is a difficult, complex scenario.
Q
Hilary Meredith: Going back to the Al-Skeini case: the decision that opened the door for human rights in a foreign territory where we had control, and the situation where we had control was detaining prisoners. Of those who claimed civil compensation—I keep using Major Campbell’s case. That was not in detention but that was somebody who was said to have drowned in a river. These prosecutions just go on and on. I have forgotten the question.
Q
Hilary Meredith: As a result of those civil claims that were brought—I do not know how many civil cases were brought against the Ministry of Defence; it would be interesting to know—they led to over 4,000 accusations of crime under the IHAT team, which happened to be investigating. Of those 4,000, there was not a single prosecution.
Q
Hilary Meredith: I understand that, out of the 4,000, there were possibly 30 worth investigation. Of those 30, it was whittled down to around five, and of those five, there was insufficient evidence to say whether there was any issue or not. Somewhere along the way, somebody decided that the British military were “rotten to the core” and they were not given a chance, so they were almost guilty before being proven innocent. That is where the presumption against prosecution is so important.
Q
Hilary Meredith: There are two scenarios, depending on whether you are still in service or you are a veteran. If you are a veteran, there is nothing—there is no chain of command. A number of times, the MOD said to me that veterans can go and see the chain of command, and I say that they are retired and are veterans, so there is no chain of command, or their commanding officer has retired. Who do they contact? If you are in service and have a good commanding officer, you can go and seek help through them. I know that the Army legal services tried to help in some instances, but I think there is a conflict of interest with the Army legal services protecting the Ministry of Defence and trying also to protect individuals.
Q
Hilary Meredith: That is one thing I considered. The remit of the ombudsman would have to be extended to do that. To look into 4,000 falsely brought accusations is a big job. Whether the ombudsman has the resources and the remit would have to be looked at, but I think that is a good idea.
Q
Hilary Meredith: If their remit is extended and they could cope with the volume, yes, definitely. My idea is for an independent person, which the ombudsman is, or somebody from the Bar Council or the Law Society, or even a panel appointed on a rota basis that could assist.
Q
Hilary Meredith: I agree; it is extremely difficult. When I am putting forward an independent person, I am talking about somebody in civvy street, which would be even more difficult. Unless you sign up to the Official Secrets Act and there is a full cards-on-the-table procedure, it would be very hard to defend.
Q
Hilary Meredith: The time limit, on the face of it, is welcomed by most veterans and military personnel, but the reading of it is a concern. For example, time limits will be introduced if military personnel serving overseas are killed or injured in service. Putting a time limit on that puts them in a worse position than civilians. That alone outweighs the prospect of a time limit on a criminal prosecution. Most criminal prosecutions were done in a timely manner. It was the process that caused them to be historical. Differentiating between the two and sorting out the process is more welcome than actually putting a time limit on an allegation.
Q
Hilary Meredith: In civilian cases, with the date of knowledge of, for example, of PTSD, you may consider that there is something wrong post service, but it can take up to 15 years for PTSD to actually raise its head. An example of that is the young men and women who came back who have lost limbs. People were surviving triple amputations and went on to do fantastic things; they climbed mountains, they skied, they had great prosthetics—they all did remarkably well. But as the ageing process takes place, they cannot walk on prosthetics; they become more wheelchair-bound, they put on weight, the Invictus games is not available to them, and that is when PTSD sets in. PTSD is not just the diagnosis; it is the date you realise it is connected to service, and 15 years down the line it can be difficult to differentiate between, “Yes, there is something wrong with me,” and, “Ah, but it’s also connected to service.” It is the causation issue—the service caused the PTSD.
Thank you, Hilary. With that, we have reached the end of the time period that was allocated for your evidence. On behalf of all the members of the Committee, we are very grateful to you for the evidence you have given and for bearing with us and the logistics we have to follow to comply with social distancing. Thank you very much for your evidence.
Examination of Witness
Major Bob Campbell gave evidence.
Our next witness is Major Bob Campbell, who is giving evidence remotely using sound only. We have until 11.25 am for this session. Major Campbell, could you just confirm to me that you can hear me, and could you speak so that we know you can hear us?
Major Campbell: I can hear you fine. I will just say that I have hearing loss in both ears, so may I ask for the questions to be spoken clearly? You do not need to shout, but just speak clearly, and then we will probably get through this more quickly.
Excellent. You are pre-empting my good self in giving that instruction to those asking for evidence. Major, could you just confirm your name formally for the record?
Major Campbell: My name is Robert Campbell, former Army officer.
Thank you very much, sir. I have four Members who have indicated that they want to ask questions: Stephen Morgan, Kevan Jones, Carol Monaghan and Stuart Anderson. If anybody else wants to ask a question, please indicate. I will go first to Stephen Morgan, who I am sure will follow the Major’s instructions.
Q
Major Campbell: No, there was none. Depending on which investigation you wish to address, in the early investigations under the Royal Military Police we were told just not to think about it and to get on with stuff. No concession was given to us in our day-to-day duties. Later on, when the Aitken report was written in 2008, we were not approached prior to the publishing of the report; I heard about it on the radio like everybody else, while I was driving home. It is rather unpleasant to discover on the radio that your own Army accuses you of killing somebody in Iraq, three years after you have already been cleared of that allegation.
Moving forward to the later investigations, there was a civil claim made by Leigh Day in 2010, in which we were ordered to give another statement and we were ordered not to seek our own legal advice by the Treasury Solicitors. We ignored that instruction: we got our own legal advice, and we declined to assist the Ministry of Defence in defending the civil claim, because frankly we thought they had rather a cheek after previously accusing us of committing that offence.
When IHAT came in 2015, I had just started my intermediate officer education at staff college. I knew IHAT was going to come and arrest me and question me, so I approached the course colonel to ask whether I could defer the course, because I had to concentrate on this allegation. He wrote to me in an email, “Based on the version of events you have described to me, which would doubtless be corroborated by your colleagues, I do not believe you have anything to fear. Given the utter discrediting of Iraqi witnesses in al-Sweady, I believe you can take further confidence. I know this is extremely unsettling business for you, but I would urge you to try to put it to one side and focus on this course. That in itself will be a distraction and help you get on with your life.” So, to briefly answer your question, no, we were not offered any type of meaningful support other than some rather unhelpful advice to try not to think about it.
Q
Major Campbell: No. Again, that last instance was my direct line manager—okay, it was slightly different from the normal chain of command because I was on a course. Their belief was—this is what kept being told to me—if you have done nothing wrong, you have got nothing to fear. While I tried to explain to them, “Look, I have been through many investigations and, trust me, they are very, very unpleasant” they would not have it.
I pushed it up the chain of command to Army headquarters, and again they were not really interested in helping. They expressed to me that they were being told by the directorate of judicial engagement policy not to get involved. In terms of hindering me, if you like, I was appalled to discover that the Army personnel centre had handed over my service and medical records to IHAT without my knowledge or consent.
Apart from the military chain of command, I wrote to Penny Mordaunt, Mike Penning, Mark Lancaster and the Secretary of State, Michael Fallon, in response to some of their public statements in order to correct some things they said that were not entirely accurate when they were making claims that everybody was fully supported. They all responded back to me, “You don’t understand—we have to do this because we have to be seen to be doing something.” The impression I got was that me and my two other soldiers being multiply investigated was necessary for the reputation of the United Kingdom or the Army.
Q
Major Campbell: The Army is a large and compartmentalised place. For example, when public statements are being made about these investigations, nobody actually checks with us or our solicitors if they are indeed true. Certainly, Brigadier Aitken did not think to check with us or our solicitors if we might wish to dispute anything that he was going to write in his report. He wrote retrospectively that our case was included in another load of cases, some of which were true and some of which, I believe, were false. However, I think a greater degree of a direct communication would have been better.
I also suggested in my letter to Michael Fallon that an officer at least of colonel rank should be set up somewhere like Army headquarters—I will focus on the Army because I am not too sure about the other two services—to be the one-stop shop for anybody who is under investigation. I was told that that was not necessary. Both Michael Fallon and Sir Stuart Peach in the Defence Sub-Committee on this matter said there is no need for such a thing because there is the chain of command, which will do everything. The chain of command folded at the first hurdle. The administrative process in place to apply for our legal fees to be reimbursed failed at the first hurdle, because the form did not have a box for an IHAT investigation.
On top of that, there was just to be no concession on how we were supposed to conduct ourselves in our day-to-day life. Because there was no single point of contact, we had nowhere to address our concerns. I had a very tedious series of correspondence, again with all those people I just named, who all responded, “If you’ve got a problem with it, complain to IHAT.” That is not the most helpful piece of advice.
Q
Major Campbell: In terms of legal protections of soldiers, I would not change anything in terms of historic allegations, let me make that point clear. Had the Bill been in place during my case, it would have meant, at the absolute worst, that our torment would have ended in 2009, and neither IHAT nor the Director Service Prosecutions would have had any method of dragging it out further. For me and my two soldiers, SO71 and SO72 as they are cited in the IFI report, that would have meant that we could have at least enjoyed the last 11 years in peace.
Secondly, if the Bill had been in place during my time, Leigh Day would not have been able to bring about false allegations. That would never have got off the ground. I am no legal expert, but if the Bill was in place, it would make the vexatious, scattergun, “throw a thousand allegations at the wall” process unprofitable, and people like Leigh Day and Phil Shiner would have to find some other human misery to exploit.
The last point about this hard stop of five years is that it would be a useful device, because it would focus the minds of the MOD and the investigators. It was the MOD that dragged it out for the last 17 years. If they had this hard stop, they would have to really focus and decide whether they are going to prosecute or not. Putting them under a bit of pressure would have saved us a lot of angst in the years past.
Q
Major Campbell: I fully welcome the Bill, both in its intent and in its content. Again, in my amateur legal opinion, there may be a legitimate argument to be had over whether the Attorney General is the correct address in terms of being the final arbiter of further prosecutions, due to the advice he gives to the armed forces on the legality of a conflict.
My other slight concern is that previous Attorneys General have done us no favours at all. Lord Goldsmith had a lot on his shoulders for how we ended up in Iraq and the manner in which we conducted operations there. When I appealed to Jeremy Wright, and when he gave evidence to the Defence Sub-Committee on this several years ago, he took the view that this was an entirely fair process and that there was absolutely no reason to stop IHAT or even to scrutinise it any further than necessary.
The last point I would make about the Bill is that I cannot really adhere to some of the arguments against it. When I wrote to all these people, such as the CGS, the Adjutant General and previous Ministers Mordaunt, Penning, Lancaster and Fallon, they would all express a variation of, “Well, we have to be seen to be doing something.” I do not believe that public relations and being seen to be doing something are a good enough reason to destroy a soldier’s life or to drive them to suicide. I do not think that is morally acceptable in any way, but apparently they thought that was a price worth paying.
To answer your question, yes, I support the Bill. There may be some minor tweaks here and there, but, in principle, and in the absence of anybody doing anything to help us in any way, it has my full support.
Q
Major Campbell: From my very unscientific survey of veterans, I think that generally—in my orbit—the Bill is welcomed. If the words of the Bill are not welcomed, the principle of attempting to improve the lot of veterans and service personnel is welcomed. There is deep anger and distrust between the veteran community and the MOD. It is all very well for the MOD to blame Phil Shiner and Leigh Day for this, but it was the MOD that carried out the repeated investigations.
To answer your question, I think that if the Bill were to be squashed, it would send a very depressing message to the veterans community—probably one that has been felt quite harshly by the Northern Ireland veterans—that we are not important enough to get any type of assistance when facing legal assault.
Thank you for your comments, and thank you again for your service.
Q
Major Campbell: I think that is a false allegation, and I will tell you why. Again, when I wrote to all these people—even internally within the Army—I was told repeatedly that if IHAT was interfered with in any way, the International Criminal Court would swoop in and clamp us in leg irons, and we would all be off to The Hague. Michael Fallon repeated in the Defence Sub-Committee that he had no power to stop such investigations and that, if he were to do so, the ICC would get involved.
I decided to test that theory, and I wrote to the chief prosecutor of the ICC, Ms Bensouda, asking in exasperation whether I, SO71 and SO72 could surrender ourselves to the ICC rather than go through several more appalling years at the hands of the Ministry of Defence. Ms Bensouda responded that our allegation does not fall within her remit, because her job is not to prosecute individual soldiers; her job is to prosecute commanders and policy makers for the most grave crimes. In her orbit, manslaughter, which is what I was accused of, is not a war crime. It is a domestic crime—a regular crime, as opposed to what she would normally deal with. I reported that rejection to the Ministry of Defence, which continued to repeat that the ICC would fall in.
The second point I would make is, what would be so terrible about the ICC being involved? We kept getting told that the ICC has a bit of scrutiny over IHAT and is keeping a very close eye on it. Personally, I do not have a problem with that. Like I said, the ICC was not going to ruin our careers, the ICC was not going to harass our families, and the ICC was not going to go and bully soldiers who had left the Army for a witness statement—not even a suspect’s. The ICC would conduct itself professionally, and it would have no incentive—no financial incentive—to drag things out for years, like Red Snapper, which provided most of the detectives to IHAT, did. Finally, the ICC would probably not use the investigative technique that IHAT used, which was to pay Phil Shiner’s gofer to be the go-between between them and witnesses because IHAT was too scared to go to Iraq.
So regarding the whole spectre of the ICC, first, I do not find it remotely as scary as people make it out to be and, secondly, it is completely false, because I attempted, with my two soldiers, to surrender ourselves in order to spare us another several years of the MOD fannying about, and the offer was refused. So to answer your question, I do not see that as an issue at all.
What I would say, though, is that I think I understand why the Government would be reluctant for the ICC to be involved, because the scrutiny would not be on Tommy Atkins; the scrutiny would be on General Atkins and Minister Atkins. Those are my thoughts on the ICC.
Q
Clearly, a lot of this is still very raw for you, and you have talked about the MOD dragging it out over the last 17 years. Can you tell me how you think this Bill will actually tackle the MOD’s actions and inactions, which you have been subjected to over the last 17 years?
Major Campbell: Like I said in the previous response, if there was a time limit within which these things can be actioned, then I feel that a higher level of scrutiny and decision making would be necessary to make them work. I also think that the kind of dithering manner in which this process has been carried out to date would be nullified. If there is a time limit within which they have to get on with it, get it done right the first time and get the correct legal advice, I think that would improve matters no end.
Q
Major Campbell: That is a good question, because I do not know. The reason I say that is that I do not believe that there is a police force in the United Kingdom that would be able to carry out such a contested, political and adversarial investigation. If you think about the way that it has been done in the past, when IHAT got this group of ex-detectives who were used to domestic crime, and they are asked to investigate an allegation in a country they have never been to, in a culture they do not understand, in a combat environment they have never experienced and in a language they do not speak, I just think that you are already on a hiding to nothing if those are your parameters.
I do not know how a war crimes investigation can be done effectively while hostilities are ongoing. For example, if there was an allegation against our forces in Syria, I really do not understand how you are supposed to be able to gather good evidence in an area that may be occupied by the regime, Russia or ISIS, and I do not understand how you would achieve the right level of evidence. But what I do know is that the way they did it in the past was an absolute shambles.
Q
This needs to be a very short answer, Major Campbell.
Major Campbell: I would argue yes, because otherwise, if you make it longer, you are just handing another incentive to the Leigh Days and Phil Shiners of this world to drag it out, because they have got absolutely nothing to lose. All of their funds are provided by the taxpayer, and all of the funds of the claimants are provided by the taxpayer. They can take a punt, and it is a win-win for them.
We do have a time limit, which I am afraid we have reached, Major Campbell. But again, on behalf of all the members of this Committee, I thank you for your evidence this morning. Thank you very much indeed.
Major Campbell: Thank you.
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI hope that Professor Ekins can now hear proceedings. Will witnesses say for the record their name and designation, so that we may confirm that we can hear you?
Professor Ekins: I am Professor Richard Ekins. I am head of Policy Exchange’s Judicial Power Project and Professor of Law and Constitutional Government at the University of Oxford.
John Larkin: I am John Larkin QC. I am in private practice now in Belfast—[Inaudible.]
Your sound is not very clear, Mr Larkin, so I am going to see whether we can have that adjusted. Will you repeat what you have just said?
John Larkin: I am John Larkin QC. I am counsel at the Bar of Northern Ireland, and practising there.
Please try to get as close to your microphone and to speak as robustly as you can.
John Larkin: I apologise in advance, Chair. I am afraid that you have the alarming choice of seeing me leering forward or perhaps not hearing me. We will sacrifice aesthetics in favour of audibility.
We will take hearing you—that is our priority. If our two witnesses online will bear with us on the logistics, we are joined in the room by Dr Jonathan Morgan. Dr Morgan, will you introduce yourself for the record?
Dr Morgan: Hello. I am a reader in English law at the University of Cambridge and a fellow of Corpus Christi College. As you might be aware, I co-authored with Richard Ekins a paper called “Clearing the Fog of Law” for Policy Exchange in 2015. I imagine that that is why I am here, but you might be able to tell me better.
Excellent. I am going to call Kevan Jones to start the questions, and I would ask that he and others indicate whether they are addressing a question to a specific witness or to all the witnesses.
Q
Perhaps, if the question is to everyone, we will start with you, Dr Morgan, in the room, and then go to Professor Ekins and Mr Larkin.
Dr Morgan: My expertise is in private law—so, tort law—and I imagine that we will come on to that later. There, you have time limits of three years, six years, one year. In my view, there is no ultimate principled way of defending a particular time limit. Five years is obviously some kind of compromise. Ten years was originally proposed; that has been reduced to five. There seems to be no logical answer, certainly, as to that particular time period. It is a balancing act.
Professor Ekins: I agree with everything that Dr Morgan has just said. All I would add is that I presume five years has been chosen with a view to allowing a sizeable period of time to pass during which—[Inaudible]—can be brought in the customary fashion. After five years, a somewhat different regime obviously applies, although it might be too strong to call this a cut-off period. There is always something somewhat arbitrary about procedural time limits. As Dr Morgan said, three years and six years are used in civil law; the criminal law does not tend to do this so often, so I do not think this is a salient number—to my knowledge.
John Larkin: I agree. There is no magic in the number five; that is a matter of policy choice.
Q
Dr Morgan: On the second of those questions, which is whether the Attorney General’s decision not to prosecute could be challenged in court, I think that, yes, absolutely there is a risk of that, and I think the Minister, in a letter that he wrote to the Defence Committee, accepted that that was the case, but expressed the view that the courts would have to take account of the context that it is a quasi-judicial decision, and that they should respect the Attorney General’s decision. But I suspect that it is very strongly likely that it would be reviewed. How successful that would be is hard to say in the abstract, but it could be challenged, in my view.
Q
Dr Morgan: Criminal procedure is not my area, but I am not aware of any others in UK law. There are references to limitation statutes in other jurisdictions. I think that the example given is that, in French law, there is a 30-year period, which is very much longer and which apparently does not apply to war crimes, so that is almost the mirror image of what is in the Bill.
Q
Dr Morgan: It says that only exceptionally will there be a prosecution, so it is not a total amnesty after the five years. But even having the presumption after a time period is, as far as I am aware, unique in English criminal law. When we are talking about tort law, which is much more my area, limitation periods are absolutely standard, but in criminal procedure it is much more exceptional. I think that is why this has received so much more attention, media attention and public criticism than the civil law proposals.
Professor Ekins: As Jonathan Morgan says, there are precedents elsewhere for statutes of limitation in the criminal sphere in other jurisdictions, but they have not been a feature of English law, although, of course, this is quite a soft statute of limitations in so far as it provides no obstacle or bar to prosecutions after the five years. It certainly does not stop investigations. In fact, if one were to make a criticism of the Bill, one might say that it places no obstacle on continuing investigations, which might be thought to be one of the main mischiefs motivating of the Bill. If there has been no investigation, the fact that there is an investigation, and cogent evidence arises of a crime, will tend to beat back the presumption against prosecution, if one wants to call it the presumption against prosecution. So it is not quite right to my mind to say this is putting the cart before the horse and deciding against prosecution before one investigates.
In relation to the Attorney General and consent to prosecute, there are two stages. One is the prosecuting authority deciding whether or not the prosecution is warranted, and the Bill looks at some of the factors that should be taken into account in making that decision. That might be one way to think about part 1 of the Bill—it is framing the determination by the prosecuting authority. In addition to that, the Attorney General’s consent is required. They are not necessarily the same stage or the same act.
As to whether the Attorney General giving or withholding consent—more likely the withholding, although I suppose either—will be challenged in the courts, I think, very likely, yes. How much risk is there? I think that is an open question. I think there must be some risk that there will be a Human Rights Act challenge arguing for a narrow and restrictive reading of the Attorney General’s power to give or withhold consent, and that might end up requiring the Attorney General to give consent in circumstances where one might not otherwise expect it. It is possible the courts will not take that course, but I think it is a risk that parliamentarians should be aware of.
John Larkin: Yes. I am in agreement with Professor Ekins. Classically, the decision of an Attorney General to give consent to prosecution has been subject to very light-touch review. Here, although it is described in the clause heading as “Presumption against prosecution”, it is really more the establishment of an exceptionality test, and that of course gives a handle to anybody seeking to challenge the Attorney General, because what is or is not exceptional will be a matter ultimately for judicial determination. I think that challenges are almost inevitable, but they are by no means to be regarded as inevitably successful. I think the approach of the courts—one can see that in the Supreme Court challenge a year or so back to the certification by the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland in the Dennis Hutchings case—tends to be associated with the bestowal of a good deal of latitude to the responsible law officer.
Q
John Larkin: The law is full of operative presumptions, from time to time, but the precise model here is something that I have not seen either in the UK or elsewhere.
Professor Ekins: I do not think the UK has tended to legislate about the decision to prosecute. There are a great many statutory requirements for Attorney General’s consent before prosecuting, so that is by no means unique, but the legislating to frame the prosecutor’s decision as to whether to initiate the prosecution is unusual.
Q
Professor Ekins: Not to my knowledge, but it is difficult to sever it from the point about time. There is a difference between a Bill that does what you see in part 1 from day one and a Bill that does so after a certain period of time has passed, which is why the Bill refers, understandably, to the importance of finality if you have an investigation and further evidence has arisen. Those are all considerations that a prosecutor might well take into account anyway; it is just that Parliament is requiring them to be taken into account, framing when and how—[Inaudible.]
Q
John Larkin: I possess no qualifications to judge the reputational effectiveness of the Bill and its impact on military operations. What I have said to Policy Exchange is that many of the criticisms of the Bill are quite misplaced. It is not a blanket amnesty; in fact, it might be regarded as a fairly modest, proportionate measure.
Mr Ekins?
Professor Ekins: I suppose the best case one can make for the positive benefit of the Bill is that it may provide some assurance to personnel. If no application has been made after five years, they are unlikely to be prosecuted. However, in one sense that is too strong, because if cogent evidence arises, it can be investigated. It probably will be—there is no bar to it in the Bill—and it may well result in a decision to prosecute.
Having said that, prosecution is the major risk for people who have been serving on operations abroad. It is a major problem in relation to Northern Ireland—we have been getting prosecutions 40 or 50 years after the fact, which are very difficult to conduct fairly, and which understandably cause an enormous amount of stress. In recent years, the problem in relation to people who have been serving abroad has been, in a sense, a seemingly never-ending cycle of investigation and reinvestigation. The Bill does not really do anything about that, so in that sense it will not provide much help.
I should have referred to as “professor”—sorry, I did not want you to feel left out. Doctor Morgan?
Dr Morgan: The answer is, up to a point. It really depends on what kind of allegations we want to defend service personnel against. In the Second Reading debate, there were many references to Phil Shiner—we can take him as shorthand for spurious claims being brought. But you might say that if spurious claims are brought within six years, if it is a tort action, or within five years, if it is leading to a criminal prosecution, the Bill is not doing anything about those. It is not doing anything about promptly brought spurious claims. Indeed, it seems to me that the Shiner claims were actually brought promptly. There were many problems with them—namely, that people were making up the evidence—but they were not being brought many years later.
The Bill addresses one particular problem: very old and stale allegations being revived after a long period, which are either brought as a tort damages claim—that is part 2 of the Bill—or lead to criminal prosecutions, which is part 1. It seems to me to be part of a solution to what is actually quite a big and complex problem with a number of different strands in it. It is not the total solution, but it addresses that aspect of it.
Q
John Larkin: I have given my view on that. The short answer is that it does not.
Professor Ekins: I agree with John.
Dr Morgan: I think “blanket amnesty” is a very overblown way of putting it, if we are talking of criminal prosecutions after the five years. It is establishing presumption, and that is what should be referred to. Having said that, the stronger the presumption is against prosecution, the closer it approaches that. The weaker the presumption is, the less protection it gives to the service personnel in question. So there is obviously a balancing act, but, as it stands, I do not see it as an amnesty; that is a misdescription.
Q
Professor Ekins: To my mind, the major problem of the Bill—this is a major absence, but it would be quite a substantial policy change to introduce it—is that it does not really address the extraterritorial application of the Human Rights Act. That is the main driver behind some of the difficulties we have seen in the last 10 or more years in a whole range of ways. That includes requiring continued investigation and litigation—sometimes from enemy combatants relying on the Human Rights Act while UK forces have been in the field. The Bill could be improved—although, as I say, it would be a major change—by limiting the extraterritorial application of the Human Rights Act.
That would be, in a sense, restating the position that our senior judges understood before the European Court of Human Rights extended how jurisdiction was understood. I think that would also be much more consistent with the way in which Parliament understood the Human Rights Act when it was enacted in 1998. The ECHR and the Human Rights Act really have been extended by a series of problematic judgments, and a Bill on this subject could usefully roll that back. That might mean that the Human Rights Act simply applies in the United Kingdom, or alternatively—this may be more plausible as a prospect for enactment—it might allow for limited extraterritorial application, in the limited way that was understood to be possible in 2003 when the European Court of Human Rights gave a significant judgment on the point, as well as by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court in the years to follow. That would address the problem of being unable to stop investigations and being exposed to litigation that requires the continuation of investigations, when the Government think that that is unfair to the personnel. The Bill does not address that—save, perhaps, by encouraging Ministers to derogate from the ECHR.
John Larkin: There is a lack conceptual clarity in part 1—[Inaudible.]
Mr Larkin, we are sorry but we are not hearing you very well. Do you want to try to speak a bit closer to your microphone?
John Larkin: There is a lack of conceptual clarity in part 1 of the Bill with respect to the prosecutorial task. As the Committee will know, the prosecutor’s task breaks down into two parts. First, they ask themselves whether the evidential test is met. If it is, they consider whether a prosecution would be in the public interest. That is the approach taken in all three UK jurisdiction—[Inaudible.]
We are still struggling, I am afraid.
John Larkin: Clause 1 of the Bill puts no time limit on assessment of the evidential test. But then, when one looks at clause 3, subsections (1) and (2) tend to reduce the person’s culpability. Culpability is at the core of criminal liability—it is synonymous with criminal liability. There may be value in amending the Bill to permit the prosecutor to take a global view.
The Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland, in its code for prosecutors, permits the public prosecutor to take a view based on the public interest test, sometimes—exceptionally—in advance of full consideration of the evidential tests, so if one has a sense from the beginning that the case is going nowhere, one should not have to go through what might seem to be a very empty exercise of none the less carrying out the evidential test in full. There could be an expressed power, by amendment, given to prosecutors to determine in advance of consideration of the full evidential tests. As you rightly note, clause 3(1) sits ill with clause 1’s exception of the evidential consideration.
Q
Are you happy to do that, Mr Larkin? We did not hear all of what you said. Members may have got the general thrust of what you were saying, but we did not get the detail.
John Larkin: I am happy to do that. It is a technical point, so it might be of assistance to Committee members if it were reduced to writing.
Q
Dr Morgan: I would approach the question in two ways. One would be, “How would I improve this Bill?” and the other would be, “What would I do if I was starting with a blank sheet of paper?” You would get two quite different answers, but I will start with the second one.
Let us have both approaches.
Dr Morgan: Okay. To start with the second one, it seems to me that the problem in this area is lawfare or the judicialisation of war—whatever you want to call it. The extension of the European convention on human rights into this area as a result of the European Court’s decision in Al-Skeini, and the decision of our Supreme Court in Smith v. Ministry of Defence, which confirmed that and extended the law of tort into the battlefield, led to the erosion of combat immunity. To me, that should be the priority for any legislation on this difficult and multifaceted problem.
The section of the Bill that partly deals with the issue is the derogation provision and the duty on the Minister to consider derogation. It is not a duty to derogate; it is a duty to consider doing it, which is putting into statute the Government’s policy. It seems to me that that is valuable, although it does not change very much.
In its consultation paper published in June 2019, the Ministry of Defence said it was going to look at restatement of combat immunity, hand in hand with a no-fault compensation scheme for service personnel to pay damages on the full tort measure. Those two things should go together. I regret that last month, in reply to the consultation, it said that legislation on the issue is
“not being taken forward…at this time.”
I think it should be. The priority should be to restate combat immunity and, hand in hand with that, to have no-fault compensation for service personnel on the full compensation measure that you get if you bring a claim in law.
If that were done, it would help with the problem about the shorter limitation periods for tort claims—damages claims—that was raised several times at Second Reading. The British Legion has been quoted several times saying that that breaches the armed forces covenant. I do not want to get into that particular debate, but there is no question that service personnel might, in some fairly unusual situations, find their ability to bring damages claims caught by the proposals in part 2 of the Bill as it stands.
If the Ministry of Defence took forward the proposal that it called “Better combat compensation,” to have full compensation through the armed forces compensation scheme, those worries would fall away. If there was full compensation available without the need to bring a tort claim or negligence action against the Government, any limitations on the time periods for bringing tort claims would be an irrelevant question for service personnel.
Those are two reasons why I would revive what seems to have been the Ministry of Defence’s approach at one point, which was restating combat immunity and ensuring full, no-fault compensation. If you want me to give more detailed comments on the provisions of the Bill I can do that, but I would approach the issues in a quite different way than in the Bill that we have.
Q
Dr Morgan: The proposal to make that switch is in the joint paper produced by Richard Ekins, Tom Tugendhat and myself that I mentioned at the start. We said in that paper that that there is a case for having a more generous strand within the armed forces compensation scheme applying to those soldiers who cannot bring tort claims at law. In other words, if Crown immunity in warfare were to be revived—the Government already have the statutory power to do that, they do not need an Act of Parliament—and it was decided that you cannot bring claims at all, there would be a case for having a more generous approach within the armed forces compensation scheme to those people. I would not necessarily say the whole armed forces compensation scheme should be upgraded—I am aware of how expensive that would be. If we are going to restrict tort claims of a certain sub-category of injuries to service people, then it would be a good idea to balance that out by having full compensation.
Q
Dr Morgan: Yes. I confess that I have not looked at the limitation rules of the armed forces compensation scheme. It certainly does ensure cover.
Q
Dr Morgan: It also gets away from what we see in Smith v. Ministry of Defence: the allegation that the Land Rovers were not the right ones. Once you go to court investigating that in a negligence claim, it is getting into areas that should not be dealt with by a court in a negligence claim, it seems to me. If you are going to stop people from bringing such claims, you had better give them at least as good a compensation scheme without them needing to prove fault. That was our argument in the paper five years ago.
Q
Dr Morgan: I was going to comment on Major Campbell; I read about him in the newspaper on Saturday. It seems to me that his case would not have been addressed by these proposals. He was prosecuted in 2006 about an alleged offence in 2003, so that would have been within the five-year period for bringing the prosecution. It is only in 2020, after 17 years, that he has finally been cleared. The point was made in the Second Reading debate by a number of Members that perhaps the real vice is not so much very late prosecutions but the continued investigations by the Ministry of Defence without necessarily leading to a criminal prosecution at all. If I have understood the facts of Major Campbell’s case, it rather shows how a five-year soft cut-off for prosecutions is not going to solve that kind of problem at all.
Q
Dr Morgan: There is a rule in criminal law that if you have been tried in a criminal court for an offence and you are either acquitted or convicted, you cannot be tried again. That is double jeopardy. What I do not understand is why the double jeopardy rule is not applying, by analogy, to these repeated investigations within the Ministry of Defence. That needs to be urgently addressed, and it is not within the Bill. Maybe the Bill cannot do everything, but the Campbell case shows that there is a gap.
Q
Dr Morgan: Yes. Whether this needs fresh legislation or whether it can simply be done by changing the rules, I do not know. I know what Professor Ekins will say, which is that because the Human Rights Act requires investigations into deaths, we are currently limited in what we can do. Perhaps he will comment on that.
Professor Ekins: I am sure the Ministry of Defence has had many failings across the years, but in one sense it needs to keep investigations going and to be open and avoid plodding along. It has done a lot under the threat of litigation—sorry, the reality of litigation—where it is exposed to a duty to investigate in accordance with changing standards over time. Something similar has happened in Northern Ireland, which John Larkin knows much more about than I do. It has been a particular feature of the legacy and the legal cases around Afghanistan. Those conflicts were fought on a pretty sound legal position and on the understanding that the European convention did not apply. The ordinary rules of the law around conflict and service law applied, yet subsequent decisions about investigation or not investigating have been challenged in the domestic courts by way of the Human Rights Act. I cannot see how we deal with that prospect recurring over time without addressing the territorial reach of the Human Rights Act.
The Bill deals with the issue incidentally and in part in so far as derogation, if there is derogation, in advance of future conflicts might help, and in so far as there are time limits on Human Rights Act applications or proceedings. That might deal with some of the risk of historical allegations being made and investigations rolling on. In terms of the problem of people being investigated repeatedly and a prosecution never being mounted, that is not a problem the Bill deals with directly, although I think it probably is the main mischief.
John Larkin: I agree with Professor Ekins that the Bill is somewhat silent on the duration and repetition of investigations. In some cases, that leads to real mischief. It is not much fun for anyone to be finally vindicated after 10 or 12 years have elapsed. They would much rather be vindicated promptly—this applies both in terms of ordinary criminal civil justice as well as in the issue of service personnel—after a thorough and expeditious investigation.
Q
Dr Morgan: It is the point I made, so I agree that it will not solve all of the problems as it stands.
Professor Ekins: Yes, it is a real concern.
John Larkin: I think it is wrong to see a so-called independent investigation as the answer. The issue is not the independence or otherwise of the investigation. In fact, investigations are substantially independent at present. The issue is efficiency and the fairness of what is investigated.
Q
I would welcome feedback from each of the witnesses. How would you limit the territorial reach of the Human Rights Act within this legislation? You mentioned it as a point, and I wanted to hear how you would do that.
Dr Morgan: The Human Rights Act would have to be amended to say that the Act itself did not apply extraterritorially. Parliament could do that; what Parliament cannot do is of itself reverse the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. The nearest thing to do is for the Government to derogate using the process in the European convention. Those powers are already there in the Human Rights Act.
Q
Dr Morgan: In my view, this is nothing to do with the European Union. This is purely a European convention matter, so Brexit, thankfully, is out of the picture on this particular issue. It is purely a decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which extended the extraterritorial reach of the convention in the Al-Skeini case.
There are two things that one could do about it. One is to derogate in future conflicts, which the Government have said they will consider doing. Another thing is for the Government vigorously to fight cases, such as Hassan v. United Kingdom, where the Government rather successfully argued that the European convention should be interpreted in line with the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law.
Those are two things that one could do. A third thing, which would require fresh primary legislation, would be to amend the Human Rights Act so that domestic UK courts may only hear claims relating to things that happen within the territory of the UK. That will not stop the Strasbourg Court from hearing claims against the UK. Parliament cannot unilaterally change the meaning of the European convention on human rights, but it can change the meaning of the Human Rights Act. Richard Ekins is more expert than I, so I would like him to answer.
Q
John Larkin: May I come in on that point? The Member is referring, I think, to decision 2/15 of the Court of Justice of the European Union—[Inaudible.]—incompatible with the European treaty. Many of us smiled at that decision, because it showed the Court of Justice of the European Union was not particularly enthusiastic about being subject to the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court—[Inaudible.]—
When you write to us on the previous point, Mr Larkin, will you also set out your thoughts on the question that has just been asked? We come to you, Professor Ekins.
Professor Ekins: It was a surprising decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, holding that the EU was not really able to make a treaty commitment to join the ECHR. It shows that the EU legal order guards its legal autonomy jealously, but I do not think that it helps in this context.
In answer to the question about how one limits the territorial reach of the Human Rights Act, one thing would be to include a clause in the Bill that amends the Human Rights Act to specify its territorial reach. That could be the more limited reach of only applying in the United Kingdom, or it could effectively restate the position as it was held by the European courts in 2003 and accepted by our senior judges for many years thereafter, that the convention applies in the United Kingdom and in some very limited extraterritorial circumstances. I drafted a provision to that effect, if anyone is interested, in submissions to the Defence Committee and in other papers to the Policy Exchange. It is open to question, obviously, but it is certainly possible to frame a limitation in a clause that could be adopted in the Bill. It is not impossible; it depends on whether Parliament wishes to do so.
As Dr Morgan says, though, that would not change the UK’s position in relation to Strasbourg, the European Court of Human Rights. Derogation is an important addition to the meaning of the Human Rights Act. If you want to deal with the prospect of continuing litigation, investigations and reinvestigations, you have to address the scope of the Human Rights Act. The same thing is true in relation to Northern Ireland and those historic allegations as well. The intention is that that should be dealt with in a separate Bill.
Q
Thank you for coming to this session. We referred to Major Bob Campbell previously, and I wanted to follow on from the point made by Carole Monaghan and the evidence given by Major Campbell. He said that he gave evidence after several years of being investigated and reinvestigated, and he wrote to the International Criminal Court to ask them to prosecute him. The ICC actually refused that request. On Second Reading—I am sure you all witnessed the debate—a number of concerns were raised relating to veterans being hauled before the International Criminal Court as a result of the Bill being passed. Do you expect any veterans to be put before the International Criminal Court if the Bill goes ahead?
Dr Morgan: There is a risk that it could happen. I have read the Government’s comments on this, and they point out that prosecutors will remain independent, that it is not an absolute bar, and that it is not an absolute amnesty. All of that is true; but if, in a particular case, a war crime is alleged against a person and it is after five years, and the prosecutor decides not to bring a case because it is not sufficiently exceptional, then in that situation there must be a risk either that the International Criminal Court would seize jurisdiction, or that another member state could apply for extradition of that veteran.
Professor Ekins: I am not an expert on the International Criminal Court, but it is probably correct to stay that there is a risk. That said, prosecutors have a discretion as to whether to bring prosecutions even without the Bill. If a decision is taken not to prosecute in a particular case, then there is a risk that the ICC may take a different view. The ICC should not be taking over prosecutions if the UK—as I think it will even if the Bill were enacted—remains a country that does take its obligations seriously, that does investigate credible cases promptly and that does retain a system of deciding which cases to prosecute, rather than having a rule that they will all be prosecuted regardless of strength of evidence or other considerations such as the passage of time. There have, however, been types of cases in which the ICC has proved to be somewhat political in its decision making. It might turn on who the prosecutor is at the relevant time. It probably does increase the risk. If you ask me whether I expect there to be prosecutions before the ICC, I would say, “Not really,” but that is amateur speculation and not bankable.
John Larkin: I think the risk is modest because, as the Committee knows, offences that are excepted from the reach of clause 1 include genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined in articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome statute respectively. Given that those are not subject to the five-year exceptionality rule, I think it is quite likely that those more serious offences would be prosecuted domestically, because they would benefit from the five-year exceptionality filter.
Q
Dr Morgan: It would have to fall within the definition of war crimes, so one hopes that it is unthinkable that credible evidence of this would ever be laid but, if it were—this is a hypothetical situation—if such evidence existed, because it related to events a long time before, perhaps long before five years, and if the sole reason for not prosecuting was the change that the Bill is making, namely that it was after the five years, then the risk is there. It is probably quite small because, as you say, the kind of situation that will trigger the ICC jurisdiction we all hope would never happen anyway, but that does not mean it cannot.
Q
Dr Morgan: The only point that I would add is that the fact that what is being proposed is internationally unusual I think increases the risk. I probably agree with Mr Larkin that the risk is modest, but I think the fact that it is a five-year time period, which to my knowledge is not visible in any other signatory state of the ICC, increases the risk.
Professor Ekins: The ICC should be focusing on allegations of atrocities, widespread wrongs and so on, rather than on what you might call manslaughter or questions of where the allegations are much more fine-grained, such as excessive force and so on, but there is a risk that the ICC does not always observe the limits that we apply in law to its jurisdiction. There have been instances of somewhat politically motivated decision making. There might still be a modest risk of the ICC going into the kinds of case that are likely to arrive at a place where a decision is made that it is not worth prosecuting because of particular circumstances, a lack of evidence and so on. The risk is probably quite—[Inaudible.] This will only arise if after five years a prosecutor decides that the public interest in prosecuting is not really there. I think it would only be possible for the ICC to justify intervention if there is a sufficiently strong case that would result in a conviction, and disagree about the public interest. That would sound like a surprising ground on which to debate a disagreement on whether a prosecution is warranted. I think it is possible but not very likely.
John Larkin: My point is that genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity are not subject to the five-year time limit, so if the evidence emerges at eight years, for example, the process envisaged by this Bill—exceptionality assessment—simply does not apply; it will be determined as if it had occurred last week. That is an important point that is lost in legal—[Inaudible]—the international—[Inaudible]—of the Bill, but it has not been sufficiently appreciated that part 2 of the statute of Rome makes an exception for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. They will be prosecuted if the evidence exists domestically, and therefore the risk of a lance corporal being hauled in front of the International Criminal Court seems to me to be fairly minimal.
Q
Dr Morgan: indicated assent.
I think you have to speak as an answer, Dr Morgan, because we cannot otherwise hear what it is.
Dr Morgan: Retrospection is obviously going to add a further layer of controversy on top of this. The question really is whether it should apply to Iraq and Afghanistan after this lapse of time. If you believe that the Bill is the right solution to the problem, then it seems to me odd that that is not being proposed, but I am not convinced it is the right solution to the problem, so I am not going to argue for it to be retrospective.
Q
Dr Morgan: We have to wait and see what it says. It would be curious if the Northern Ireland situation and the Iraqi and Afghan situations were dealt with in a different way on that issue of retrospection, so I agree with your point.
Professor Ekins: I would question the premise of the question, because as I read the Bill, it does apply to actions taken in the past. It will not foreclose prosecutions or proceedings already under way. It is a procedural change; if the Bill were enacted, say, tomorrow, a prosecution brought the day after that, more than five years after the events in question, would be subject to the regime in the Bill. I think it will apply to Iraq and Afghanistan, save insofar as there are prosecutions that have been initiated or proceedings that are under way. It will not apply to ongoing legal proceedings, but it will be a question sometimes, if I wanted to continue proceedings, where it might apply.
John Larkin: The Bill is, as Professor Ekins has said, significantly retrospective. If one looks at clause 15(6), it says:
“None of the provisions of Part 1 applies to proceedings instituted before the day on which the provision comes into force.”
As [Inaudible.]—
Sorry, I think you were looking away from the microphone when you answered.
John Larkin: Clause 15 makes it clear that the Bill does not apply where proceedings have begun or are under way before the day it comes into force, but if they are not under way—[Inaudible]—clearly defined rules can crystallise shortly thereafter, and—[Inaudible]—subject to the exceptionality—[Inaudible.]
I think we are going to ask for that answer in writing, as well. The Minister has a very quick question—
I am happy to pass on it; it has been answered by Dr Ekins.
Thank you very much indeed. If no one else has any further questions, we have reached the end of the time allocated. I thank each of the witnesses for their evidence and for being with us in the technical circumstances. Mr Larkin, I am very sorry that we were not able to hear some of your responses; if you are able to write to the Committee on the matters we have come back to you on, that would be very helpful indeed.
John Larkin: I am happy to do that, Chair.
Examination of Witnesses
Ahmed Al-Nahhas and Emma Norton gave evidence.
Before we move to our next set of witnesses, I should say that in the event that there is a Division in the House during this session, which there could be—this is for the information of the witnesses as well—we would initially suspend the sitting for 15 minutes. If the vote takes longer than that and Members cannot get back, we will deal with that pragmatically.
We are now joined by Ahmed Al-Nahhas and Emma Norton. Mr Al-Nahhas, perhaps you could say who you are so that we can confirm that we can hear you. I know from my mispronunciation of your name that you can hear me.
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: My name is Ahmed Al-Nahhas. I am a representative of the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, which is a not-for-profit organisation that campaigns for victims of injuries and negligence. I am also a solicitor advocate.
Emma Norton: My name is Emma Norton. I am the director and lawyer at the Centre for Military Justice. I have developed a dry cough in the last two days, which is why I am appearing virtually—I apologise in advance for any coughing that I may do.
Thank you very much in advance for giving evidence today. I will ask Emma Lewell-Buck to start the evidence session.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: No, APIL’s position is that the Bill does not afford that. We acknowledge the good intentions behind the Bill. However, in respect of part 2 of the Bill, which I am here to discuss—the civil claims aspect—we believe that it strips service personnel and veterans of certain rights in relation to civil claims and their rights under the European convention on human rights.
Emma Norton: I would agree with that and I will not repeat it. I would say that one of the major flaws in the Bill is that it does not address the issue of the investigations that gave rise to all the problems that we are dealing with today. I think you heard that in the previous evidence; it has been a thread that has been running throughout the evidence that the Committee has heard today.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: I may pass that question to Emma, who is here primarily to deal with those issues in respect of investigations. My remit is in respect of civil claims.
Emma Norton: I think there were very serious problems with the original investigations that took place into the allegations of harm in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is what made it relatively easy for courts to find that, time and again, fresh investigations needed to be conducted, which then gave rise to further litigation. The responses from the Ministry of Defence to those adverse findings did not go far enough. The investigations that we had had time and again never got to the bottom of what had happened.
As witnesses have said, the longer period of time that you get between the event and the investigation, the harder it is to get to the bottom of what happened. If we were serious about really addressing the issues that Mr Campbell and other veterans have described, we would be looking at what kinds of systems and structures that we could build now and that would ensure that this does not happen again. What kinds of investigations could we set up and design that could function in the context of overseas operations? I am afraid that until that happens, these problems are going to recur and I do not think the Bill addresses them.
Q
Emma Norton: I am happy to say that I would, personally. That would have been a sensible way to go about it—to have a consultation that would really hear from individuals who had been directly affected by investigations, as well as victims, and to speak to experts who can talk to the challenges of building a really good system of investigations overseas, because it is really difficult and we do not underestimate that. There are lots of things that could be done and could be done better.
There was a service justice review, and I know we are expecting some further responses to the recommendations in that review, but that was published in February and it had taken two years to get to. That contained some really interesting ideas about how we could improve service policing and the quality of prosecutorial decision making. I know that there are lots of other ideas—ideas about maybe getting greater degrees of civilian oversight and input into military policing overseas, or possibly having judicial oversight of decisions to detain insurgents and reviews of those kinds of decisions. It would have been more sensible to have those discussions first and then look at what was needed by way of amendments to the criminal law. It feels very much—we have heard this a couple of times today—that this is a cart before the horse situation.
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: I would add my agreement to that. APIL’s concern is that the impact assessment does not go far enough and is not clear. I would welcome a pause so that a proper impact assessment can be taken and further expert evidence explored.
Thank you both. My colleague, Kevan Jones, wants to come in quickly on investigations as well.
Q
Emma Norton: I do not think you can have a set time limit for an investigation. I think an investigation needs to take as long as it takes, as long as it is being conducted expeditiously. The problem with the original responses to allegations of really serious abuse overseas was that those allegations were not responded to sufficiently, certainly in accordance with our convention-compliant obligations, which are that they needed to be sufficiently independent, sufficiently well-resourced, sufficiently prompt, adequate—all those kinds of things. I do not think that setting an arbitrary time limit on what would be criminal investigations is necessarily helpful. If we think about how police conduct criminal investigations domestically, although there are time limits in terms of issues around police bail and things like that, there are no hard and fast time limits within which police need to complete those investigations, although obviously they should do them as quickly as possible, because otherwise the defendant is prejudiced.
Q
Emma Norton: In terms of how that would function overseas, I can see the benefit. It may be that when you have sufficient levels of civilian input into those investigations or oversight into those investigations, or judicial oversight into decisions to detain in theatre, then that may not be necessary; you could inject that level of requisite independence in those ways. This is something that would really benefit from a wider consultation with experts in criminal law and procedure, who are experienced in criminal law and procedure but also in the challenges of having investigations overseas. We have not had that.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: I am sorry, I cannot comment on criminal matters.
Emma Norton: I am not an expert in international criminal law, but if an otherwise credible allegation of a war crime was not proceeded with because of the Bill, that by definition increases the risk that those matters would be taken up by the ICC. That is something, of course, that our Judge Advocate General Jeff Blackett has very real concerns about and has spoken about. I know a lot of others also have very serious concerns about that.
We have heard a lot about veterans and their understandable fear and anxiety. We have heard less from very senior and formerw members of the armed forces who are really concerned about these provisions—the criminal side of the Bill as well as the civil side—and feel they are not in accordance with the Army’s values and standards. The message the Bill will project to the rest of the world about how the Army wishes to conduct itself is really serious, and they feel quite despairing about it. I was speaking to a former brigadier this morning who served 36 years, and he said that he was really ashamed of the Bill. So I think there is a real concern.
Q
Emma Norton: What is necessary is for what happened in the past never to happen again—definitely. I just do not think that the Bill will fix it, for the reasons I have given. I will not go over them again, but they go to the lack of willingness inside the MOD to look at those allegations at the time.
I think we are in a different place now. The MOD has learned a huge amount from all those errors. I would say that the MOD has learned from some of the litigation; there have been some very positive outcomes from that, and that is missing from the debate. I just do not think that the Bill fixes those problems sufficiently.
Q
Emma Norton: Hilary Meredith mentioned this morning that the ombudsman could have a role here. I think she was looking at whether some sort of compensation or ex gratia payment scheme could be made or some form of redress could be given to the soldiers subjected to this cycle of investigation. That was a really interesting idea. I know that, separately, the ombudsman is very under-resourced, so that would need a whole separate discussion as well.
The interplay with the service justice system is something you should ask the Judge Advocate General about when you speak to him later, because—obviously—he has huge amounts of experience of issues arising where somebody is not convicted of the main charge but is perhaps convicted of a lesser charge under the court martial.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: Good afternoon. I think it is a feature of military claims that service personnel are largely unaware of their legal rights to bring a civil claim. I often find in my own practice—many of our members have also reported this—that they will, in fact, be misinformed of their legal rights. This may be because there is confusion in their chain of command. Indeed, we have heard of many cases in which the chain of command will misinform them and say that they should wait until the end of their service before bringing a civil claim, which usually means that they are out of time by the time they bring a claim. In other cases there is confusion between civil claims and the armed forces compensation scheme, which is a separate, no-fault scheme, which has a much longer period of time in which to apply—normally seven years. In answer to your direct question, I think they are very unaware and, in fact, a lot of the time they are misinformed.
Q
Emma Norton: Just that that is entirely my experience as well. I have not advised people about overseas claims, but I advise them about claims arising in other respects, and that is a very, very common observation, yes.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: There is often a delay. In fact, I have dealt with many hundreds of inquiries, or at least many of the lawyers who APIL and I work with have dealt with many hundreds of inquiries, that are many, many years out of time. You will have calls from service personnel who have just finished their 22 years in service, and they will call up and inquire about the opportunity to bring a civil claim, and you have to tell them that actually they are about a decade out. So, it does vary, but more often than not they are quite a few years out of time.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: Absolutely—forgive me for interrupting you, but absolutely I think they could. In fact, at the moment I do not think that they do anything to inform service personnel of their rights to bring a civil claim. I am not suggesting that as an organisation they should be shouting from the rooftops and saying to service personnel, “You should really explore your opportunity to sue us”. However, I think that the Ministry of Defence has an obligation under the armed forces covenant to be fair to service personnel. They do provide them with information about the AFCS, but, as I said, there is a much longer period of time to claim under that scheme.
I think that we also need to bear it in mind that service personnel are quite unique legal creatures in a way. For example, they are not allowed, if we are comparing them to civilians, to join a trade union. So, if you were a civilian and you were injured, you might speak to your trade union and get some advice about what claims you might bring. They may even point you in the direction of a solicitor. That often does not happen with service personnel. So, yes, I think the MOD needs to address this and be fairer with service personnel about the information available to them.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: I think that the Bill, as drafted, is potentially in danger of breaching the armed forces covenant, and I will explain why. As I mentioned earlier, service personnel are quite unique legal creatures. They do not actually have the same legal rights as civilians. So, just to take an example, service personnel have very limited rights to bring a claim in the employment tribunal, save for issues such as discrimination. However, if this Bill were to be passed, they would not—beyond the six-year longstop—be able to rely on section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 in respect of civil claims. They would not be able to bring those claims, which may be worthy but are actually brought very late in the day, whereas civilians might have the opportunity to use section 33 of the 1980 Act.
Of course, the other aspect of the Bill is the stripping away of reliance on the European convention of human rights. So, in many senses, if this Bill were to pass, service personnel would have less civil rights and less human rights. By analogy, they will have less rights than a prisoner, so I do not see how that squares with the armed forces covenant. I am very concerned about that.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: If I may, I will answer your question in two answers, because I think that there are two parts to it. The first is the difference between the date of knowledge and the date of diagnosis. The date of knowledge is the date when the courts will infer that a claimant realises that they have a significant injury and makes the connection between that injury and the person whose fault it was. The three-year time limit in civil claims starts from that date of knowledge. A date of diagnosis is a factor that may be taken into account when the court considers the date of knowledge. The court may assume that, if somebody is diagnosed with a condition and is told by a doctor what they have, that will move them a long way toward obtaining their date of knowledge. I think that there has been some confusion about that in some aspects of discussions.
Could I ask you to repeat the second part of your question, please?
How clear cut are those questions about the date of knowledge and the date of diagnosis?
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: They are not clear cut at all. In fact, they are incredibly complex, because it is about the date of knowledge relating to a particular claim by that particular service person in their circumstances. The facts will change from case to case. You cannot prepare arguments for this sort of thing. You have to assess their merits on a case-by-case basis. They are very complex arguments, and they may well lead to satellite litigation within civil claims.
I wish not to take up too much time on this question, but I will just explain that normally in civil claims you issue a claim and it will proceed on the way. It will take a certain amount of time, evidence will be exchanged and you will end up in trial. When you have date-of-knowledge arguments or limitation arguments, it may well encourage the courts to order a split trial, or indeed the parties to apply for one, so that this issue of the deadline is determined first. That invariably leads to increased costs, in my experience.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: Invariably. The MOD has very robust lawyers who do a good job. Like any lawyer, they look to take advantage of the law and to act in their client’s best interests. I am certainly not suggesting that they are doing anything wrong by using these arguments. However, I have never had a case—never—in almost a decade of litigating exclusively against the Ministry of Defence in which limitation is an issue and the lawyers have not raised it or sought to take advantage of that argument in order to either strike out my client’s case or to negotiate a settlement downwards. My answer to your question is: invariably.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: That is a difficult question to answer. I think it will definitely have an impact. I do not think that the impact statement that has been released really explores it fully, because it ignores a large proportion of civil claims brought against the Ministry of Defence, which may include elements of overseas operations.
If I can give you just a quick example, the impact study does not take into account noise-induced hearing loss claims. These are complex claims that may involve exposure to harmful noise at any point of the serviceperson’s service, and at different points of overseas operations in different countries. The impact study that has been released ignores all of those claims. In the last year alone, I think the figures released by the Ministry of Defence suggested that 1,810 claims relating to noise-induced hearing loss were brought against the MOD.
My answer to your question is that I think there will be an impact, but we do not know the extent of that impact, and that needs to be explored further.
Q
Emma Norton: We are talking about civil claims. I am not aware of any evidence that the courts cannot do that. They do it all the time; it is a fairly standard part of civil law procedure. Civil procedure rule 3.4—I think—says that if a claim discloses no reasonable prospect of success, the defendant can apply for strike-out, and the strike-out can be given. There are some really good examples of that happening where the MOD has been the beneficiary. A good example was the second batch of the Kenya litigants’ claims, which were thrown out a few years ago now. Something like 40,000 claims were dismissed on the basis that they were too old and it would be unfair on the defendant, which was the Ministry of Defence, to defend the claims because it no longer had the evidence available to have any reasonable prospect of defending them. The courts are perfectly capable of striking out stale claims and they do it all the time.
I want to pick up on a couple of Ahmed’s points, which were excellent. The point about the Limitation Act is really important. The Limitation Act contains a range of different criteria that, in my opinion, are duplicated by the new criteria that are set down in the Bill. Section 33 of the Limitation Act enables the court to consider whether allowing the claim out of time is going to prejudice the defendant, in particular, or anybody else. It requires the court to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, which would include the fact that the claim arose from overseas operations, and all the difficulties and complexities of that environment. I think the courts have more than enough powers.
Q
Emma Norton: No, they do not, and I respectfully disagree with the previous witnesses on that issue.
In the Smith case, which Dr Morgan cited, the Supreme Court made it very clear that the principle of combat immunity is absolutely sound. In that case, the Ministry of Defence was trying to expand combat immunity to cover a range of factors that the court said were never intended to be covered by that. It was just heat of battle, in theatre. The families of the deceased—remember, they were young soldiers who got into those Land Rovers, or other vehicles that had been procured, and suffered dreadful injuries and death—wanted to challenge the decisions made by individuals back here in Whitehall, behind a desk, to procure that equipment for use in Iraq. That was the decision that they wanted to challenge. All the court said was that combat immunity did not go that far. It has not been chipped away or reduced. So no, I do not agree with that.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: I am not going to comment on the criminal aspect, but from my perspective there is a need to protect service personnel from spurious criminal claims, which we are looking into. That brings forward a lot of people who want this Act in place. I am not sure whether that is the incentive behind part 2 of the Bill, which is the civil aspect.
I can share with you, as a representative of APIL, that many of our members have many hundreds of clients who are service personnel. I have been doing this for a long time. The people we act for come to us seriously injured and needing compensation. The tools that are available to us as lawyers are the civil claim route and the Human Rights Act. If you start taking those rights away from veterans and service personnel then you will be, in my view, doing them an injustice.
I do not envy you. I can see that this a fierce debate and there are different sides to the argument. I would caution that that should be a sign to all of us that there should be a pause to the Bill and further exploration. I wonder to what extent the confusion is caused by the fact that the Bill tries to do two things. It tries to resolve the issues in respect of criminal law and it also addresses civil issues, which are incredibly different. That is a cautionary word that I would pass to you.
Emma Norton: We heard some compelling and moving testimony this morning. I was particularly struck by the gentleman from the British Armed Forces Federation—in fact, both witnesses spoke about the fear in the veteran community about being dragged off to court and having knocks on the door at 3 o’clock in the morning. Both of them indicated that they felt that that fear was ill founded and based on misunderstandings of what is actually happening.
Looking at the number of prosecutions that have actually been brought, let alone the number of convictions, it is quite stark. It is a very small number, and it is not reflected in the level of fear and anxiety in the veteran community. I do not underestimate that, but I think the question becomes: what do we do to meet that fear and anxiety? How do we reduce it? We reduce it by being honest with them about the real extent of the problem and by addressing the causes of the problem, which were the failures, early in the day, which the Minister acknowledged—the early failures to investigate these allegations. Had that happened, the unfairly accused would have been exonerated years ago and the victims would have had justice as well.
That is my concern about the Bill: veterans think that they want it, and I understand that, but I am not entirely sure. Indeed, the previous witnesses all agreed that it does not address the issue of investigations—the Attorney General for Northern Ireland has said it does not address the issues of investigations.
Q
You say these things amplify the fear. The veteran community is very small, so we all know someone who is expecting a knock on the door. That is really amplified, because there is a brotherhood and sisterhood that has gone through the forces. When one person is affected, everybody is affected. Nothing has been brought in so far, and now we are at the start point. A major fear I have is that I keep hearing people saying stop. It has taken decades to get here. I do not know how long I will be a politician, but if I have a long career, we could still be saying stop, because people will never find a perfect Bill.
I hear what you are saying, but I think it goes against what the veteran community wants and is crying out for. As you have heard today, and with the greatest respect—I value what you are saying—every person we are seeing has a different view on this. As politicians, we need to find the best way to get the Bill through. If the Bill were to be stopped, I know the absolute lack of trust and heartbreak that the veteran community would feel. We have to use what we have and move that forward. I respect what you have said, but I felt that it was important to express how the heart of the veteran community is feeling about this.
Emma Norton: I do understand that. You say that every person that has appeared before you has a different view; in fact, it has been a running thread throughout all of this. Everybody seems to agree that the problem is the lack of independence in those early investigations, and we still have a lot of questions, and need to have discussions, about how to improve that. If we addressed that, it would be a much safer basis to proceed and face the future. It would also be litigation-proof for the MOD; if you have investigations that are solid, independent and secure, they would be litigation-proof. That would be good for the victims, and it would be excellent for the soldiers.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: Yes, I believe so. What you are giving veterans with one hand, you are taking away with the other. That is a confused approach to legislation, and I am very concerned about it. Does that answer your question?
Q
Emma Norton: I do not have much to add to that, except to say that I agree and that it is quite extraordinary that part 2 will only benefit the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Defence is the defendant in all those claims. That is quite extraordinary.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: There is definitely a risk with any hard stop. APIL’s main concern is that taking away the flexibility of section 33 is a real danger. You are touching on accountability here; I heard your question to the previous academics about that, and it is important.
May I share an example from a case of mine? It was the wife of a serviceperson who died in Iraq in 2005. At the time he died—he died in a Snatch Land Rover due to an improvised explosive device—she had no idea whatsoever that the Ministry of Defence was culpable in any way. It was not until more than a decade later, when the Chilcot report came out, that fingers started to be pointed towards the Ministry of Defence. That report stated that the provision of Snatch Land Rovers was woeful and put service personnel’s lives at risk.
The wife later sought to bring a civil claim for her and her children. At that stage, 10 years after the death, her claim was already technically out of time. We had further delays because she was dealing with cancer and going through treatment. That sounds like quite an exceptional case, but we have had similar situations—I brought a claim that technically was out of time, and if this Bill had been in place, that claim could not have proceeded. The claim was settled for several hundred thousand pounds, and brought her some justice and some compensation.
I mention that example for two reasons. First, you are talking about the accountability of these investigations that take so long; secondly, adding to that the complexity and problems of a Bill that introduces a longstop is opening the doors to some real problems here.
Emma Norton: May I make a quick point on that? Another thing that is overlooked is the benefit of some of this litigation that we are discussing now to soldiers and the MOD more widely. The Snatch Land Rovers are a good example of that, because those Land Rovers are no longer used in those kinds of conflict. If those families had not brought those claims, we would not be in this much-improved situation. That is an example of the positive outcomes of litigation, and that is worth reminding you of.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: Yes, potentially. It would not encourage people to come forward and bring claims. It is normally a very brave lawyer who takes on a case that is out of time in the first instance; the reason section 33 is there is that it allows flexibility only in the most exceptional of cases. If you were to take that away and introduce this Bill, you would see less litigation on these issues. Emma raises an important point; it is certainly my experience and the experience of our members that it is primarily through litigation that organisations such as the MOD listen and change. That is one of the aspects of removing those protections that causes us great concern.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: That is one of the big problems with this Bill: it will encourage a great deal more argument. As I said in my answer to the previous question, I think the Ministry of Defence will seek to use this Bill to strike out claims. Using noise-induced hearing loss as an example, as you did, that is a very typical injury that service personnel suffer. They normally get compensated through the AFCS, but where there is negligence, they can get significant compensation. By “negligence”, I mean where the Ministry of Defence has, for example, not provided sufficient training or sufficient equipment to protect that serviceperson’s ears.
Those exposures to harmful noise can happen throughout a career. It becomes very complex, because as a lawyer you are investigating the entirety of someone’s career, with their medical records in one hand and their personnel file in the other. You are looking at overseas operations, maybe in Iraq or Afghanistan, and you have to explore whether they were exposed to a certain level of noise that may have been harmful. If I can put it simply, they are complicated enough as they are. Introducing this Bill will only do two things: it will increase the challenge to service personnel in bringing claims, and it will complicate claims unnecessarily.
Q
Emma Norton: No, I do not have anything to add on that. I was just going to say that there are often references to the armed forces compensation scheme, and it might be worth briefly mentioning on behalf of service personnel how dreadful they find it to try to operate that scheme. Ahmed has more experience of this than I do, but a lot of my clients have described to me how bureaucratic, difficult, slow and stressful it is, and it is true to say that the awards you would generally expect to recover from that scheme are significantly lower than those you would expect to recover if you succeeded in court. Ahmed will correct me if I am wrong about that, but I think it is a point worth making.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: I am struggling, to be honest with you. As Emma pointed out, this is all about civil claims that are brought against the Ministry of Defence; it is not about civil claims that are brought against service personnel, so I am really struggling to find any advantage for service personnel. When you are stripping away their access to section 33 of the Limitation Act, you are ignoring those exceptional cases in which a judge may think, “You know what? This case is out of time, but there are really good reasons why we should proceed with it.” It may be for reasons of accountability, which we have touched on, or it may be because that particular claimant deserves some justice. When you start stripping that away and then start stripping away the protections under the Human Rights Act, service personnel are left vulnerable—more vulnerable than civilians, more vulnerable than prisoners. I do not understand what advantage they are getting out of this.
Emma Norton: I agree with that. I do not have anything to add to that.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: There are, sir. They are published by the MOD on an annual basis. The MOD split the figures according to the type of claim that is being brought. What you are looking for is what they term employer’s liability claims. The figures are available online. I am happy to provide them, but I am sure you have quicker access to them than I do.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: They do split them. I do not have them to hand, unfortunately, but they separate them out, so maybe you will glean more from that. I am sorry that I cannot assist further. My understanding is that the Bill will affect the vast majority of the civil claims that are brought against the Ministry of Defence, which are the employer’s liability claims. The main provisions that the MOD break them down into are non-freezing cold injury claims, which are a mainstay of civil claims that are brought, and are in relation to negligent cold exposures, and noise-induced hearing loss, in relation to negligent exposure to loud noises. The others relate to industrial disease—things like asbestos—and then they have a quota that is defined as “other”. With a freedom of information request, we may be able to dive a bit more into those statistics. I hope that helps.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: That is a very good question. It depends on what they agree with their lawyer. In the industry, the norm is to provide something called a conditional fee agreement. Where you can establish that a claim has good prospects of success, you may, as a lawyer, offer a service person’s family, in relation to your example, a CFA, where you do not charge them unless you win. It is conditional on certain terms. These days, there are a lot of rules that regulate how much lawyers can charge. Normally, for example, and taking a rule of thumb, they cannot exceed the damages that you recover for the individual. In the past, there were fewer constraints on the extent of lawyers’ fees.
There are lots of lawyers out there who are specialists and who offer no win, no fee agreements to service personnel and their families. The only way that service personnel or their families may be required to pay legal costs normally is that they sometimes have to pay a chunk of their costs, related to what lawyers would define as unrecovered costs, which are things that they cannot recover from the Ministry of Defence, but as long as the claim is successful, in this context, it would be the Ministry of Defence that pays the lawyer’s bill. I hope that answers your question.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: It depends on the terms offered by the lawyers. They can vary, typically between 15% and 25% of the damages that are recovered. There are certain caps, but that is typically what you might find in the industry.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: As I am representing APIL, I would not be able to share specific numbers, but I am very happy to share my experiences on section 33. I would say that it is a small fraction of cases that are pursued that will have to rely on section 33.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: To give you an idea, it may be that two out of 100 cases that we manage would be at risk of being out of time—maybe 5% at most. On whether or not you succeed with a section 33 argument, well, the only time I went to court on a section 33 argument, I lost. I took it to the Court of Appeal, and I lost there, too. I think that might indicate to you how difficult it is to succeed there. The judges really do not engage in a liberal application of section 33.
As a lawyer, if you are partaking on a case that is out of time, you need to be brave, and it is very rare. Often or not, in some of these cases where there is a section 33 argument, they may be settled along the way, but the fact that the claim is out of time might be a factor that affects the settlement figure. I hope that answers your question.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: In answer to your direct question, yes, it is incredibly rare that you use it, but that is dependent on the lawyer and whether they are willing to take on riskier cases. On the whole, it is not something that lawyers engage in easily. But the key about section 33 is that you will come across those cases, like the one I explained earlier involving the widow of the serviceperson, where they are demanding justice. They are worthy cases, and you use section 33 because that is the flexibility in the system. That is the conduit through which judges can achieve justice, even if you are out of time.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: That depends on the definition of win. What is interesting is that most of the claims—civil claims in this area—will tend to settle. The MOD will publish, with the same document I mentioned earlier, the figures in respect of settlements that it pays out. I think that last year it spent £131 million in respect of compensation and legal costs. I do not think it has separated what is legal costs—
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: I could not give you an accurate estimate here. I am a representative of APIL, representing hundreds of solicitors across the country in this field. It may be that I can provide written evidence, if that would assist the Committee.
That would be welcome, thank you.
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: Of course. I am sorry that I could not assist you immediately.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: I have no idea. They may need to rely on charity. They may need to rely on family. They have very limited options. Actually, they often have a big challenge: they need to find a specialist in this field to begin with, because it is not easy to sue the Ministry of Defence and it is not easy to understand the specialties and complexities of such cases. They will often go to another lawyer for a second opinion, and one hopes that that lawyer would take on their case, but there are no guarantees, and particularly on cases that are out of time. You may be going around the houses to tens of lawyers who will all say to you, “I’m really sorry, but you are out of time. There is nothing I can do for you.” That is one of my concerns with the Bill.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: I would say, on average, in my own practice, probably between 70% and 80% of inquiries that come in will be rejected because they are out of time. Forgive me, that is anecdotal and off the top of my head. I was not expecting that question but, if it gives you an idea, the vast majority of the inquiries we get are from people who are frankly out of time.
Q
Ahmed Al-Nahhas: It should not—it definitely should not. You are taking away legal rights from service personnel who already have fewer legal rights as it is. You really are stripping the tree there.
If no other Member wishes to ask a question, I thank both our witnesses for their contributions to the Committee this afternoon. Thank you very much indeed.
Examination of Witnesses
Martha Spurrier and Clive Baldwin gave evidence.
Q
Martha Spurrier: Hi, everyone. I am Martha Spurrier and I am a lawyer and the director of the human rights organisation Liberty.
Clive Baldwin: I am Clive Baldwin, senior legal adviser with the international organisation Human Rights Watch. It is perhaps also relevant to the Committee that I was previously involved in training the UK armed forces and other armed forces on detention practices and international law.
Thank you. We are expecting a vote in the House imminently; I will have to suspend proceedings for about 15 minutes in that event. We will begin the questioning with Chris Evans.
Q
Given that the Government have managed to exclude sexual offences from the Bill, do you see any reason why torture should not similarly be excluded?
Clive Baldwin: No, there should be no reason. Not just torture but other international crimes should not be excluded, particularly war crimes, crimes against humanity and, indeed, any other international crimes, such as enforced disappearances that the UK is obliged to investigate and prosecute. For the reasons given by the Secretary of State, sexual offences have no place in armed conflict, and neither does torture or war crimes. The exemption should be very clear. Even in international crimes, particularly war crimes, it is a very clear principle of international armed conflict law that there should be no statute of limitations on war crimes, because of the difficulties in investigating them. Anything that starts to look like a statute of limitations on war crimes risks the UK violating its international obligations.
Martha Spurrier: I entirely agree. I cannot see any legal or moral justification for not including torture and other war crimes in that schedule.
Q
Clive Baldwin: The triple lock, as it is set out, is quite worrying, particularly for those international crimes, because it seems to be creating a block to prosecution. The first element is the five-year limit, together with the presumption against prosecution, which is quite unique. I am not aware of any other country having something similar, especially for those international crimes.
The third part of it—the increase in the powers of the Attorney General—is a position that we at Human Rights Watch have objected to for some time. The Attorney General is an unreformed legal position that essentially remains a member of the Government and should therefore have no role in determining individual decisions on prosecutions, although of course the Attorney General still has some of those powers. The increase in the power to effectively block prosecutions gives the risk of all this appearing to be a political attempt to make it extremely difficult in an exceptional situation—as the draft Bill says—for war crimes, torture and other international crimes to be prosecuted.
The second element in the triple lock is the taking of facts into account. Those are relevant factors—the situation on the ground and the situation of forces personnel—but those are situations that should be taken into account anyway, particularly when prosecuting war crimes, as war crimes are designed to be crimes that apply on the battlefield and in situations of armed occupation. There are many other issues that should be taken into account as well, not least the need for justice, the seriousness of the offence and the seniority of the person responsible.
Martha Spurrier: On the stated intent and whether the triple lock is a rational answer to that stated intent, as far as I understand it the stated intent of this Bill as a whole is to deal with so-called vexatious claims. It is clear from the statistics that it is not a significant number of civil claims that are, in fact, properly termed as vexatious. Of course, it is also important not to conflate civil and criminal cases. There is not really such a thing as a vexatious criminal case. That would bring suggestion that the state was abusing its powers in prosecuting something, and I do not understand that that is being suggested.
The way to meet that stated intent is to deal with the inefficacy of investigations as they currently stand; it is not to impose a triple lock on dealing with very serious crimes committed by military personnel. That deals with an entirely different proposition, one that we say is deeply problematic—that there is no justification for the five-year time limit, no justification for a list of factors to be taken into account by a prosecutor, which exclude things like the public interest in upholding the accountability of the military and the public interest in victims having their voices heard, and there is no public interest in there being an Attorney General’s veto in what is often a very highly politicised context.
The triple lock does not meet the stated intent, but in and of itself it is not something that Liberty and other organisations can stand by, because it amounts to a chilling effect on prosecutions for serious crimes and effectively a culture of impunity in the armed forces.
Q
Martha Spurrier: Absolutely. If you have a triple lock on prosecution, it must be right that your intention is to make prosecutions harder to bring. If you have been the victim of an injustice, whether that is because you are a civilian victim abroad or you are a serving man or woman who has been the victim of an abuse of justice by the UK military, those three locks on you getting justice could very easily act as a bar. They are an additional three hurdles that an ordinary, if you like, victim of crime would not have to cross in order to seek justice, accountability and punishment for what they have suffered.
Q
Clive Baldwin: Absolutely. Particularly in the situation of crimes that may have been committed overseas, it is very difficult for victims to achieve justice, for many understandable reasons, in those cases. This makes it even more difficult, in that after five years it becomes the exception rather than the rule to prosecute. This is just focusing on part 1, the criminal side. It does run the serious risk of creating injustice.
Q
Clive Baldwin: No, I am not aware of any international law or even system that has something like that. Some countries have statutes of limitations—absolute time limits for the prosecution of minor offences, or relatively minor offences. Certainly, when it comes to war crimes, as I have said, there is a very strong international law, under the law of armed conflict, that there should be no limitation period for war crimes.
As you say, this is quite a strange law. It would create a very strange situation and I think, as Martha was saying, that it will have a very chilling effect, not just on prosecutions but even on criminal investigations, because those doing the investigation will know that there will be a presumption against prosecution.
Q
Clive Baldwin: Internationally, there are standards, as with the independence of the judiciary, that prosecutors should be independent and not subject to interference by politicians or Ministers on individual cases. Of course, Ministers may be at the head of the prosecution system. Some countries do this better than others, and there are very different types of systems. In the United States, for example, Attorneys General are elected, which creates its own political problems. However, the move has generally been very much towards making prosecutors, and that prosecutorial decision to prosecute or not, as robustly independent as possible.
One country that had a similar system to the UK was Kenya. When it had a major constitutional reform, it made sure that the Attorney General became a very apolitical, non-political position, because of the importance of the Attorney General in making these decisions about prosecutions.
Q
Clive Baldwin: Yes. As an organisation that works very closely on international criminal justice, including with the International Criminal Court, I would say that this Bill, unamended, would probably significantly increase the risk of UK service personnel and others facing investigations from the International Criminal Court, or perhaps in other countries, on the principle of universal jurisdiction for international crimes such as war crimes and torture—universal jurisdiction being that principle that a crime like torture should be prosecuted anywhere. There is a duty under international law that countries have to criminalise, or make it possible to prosecute, or extradite, anyone suspected of torture found in their territory.
The Bill, unamended, would increase that risk because it does not exclude all forms of international crimes—war crimes and torture. The International Criminal Court and others will consider whether the UK is willing and able to genuinely prosecute such offences, and given that the Bill would include those offences, would create this triple lock and would create effectively a presumption against prosecution after five years for those offences, it creates the serious risk that the UK would not be considered willing to prosecute offences after five years. That would increase the risk that the ICC or other countries would seek to prosecute such offences.
Martha Spurrier: I agree. The phrase to remember is that, when looking at whether to prosecute, the ICC will think about whether the home country is willing and able to bring forward a prosecution. If you have a stated legislative intention from Parliament, with a triple lock and with a schedule that you have said you are not going to include torture and war crimes in, that telegraphs pretty clearly to the ICC and others that the UK Government and UK prosecutors are unwilling and unable, and therefore that those prosecutions would have to take place elsewhere.
Q
The Bill obviously extends beyond the traditional battlefield. Are you thinking of areas where we have deployed UK troops on peacekeeping missions and they may or may not have committed offences there? That is just an example.
Clive Baldwin: It is difficult to say; I have not seen any indication from the Government of where they would intend this. Of course, if the Government made a very specific commitment to exclude all international crimes, they could exclude new international crimes. Enforced disappearances would be one, and perhaps others that might arise and that the UK may sign up to. However, I worked for several years in Kosovo on justice issues during the peacekeeping operations and, as you mentioned, in situations of peacekeeping many issues arise about day-to-day crimes—traffic offences, even, and elsewhere—that the Government may or may not choose to exclude, depending on the nature of the peacekeeping mission.
If a peacekeeping force is part of building a justice system and there is a functioning justice system in the country, it may be that the Government may choose to make some of those crimes part of it. On a wider picture, giving that power to the Secretary of State, when it is done on an ad hoc basis, mission by mission, will produce uncertainty and lack of clarity about what crimes will be prosecuted. That is something it is quite important to be really clear on, because if anything is amended in the Bill now, it is a very clear and simple statement that no international crimes are part of this Bill; they are all excluded.
Martha Spurrier: The danger of secondary legislation for lawyers is, of course, that, as the Committee will be aware, it simply does not receive the parliamentary scrutiny that primary legislation would. The very real concern with this delegated power is that, as Clive said, you could end up taking away or adding really serious international crimes; you could also conceivably say that the Minister might, by secondary legislation, make changes to the Human Rights Act. That would be pretty unprecedented in parliamentary terms. We have seen over the past few months with the coronavirus regulations how much the state can do without parliamentary authority. We are deeply concerned about the extension of the use of secondary legislation to make such substantive changes that will impact on people’s rights.
Q
Clive Baldwin: No, for the reasons you say. My organisation works a lot on these situations of violent conflict and the intersect between human rights law and the law of armed conflict, and we are seeing a breakdown in what is the beginning and the end of an armed conflict, what is the battlefield and what decisions are made in which country—you mentioned drones, but there are other decisions made within a country, and cyber-warfare is coming.
The artificial distinction of an overseas operation with a clear beginning, a clear theatre and a clear end is one that is very much breaking down. The distinction of when an armed conflict begins and ends is becoming murkier in many ways, especially non-international armed conflict. The idea of having one rule for overseas operations and one for domestic operations will be increasingly artificial, and that lack of clarity about the real application of such situations and such laws will be another danger of this Bill.
Martha Spurrier: The definition, as Clive says, is unclear but it is also over-broad. In my mind, there is no justification for including in that definition things such as peacekeeping missions. What the definition should be focused on is restricting those powers to active hostilities, which could then include, as you say, a future-looking way of envisaging modern warfare, but should still be restricted only to active hostilities. There is simply no justification for taking these extraordinary powers any wider.
Q
Clive Baldwin: Speaking from personal experience in Kosovo and Bosnia, and from the experience of my organisation, the rules and laws that apply to overseas armed forces in these operations vary very much from time to time. You may have formal peacekeeping operations, where the armed forces have to act as domestic police officers and do domestic policing work, or you may have a strange and unclear overlap. To some degree, that was the situation in Iraq in the last decade, especially as the occupation formally ended after one year in 2004, although British forces remained for four or five years after that with special powers. Sometimes you have stated forces agreements between countries, and sometimes you do not, so it is very unclear. The actual criminal law, and crimes that have been committed by forces or that are alleged to be committed by forces also vary from war crimes in the battlefield to war crimes in occupation, but if you—[Interruption.]
We cannot hear you, Mr Baldwin, because we have a Division in the House of Commons that requires the bell to ring. I am suspending the sitting for 15 minutes and we will come back to your answer to that question. The Clerks will remain in the room, so if there are any unexpected issues they will remain in contact with you.
We are formally resuming proceedings. I ask Chris Evans to continue his line of questioning. When Mr Jones comes back, I will ask him whether he wants to resubmit the question that he asked before the suspension.
Q
Clive Baldwin: If the Bill were made retrospective, and I think it is not quite clear whether it would be for existing investigations that have not proceeded to prosecutions, but even if it were, I think that creates even more problems. With the ICC, there is currently a preliminary examination, which might then proceed to an investigation, for the reasons previously stated. More broadly, we would say that the Bill does not fix any of the problems about criminal investigations, because part 1 is trying to limit prosecutions, and there have been so few prosecutions in any event. We would say the problem recently in Iraq and Afghanistan lies with the lack of prosecutions dealing with the evidence that some more crimes—limited, but some—were committed. That has been the problem.
Martha Spurrier: I agree with Clive. The Bill is a huge barrier to victims, as I have said, whether they are civilian or service personnel seeking justice. It has no bearing on the problem that it is purporting to solve and it will make accountability for human rights violations and serious crimes harder. To make it retrospective would simply enlarge the scope of what is already going to be a bad law.
Q
Clive Baldwin: Not at all. We have been following and looking at the issues in Iraq, particularly, and in Afghanistan, and not just with the UK, but also with other countries. The problem on the criminal side is that the military criminal justice system has not shown itself fit for purpose in these particular situations of overseas investigations, which are very complex. We need a system that is fair, speedy for size, transparent, effective and independent. We would say that you start with trying to look at the problem and fixing that, so that there are investigations on the criminal side first that are as speedy as possible and fair. Once you fix that, you can look at what other measures might be needed. This problem starts with the prosecution side, which, as I said, has not in itself been the issue, because there have been so few prosecutions.
Martha Spurrier: That is absolutely right. The answer to the stress faced by service personnel is to deal with investigations: to make them thorough, to make them independent, to make them fast, to get them done to a high standard, and also to offer proper support to service personnel and victims. You heard from Major Campbell today, and he has been clear in his public statements that he does not feel that the Ministry of Defence supported him through the repeated investigations he faced. Presenting the Bill as a solution to what people like Major Campbell have faced is, frankly, offensive to the trials he has been through. It is not an answer to that problem. Nowhere on the face of the Bill does it deal with investigations.
Q
Clive Baldwin: To answer the second question on the law of armed conflict, you say “pushed to the limit”, and, as I said on one particular element, if it starts to look like or resemble a statute of limitations on war crimes, that does violate a basic principle of the law of armed conflict. If you are suggesting that anyone would then feel that they could push any other crimes, or commit crimes with impunity, that may or may not be the case, but it would certainly encourage people to delay investigations to cover up, which is something that we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Also, the UK has a fairly poor record in actually prosecuting crimes committed overseas, despite there being public inquiries and investigations. Only when you have some of the clear cases of torture being prosecuted do people become aware of what is or what is not torture. One example from Iraq relates to torture practices, such as sensory deprivation and hooding, that the UK said in Northern Ireland 40—then 40, now 50—years ago were unacceptable, and should not recur. They started recurring in Iraq. You might say that that was because there has not been a clear prosecution of such cases as torture. It took an English judge in one of those civil claims in the past few years to say that these practices should have no place in the 21st century. That is why you need some litigation. Of course, the innocent and the accused who have not committed any crimes also get tarred with the same brush if these investigations go on and nobody gets prosecuted. You need a prosecution to clearly identify the few people responsible for war crimes, and to make sure that those individuals are held responsible and not the armed forces as a whole.
Martha Spurrier: Clive has covered the second question, so I will take the first one. When you start with a Bill that does not deal with the problem you are trying to solve, it is quite difficult to answer the question of how to make it deal with that problem. There are lots of practical things that the Government could do to try to make investigations better. The recommendations from the Service Justice System review would be a good place to start: issues about things such as independence and fast pace, and doing basic investigative things like taking witness statements promptly, gathering forensic evidence effectively, and so on. All of those things can and should be done, and they should be a matter of priority. The Bill cannot and will not do any of those things.
You could amend the Bill to knock off some of its most egregious aspects. You could include torture, war crimes and crimes against humanity in the schedules. You could remove the triple lock by taking away Attorney General consent, by removing the presumption against prosecution in relation to the time limit, and by balancing out the factors that a prosecutor would have to consider before proceeding with a prosecution. That would not cure the Bill and would not make it a good piece of legislation, either from the perspective of accountability, justice and human rights, or from the perspective of trying to solve the problem that the Government purport to be wanting to solve.
Q
Clive Baldwin: To clarify, I was not saying that it would encourage it. I am responding to the question that seemed to be saying, “Would it lead to anyone trying to stretch the law of armed conflict?”. If a law creates impunity for offences and makes sure no one gets prosecuted, it may make those offences more likely. I would repeat that torture was admitted but never prosecuted in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, and the same techniques—the same type of torture—was repeated in Iraq in the 2000s. That is because you need prosecutions. You need people to be aware that they will face prosecutions for an offence. If they perceive that an offence will not be prosecuted after five years, it will make it more likely even for the investigations to be delayed to that moment and for offences not to be seen as, very clearly, “This is criminalised. This is unacceptable. These are crimes that will be prosecuted.”
Q
Clive Baldwin: I do not think anyone would be briefed. When I was involved in training the armed forces in detention we were very clear, and everyone was very clear—these are the crimes. What has been interesting, as well, though, is that there are some elements which are just, traditionally, not being prosecuted in the United Kingdom. One of the keys is that senior people do not get prosecuted for war crimes in the United Kingdom—senior military people, even Government Ministers—under the principle of command responsibility, which is an international element of war crimes. It was put into the International Criminal Court Act 2001 in the UK, but to my knowledge and others’ no one has even been investigated under that.
It was only when I used to brief people in this country and other countries about that element, people sit up and take notice, because it makes people aware that as a commander you could be criminally liable if you fail to prevent war crimes or if you fail to prosecute them. It is elements like that—you only become aware of that when you actually see people being prosecuted for it and know that it is liable. Again, if it comes after five years it is much more difficult and there is a presumption against prosecution: that is why the words matter. Something like a presumption against prosecution—it sounds like it would be very difficult, it would be exceptional, to prosecute. That would send a very difficult message, both internally and externally in the rest of the world.
Q
Martha Spurrier: I absolutely would support a Bill that protected service personnel, because, as I am sure you know, Liberty has done a lot of work supporting military personnel and their families to find justice. What I think about this Bill, as I have said, is first that it is setting up a solution to a problem that is often mis-stated; and then the solution does not fit the actual problem.
In my view what service personnel need, to be protected, is to have an absolute assurance that any investigation that they face will be dealt with fairly and independently, and to an extremely high standard. One would hope, therefore, that that would mean that they do not have repeat investigations hanging over their heads for many years, which obviously is an unenviable and miserable situation for any human being to find themselves in—but that Bill will not deal with this.
I appreciate the lens of saying that it will create a culture of impunity, in the sense that I do not think anyone is suggesting that you would go out to the battlefield and commit a crime in the hope that you could delay being noticed for five years; but the fact is that there are plenty of reasons why five years might elapse before an effective independent investigation can be undertaken, either to exonerate someone who has wrongfully been accused, or to convict them. That could go for torture survivors, for example, who are often not able to come forward for a number of years because of the trauma they have faced, and for serving military personnel, who often do not feel able to come forward, including if active hostilities have been continuing for that whole period of time.
I do not think it is about saying, “Well, let’s just bin the Bill, and then do nothing.” There are plenty of constructive things that one can and should do in order to support military personnel. I just do not think that this Bill achieves those things.
Q
Clive Baldwin: It is important to distinguish between the three types of investigation that the MOD and service personnel have faced in the last 20 years. One is public inquiries, which should be about the general situation and general problems. They should be for learning lessons and to find out the truth about what went on. There are then civil claims that are brought against the Ministry of Defence, sometimes by service personnel and sometimes by others who have claimed to be victims, some of which have been upheld and some of which have not. Then there are criminal investigations.
I am not sure about this Bill. Improving investigations would be better done in a wholescale reform of the military criminal justice system, which we hope will happen in the next armed forces Act and has been promised for many years, that is based on rights, fairness to the accused, those investigated and alleged or real victims, and some basic human rights principles, such as double jeopardy, which has already been mentioned. Generally, no one should be prosecuted twice, once finally acquitted or convicted for the same offence, and they should not face repeat investigations for the same offence.
Strengthening of those conditions and some fundamental principles, not just of human rights law but of English tradition, such as habeas corpus, having judges control detention and having every detainee brought before a judge, not only deters abuse but protects those doing the detention, because they can say, “We had a record and the judge controlled the detention.” Records made at the time make it much easier to investigate afterwards. There are a lot of recommendations for the justice system. They are probably better done in a military justice reform Act rather than in this Bill.
Martha Spurrier: I agree with Clive. There are plenty of good and constructive things that one could do to the military justice system in order to make it fairer for all concerned. This Bill does not do that.
There is a danger in saying that the way to cure the deficiencies in the Bill is to effectively add a section on investigations. That would deal with the fact that investigations are missing, but it would not deal with the fact that what you have in the rest of the Bill is a system being set up that creates a culture of impunity in the armed forces. It means that bringing criminal prosecutions for the most serious offences imaginable will become much harder. That is why I think both Clive and I are now saying that this simply is not the vehicle.
This Bill cannot be cured by adding things in about investigations. That is something that will have to be done separately. There is a real danger of losing focus on the egregious parts of this Bill, which will damage the standing of the armed forces abroad and damage the UK’s reputation as a leader in human rights. That is why you have seen many people, including people from the military, coming out with grave concerns about this Bill, whether you take Lord Guthrie or the Judge Advocate General. These are people with high standing in the military who have real concerns about what this piece of legislation could do to the integrity of the British armed forces.
Q
Clive Baldwin: On the international side, which is what my organisation works on—I will be brief, because Liberty’s focus is on this—there are many reasons why claims, brought both by members of the armed forces and by others in different parts of the world, may take some time. We have seen them on rendition cases and others in the last year. It is partly because people may not be aware of damages in a case, or because evidence did not come out, as the only people aware of the crimes that may have been committed were those who suffered them and the persons who were responsible, or because other types of claims could be made. There are many reasons why, particularly for overseas operations, flexibility around time limits would be vital in order to secure justice.
On an international level, particularly when it comes to torture, there are quite a lot of international standards that say countries need to give an effective remedy to people who suffer torture allegations. It needs to be a fair system. Sometimes it is not possible to have trials—this has been mentioned about the Kenya cases from 70 years ago—but it still needs to be a fair system that has a degree of flexibility. Something that looks like a very hard time stop perhaps risks creating some severe injustice.
Martha Spurrier: As someone who has practised law and argued these kinds of cases before judges, equitable is the watchword. Bright-line rules, in the context of what are often extremely complicated textured cases, very rarely give out justice or achieve something equitable for either victims or perpetrators. The courts have a whole range of powers available to them, in [Inaudible] and beyond, to prevent cases from being brought—be it before or after a time limit—if those cases are unmeritorious or are being brought for abusive reasons. For example, you can have your legal aid certificate removed, or your claim can be struck out. You can have your funding withdrawn if any dishonesty offences are proven. There are a whole array of tools that judges can and do use routinely to make sure that justice is done, and that includes justice being done in a timely fashion.
The danger of putting a hard stop is that the kinds of cases that you have alluded to—whether you are talking about noise-induced hearing loss, some other complicated medical issue or an issue entirely beyond the control of any of the parties to the litigation. That case, falling three days the wrong side of that rule, would not be heard even it was a meritorious case. That seems to me to be arbitrary injustice. What should instead continue is judicial discretion over what is equitable for both parties. Of course, both parties will be represented and they can—and, believe me, they do—argue very forcefully on both sides, either to extend or not extend time limits. Again, it feels to me as though people speculate that this is a problem that exists in the justice system, but it is certainly not one that is statistically significant or that I have ever experienced as a lawyer.
Q
Martha Spurrier: Sorry, could you say that again?
Q
Martha Spurrier: Yes, in the sense that at the moment, everyone is equal before the law, and that is how it works. You can pitch up and argue that a case should be struck out because it is out of time, or that it should not be struck out because it is out of time. There is no weighting according to whether you are a civilian, a claimant, a defendant or a member of the armed forces. Of course, the proposal in the Bill is that civilians will be disadvantaged more greatly than service personnel by the longstop. That is an unjustifiable weighting in favour of service personnel, in the same way that the weighting works on the criminal side, where presumption goes all in favour of military personnel and all against victims of military crimes.
Mr Baldwin, do you have a view on that?
Clive Baldwin: I have nothing to add to what Martha said.
Q
Martha Spurrier: If the six-year time limit came in, it would benefit the Ministry of Defence and the Government, because these claims are, by and large, being brought against the Ministry of Defence, either as an employer or as a detaining official, or against the Government as a policy maker. It is absolutely critical that the forces of the state—again, I have acted for countless individuals and families where bringing a claim against the state is no mean feat. You are usually against a range of senior and powerful lawyers, and any additional disadvantage that you face makes it incredibly difficult to seek justice. So, unquestionably, this is a power that plays in favour of the state, and state agencies, and plays against individuals, whether those individuals are service personnel or civilians.
Clive Baldwin: To add to that, it is so clear, when it comes to civil claims, because they are public claims, that the beneficiary of any limit to those powers would be the British Government and normally the Ministry of Defence, because that is what the claims are made against. That includes service personnel bringing claims; it includes people in other countries bringing claims who in some cases have been the subject of abuses. That is the beneficiary. Of course, you still have to have a fair trial, but in most cases it is going to be the MOD.
When it comes to the investigations, the Government, when it is a civil claim, which is not against individual personnel, have a duty of care towards their personnel and ex-personnel. Those are not investigations and claims against those individuals; they may have to give evidence and that has its own degree of severe stress, but it is not a claim against individuals. That is why it is so important to separate the public law issues, the civil claim issues, and the criminal law issues.
Q
Clive Baldwin: On the broader issue of derogation from human rights, that is part of human rights law; that is part of the European convention. It is actually something I proposed in Kosovo 20 years ago—that there would be a derogation then to reflect the realities of the situation and still be able to detain people according to the law. It is also important to realise that derogation is not exempting anyone from human rights law; it is just modifying it to deal with emergency situations. That is the case particularly on detention: it does not remove the need for detention according to law. It does not remove the need for habeas corpus, to bring someone before a judge. It could mean that someone is before a judge within weeks rather than days, perhaps. This does not mean that human rights law does not apply.
Q
Clive Baldwin: Effectively, Governments always have to consider derogation, so I do not think that legally it changes anything. Human Rights Watch proposed some years ago to Government that they should consider this when dealing with the issue of detention overseas. You have to prepare it—I do not know of any situation where a Government has actively declared a state of emergency, which is what you need for derogation, in another country, and a lot of these situations are multinational peacekeeping and other operations, so you cannot really have one rule for the UK armed forces and one for others, normally.
So it is quite a complex situation. Also, derogation changes the law; it changes the law that applies, so again, it should not be done by just a secondary declaration by a Minister or Secretary of State. It would need a change in law. But we would say that preparing for these situations, preparing for detention in armed conflict or peacekeeping, and having a law that is clear is something that people have been saying that the armed forces need for the last 20 years. The armed forces I know say that they want clarity when they go to detain, which means knowing what law they should apply, how they detain and to whom they should apply. Giving them that clarity in advance would be of great interest. Derogation, when applied properly, is a strengthening of human rights law. It is not an exclusion of human rights law, but only when it is applied carefully, properly and not by just some ministerial fiat, as it could risk becoming.
Martha Spurrier: As Clive says, the power to derogate is a really critical part of the human rights framework; it is the power to suspend rights or to restore rights, and that is why it is tied to a state of emergency. Writing that requirement to consider into the Bill, on a narrow view, changes very little in relation to the legal position.
The concern, of course, is when you take a wider view and look at this Bill as a whole, which very much signals the desire to water down the human rights arrangements; and then you look at the wider agenda more generally, which is a Government with a manifesto commitment to update the Human Rights Act and an ongoing process to look at access to judicial review, and whether certain Government decisions should be shielded from that mechanism of accountability.
So, our concern is not so much about the narrow wording of that clause, but about a culture of watering down Executive accountability that crops up manifestly in this Bill but also in other places in the Government’s agenda, which we would say overall will make it very much more difficult for ordinary people—be they soldiers or civilians—to hold powerful people to account.
I will call Carol Monaghan, because we can go on until 5.15 pm, and I want Carol to have the opportunity of asking her questions.
Q
I just want to ask a few questions about part 2 of the Bill. In the briefing sent by Liberty and Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and I think a few other organisations, one thing it says is,
“It is notable that by far the largest proportion of claims against the MOD between 2014 and 2019 were brought by service personnel seeking compensation for injuries.”
I asked the last witnesses about this, as well. Have we got a Trojan horse situation, where part 2 of the Bill has been snuck in off the back of part 1, so veterans and personnel think this Bill is about helping them, but in actual fact it is putting barriers in their way?
Clive Baldwin: The submission was actually from Liberty and Amnesty; I will not have Human Rights Watch take credit for that. However, in some ways, absolutely, by removing the power of anyone, or by having this backstop, to take action against the Ministry of Defence, it will definitely affect members of the armed forces. So, for some it will be removing protection.
Q
Martha Spurrier: This Bill protects the MOD and the Government much more than it protects anybody else.
Q
Martha Spurrier: Yes, I think there are plenty of circumstances in which there would be entirely fair and honest reasons for not starting a claim promptly. The one example that I have already alluded to is the case of noise-induced hearing loss, where an injury may develop over a matter of decades of service, and the date of knowledge may occur after the six-year time limit has already elapsed, and then you may be prohibited from bringing a claim for really no good reason.
That is why you need to be able to have flexibility in the hands of the judiciary when considering these claims. That is not to say that claims that could have been brought promptly but were not should be allowed to proceed; maybe they should not be allowed to proceed. However, that is not what this longstop will do. This longstop will just create a bright line that creates injustice for people who fall the wrong side of it, even though they may have perfectly good reasons for doing so.
Q
Clive Baldwin: Just to add that, although some time limits on civil claims are quite common in systems, there needs to be that element of flexibility or fairness. Can we imagine situations in which there are good reasons not to bring claims within that time limit? Quite a few, particularly for overseas operations in which, as we said, the situations are complex and people may not even be aware of their rights, or rights to bring a claim, until later, or even until they have left the armed forces. That is why the overriding principle has to be one of fairness. People may need to justify why they are bringing a claim later than they could have done, but they may have good reasons to do so, and the judiciary needs that element of flexibility to respond to those situations.
Q
Clive Baldwin: Quite possibly. You would have to ask the veterans. The idea is that the Bill will protect veterans, but as we said, on the civil side, it will clearly take away some rights, and on the criminal side, it will not stop investigations; it may stop prosecutions, but very few have been happening anyway. It increases the risk of international criminal investigations against members of the armed forces and others if the UK does not appear to have a credible system of prosecution of international crimes. Yes, the Bill, in its current state, does not seem to strongly protect veterans and other members of the armed forces from some of the real injustices that some of them have suffered.
Martha Spurrier: I agree with that proposition. The Bill does nothing to deal with slow, ineffective or unfair investigations, which is what service personnel are complaining about. Certainly, the families and the people who Liberty has represented are often bringing cases against the Ministry of Justice or against the Government after years of banging their head against the wall of institutional power. The Bill will do nothing to help those people seek justice and accountability.
If there are no further questions, I thank our witnesses, on behalf of the Committee, for their evidence this afternoon. That brings us to the end of our oral evidence session today. The Committee will meet again in this room at 11.30 am on Thursday to take further evidence.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Leo Docherty.)
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesBefore we move into the evidence session, are there any declarations of interest?
I served with General Nick Parker in the same battalion.
I do not know whether I need to declare this, but I am a member of the British Legion.
It is always best to put these things on the record.
Thank you, Mr Byrne, for joining us in person. Will you say who you are for the record, and who you are here on behalf of?
Charles Byrne: I am Charles Byrne, director general of the Royal British Legion.
We are joined online by General Sir John McColl, who is chairman of the Confederation of Service Charities. Will you also confirm your name and designation for the record, General McColl?
General Sir John McColl: I am General (Retired) John McColl. I am the chairman of Cobseo, the Confederation of Service Charities.
For your information, in case you are not aware, we have a witness here in the room, Mr Charles Byrne, so we will be alternating between you and Mr Byrne. We have some logistical challenges, because we have to adhere to social distancing, so I am sure you will bear with us if those arise. We have until 12.15 for this session. I call on Stephen Morgan to begin the questioning.
Q
Charles Byrne: Thank you for the question. We welcome and understand the good intent behind the Bill. However, we have raised concerns that the six-year longstop could be a breach of the armed forces covenant, because it restricts the ability of armed forces personnel to bring a civil claim against their employer. As far as I understand it, that longstop limit does not apply elsewhere. That is the concern we have exactly.
So it would breach the armed forces covenant, in your view?
Charles Byrne: That is what we think, yes.
Can I put the same question to the general?
General Sir John McColl: First, I absolutely agree with Charles’s support for the intent of the Bill. The pernicious harassment of servicemen by the legal profession following the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan was absolutely disgraceful. We commend the efforts of the Government in bringing forward this legislation to try to address that issue.
In terms of the advantages and disadvantages, we absolutely acknowledge that the six-year cut-off will disadvantage some elements of the community—we understand that it is about 6% of cases. Of course, there is a judgment to be made between that disadvantage and the disadvantage experienced by the 94%, or the significant number of people, who may be subject to harassment. That is the balance of advantage.
I just observe, sitting in front of you as the chairman of the Confederation of Service Charities, that we members of the service charity community are not experts in law, human rights or legislation. Those are the remit of politicians, officials and lawyers. We can talk in broad terms about the interests of our community. We cannot talk about the detail of how to achieve the laudable intent of trying to put a stop to this appalling harassment.
Q
Charles Byrne: Anything that can be done to address the fundamental concern about that six-year longstop. As I say, we support the intent behind the Bill and welcome that the impact on mental health is explicitly called out; that is very good. While there is good there, we think that the Bill could be improved if it is possible to address the six-year longstop that limits the ability to bring civil cases. There is some difficulty in the numbers as well—the 6% that Sir John refers to. We could look into the detail that sits behind that.
General Sir John McColl: We encourage continuing consultation to find ways of ameliorating the difficulties of the 6%. However, we observe that the overriding requirement is to ensure that this harassment ceases.
Q
Charles Byrne: No. To be honest, I have not been through it in detail.
I think the Minister has a follow-up question, which he will have to deliver from the microphone.
Q
You argue that someone serving in the armed forces will have that limitation and will therefore be disadvantaged, breaking the armed forces covenant. Service personnel will of course be able to serve in operations, where they may get killed or lose limbs, and some would argue that that is a disadvantage. The Government would argue that that is a misapplication of the armed forces covenant, and that, actually, if you compare a service person with a civilian in the same situation, there is no breach of the armed forces covenant. What would you say to that?
Charles Byrne: You have always been very clear about welcoming our challenge as a constructive effort, so we have had this conversation before, Minister. Thank you for the chance today.
For me, it is fairly simple. In the armed forces covenant, the principle of no disadvantage is not caveated to say, “It must be no disadvantage in directly comparable situations.” It is a principle of no disadvantage much more generally than that. This Bill would effectively prevent a member of the armed forces from being able to bring a case against their employer, which would be different from a civilian—
Q
Charles Byrne: Not in quite the same way. I was looking at it much more generally—
You do not think it is a disadvantage?
Charles Byrne: I think this Bill would be a breach of the armed forces covenant. If you look at the general principle, when we say that we do not want someone to be disadvantaged by their service, and think of a really straightforward example—one that you will well know—about people who move house regularly because of deployment, they therefore go to the back of the queue for dentistry or primary schools. That is where you are comparing somebody who works nearby—in a shop or a hospital—in a direct comparison, where we do not want the disadvantage. I think it does apply in very general terms.
Q
Charles Byrne: No. The intent behind the armed forces covenant was that there should be no disadvantage, and it looks—
But is being killed a disadvantage?
Charles Byrne: Is that an inherent risk of—
Of military service—I think most people would argue that it is.
Charles Byrne: Exactly.
Sorry.
Charles Byrne: What happens if this Bill goes through is that it protects the Ministry of Defence from civil action—from someone bringing a case. That longstop does not protect the armed forces personnel. Is not that the intent behind the armed forces covenant—not to protect the MOD, but to protect armed forces personnel?
On overseas operations.
Charles Byrne: On overseas operations.
Q
Charles Byrne: Even that number is questionable, though, is it not?
It is not questionable—it is the data.
Charles Byrne: No, it is based upon a sample. Of the 70 cases that fell outside of the six months, only 39 were investigated—not all of them. Of those 39, 17 were found to have—so those were 17 actual cases. There could be another 31 from that sample size, which is taken only from Afghanistan and Iraq, as you know. There is a whole area of exclusions within that. So that number is a little bit—
Well, the numbers are the numbers. We cannot argue with them.
Charles Byrne: They are, but they are questionable numbers, potentially.
Q
Charles Byrne: Is that not exactly what this Bill is potentially doing? It is choosing to apply it in some cases, and not in others.
No, because what we are looking to do is to protect, and to ensure that our servicemen are not disadvantaged.
Charles Byrne: I think it is protecting the MOD, rather than the service personnel—that is the debate that we have had.
Could we go back to constructive questions, rather than an interrogation?
Indeed. I think we will have the opportunity for some of the issues that the Minister has raised in the parliamentary debate and in the subsequent discussion in Committee.
Q
Just to explain it to you, General McColl, that bell is not a fire alarm or for a vote; it signals the fact that the House of Commons has suspended its sitting in the Chamber for three minutes. We will hear another bell shortly, so just be aware of that.
If that one year from point of knowledge was not in there, I would get your argument. I believe that we are here to try and get the best for our service personnel and veterans. However, that one year from point of knowledge has to have the weight. That is why it has been put in there—it could be 20 to 30 years later. We heard the other day about asbestosis. That is not within a six-year period. There will be things that some in the veteran community experience in 20 years that we do not yet know exist.
Charles Byrne: We recognise and understand that there is that point of knowledge, which is a really powerful and important principle in there. Then we look at the recent sample survey of that limited pool of data and we find 19 cases where, even from point of knowledge, they would have fallen outside that six-month period. Even allowing for the point of knowledge, there are still 19 families and veterans who would not have been able to bring a case under the Bill.
Q
There has to be education about the Bill as well. I really respect the work your organisation does, but within and outside the military there is a need to educate our troops and let people know about this. How do we connect with people who are now 60 or 70 years of age and let them know about the point of knowledge? It is not all about the Bill. I believe we have a role to educate the community, which we know well, about the point of knowledge. At the armed forces breakfasts and through all the different routes of communication, we can try to reduce that number. There will always be people who fall through, but we should do everything to stop them and there is a role for education. Do you see that role?
Charles Byrne: The Legion was always the organisation that championed and brought the armed forces covenant into law, so education is part of that. In an ideal world, we would get all that is good in the Bill and we would also address this area of concern, because we would not want anybody to fall out of that. We are looking to make sure that no veteran or member of the armed forces community is disadvantaged by a six-year stop, even allowing for the point of knowledge. It does not exist today. If we were to introduce it, it would be a limit that does not exist today.
Q
Charles Byrne: Can you say that again?
Do you think a legally binding covenant is compatible with what we see in the Bill, in terms of the proposals that will be brought before Parliament next year?
Charles Byrne: It is an interesting question. On the general principle of strengthening the force of the armed forces covenant, I welcome that. In all honesty, on the considerations of how this might play out in that situation, I cannot give you an answer now.
The proposals for next year are to bring the armed forces covenant into law. Do you believe that a legally binding covenant and this Bill would be compatible under English law?
General Sir John McColl: We are in consultation with the Government at the moment in relation to bringing the covenant into law. We have raised a number of issues with them, which the Minister who is sitting with you is very well aware of. Charles can support me here in terms of the concerns we have.
The first concern is that initially there was no mention of special consideration, in other words, for those who had given the most—those who had suffered bereavement or very serious injury. I understand that may now be in it. There was also a concern that it was limited, in that it dealt with three specific areas rather than the totality of the covenant. We continue to have concerns in that area, and we also have concerns that it seems to focus the effort on local government rather than central Government. Those are our major concerns. I am not sure whether I have answered your question, but those are the concerns that we have. We will be watching the consultation and participating in it.
Q
Charles Byrne: No, we are not opposing the Bill. We think the Bill can be improved, which is why we are focusing on this particular element in the second part of the Bill. To be categorical, no, we are not opposing the Bill.
Q
Charles Byrne: We certainly welcome the intent behind what we see the Bill is trying to do in, as the general said, trying to reduce pernicious, vexatious claims. However, we are looking to say, “Can we achieve those aims without disadvantaging service personnel?” If we can do both, both should be done.
Q
Charles Byrne: Is that a way of saying that there is not the appetite to try to address those who would fall out of the Bill?
Q
Charles Byrne: The answer is the same: if there is good being done, we should aim to make that good go as far as possible and not exclude those who would be excluded by the six-year longstop allowing for the date of knowledge.
Q
Charles Byrne: That is the concern that we have brought forward, yes. If that can be addressed through further consultation work, that would be a good development.
Thank you, Charles. By the way, your new TV poppy appeal is very good. I saw it this morning.
Charles Byrne: Thank you.
Q
Charles Byrne: In terms of specific examples, I cannot at the moment. I know from the sample size that was taken that there were, I think, 19 individuals or families who fell outside that. I do not have specific examples.
Q
Charles Byrne: This is difficult, because what are the effects of loss or injury that might make somebody find it difficult and challenging to bring forward their cases? The obvious one that comes around is hearing loss, which I think was excluded from those numbers as well. When it is that small percentage, that excludes hearing loss. You can imagine that if there are conditions that are developed over a period of time that do not relate to just one field of operations, and that is a whole area that could fall outside the Bill. If the hearing loss is established over a period of time over a number of operations, you might not be able to trace it back to a particular overseas operation. That is just one example.
Q
Charles Byrne: Of course, yes.
Q
Charles Byrne: Absolutely, and this cuts both ways. We recognise that if we are asking that the armed forces maintain the highest standards when they go out and serve in difficult situations, there is an equally fair onus on their employer, the Ministry of Defence, to provide them with what is needed do that and the support that is needed.
Q
Charles Byrne: The Minister has been very clear and welcoming of our disagreement with him over this point. He knows well that we have a different view around the impact of this on the armed forces covenant.
Q
Charles Byrne: Why does it put them at a disadvantage? Because, in my understanding, unless the civilian is being employed by the MOD in overseas operations, there is nowhere else where there is a similar time limit for cases of injury or death that could be brought to an employer. That is the difference.
Q
Charles Byrne: It is an interesting question. I think there will be support for the intent behind this Bill, because—
I am talking specifically about part 2.
Charles Byrne: Yes, indeed. I think there is a level of understanding that is required, but when people understand the potential for limiting the ability of veterans and armed forces personnel to bring claims, that would not be welcome.
Q
Charles Byrne: The point we have been working around so far is that at the moment there is no time limit, even allowing for point of knowledge. This would introduce a time limit. That time limit does not apply more widely in other civilian cases, so we see that as a disadvantage. What impact might that have on morale? Good question. Would it possibly make those who get caught in this situation feel less valued? That would be my conclusion.
Q
Charles Byrne: I am glad you called that out, but I do not think I am in any way qualified or able to answer that question.
The Bill requires additional weight to be given to the stresses of operations when deciding to prosecute. To what extent do you think service personnel are adequately trained to deal with these stresses?
General Sir John McColl: My personal opinion on that is that the training that service personnel receive generally for conducting operations is absolutely first class. Indeed, that will reflect on their conduct on operations and that conduct will be affected by the role of the chain of command. I think they are well prepared. I am sure there are exceptions and that there will be difficulties, but in general terms that is what I would say. It is a question that you should really be asking of the serving chiefs within the Ministry of Defence, rather than a retired general, such as myself.
Q
General Sir John McColl: Training can always be improved, there is no doubt about that. After every operation there is always analysis of the training people go through to ensure that they are prepared for whatever they may have to deal with. I am sure that is the case. The area where training has particularly improved over recent years, but continually needs to be improved, is that of mental resilience. If I am being honest, that is something we did not pay significant attention to in previous decades. We need to do better in that particular area.
I think Mr Byrne wants to say something.
Charles Byrne: I think this is an area I probably need to be careful about. Echoing John’s comments from the personal perspective, I was with friends last night, one of whom is still serving with the Royal Marines. He spoke very passionately about how well their training goes and a new element of the programme, I think called Regain. It is taken very seriously and good work is being done to recognise and address the mental stresses, the mental health and mental strain.
I am going to call Peter Gibson on a supplementary and then I will come to you, Mr Anderson.
Q
Charles Byrne: I think this is a point we have covered previously, so forgive me if I repeat myself. I think it is the same sort of question. We have seen the evidence that there are 19 cases where veterans’ families would not be able to bring a claim against the MOD because it would fall out of the proposed six-year time limit after the point of knowledge and all those other caveats. Those are the examples that we think would follow from the Bill and that is only of the ones that we know, and the ones where the data exists, for Afghanistan and Iraq.
Q
Charles Byrne: That is a good and fair question, which the Minister has also asked us, to which we say, in fairness, that we think that is your job. It is our job to try to point out where it can be improved, but not how. That is a bit unfair, but that is the way it works.
Q
General Sir John McColl: Both Charles and I started off this hearing by saying that we welcomed the intent of the Bill. What veterans want to see is the pernicious harassment of veterans following operations by the legal profession stopped. If the Bill achieves that, they would regret the fact that it had been stopped.
I accept that there may be some trade-offs in doing so. Whether or not it is a breach of the covenant, there will be roughly 6% of people who may have brought cases against the MOD or the Government who can do so now and who will not be able to do so in future. We would wish to see that ameliorated. We would wish to see that in some way worked around. It is up to the Government to see if they can do that. The bottom line—I think that is what your question is getting at—is that we want to see harassment stopped. There may be some compromises required in doing that.
Thank you very much, General. I know I said veterans, but I also mean serving personnel.
Charles Byrne: Thank you for that response, John, which helps to lay it out. The point of this process, and the consultation and the debate that we had, is to produce a better Bill at the end of the day. As I said before, the Minister has always been very clear that he welcomes our constructive challenge and disagreement.
You said that if this Bill addresses everything the Legion is looking for, it might not get through. There is not everything in there; there is a single focus point. There is a restriction introduced by the Bill, and if it can be removed, the Bill will be better. It seems to me that that is a good thing to do. As Sir John says, everybody wishes vexatious, pernicious claims against veterans to be addressed and reduced, and we fully support that intent. We want to make this better, which is why we have contributed and have always been very clear about our concerns in this area. If the Bill can be made better, I am sure you and veterans would welcome that.
Q
Charles Byrne: Is this the Government offering to pay for a massive campaign from the Legion?
That is outside my remit.
Charles Byrne: We are just about to go into our poppy appeal in the most difficult time we have ever had, so I would not give a commitment to any campaign. We do a lot to drive awareness of the armed forces covenant as it is, and we always have done. We are trying to build the awareness of all our services. We would welcome any support and help that you are able to give us on that.
Are there any further questions for either witness? As there are no further questions, I thank you, General McColl for your appearance online, and thank you, Mr Byrne, for your appearance in the room. I am grateful for your forbearance with the logistical issues we are managing today. Thank you, on behalf of the Committee, for your evidence.
Examination of Witness
General (Retd) Sir Nick Parker gave evidence.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: I can indeed. Thank you very much.
And could you set out for the record who you are and your locus in today’s discussion?
General Sir Nick Parker: I left the Army in 2013 as the commander land forces. My perspective on this is that of an operational level commander, and it has been informed by my experience in Sierra Leone in 2001 and Iraq in 2005. Not directly connected to this, but it informs it, I was the last general officer commanding in Northern Ireland in 2006-07, and then I was the deputy commander of the International Security Assistance Force from 2009 until 2010. I view this from the perspective of the senior levels of the chain of command, not from that of the MOD.
And to confirm for the record, you are General Sir Nick Parker.
General Sir Nick Parker: Yes. Not to be muddled with Carter.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: I start by echoing the previous witnesses. Malicious claims have to be taken very seriously, and I welcome everything that does that, but to answer your question, my concern is that the process risks the legitimacy of the armed forces, and I am not convinced that what is being done is the most effective way to deal with the challenge. It feels to me as if we are treating a symptom through this Bill, not going to the cause at the heart of the problem. I will elaborate very quickly on that, if you are happy.
As far as legitimacy is concerned, we deploy on operations, quite rightly answering to the highest possible standards. While I am not a legal expert—again, I am applying my operational experience to this—during the passage of the Bill, particularly part 1, there has been a weight of eminent legal opinion that I trust, including from people who were involved in the service legal issues before, who are concerned that one of the effects of the Bill will be to demonstrate in some way that the British are not operating under international legal norms. If that were the case, it would be extremely challenging both externally, if we are working in a coalition with other countries where our behaviours need to be consistent, and with the enemy. Most of the enemies I have faced do not follow international law, but it may well be that that is the case, and if we are seen to be prepared to operate outside the international norms, that risks calling us into question and adding another complex element to the decision making that the chain of command needs to take.
That is the legitimacy side. On the effectiveness side, it appears as if part 1 of the Bill focuses entirely on the process of prosecution, whereas for me the big issue here is the process of investigation and, critically in that process, ensuring that the chain of command is deeply connected with what goes on from the very outset. I do not think there is any serviceman or woman who would not accept that bad behaviour on the frontline must be treated quickly and efficiently. Nobody would want anything in the process that somehow allows people who have behaved badly on the frontline to get away with it. But all of us would believe that the process has to be quick, efficient and effective to remove the suspicion of a malicious allegation as quickly as possible. I cannot see how this Bill does that.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: In the complexity of the frontline, there is an enormous amount going on and it is very difficult to produce accurate, timely records of what is occurring. It may be that someone will stand up and contradict me, but when I served we had a thing called a battalion war diary, which was very nearly a mandraulic, hand-written process. We need to change our culture of record keeping on the frontline so that there are sophisticated ways of recording exactly what is going on, so that when somebody comes to look at an allegation of bad behaviour, they have good, accurate records that are endorsed by the people who gave the orders to those who have undertaken the act and they are also held accountable for what happened. That needs to be investigated not, in my view, by an RMP lance corporal who has been trained to do a whole load of important but relatively menial things, nor by an independent constable from Northumbria who has no idea of the activity on the frontline, but by a properly found investigative organisation that is a genuine independent part of the organisation and respected by both those on the frontline and those outside the armed forces as an effective body. That certainly did not exist when I was serving, and I think it would require resources to create it.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: The chain of command is responsible for giving its orders to our people both before, during and after a battle. In all three circumstances there are levels of complexity. Clearly, in the heat of battle the complexity increases in some ways, but the pressures on individuals often increase quite significantly afterwards. The chain of command is the organisation that gives the orders and should be accountable for the collective action of those it is in charge of. When something occurs that is challenged by people, in the terms of a malicious claim, the chain of command should be the first port of call to present why what happened is or is not acceptable, because the chain of command has to own the responsibility of the actions of its people. The thing that I have found quite difficult—I have done a little bit of work with some people in Northern Ireland, which I know is not this case—is that it appears in law that the chain of command is not really considered a factor in all this, yet it is right at the heart of it.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: I am not suggesting that the chain of command frustrates investigations. I think that the lack of accurate, timely, well maintained information, recording what is occurring, means that there may be confusion. I think there are also probably instances where levels of the chain of command do not take sufficient responsibility for what their subordinates should do. A very brief example: in Afghanistan, the lack of force density in certain parts of the theatre may have meant that a significant level of force was used in order to protect our own people, because there were so few of them. The reality may be that there should have been more people allocated to the ground, in order to achieve the objectives that were being set. I think the responsibility for that sits quite high up in the chain of command, and there people need to understand their responsibility for the decisions they are making. I am not convinced that at each level of the chain of command we have yet created the right culture to support the effective dealing with things like malicious claims.
I would add that I think one of the key things that we have to do is to produce mechanisms that establish a really effective duty of care for those who are placed under the spotlight by malicious claims. Of course, if you deal with these things quickly, that will help, but anything that drags out, even for two or three years, puts individuals under massive pressure. If the chain of command does not have the ability to look after them, because it somehow distances itself from them, then we have got to address that as well.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: No, I think it focuses too much on prosecution and putting checks in place to ensure that prosecutions are absolutely as fair as they need be, when the reality is that you need to go back down the pipe and deal with what is happening on the coalface.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: Only that you must understand the challenge that exists in a complex operational environment. I am not suggesting some sort of panacea that will provide a perfect level of information, but we have to do much better at providing accurate, timely information, and having an independent, properly found investigating system, respected by all, that can then take that information, investigate it and come to as quick a conclusion as possible about the actions of the people who are being investigated.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: We operate in grey zone warfare anyway, so I imagine that the Bill and everything being discussed has been generated in that environment. My point is not whether the Bill addresses that, but that it does not address the core, which is the investigation, in black, white, grey—wherever it is. The emphasis appears to be on prosecution. In reality, it should be on what is happening in the investigative process, whether it is grey zone or not.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: I do not understand why sexual acts have been excluded, but not murder and torture. I do not understand why that distinction has been made and whether it undermines the fundamental credibility of the Bill. As I said at the beginning, I am not a legal expert, but I have been told by people whose views I respect that even putting in conditions for prosecution that separate your military from the normal process will be viewed with some suspicion by those who uphold international law more generally.
I have heard enough people whose views I respect telling me that they are concerned about the five-year time limit or time point; they are concerned about the exclusion of sexual offences; they are concerned about the triple lock and why it needs to be applied when our systems for prosecution are perfectly effective if the investigation is effectively carried out and properly presented. If that is the case, we will potentially be viewed by other countries as operating in a way that contravenes international norms.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: Yes.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: Because, surely, for those serious things, we should all be treated the same. There is no need to introduce an additional check. If all of us believe that on the frontline we all do our best in very difficult circumstances, that those who commit illegal acts must be dealt with, and that everybody else should be protected by an effective record-keeping and investigative service, why does anything need to be different?
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: I think it less likely that you would commit murder at the Tesco counter. My view is that we train for those really difficult circumstances. You are talking here about acts that take place under the very watchful eye of an extremely rich chain of command. I believe that we therefore operate in an environment where we can uphold the rule of law in the way that it is presented to everybody else. Do not forget that we are operating under international law, the Geneva convention and the terms of the Armed Forces Act, which allows us the opportunity to operate in those very challenging circumstances.
Under the International Criminal Court’s article 53, there is a similar provision where you can exclude from prosecution, as there is here with the presumption against prosecution. It is not exactly the same, but very similar, so I do not think we are deviating from international legal norms. I will have to disagree with you, but I thank you for your comments.
Q
General Parker, we heard on Tuesday some witnesses saying that they did not feel the Bill would stop the number of investigations and re-investigations that people such as Major Campbell were subjected to. What are your thoughts on that?
General Sir Nick Parker: If it is being used as a tool to undermine our military capability by an enemy, if I was the enemy, I would start thinking about introducing lots of claims against acts of rape and sexual behaviour, because I could use it as a tool to somehow fix the willingness of my enemy to fight. I do not think it will solve the problem. I think we need to address the way we hold the chain of command accountable and conduct our investigations. Those are the two key things. With a chain of command, effective information and an effective investigating system, you will stamp out the malicious claim because you will see it very quickly for what it is.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: I do not think you need to have a time limit. I just think you need a system that can investigate effectively. If you can produce the facts, because you have the right level of capability to investigate, you will do it as quickly as you can. I do not think you need to put a time limit on it.
I ask because Major Campbell talked about the 17 years of investigation and re-investigation, so some sort of time limit might reduce the chances of that re-occurring.
General Sir Nick Parker: Without going into specifics, there are cases where people have actually been found to be innocent, and then the issue has been returned to because the chain of command has failed to show the levels of integrity and accountability that they should have. An investigation takes place, it is sanctioned by the chain of command as being effective, it is investigated independently, and that is the end of it. It is disgraceful that somebody can be investigated for 17 years and can go and see almost every senior officer—I have to be careful—but it is sort of pushed off because the system has to be allowed to churn on, and yet at the beginning it is already being investigated. That will not happen if you have a credible system that investigates and you address some of the cultural issues in the chain of command by making it genuinely accountable for what is happening.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: I am concerned. If you look at things like the report on the Baha Mousa investigation, you see the potential for some sort of cultural resistance to the fact that an investigation is taking place. We need to address how the chain of command approach the issue, because they are fundamentally responsible for what their subordinates do. As an aside, I am slightly nervous that the focus on the prosecution of individuals almost feels as if one is focusing on the people on the frontline as if they are the guilty parties, and we the system are failing to address the issues that we should address because it is our responsibility in the first place. Somebody might accuse me of trying to stand up to the Bill and not looking after our boys and girls. That is fundamentally not what I am saying. I am saying that we are failing to address the responsibility of the chain of command—its cultural approach to these sorts of issues, and its ability to maintain records and then allow people independently to investigate what is happening, so that we can deal with things quickly. I would suggest that if that were in place, what happened to Bob Campbell would never have happened. For a start, they would not have lost the records of the communications. Why did they lose the communication records in the week of his incident? That will not happen if you have an effective system.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: I honestly do not know, and that should worry us. If one is in a coalition with a Danish contingent, and if the Danes consider that the way we are approaching dealing with our people is different from their way and they feel that it is culturally incompatible for some reason, that would create difficulties. It might seem slightly pathetic, but I would defer to the eminent legal opinion, which I would not profess to have. All I would say is that when there is a considerable amount of noise about something, I would hope that it is taken seriously. My feeling is that the Bill is moving at such a pace that there are certain key people who should be able to present their evidence—people such as the Judge Advocate General. These are people who have really important views. If there is some doubt about this and we are viewed in the international community as being prepared to operate outside norms, there is an implication for the people who will have to command in the international community.
I am going to call Joy Morrissey, who is going to address us from the standing microphone.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: I cannot answer for the Americans and the French, but I would revert to my original point: we might not be keeping effective records and investigating them as rapidly as some of those other countries are. I know that the American situational understanding, because of their investment in information technology—certainly when I was serving—meant that they got a very quick and clear picture of events in these conflict situations. I can only assume that they have a more effective investigative system.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: It comes back to the point that we need to conform to international norms so that we are seen to be legitimate, but the way we protect our people is by ensuring that they are properly commanded, that we keep accurate records and that we investigate any claim very quickly, so that we can ensure that our people are properly looked after. I do not think the comparison is relevant from the perspective of what we do about this particular issue, which badly needs to be dealt with.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: As I said, I believe that we need to be consistent with our coalition partners. All I would add is that you cannot predict who your coalition partner will be, because we do not know whom we will be fighting with in the future. Therefore, there has to be a certain consistency that is probably provided by international norms.
Q
A lot of what you discussed there is the chain of command. You talked about implementing different procedures within the chain of command. I would argue that that is an internal military adjustment, not for a Bill or other legislation, but I would then say, looking back, with your experience and what you know with hindsight—we always want to learn from the past to move forward—what would you have done differently, and what could be done differently by the chain of command, outside legislation, to protect our troops?
General Sir Nick Parker: The irony, then, is that I am now subordinate to you, an elected representative in the House, so congratulations, and—
I am not sure that is how it works.
General Sir Nick Parker: I am now decaying in my shed at home.
I feel very conscious of the responsibility that I had at every level, and I am also acutely aware of the nature of the responsibility that you have as a platoon or section commander, which is different from the responsibilities you have as a company commanding officer and so on, but there is a critical connection between every level of the hierarchy that requires us to enact things like mission command effectively. So, if you are going to tell somebody what to do, you need either to resource them properly or, at least, to have a conversation with them about why are you not giving them sufficient resources, so you both understand and manage the risk. That is something that should be inherent in our training anyway.
To your point, why this is all nothing to do with the Bill, my answer is, I do not think it is. I think there is a worry that the Bill goes through Parliament and yet does not actually address the real issue. To go back to my experience, what I would have liked is to have had much more effective operational record keeping, a credible and properly resourced investigative organisation that one did not see as the dodgy people who came sweeping in to start testing you, but people who would be able to look at the records that you had been keeping, have a mature conversation with those who had given the orders, come to their conclusions and have the ability not to penalise those who are focused on the operation.
I acutely remember somebody being placed almost on the naughty step, because they were being investigated, and I think that was because of the culture that we were promoting. It might well not be the case today, but while I was always part of a transforming organisation, I am not sure that the chain of command was as good as it should be at balancing this duty of care with the need to ensure that you deal with those who behave badly quickly and efficiently.
You need resource to do it. What I can be accused of is worrying too much about wanting to spend money on tanks, when I should have been spending money on a really effective operational record-keeping system.
Q
General Sir Nick Parker: That is a political question.
That is why I am in this role.
General Sir Nick Parker: I am very prepared to give a view, but treat it with the contempt it deserves. As I said right at the beginning, I welcome the willingness of the Government to deal with this issue, and I welcome the fact that it was an election pledge and we are going to deal with it really quickly, but I am really concerned that that good intent could end up creating more challenges than we need and indeed not address the issue, which, as you said, may not need to be brought to Parliament at all.
Now, you have to decide how the Bill proceeds, and I am sure the Minister would expect it to proceed. What I would like is to try to mitigate against the risks of legitimacy that I perceive—you may not agree—and concurrently for much more energy and effort to be put into the business of how we investigate these things effectively so that the people who are guilty are dealt with quickly and the people who are not are properly protected.
I will just go back to Dover. I know you would believe that if somebody had done something that was genuinely illegal and outside the orders they were given, you would pray that they would be dealt with quickly and effectively.
One hundred per cent.
General Sir Nick Parker: And I am not sure that we are able to do that if we are so vulnerable to malicious claims, because that is clogging the system up. We need to address that.
Thank you. It is a pleasure to talk to you again, General.
General Sir Nick Parker: I am wearing a rifles tie, rather than—
If there are no further questions from Members, I thank you very much, General Parker, for your evidence and for joining the Committee online. That brings us to the end of our morning session. The Committee will meet again in this room at 2.30 pm under the chairmanship of Graham Stringer to take further evidence.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Leo Docherty.)
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: My name is Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Chris Parker. I am the chairman of the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment Association and I am an infantry veteran of nine combat and operational tours.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: The effect of the legislation on people would be to remove quite a large amount of pain and misery, which I have experienced not only with individuals but with their families. We must remember that when people’s lives go on hold for several years due to investigations, whether they are right or wrong, that can have a very damaging effect on families and individuals. This legislation certainly will remove most of that pain and misery, which I have witnessed, as many have.
From our regiment’s point of view, few things have been harder for our men—our infantry are primarily male—who are often from the most vulnerable places in our society and often very tough backgrounds, who do their bit and then find that they are exposed. This legislation is broadly going to remove that risk and pain—in broad terms. I know you might want to talk about the smaller aspects.
In terms of the effects on operations, I can only speak from a subjective point of view about the impact on me, but also on all the people I speak to. There is an increasing concern among very young junior commanders—I have been one of them on operations, where you have to make decisions. Going forwards, without this sort of legislation, there is the increased risk to life of people not being able to take decisions, as I had to, such as: do you bring in a precision airstrike or not and take 10 lives with some risk of collateral damage on the spot, to save lives, without some form of legal concern, because you are doing the right thing and you are following drills?
I think your Bill’s effect on operations will be to remove a large amount of that concern. I think that is probably the bigger professional concern—that it would cost more British lives because people would be hesitant.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: That is a difficult question, because of the stretch of my understanding of what is and is not legally possible. If I may add value in this way, I think there is a concern about the six-year time limit. There is a perception—maybe it is my misunderstanding —that the six-year time limit would apply to service personnel themselves bringing claims against the armed forces, or against people. Is that correct?
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: I think there has to be some form of recognition and qualification that the major concern—I see it as a volunteer—is that we are getting close to 100 cases, in a body of about 5,000 people, of severe mental distress, and those are rising by the week, primarily out of Afghanistan. On the timeline of those cases appearing—we are in the category of post-traumatic stress disorder in about 90% of cases—we are talking about 10 years.
Bear in mind that there are proven facts that the bell curve of PTSD cases is 28 years. My own personal experiences was 24 years after the event, out of the blue, and then being treated for it. If cases were to be brought—and I think it is quite reasonable to allow soldiers, sailors and airmen to bring cases for mental duress that could have been caused by a mistake, an error or incorrect equipment, or some form of claim—to put a six-year time limit does not help. It may help legal reasons for other purposes, but it certainly does not help the mental duress, because the facts and evidence point to a 28-year bell curve, with 14 years therefore being the mean.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: Understood. It is great to hear that clarification.
Yes, it would. You have no idea what you are talking about.
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: You can understand the problem that the military community have. It is hard enough for someone like me, as a master’s graduate, to understand it, but also trying to get this understood by a large body of quite unqualified people who fought bravely is difficult enough.
The only other qualification that I would add is to do not with the question that you have directly asked but with a broader question, which you may want to touch on later. It is very difficult to separate, in the view of the veteran, operations from one theatre and operations from another theatre. Obviously, you probably know straight away that I am referring to Northern Ireland. I understand, and we understand, that it is not part of this Bill, but I think there has to be a measure by the Government to say—and I think they have—that other measures will be taken ahead to deal with that. That is something that I know is a concern, and it is something that is of prime concern.
Broadly—I have to say this broadly because, again, we have to remember that we do not get people scrutinising the Bill itself; they hear the broad terms of it—it is welcomed by the community and there is no major feedback of negativity other than the points we have registered about claims, which you have clarified very helpfully.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: The problem came, in a lot of our cases—certainly with some of the earlier ones with the Iraq Historic Allegations Team and others—that, because it was done in a very legal and correct fashion, sometimes we can forget that the care is needed, because they still are people. It was often very difficult for people to get facts and information about what was likely happening. I would say that we have come quite a long way with that. We have an independent ombudsman and others. Personally I think that has been a huge step forward, and I met Nicola the other day. We must remember that we have to think about whether there is a resource capability gap or not, to allow some form of funded or additional care for the families, and also potentially for people’s loss of earnings and loss of promotion.
One of the biggest fears and concerns that people had is that their career was on hold and their career was affected. Like it or not, that comes down to the financial burden that people feel they have suffered unduly. I can think of several cases where it is pretty hard to explain why certain people were not promoted for a few years when these investigations were going on. Obviously, it was a difficult position for everyone.
There are two things there: a broad duty of care with some resourcing for the impact on families and the individuals themselves, whether that is more information or some sort of independent helpline. Perhaps it could be done through a body such as the ombudsman or something in addition to that. Secondly, it is the ability to explain and understand those pieces.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: I have not found it because I think it is a softer thing—it is beyond the Bill. It is something that the MOD would have to bring in. It is a chain of command issue. It is very difficult for people. The chain of command is uniquely allied to the same thing as the duty of care chain, because it is the officers, and therefore there has to be perhaps support outside of the chain of command: somebody to care, outside the direct chain of command, for those individuals. People have made the best effort to get by, but we have a unique problem where the officer chain of command, the line between [Inaudible] and courts martial, cannot be compromised, and therefore other people have to be involved.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: Thank you very much. The 5,000 I referred to are our Iraq and Afghanistan veterans. They were a large regiment. You can see the numbers because the throughput is quite large and significant, and that is just in one regiment. We have about 20,000 in total, including right down to the oldest. Some of them are second world war veterans.
In terms of when we first heard, I have to be honest that I cannot recall a date or time, but we are informed through our regimental headquarters, which is a very small Ministry of Defence-funded element. It is very small. It has been cut right down to the bare basics now. They inform us of those things, but you must remember that the association people like me are volunteers, and for us to spend time trawling through things and looking at emails to with things can be difficult, so we get prompts and help, and then they provide, effectively, a staff capability. When we heard through them, which was very helpful, the initial reaction—we serve using social media platforms, with groups of several thousand of our veterans, and those are quite active, to care for people—and the mood was very positive. It was seen as a weeping sore in the minds of many that they had done their service and they would not be looked after. We know that the Government put this in the manifesto late last year, and it came into being very soon after the general election in late 2019. It was welcomed, but it was not a political point for the veterans; it was more about the Government doing something to address what they had seen as an injustice. Their feelings were certainly very positive.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: I do not think they would understand why. We must remember that among the base we address, look after and care for, the understanding of things like how the machinery of government works is quite low. They just see a very clear sense of right and wrong, partly because we instilled it in them. They have that very simple view of life, so I think there would be acute distress. There would certainly be an increase in mental duress, and I think that for those people who hover around the distressed level, rather than getting into specific, incident-related PTSD—we deal with a lot of those—there would be a lot of hands being thrown up in the air. Allied with the current conditions, which obviously include the environmental factors of covid, separation and people being isolated, I would see that as a very big risk. However, the country seems to be behind this, and certainly the veteran body is. It seems to be something that is apolitical at the moment, notwithstanding the need for good scrutiny.
That is brilliant. Those are all my questions. Thank you very much.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: That is a very fair point, and it is an excellent question, because the time has been a big factor. I am not aware of any way in which military law should be seen to be rushed along or pushed along. However, I think this comes back to the duty of care. I know there is provision in the Bill for certain time restrictions, so if there were a time restriction on an investigation, unless there was a good reason to extend it, that might be something that would allow a positive factor of, “Yes, there is some definite evidence brewing here.” That could be positive.
We are talking about several years in which people are on hold. That was certainly the case for people involved in the Danny Boy incident in al-Amarah, with the public inquiry and the many cases to do with that particular incident, which was a real travesty. That affected some people for eight or nine years, so that was quite a long wait, and of course some of those people were already in distress because of the very tough fighting in that incident.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: That is a good question, because it is something I have heard from chats on veteran social media and other discussions. You must remember that our face-to-face contact with our people has been limited from the summer onwards, but in a lot of the discussions that happen on this, sometimes weekly, there is without a doubt greater fear of a non-British legal action coming against people than of anything British. Even though soldiers, sailors and airmen might grumble about the prosecutions, I think they would all, to a man and woman, admit that British justice would be the preferable place to go to every time. There have been many times when people have been investigated but then there has been no case to answer and justice has been seen to be done—there has been no prosecution, and certainly no conviction, in the majority of cases—so I would agree with you.
Again, we must remember that I, let alone the body of the kirk, if you like—the association members—would not understand the nuances of what might cause an International Criminal Court action. If there seemed to be a risk of that, it would need to be closed on behalf of the veterans, who would see that as a far greater risk to themselves than facing British justice. I think that is a fair question to ask.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: When I was involved in a public inquiry—it was the Baha Mousa public inquiry—there were five separate teams of lawyers and barristers, of which two were consulting me as a person giving evidence, not in any accusatory sense, but for contextual evidence. I was amazed by how much effort and money was going into that. The accepted norm is that a lot of people are left to their own devices and are not able to access the same level or scale of funded assistance when they are accused by military investigations such as IHAT and others.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: It is, and I understand that. As an association, we have our own private funds and we raise funds. We have had need to use them, and we have a regimental advocate or lawyer who helps us, often on a gratis arrangement. But that is a poor reflection on the way it should be.
I agree with you. If this can add any context, after my 17 years of service and a lot of frontline tours, often the biggest point of failure that caused the most damage was when there was a point of failure in the chain of command. If a commanding officer or a senior officer—a major or a brigadier perhaps—was the person causing the problem, they are also in the discipline chain, so the whole thing grinds to a halt and becomes an impasse. That is a very difficult situation.
The second-order question is: why do we not have a Police Federation equivalent or a trade union? I have seen a number of failures—not a large number, but it has happened—in the chain of command by officers behaving improperly, and that says to me that the only way you can stop that sort of thing affecting the people beneath them is by having, if not a trade union or federation, then an independent place to go. Personally, I think we have that with the independent Service Complaints Ombudsman, which is available as a pressure release valve. The good work that has been done to bring that in, although that small body is not widely known at the moment, has removed some of the risk.
Q
I am trying to think whether there is a mechanism we could get for those accused. I accept the point that you make about the chain of command, but I am trying to understand whether there is anything we can do to even up the playing field, in terms of ensuring that people are not left on their own? Most people do not have access to independent funds, and most people have perhaps never been involved with the law before, so when they are it is obviously quite a daunting experience. If we could come up with some system that actually allowed recourse to legal support, would that be something that you would support?
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: Yes, I would, but I would qualify that support. As a veteran leader, I constantly tell our people that they must not consider themselves to be a special case when there are also blue light services and other people who are equally well deserving and who also sometimes face legal complaints.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: Correct. I understand why you ask that question. It is something, certainly for the veteran part of it, that I have proposed. I am in discussion with our excellent friend the Minister about innovative ideas such as having an inspector for veterans, like the inspector for prisons. Beyond that, there could possibly be someone who would be an independent body. Wherever that independent body sits, it cannot sit in the MOD. That is the problem—it must not sit there; it should sit outside.
Okay. Just one. There might be time for further questions, because only Sarah is indicating that she would like to ask one at the moment.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: I would say a strong yes, because in all the incidents I have seen where it has gone wrong, if the individual concerned knew that there was some way that an independent person would be able to investigate them, they may have been less likely to think that they could get away with it; it is often individuals acting fully in the knowledge of what they are doing because they can get away with it. Personally, based on my experience, I would say yes to that.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: I will, and if it helps you, I would prefer to answer that in the broadest terms, rather than focusing on individual cases, to avoid causing them any further distress. Obviously, a lot of the things we talk about are very confidential, and a lot of them are very tearful.
With that incident and the aftermath, once it started to break out that there was going to be some sort of investigations, and the manner of those investigations, there was certainly a feeling of horror and almost terror that swept through people, because they realised, “When will this stop?” It was a particularly brutal engagement, and it was cited, as the Committee probably knows, as being along the lines of second world war bayonet fighting-type engagement—incredible bravery but also incredible stress. One of the individuals I know—a large, strong, tough individual—was in tears in my arms, explaining that he had enough to deal with coping with having had to kill several people, and now he would have to deal with the fact that he might be court martialled for it. He just could not understand it.
We have to remember, again, that the individuals concerned are not people who are able to sit and pick through legal documents, nor understand them. Whether we ask the most vulnerable or tough people in our society to go forward and do these extremely tough and brave point-of-the-spear jobs, such as combat roles, we must remember that we have a duty of care to protect them from anything—intellectual or otherwise—that might affect them later in their distress.
In answer to your question about the families, that whole inquiry, and certainly that incident, were the largest single point of family distress that I have witnessed in my entire military service or veteran chairmanship of five years. That amount of distress was not only for those who were being prosecuted, but for their spouses, partners, mothers, fathers, others, and children in some cases—those who knew that the veteran had been involved not only in that incident but in others—because there was immediate presumption that there would soon be a knock on the door or a letter popping through the door for some sort of summons, so the stress levels, the distress and the impact snowballed to quite a large level. It was very hard to put a lid on that stress because that is what happened: letters did start to arrive and people did get knocks on the door, so it became a very distressing time.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: There are two parts to that. First, we would have at least had something to be able to say back, “No, no. There is protection here.” Whether it was a six-year limit or inside that is, of course, a different point. At least there would have been something there to say that.
We must remember that in parliamentary terms, it can be easy to understand it as a Bill about legal process. In the veterans sense, it is much more simple than that. It is simply understood as: the people, the public, the nation, does not want to do this to people who have stood on the wall and had to fight for freedom. They do feel that a Bill like this would allow those of us who are able to soothe and reassure to say as a result, “It’s okay. The country does care; Parliament does care.” Therefore, every effort is being made, which is why we admire what you are trying to do to close the gaps that have allowed those things to happen.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: I agree with you, but I propose that in the whole of defence—let alone the MOD, lawyers, investigators, military police investigators —everyone went through a learning process. That was an unprecedented time. Now, everything—the procedures, the understanding, the channels of complaint, the channels of the chain of command acting to look after people, the care for families—has improved, so we must be careful not to look at those past incidents when we were going through extreme learning pains with the existing legislation, but think about how we might cope not only with new legislation, but with the great leaps forward and lessons that have been learned about investigative timescale and accuracy, and the ability and the need for statements to be taken after patrols and suchlike.
Those things sound very easy. Sometimes they are difficult out in the dust and the heat, with the extreme exhaustion that goes on out there. We are in a much better place; I genuinely offer that from a very lucky perspective, because I can speak without any official man here, but I get the chance to speak to everyone who is in officialdom, as well as the soldiers from my regiment and their families.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: No, but it would not be the first time. We are in a gradual process as a country, and we must not be too hard on ourselves. We are closing gaps and are doing the best we can, but nothing will be done in a week or two. Everyone is pretty realistic—you will not get a bunch of people who are more realistic than military veterans about how long things take. There might be some concerns about the six-year rule, but I am sure people would welcome being part of that discussion. I can certainly help that process by getting my people to be part of that discussion, survey or whatever it might be, to get the feeling about whether this would be something that could sit happily with them. This process alone—my being here—is part of that. The six-year part, and the potential that other parts of society could be better off, is still countered by the fact that I have never met a military person who feels that we should be outside the law and that we should not obey the agreed principles.
Q
Lieutenant Colonel Parker: Understood, and I partially agree with you. Again, I would say that most people would be surprised, as would I, that no mechanism could be thought of to allow someone after the six years, if they felt that there was a strong enough case and it was sound in British justice, to bring a claim via appeal, the High Court or whatever it might be, to a judge, and that would be allowed to be waived. I am not a legal expert, but I would have thought that would be the situation if there was a particularly compelling case. I cannot think of any.
If there are no more questions, may I thank you, Colonel Parker, for your valuable evidence this afternoon? I am sure the Committee will find it useful and informative when we come to discuss the Bill on a line-by-line basis.
Examination of Witness
Judge Jeff Blackett gave evidence.
Q
Judge Blackett: I am His Honour Judge Jeff Blackett. I was the Judge Advocate General for 16 years. I had 31 years’ service in the Royal Navy before that. I retired as Advocate General last week, on 30 September, so that I could go and become president of the Rugby Football Union.
Q
Judge Blackett: That has gone to the end of where I was going to speak, because I was going to start off by saying that I think the Bill does not do what it is trying to do. My concern relates to investigations, not prosecutions; but there are a number of issues, and I think you and I have discussed some of them.
The first thing I would do is apply section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 to the military. That puts a six-month time limit on summary matters, and I would extend that to be matters that were de minimis—there would have to be a test of de minimis. Interestingly enough, halfway through my time as the Judge Advocate General, I issued a practice memorandum, which effectively incorporated that into the court martial. Following Danny Boy, the only offences that could be brought to trial were common assaults, and they were not, because the Army Prosecuting Authority followed my practice memorandum. The Ministry of Defence at the time were not in favour of that, and they challenged. Unfortunately I had to withdraw that practice memorandum.
That would deal with minor cases, and there are lots of minor cases. The sorts of things that IHAT was dealing with were that there would be a complaint that appeared to fall at the upper end of the spectrum. There would be an investigation. It would find that the allegations had been wildly exaggerated and end up finding that the most serious offence might have been an attempted actual bodily harm. In cases like that there should be a limitation period. So that is my first thing.
The second thing is that I would have judicial oversight of investigations. I introduced something called “Better Case Management in the Court Martial”, towards the end of my time as the Judge Advocate General. That puts time limits on investigations. The most important thing about it is that a case, early on, goes before a judge, and a judge then sets out a timetable of what various things should do. If section 127 of the MCA was brought into force, and the case dealt with de minimis, he could then say, “This is de minimis; stop the investigation.” So you need some mechanism, and judicial oversight. In my opinion, you could do that.
Thirdly, I would look at legal aid and funding. We have to remember that Northmoor and IHAT were set up by the British Government, and were funded by the British Government. The ambulance-chasing solicitors—people like Phil Shiner—used public money to pursue the means. I think you need to look at how legal aid is approved in those matters, and whether complainants should be funded, and the bar for funding them and their solicitors should be set higher.
So those are three areas. Finally, I would raise the bar for reinvestigation, or investigation. Having said that, there were only two courts martial where people were acquitted where there was a reinvestigation, but I would raise the bar for reinvestigation as well. So those are four practical matters that I think the Bill should concentrate on, rather than prosecution.
Q
Judge Blackett: You would have to ask them. I am an independent judge, who was the judicial head of the service justice system.
Q
Judge Blackett: I think in terms of the six-month time limit, there were lawyers in the MOD who said that we did not put that in the Armed Forces Act 2006. There are commanding officers who do not want to be limited, because sometimes they need more time. In terms of better case management, I think that the MOD thinks that is a good idea, but I did not come to it until quite late in my time.
I will say one thing, though. In terms of IHAT and Northmoor, as the Judge Advocate General I wanted to be more involved, but I was kept out—properly, I suppose, because I might have to try the cases in the end. We expected a lot of cases to come out of those two matters, and as you know, not a single case came out of them, which tells its own story.
Q
Judge Blackett: Yes. Perhaps I can say this. I wondered why, in the face of all the opposition—there is huge opposition, from various bodies—the Government seemed intent to pursue this particular issue. I have three concerns about the Bill. One is the presumption against prosecution, one is the wording in clause 3(2)(a), and the other is the requirement for Attorney General consent.
I listened very carefully to what Johnny Mercer said to the Joint Committee on Human Rights a couple of days ago. He described a pathway that goes from civil claims for compensation. That becomes allegations of criminal behaviour. That leads to investigation. That leads to re-investigation. I think that is the pathway you described, Mr Mercer. He said the lock was a presumption against prosecution, and Attorney General consent. I can understand, looking back, how you might get to that, but I think that logic is flawed, because actually he agreed that the issue of concern is investigations, which is my concern as well, and the length of time they take. He accepted, as he would, that all allegations must be investigated. That acceptance and a presumption against prosecution just do not equate, in my terms.
Let us look at some statistics. In my time as JAG, we have had eight trials involving overseas operations, with 27 defendants, of whom 10 were convicted. There were obviously trials. I did the two murder trials. The first murder trial was about the murder of a chap called Nadhem Abdullah by 3 Para. That was a case called Evans. The events took place in 2003; the trial was in 2005. In the case of Blackman, Marine A, the unlawful killing took place in 2011; he and two others were tried in 2013. So the system worked and due process went along. There were eight trials.
At the same time, there were 3,400 allegations in IHAT and 675 allegations in Northmoor. We all know how long they took, and nothing came out of them. So I agree wholeheartedly with what the Minister is trying to do. I am absolutely behind protecting service personnel. I simply do not believe this Bill does it, because I cannot see that a bar on prosecution or—sorry—a presumption against prosecution is going to stop the ambulance chasing that the Government are so worried about.
My second concern, of course, was the International Criminal Court. Take a case like Blackman, for instance, where there was a video of him shooting somebody. Had that come to light over five years later and there was a presumption against prosecution, first of all, the investigation would have taken place. The prosecutor could have said, “The presumption exists. Therefore I am not going to prosecute.” That would lead to a victim right of review, perhaps. More importantly, it would lead the International Criminal Court to say, “You are unable or unwilling—article 17 of the Rome statute—to prosecute. Therefore we’ll take this and we’ll put him to The Hague.” That is a real concern of mine.
The prosecutor could decide there is a case to answer, but he would send it to the Attorney General, and the Attorney General says either, “Prosecute”—in which case, so what?—or no, and you have exactly the same thing: judicial review of his decision by all sorts of people, and the International Criminal Court saying, again, “You are unable or unwilling.”
In my view, what this Bill does is exactly the opposite of what it is trying to do. What it is trying to do is to stop ambulance-chasing solicitors and vexatious and unmeritorious claims. The Minister quite rightly said we want rigour and integrity. What it actually does is increase the risk of service personnel appearing before the International Criminal Court. That is why I said it was ill conceived.
Q
Judge Blackett: No. My office is nearly always consulted on legislation, particularly when I went through the 2006 Act. I was heavily involved in that and, subsequently, with the other quinquennial reviews. I do not understand why my office was not consulted. There have been occasions in the past where paperwork has got lost when we have been consulted. I personally was not, but my office dealt with it. That was not the case here—we simply were not consulted.
Q
Judge Blackett: It was unusual. Whether it was pressure of time or whether officials wondered what I was going to say and did not want to hear it, I do not know.
Q
Judge Blackett: I would have hoped that we could have influenced the Bill, because I think a Bill is a good idea, but it has to have the right contents. Had I been able to have an input, perhaps on the format as I have just described, I do not know whether it would all have made it into the Bill, but at least it could have been discussed.
Q
Judge Blackett: That is a different matter. That is apples and pears. I am consulted on policy development, even though I am an independent judge. In terms of individual cases then clearly—and properly, at the time—I was not consulted. I was going to have to deal with the serious matters that came out of it, so I was not consulted. I was told that there might be a case—“There is possibly a case. Can you clear seven weeks in the diary to sit in a case, sometime in the future?”—but I was not consulted about how the investigations were going on.
Q
Judge Blackett: Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act would require legislation to apply to the armed forces. As I told you, I issued a practice memorandum many years ago to try to do that, which the MOD objected to and it had to be withdrawn. Legal aid funding for victims and ambulance-chasing lawyers, to use the expression that has been used, would need some legislation. On raising the bar for the investigation, the wording in the Bill might do that, but perhaps it would require legislation. Judicial oversight of investigations, particularly overseas operations, would require legislation.
Q
Judge Blackett: The process that you describe goes on all the time, but not in particular for overseas operations. There is a quinquennial review of the Armed Forces Act. I am consulted and have the ability to input issues. For example, I have been concerned for a long time about service personnel who are convicted in the court martial of causing death by dangerous driving. We had a number of those with servicemen overseas. The court martial had no power to disqualify them from driving, and I had a real concern that they would come back, serve their time, go straight on the road and kill somebody else. I have been trying to get something like that into the Armed Forces Act.
The process takes ages. I would start off 15 years ago saying, “I don’t think this should be in the Act.” It is not agreed by the policy people within the MOD, for all sorts of reasons. We go round and round in circles, miss one Act and then another Act. Hopefully, it is going to be in the 2021 Act. That goes on all the time. I am proactive in dealing with matters around trial process.
Q
Judge Blackett: No, because I was not consulted.
Q
Judge Blackett: No. I am sure other people have similar ideas—I have not got all the good ideas—but I was not asked, so I did not put anything in. That was until I became aware of the Bill—too late, but probably my fault—and at that stage I wrote to the Secretary of State and raised my concerns.
Q
Judge Blackett: Sixteen years.
Q
Judge Blackett: No. I have had exchanges and we have had meetings with Ministers, but for this particular Bill nobody came to me and said, “We are going to put this through Parliament. What do you think?”.
Q
Judge Blackett: Not to my knowledge. It needs political will, of course, and if you go back to IHAT and Northmoor, you start with the Baha Mousa concerns where we had a court martial where seven people were tried, one pleaded guilty to an ICC Act offence and all the rest were acquitted when clearly the British Army had been responsible for killing an individual over a three-day period. The court martial did not resolve in a conviction.
Following that, we had all the cases from a solicitor who in those days was well respected, so nobody questioned his motivation on the allegations he was raising. That subsequently turned out to be wrong. I think the issue then was the British Government thinking, “If we have got systemic abuse by the British forces overseas, we have got to do something about it.” Hence they set up Northmoor. That was really the focus.
Q
Judge Blackett: Not in its present form, no. The court martial system demonstrates that we have, to use the Minister’s words, “rigour and integrity”. We have got to move faster and we have got to investigate quicker. The issue is not the court martial system; the issue is IHAT and Northmoor, and that is nothing to do with the court martial system.
The Bill is effectively looking at the wrong end of the telescope. It is looking at the prosecution end, and you have got to remember that you do not prosecute until you investigate—and you have got to investigate. This will not stop people being investigated and it will not stop people being re-investigated and investigated again. Lots of investigations do not go anywhere, but the people who are investigated do not see that.
The fact is that, as you know, of the 3,400 cases, or whatever it was, at IHAT, not a single one has been prosecuted—not one. But the issue for those being investigated is dreadful. That is their complaint. Now, I understand that with high-profile cases like Blackman—Marine A—there are a lot of veterans who think we should not even prosecute that because they say he was doing his job and it is wrong to prosecute him. That is clearly wrong. When you have an offence as blatant as that, it must be prosecuted; otherwise we are undermining the rule of law and what we stand for in Britain.
Q
Finally—I am not sure whether you heard the last witness—
Judge Blackett: I heard some, yes.
I asked him how the 5,000 Iraq and Afghanistan veterans and the 20,000 overall veterans he has contact with would feel if the Bill were stopped. I do not know whether you heard his answer.
Judge Blackett: Yes, I did.
What would you say to that, then, with your recommendation that the Bill be stopped?
Judge Blackett: I have not recommended that it be stopped.
Sorry, I do not want to put words into your mouth. First, do you think that this Bill should be stopped?
Judge Blackett: Yes, but—
Okay. So now you have said that, what would your words to him be?
Judge Blackett: I believe in a Bill with some of the items that I have suggested. What I would say is that the Bill should be stopped, rewritten and, when it addresses the problem, brought back. What would I say to those 5,000 veterans? I would explain that the Bill as it stands will make life worse, not better, and therefore we will look at it again, trying to bring something back that would satisfy your concerns.
Q
Judge Blackett: No. I cannot see the differentiation between any offences but, since I do not think that there should be a presumption against prosecution anyway, that is just an academic question.
Q
Judge Blackett: It is the same answer—this is an academic discussion that you and I are having, because I do not believe that there should be a presumption against prosecution at all. If there is an offence, whether sexual, torture or anything else, it should be prosecuted.
Q
Judge Blackett: You are asking me what is probably a loaded political question. I would hope so, and when I met the Minister, Johnny Mercer—not in this forum, but in a more discursive one—he was very interested in some of my options, and I think he asked staff to look at them. I do not know how far that has gone, and I do not know whether any will be brought back, but I hope that, given my experience—
Q
Judge Blackett: About a month ago—something like that.
Q
Judge Blackett: To be fair to the Minister, he said to everybody, “I want to fix this problem, and I am open to any suggestion”—
We have heard that many times, but we are slightly concerned.
Judge Blackett: I take the Minister at his word—if he says that he is open to any suggestion, he or his staff must look at it on its merits and, if they see any merits, they will take it forward.
Q
Judge Blackett: The six-year time limit on civil claims.
Yes.
Judge Blackett: The previous witness talked about the inability of service personnel to sue, because of the six years. It is rather like going back to section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947. That is not really my area of law, so perhaps I am not the right witness to deal with it. I said to the Secretary of State that I thought it was injudicious, but there are better minds than mine who can apply that.
One bizarre thing is that, if this Bill becomes law, there is a six-year time limit but the Attorney General may give consent to a prosecution. Then, clearly, one of the things that the criminal court would be doing is awarding compensation, if there was a conviction. There would still be issues in relation to personal injury claims, which would come through the criminal court rather than the civil court, if it got to prosecution. However, I do not think I am the right person to answer those questions.
Q
“The bill as drafted is not the answer.”
You have been very clear on that today. You have made four suggestions there. I can see a problem with the legal aid one, but the other three relate to procedure for criminal trials in the service justice system. Could they be incorporated into the Bill?
Judge Blackett: Yes. If you need legislation, you can use any legislative vehicle, can you not? Certainly, I would have thought that applying the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 one, which is applying a six-month time limit to summary-only matters, would be extended. It would need more wording because I believe that should be extended to what should be called de minimis. De minimis claims probably need to be taken before the judge who is overseeing it so he can say, “This is de minimis.” Then, a great raft of those allegations in IHAT and Northmoor would have gone with that.
Q
Judge Blackett: Yes.
Q
Judge Blackett: The way I described it when we had our meeting with the Minister was relating to the Criminal Cases Review Commission. They can look at what is a miscarriage of justice and put it back to the Court of Appeal, but they have a very high bar. It was extracting that sort of test and applying it on the other side in relation to investigations. Having said that, there have been only two reinvestigations following acquittals in my time, and both of those determined that there was no further evidence and therefore it did not come back to court. However, the individual accused, who had been acquitted, had to go through all the problems that we heard the last witness talk about.
Q
Judge Blackett: In my view, you have an allocated judge—probably a judge advocate—who the investigators can come to and say, “This is what we have. We have one person saying ‘He raped me 10 years ago.’ We have no other evidence. We have interviewed her and we think”—she is lying, she is telling the truth, or whatever. The judge can then take a view, rather than the current system at IHAT. It became rather like a fishing expedition, where an allegation came in and they spent ages fishing for more evidence around the allegation. It needs, I think, judicial oversight to say, “Stop fishing, you have had enough time. This clearly will not get anywhere near a conviction and therefore stop the investigation now.”
Q
Judge Blackett: No, no. It is basically judicial supervision. It comes back to what I was saying about better case management in the court martial, which is the system we introduced not that long ago, where early on in the investigation, before the investigation is complete, the case is put before a judge. It may be that at that stage the defendant says, “I plead guilty and therefore let’s stop the investigation.” That is one way of dealing with these matters. It stops the time taken on an investigation.
Q
Judge Blackett: Clause 3 is engaged after five years. It seems bizarre to me that in deciding whether to prosecute, you have a post-five-year test, but not a pre-five-year test. All these matters are taken into account anyway when the service prosecutor decides whether it is in the service and public interest to prosecute. As you know, there has to be evidential sufficiency and public interest. This is effectively designing or describing what the service interest test or public interest test should be. Now, prosecutions may take place, even though a serviceman were suffering from battle fatigue, diminished responsibility—all of those things. There is still a proper prosecution and the offence or the sentence will reflect all those matters, but not the actual prosecution. This therefore seems to me unnecessary, because the service prosecuting authority exists separate from the Crown Prosecution Service because it applies the service interest test. That was my concern.
Q
Judge Blackett: Interestingly, a number of the issues here were raised by Marine A subsequently through the Criminal Cases Review Commission and back to the Court of Appeal, and they were never raised at first instance. Had he raised them at first instance—had all the psychiatric evidence that came out eventually appeared at the start—he probably would have been charged with manslaughter rather than murder, for example. So that can assist the prosecutor in the way he moves forward.
Q
Judge Blackett: I think if the Bill becomes law as it stands, then clearly there is a concern. We have seen it from all the responses to you, from Liberty and others such as Liberty, who are very concerned. Their perception is that you are protecting people from wrongdoing. I am sure their view will be that if you are protecting people from wrongdoing, you are not capable of being independent and therefore we should take all this away from you.
Q
Judge Blackett: Sorry, I am not quite sure what the question is.
Q
Judge Blackett: I do not read the Bill as you have suggested—that you do not investigate because there is a presumption against prosecution.
Q
Judge Blackett: You investigate on the basis that if there is sufficient evidence, it will go to the prosecuting authority and he will say either yes or no, or it will go to the Attorney General. As I said earlier, if the Director Service Prosecutions decides not to prosecute, there is a victim right of review, so there is a further process—that is, if it does not go to the International Criminal Court—and if it gets to the Attorney General, there is the option of judicial review of his decision. Yes, there is a lot of potential litigation around the Bill.
I call Liz Twist.
Judge Blackett: Can I add a rider to what I have just said? The Attorney General has to consent in a number of offences. As far as the court martial is concerned, the Attorney General has to consent to prosecuting any International Criminal Court Act 2001 offence—that is, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. Under section 1A(3) of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957, he has to consent to prosecuting any grave breaches of that Act, and under section 61 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, he has to consent if a prosecution is to be brought outside of time limits. That is in relation to service personnel who have left and are no longer subject to that jurisdiction. A consent function is there in any event, and funnily enough, given that ICC Act offences and Geneva Conventions Act offences are covered by the Attorney General, a lot of this will have to go to the Attorney General anyway, without the Overseas Operations Bill.
My concern about the Attorney General’s consent is that it undermines the Director Service Prosecutions. If I were he, I would be most upset that I could not make a decision in these circumstances.
Q
Judge Blackett: I think all Governments would want torture and other war crimes to be prosecuted, and if they give that indication, it is not for me to say anything else. I am satisfied by that assurance, but on the face of the Bill, there is a chance that it would not be prosecuted. That is the point.
Q
Judge Blackett: I would have to read the Bill again. It says in clause 1 what “overseas operations” means, doesn’t it? I cannot put my hand straight on it, but I am sure there is a section that describes what overseas operations are. Sorry, this is not really answering your question, but the eight cases that have come to court martial include ones that were not necessarily on the battlefield. The Breadbasket case, for instance, where soldiers were alleged—they were found guilty—to have abused civilians by stripping them naked, making them simulate sex, urinating on them, et cetera, was not on the battlefield, but it was in operations shortly after the war fighting. That does not answer the question, does it?
Q
Judge Blackett: Yes. The way I read the Bill is that anybody on an operational tour in an operational area is covered, so the case I just described would be captured by this. That would be my interpretation.
Q
Judge Blackett: It does not talk about the battlefield; it talks about overseas operations. I went on a number of overseas operations in the Royal Navy, which were not a battlefield. It was never in the face of the enemy; I cannot say more than that. I would have considered myself on an operational tour when we were sailing round the West Indies, for instance, but I do not think that would be covered by the Bill. Any activity where there is effectively war fighting is what this Bill is about. That is my interpretation. It is not just about what is happening when you are firing bullets at each other; it is what is happening around it.
Q
Judge Blackett: Yes, because they are being investigated.
Q
Judge Blackett: What I am saying is that the fact that there is a presumption against prosecution would not stop the knock on the door and the investigation. That is the whole point. The presumption against prosecution does not stop the investigation; the investigation happens. The 80-year-old who is alleged to have done whatever he has done would still get the knock on the door. He would still be investigated. Once there was sufficient evidence against him, it goes to the prosecutor. If there is not sufficient evidence, the investigation stops. If there is sufficient evidence, it goes to the prosecutor, who then has the five-year presumption against prosecution. The 80-year-old is still going through all the trauma, and it may be that the police say, “This is such a serious case that it is exceptional, and therefore we should waive the presumption against prosecution.” This Bill will not address that question. That is the whole point.
Q
Judge Blackett: No, because that was very much an investigation function. It has changed a bit because of what I have done with the system, but at that time I was effectively waiting for the investigation to happen and the prosecution to come to us. The judge becomes involved when the case first steps into the courtroom. That may take another two years, even after it has stepped into the courtroom, because of whatever has to happen. I was not consulted, no, and nor should I have been at that stage.
Q
Judge Blackett: I constantly raised concerns with the DSP that this was all taking too long and that they ought either to get rid of it or get to court. I did that.
Q
Judge Blackett: I was reassured that the investigations were taking time, more evidence was needed, some cases were coming, and I needed to keep out of it so that when the cases came I could deal with them.
There was one other point that I wanted to make, which is about complementarity—not with the ICC. I would pose some questions, particularly to the Minister. You will remember that six Royal Military Police were killed at Majar al-Kabir in 2003. If those responsible were identified today, would we accept that there would be a presumption against their prosecution? Would we expect the factors in clause 3(2)(a) to be taken into account? Would we be content that a member of the Iraqi Government’s consent would be needed to prosecute? Would we accept a decision by that person not to prosecute? In my view, there would be outrage in this country if that occurred. In all areas of law, you have to be even-handed. If, in that same battle, it turned out that one of our soldiers killed one of the Iraqis unlawfully and we said, “Well, he should be protected, because it was a long time ago, but we not protecting these Iraqis,” that is just not right. I fundamentally think the Bill is wrong, and I really believe it needs to be revised before it passes into law.
Thank you, Judge. That neatly turned around the normal procedure—instead of the Committee asking you questions, you are asking the Committee questions. The Committee has come to the end of its questions. May I thank you on behalf of the Committee for the very interesting and valuable evidence that you have given to us? That brings us to the complete end of our oral evidence sessions with different witnesses. We will meet again on Wednesday next week to commence line-by-line consideration of the Bill. We will be meeting at 9.25 am in Committee Room 10.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Leo Docherty.)
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesBefore we begin consideration, I have to make a few preliminary points. Members will understand the need to respect social distancing guidance, and I shall intervene if necessary to remind everyone. I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings.
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We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room, on the desk. It shows how the selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or a similar issue.
Please note that decisions on amendments do not take place in the order that they are debated, but in the order that they appear on the amendment paper. The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment are taken when we come to the clause to which the amendment relates.
Clause 1
Prosecutorial decision regarding alleged conduct during overseas operations
I beg to move amendment 23, in clause 1, page 2, line 1, at end insert—
“(ba) operating weapon-bearing UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) or RPAS (Remotely Piloted Aerial Systems) from the British Islands in support of overseas operations.”
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer.
The Bill is important to our service personnel, and it is crucial that we get it right. Last week, one of our witnesses, Mr Sutcliff, said to us:
“please scrutinise the Bill as carefully as you can…and…look after your service and ex-service personnel in the best way you can.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 10, Q9.]
It is important to keep those things in mind as we proceed. I hope that the Government will consider our amendments even-handedly. They have been tabled in good faith, in the hope that we can make the Bill the best it can be for the brave men and women who serve in our armed forces.
Amendment 23 calls for unmanned aerial vehicles or remotely piloted aerial systems operated from the British isles in support of overseas operations to be included in the Bill. The Minister has said that he is happy to look again at all aspects of the Bill and that he wants to build a collegiate approach in the House to get the Bill through. I would argue that this clause is a good place to start. The amendment would a simple and effective way to help the Bill to achieve its stated aims. If the Government are serious about making this Bill comprehensive, I see no reason for UAVs not to be included. As drafted, the Bill is not clear enough about its scope or what it includes.
In recent times, we have seen a dramatic rise in the use of UAVs. The failure to include them in the Bill gives me concern that it is not looking enough to the future of warfare. The Government have made their plans clear, saying that they will rely increasingly on unmanned aerial vehicles, meaning that those will account for an important part of the integrated review. Across the world, armed forces have invested millions in the development of UAVs for military operations. The United States has increasingly relied on drones to carry out its military operations overseas, and the rest of the world is quickly following.
In 2016, at the cost of £816 million, the drone acquisition programme was approved by the Ministry of Defence. Earlier this year, the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence said that the estimated cost had risen by an additional £325 million. The UK Government are funnelling ever-increasing sums into the funding of UAVs for military purposes. Since 2007, about 3,700 Royal Air Force drone missions have killed 1,000 terrorists in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria.
Does my hon. Friend agree that UAVs are an integral part of the new battlespace and that, while some people argue that they are outside any rules of engagement, they are in fact governed by the same rules as govern conventional weapons and that the people using them are aware of the legal restraints?
I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. A long-standing member of the Defence Committee, he has developed a reputation as an expert in the field of defence. He is right that the impact of technology will only increase in changing our world beyond all recognition. It is important to realise that, in future, whether drones are operated from the British islands or America, they will be as much a part of warfare as boots on the ground. Unmanned combat is likely to become an increasingly common form of warfare. The Ministry of Defence has said it aims for a third of the Royal Air Force to be remotely piloted by 2030, and funding for unmanned aerial vehicles for military purposes continues to grow. Given their rising use, the exclusion from the Bill of UAVs and remotely piloted aircraft systems is a glaring oversight if the legislation is to serve its purpose in the future.
The Ministry of Defence is also considering the most appropriate systems for air combat, especially when Typhoon leaves service in 2030. Options for air combat forces include unmanned combat aerial vehicles with both offensive and defensive capabilities. That would see a mix of manned and unmanned craft in the air force, working alongside each other. Surely those piloting UAVs from the UK should be given the same consideration under the Bill as those they work alongside.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. People will still have to operate those vehicles in future, and they will also be open to the horrors of war and what happens on the battlefield. We should keep that in mind as we develop this argument.
Until recently, the drones used by the UK armed forces were remotely piloted aerial systems. The proposed unmanned combat aerial vehicles differ from the previous drones as they are designed to fight for air supremacy. That widens the scope of drone and other unmanned warfare, as my right hon. Friend just said, increasing the number of service personnel working on an overseas mission but not physically based overseas. General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith recently said that he foresees the Army of the future as an integration of “boots and bots” and that in future combat those on the ground will be supported by “swarms of drones”. We look forward to hearing more about those plans when the integrated review is finally published.
The Ministry of Defence also continues to fund research into the future of drones. The Government are funding jointly with the French a study into the feasibility of an unmanned combat aircraft as a possible replacement for Typhoon from 2030. The Government have said they have no plans to develop fully autonomous weapons; that means that service personnel will continue to operate UAVs for the foreseeable future. What is clear from all that is that drones are here to stay. Therefore, those who operate those missions should be included in the Bill. It is important to note that drone operators face a worryingly high chance of developing post-traumatic stress disorder. In fact, in 2015, Reaper squadron boss Wing Commander Damian Killeen told the BBC that staff operating drone aircraft in Iraq and Syria may be at greater risk of mental trauma.
While drone operators may be based in the UK, they are completing overseas missions. There is a popular image that operating a drone is like playing a video game, but those who serve say that that is simply not the case. One US drone operator is quoted as saying:
“You are 18 inches away from 32-inch, high-definition combat, where you are in contact [by headset with] the guys on the ground... You are there. You are there. You fly with them, you support them and a person you are tasked with supporting gets engaged, hurt, possibly killed, it’s a deeply, deeply emotional event. It’s not detached. It’s not a video game. And it’s certainly not 8,000 miles away.”
For some, drone operation can be more traumatising than flying a conventional aircraft. As Commander Killeen says:
“You’ve got that resolution where you know exactly what it is that’s on the other end of your crosshairs.”
Research by the US air force also suggests that those in the kill chain see more graphic violence than their special forces counterpart on the ground. On surveillance missions, they are more likely to see destroyed homes and villages, as well as witnessing dead bodies and human remains. One UAV pilot told the Daily Mirror:
“The days are long and hard and can be mentally exhausting. And although UAV pilots are detached from the real battle, it can still be traumatic, especially if you are conducting after-action surveillance.
When you are piloting a UAV for hours, you feel part of the battle, even though you are thousands of miles away.”
The risk of post-traumatic stress disorder is also increased by the fact that, unlike personnel on the ground, who perhaps do a four-month tour, UAV operators often work year round, meaning less chance for a break and time to recover. Justin Bronk, a research fellow for airpower at the London-based Royal United Services Institute, said that fast jet crews were used to deploy on short tours abroad, but that drone operators switched daily between potentially lethal operations and family life, which could be
“extremely draining and psychologically taxing”.
The psychological stress of drone warfare is visible in difficulties that the UK faces in recruitment and retention of those qualified to fly armed drones. During an appearance before the Public Accounts Committee in January, the Ministry of Defence permanent secretary said that for the Royal Air Force, the training and retraining of drone crews has “historically proven challenging”.
The effect that taking part in such machines has on UAV pilots mentally, despite their being physically further away from the action, merits their inclusion in the Bill. Only last week, in our evidence session, Clive Baldwin of Human Rights Watch said:
“The idea of having one rule for overseas operations and one for domestic operations will be increasingly artificial”.––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 67, Q135.]
Drone operators may not be physically overseas, but they are very much taking part in overseas operations. With unmanned warfare looking like it will be more common in future conflicts, I would argue that failing to include those operations in the Bill may cause the Ministry of Defence service personnel issues down the line. The Government have said that they want the Bill to protect service personnel from repeated investigations and vexatious claims. Do those service personnel who operate UAVs not also deserve to be protected?
Given the increasing use of UAVs and RPAS, I would be deeply concerned were they not included in the Bill. If the Bill is to do as the Minister purports, surely, if we are to protect our service personnel, we want to include and protect those personnel who operate our drones.
I thank my hon. Friend for introducing this amendment, which I assume is a probing one in order to have the debate. But, Mr Stringer, it was remiss of me not to say what a pleasure it is serve under your chairmanship, especially now we are both serial rebels on our Benches, after votes that took place this week on covid.
I do not like the word “drone”. It gives the sinister idea that somehow these things are indiscriminate weapons and there is no human in the chain. Unmanned aerial vehicle is a more appropriate term. I accept that, in the future, we may get to a system where unmanned aerial vehicles or subsea systems are completely autonomous, but at the moment, we are talking about the human in the chain.
It is a common myth, mainly argued by those who are against the use of UAVs, that somehow there are no rules that govern how they are used. Nothing could be further from the truth. When I was a Minister in the Ministry of Defence, I met the individuals who pilot—that is the word we use—these unmanned systems in both Iraq and Afghanistan. They are in the same decision-making process and legal framework as if someone was dropping a ordnance from a Typhoon or any type of manned aircraft.
There is a chain of command, including a legal framework around their decisions. Before each individual airstrike takes place, there is a legal justification. That might come as a surprise to some people who want to portray the view that people are sat in Nevada or Waddington or Florida pressing buttons, attacking targets. Nothing could be further from the truth. There is a legal framework for each operation and that is supported by the legal service. It surprises some people that each strike has a legal sign-off, with lawyers who agree what can and cannot be done, including, as I know from my time in office, a chain that sometimes includes Ministers who have to agree to those sign-offs. There are many examples where Ministers have had sign-off.
Is what we are talking about pretty? No, it is not—but anyone who knows the battle space or any type of combat knows that it is not a pretty thing. Killing people is not something that anyone wants to do, but unmanned aerial vehicles have given a capability to us and our allies which has been of tremendous help, not only in saving UK and allies’ servicemen and women’s lives, but in saving civilian lives.
The chain of command is a legal framework. Do things go wrong? Yes, clearly they do, and not just in this theatre. Sometimes in a very complex battle scenario, no matter how well you plan for it, you cannot foresee every eventuality. What irritates me is that people sometimes look back at those situations with some sort of crystal ball and say, “Well, if I was there, I would have done X, Y and Z.”
On a point of information, and paying tribute to the right hon. Gentleman’s experience in the field, if a Minister signs off an operation and it goes wrong, does that mean that the Minister is legally culpable for the decision, or is it the operator operating the UAV or is it the people on the ground calling in the mission?
I will come to that in a minute; it is an important point on the legal protection that is there for the people involved.
Things do go wrong. It is fine for people to look back and say, “Look, if that happened, I would have done this differently,” but that is just not how warfare takes place. Sometimes, there are critical decisions that have to be taken at short notice to protect civilians or protect our armed forces’ lives. At the end of the day, they are down to individual judgments, not only by the commanders who authorise things, but by the people we are asking to protect us as members of our armed forces.
When the hon. Member for Islwyn was introducing the amendment, he noted that it was not meant to take on board issues in relation to fully autonomous systems. Nevertheless, it should be recognised that fully autonomous systems will be with us sooner rather than later and that, in those systems, there is a human decision-making process that must be safeguarded. Artificial intelligence is artificial, requiring human instigation to create the algorithm to make the decision-making process, and we must keep that in mind as we recognise the need for and validity of securing protections.
I agree. Again, some people writing or talking about this area are saying that somehow the human being has nothing to do with it. The hon. Gentleman is correct in that even if we get to having a futuristic system with fully autonomous vehicles and in-flight combat between various systems, swarms of drones and things like that, a decision will still need to be taken on how that system is used. That is an area where not just in the UK but internationally we will need to look at rules of engagement and the definition of an autonomous vehicle. There is increasingly a move towards autonomous vehicles. Look at the Team Tempest programme from BAE Systems and its partners and how that is going: there can be a pilot, but the design will not need a pilot, and that ain’t that far away—it is coming up fast.
It comes back to the decision-making process. The hon. Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke mentioned the chain of command issue. That goes to the heart of the Bill because of the importance of having the audit trail for who took which decisions. It is difficult for anyone in the chain of command to take a decision, from the person executing the mission on the ground right up to a Minister signing something off. That is not an easy process. Can things go wrong all the way through? Yes. However, I would argue that as long as a decision is underpinned by our legal processes right the way through to authorisation by a Minister to ensure that it is legally watertight, we should be okay. Mistakes will happen. What a lot of the public find strange is that in cells that deal with targeting, there are MOD or RAF lawyers sat there, saying, “I am sorry, you cannot do that.” It shocks people.
Unmanned aerial vehicles have got to the point where there is a bit of folklore when people make a decision. It is therefore important to ensure there is that legal framework. However, as I said, things will go wrong, and my hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn is trying in the amendment to consider what happens when things do go wrong. Is somebody sat in RAF Waddington classed as being on overseas operations? That is a grey area that perhaps has not appeared yet in all these claims, but I think it will.
The evidence we have taken in the last few weeks has highlighted how, in many ways, this is an easier area to look at in terms of investigations because there is—there should be—that chain of decision making. However, it does get complicated when we are working with allies. I am confident that we have some of the most robust rules in terms of targeting and rules of engagement, but—how can I put this diplomatically?—I do not think it is the same for some of our allies, especially one of our closest allies. Could we argue that some of the examples I have seen in Afghanistan and Iraq were proportionate in the way they were conducted? I do not think they were. That has led to the idea that somehow we are the same.
Let us suppose we get to the situation where we have a legal challenge to somebody who has been sat in Waddington, has legitimately followed the legal advice and something goes wrong. What happens? Are they classed as being on overseas operations? We should give them protection because they are not just following orders, but following the legal guidance that has been supplied to them as to why they are carrying out the mission. That is an area we need to look at.
It links to a broader point about what we deem to be overseas operations. Eminent lawyers will want to argue around the head of a pin about this, if we do not look at it. The other side is other operations. Increasingly we, as a nation, are not going into conflicts on our own, but with other nations. That leads to a situation where, on occasion, UK forces are not under the command of UK personnel, but those of other nations. I do not think people realise that.
Some nations have different interpretations of what is proportionate. How are they included, especially within—that misnomer—peacekeeping? Peacekeeping can be dangerous. I have visited parts of the world where peacekeeping is taking place that were far from peaceful, and were stressful for the individuals involved. Is that classed as an overseas operation?
When I was walking in this morning—I often think when I am walking—I was thinking that this gets to the definition of what an overseas operation is. If somebody were based at NATO headquarters in Brussels, would that be classed as an overseas operation? I am not suggesting they would be involved in a mission such as an airstrike or combat in Brussels, although perhaps they might be on a rowdy Friday or Saturday night in the Grand Place. Is that classed as an overseas operation for that individual? Those individuals are lone officers, but members of our armed forces are serving in ones and twos around the world, mentoring forces, doing a great job in defence diplomacy and ensuring that the high standards we have in this country are passed on to other nations.
My hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn talked about the UAV operators themselves. I have read a few studies about their mental health and the jury is out on evidence of increased PTSD and other things. It is a strange environment for individuals, as my hon. Friend said, because they are separated from the battle space, but they see and do some graphic and dangerous things. Having seen some of those videos, what happens is not pretty. The jury is still out on the issue of mental health effects and that is an area where we need more research, not just in this country but internationally. That links to part 2. If those individuals developed mental illness later, given the time limits set out in the Bill, would they be excluded or not? That is another area that we need to look at when we come to part 2.
Can we ever future-proof legislation? No. Politicians all think that we can see into the future as if with hindsight, but unfortunately we all know that most of our legislation is reactive to events. We can try to make it as future-proof as possible, however, and amendment 23, which I presume is a probing amendment, is really a way of asking whether the MOD and the people who have drawn up the Bill have thought about the area. Whether we like it or not, it will increasingly become a challenge not just for how we train people, but for how individuals are legally protected. Even if it cannot be incorporated into the Bill, I would certainly like the Ministry of Defence to look not only at the training, but at what the legal status of those individuals will be. The amendment is welcome in allowing us to explore some of those areas; I hope that it will give MOD policy makers some food for thought on where we take this in the future.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer.
The principle is that part 1 should cover personnel in circumstances in which they may
“come under attack or face the threat of attack or violent resistance”
in the course of an overseas operation, as detailed in clause 1(6). When developing our policy, we considered whether we should extend the coverage of part 1 to include UK-based drone operators when the systems that they are operating are involved in operations outside the British islands. However, we determined that although the UK-based drone pilots would be considered part of an overseas operation, they could not be said to be at risk of personal attack or violence, or face the threat of attack or violence, as would be the case for an individual deployed in the theatre of operations. We therefore determined that as the personal threat circumstances would not arise in a UK-based role, the personnel in those roles would not warrant the additional protection provided by the measures in part 1. I therefore ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
I see the logic of how the Bill is structured, and I accept that somebody sitting in Waddington is not going to be attacked by an enemy, but if the purpose of the Bill is to give them legal protection for their actions, they are not immune from being attacked in a legal process for something that they do on overseas operations.
Some really important points have been made, particularly about mental health provision and the protection of those who operate these systems, but the Bill is clearly there to provide the additional protections that particularly apply to those who face the threat of violence and attack at the time, so I disagree on this point. I therefore ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
I take on board what the Minister says, but we may disagree on an overall element of the Bill. It is the Overseas Operations Bill, and the persons we are speaking of are involved in an overseas operation. Surely the security given to those in the physicality of the arena of military activity should not be just about geography or about those who are physically participating in the overall operations.
The clauses that deal with special consideration for the circumstances of what is going on at the time are there precisely to take account of the unique physical and mental demands of being in close combat; that is what they are designed for. To suggest that drone operators operating from UK shores would face the same pressures is not the same thing. I therefore ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
This was a probing amendment. I am happy to withdraw it, but I hope that the Minister will revisit the matter as soon as we know more from research about the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder on drone operators and—as we move towards the integrated review—technology starts to dominate the battlefield. I hope that he will give a commitment that the MOD will revisit that in the near future. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 1, page 2, line 2, leave out “5” and insert “10”
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 26, in clause 1, page 2, line 4, leave out “5” and insert “10”
Amendment 27, in clause 5, page 3, line 19, leave out “5” and insert “10”
Amendment 28, in clause 5, page 3, line 36, leave out “5” and insert “10”
New clause 8—Limitation of time for minor offences—
“(none) No proceedings shall be brought against any person in relation to a relevant offence, where—
(a) the condition set out in subsection 3 of section 1 is satisfied,
(b) the offence is subject to summary conviction only, or is one in the commission of which no serious, permanent or lasting psychological or physical injury has been caused, and
(c) a period of six months has passed from the time the offence was committed or discovered.”
This amendment would dispose of minor allegations of misconduct by imposing a time limit similar to that which exists in relation to summary only matters in Magistrates’ Courts.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I start by thanking you for the way you have skilfully conducted proceedings through this Committee stage so far. Your skill and guidance have allowed the Committee to provide the proper scrutiny that we all agree that all legislation passing through this House is due, and allowed proceedings to be conducted in an orderly and timely manner. I also thank the Clerks and wider support teams for their support in allowing proceedings to run as smoothly as possible. This period presents particular challenges, including allowing witnesses to provide evidence by video link. The entire Committee will join me in thanking them for their important work.
This is the first time I have led a Bill through Committee, and also, as I understand it, the Minister’s. However, this is by no means the first time that you have been Chair of a Bill Committee, Mr Stringer. As I understand it, it was the Digital Economy Bill back in 2016 that was first chaired by your good self in Committee, four years ago, almost to the day. It would be fair to say that a lot has changed in those four years and I am sure that I speak for the entire membership of the Committee when I say that we are in safe hands with your experience and guidance. I also thank my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham for his contributions, as well as my hon. Friends the Members for Islwyn, for South Shields and for Blaydon.
Before we progress, I want to take the opportunity to outline our concerns about the Bill once again. The Government still have an opportunity to fix the Bill and get it right. Unfortunately, the Bill does not focus on the root causes of the terrible stresses experienced by our armed forces personnel and their families. The Government should focus on what can be done to reduce the length and regular occurrence of investigations for vexatious claims faced by our armed forces personnel, not prosecutions. In addition, as we heard from a wide variety of witnesses last week, the Bill does not protect our armed forces personnel; it protects the MOD. As we heard last week, the introduction of a six-year time limit against armed forces personnel making civil claims puts them at a distinct disadvantage to civilians.
Crucially, the Bill also risks breaching the armed forces covenant. I repeat: there is still time for the Government to fix this and get the Bill right. As we have said at every stage, we will work constructively with the Government to improve the Bill. That is why the Opposition have also tabled vital amendments, including the requirement for the Government to commission and publish an independent evaluation of service personnel access to both legal advice and legal aid in relation to legal, civil and criminal proceedings covered by the Bill’s provisions. I hope the Government will listen to the points raised in Committee and work with us to protect our troops and get the Bill right.
Order. I have allowed the hon. Gentleman to continue, not because he started with those kind words about me, but because it is the start of the Bill and the hon. Gentleman is new to the position. The amendment is tightly drawn around five and 10 years, so I will from now on be quite strict about focusing on what the actual amendment is, and not moving out of scope.
Thank you, Mr Stringer, I was about to get to the point around our amendment.
Part 1 sets a five-year limit on the prosecution of current or former armed forces personnel for alleged offences committed in the course of duty while overseas, save for exceptional circumstances. That would mean that the Bill would halve the timeframe initially envisaged for the prosecution of offences.
The Government’s consultation originally proposed a 10-year deadline, which would have meant that operations in Afghanistan, which ended in 2014, fell outside the time limit unless the circumstances for prosecuting any new alleged offences were deemed exceptional. That raises questions about the Government’s reasons, and about the evidence or advice that they received, for changing the deadline to five years. Why not six or seven years? Five years seems to be an arbitrary figure, with no clear evidence for why that timeframe has been selected. Will the Minister provide the evidence behind the selection of that specific timeframe?
According to written evidence shared by the charity Reprieve, even countries such as France and the US, which operate statutes of limitation for criminal offences, have never introduced provisions that give military personnel special status in criminal law. Why are we deviating from the international standards that we share with our security partners, which risks undermining our international reputation? That is not the global Britain that the country was promised by the Government during the last election.
In 2020, the Judge Advocate General for the armed forces—the most senior ranking military judge—said that creating a five-year limit on prosecutions would be a damaging signal for Britain to send to the world, and would be a stain on the country’s reputation if Britain were perceived as reluctant to act in accordance with long-standing international law. What was the Government’s reasoning for ignoring such an important figure who was raising serious concerns about the Bill’s five-year limit on prosecutions?
The Government also seem determined to ignore those very same concerns when they are raised by the Defence Committee. In July 2020, the Chair of that Committee sent a letter to the Secretary of State to reiterate concerns that to protect
“serving personnel and veterans against vexatious claims or unnecessary investigations and prosecutions”,
the Bill
“may not be an effective way of achieving those aims.”
In that letter, the Chair also posed a further set of questions about the decision to reduce to five years the initial prosecution cut-off of 10 years.
The Labour party is determined to stop vexatious claims made against armed forces personnel, which cause them and their families truly heartbreaking stress, but as last week’s evidence sessions made clear, the parts of the Bill that intend to remedy that contain logical flaws. Furthermore, the Minister himself has said that one of the biggest problems was the Ministry’s inability to investigate itself properly, as well as the standard of those investigations. If those investigations were done properly with self-regulation, we would probably not be in Committee today. I ask the Minister: why does the Bill not deal with those investigatory issues that he has identified?
Clive Baldwin, the senior legal adviser at Human Rights Watch, has suggested that the Bill would
“greatly increase the risk that British soldiers who commit serious crimes will avoid justice”;
that
“the presumptive time-limit of five years…will encourage a culture of delay and cover-up of criminal investigations”;
and that, in turn, it would increase the risk of the International Criminal Court considering bringing its own prosecutions.
As I have said, there is still time to change the Bill, to focus on the issues that need addressing, and to get it right. That means focusing on legislation that will stop the sad cases that we have heard time and again about our troops undergoing drawn-out investigations, only for the decision to be made against prosecution. That is what needs fixing and it is where the Government’s focus should be.
In last week’s evidence sessions, we repeatedly heard the same concerns from a wide range of witnesses. Hilary Meredith, of Hilary Meredith Solicitors, said that she was against any cut-off. She went on:
“I think the reason why the cases became historic is not the date of the accusation—any of the criminal accusations under human rights law, for example, came within 12 months of the incident taking place. It was the prolonged procedure that was bungled afterwards that made those cases historic. It is the procedure and investigation in the UK that need to be reviewed and overhauled, and not necessarily a time limit placed on criminal or civil prosecutions.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 06 October 2020; c. 16, Q24.]
That lays clear the problem with the Bill. It became increasingly clear from the evidence that not only is the five-year time limit arbitrary, but it does not even fix the issues that the Minister cites to justify the Bill. The investigations are what cause the mental stresses that we know put our troops and their families under incredible pressure. Dr Jonathan Morgan, fellow and reader in law at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, also said in evidence last week:
“Ten years was originally proposed; that has been reduced to five. There seems to be no logical answer, certainly, as to that particular time period”.––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 34.]
To add to that, the former Attorney General of Northern Ireland from 2010 to 2020, John Larkin QC, went on to say:
“There is no magic in the number five; that is a matter of policy choice”.—[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Military Personnel and Veterans) Bill, 6 October 2020; c. 31, Q60.]
Yet again, we hear that there is seemingly no logic in the choice of five years as the limit for prosecutions. However, that also suggests something new: that the decision to select five years as the limit was a political choice, not one borne out of consultation or analysis.
I note that every example the hon. Gentleman uses is a legal representative or firm, or legal mind. We heard some great evidence last week from the soldiers. As you said, this is a point of policy. We wanted to make sure we represent our armed forces and make them the best in the world to serve in, and five years was well received among the junior ranks we spoke to the armed forces. You say that Labour is the party to support the armed forces, but arguing for 10 years shows that is not the case.
Order. I remind hon. Members that if they use “you”, they are referring to me, not the Front-Bench spokesperson. I also remind members of the Committee that interventions should be short and to the point. If hon. Members try to catch my eye, there will be time to make speeches on each amendment, if they wish to.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that remark. We also learned last week from the witnesses that, while veterans may welcome the intent of the Government to take forward action, when they looked at the detail of the Bill, they were not so satisfied with its contents.
I thank my right hon. Friend for that remark. It is very clear that the Bill in its current form will not help that case if that is repeated ever again.
The Government have let us down on the Bill. It is becoming ever clearer in Committee not only that it fails to fix the problems that it intends to fix, but that the Government have failed in the due diligence for our armed forces personnel and their families that they deserve. The Government should be developing legislation by properly conducting consultation, analysis and identifying the best way to deal with the issues at hand.
Sadly, it seems that the Government are inclined to make policy on the hoof. It is exactly this failure to identify the root causes of the issues that our armed forces personnel face that has been continually highlighted in Committee. As Professor Richard Ekins, head of the judicial power project at the Policy Exchange, highlighted in evidence last week:
“It certainly does not stop investigations. In fact, if one were to make a criticism of the Bill, one might say that it places no obstacle on continuing investigations, which might be thought to be one of the main mischiefs motivating of the Bill”.—[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Military Personnel and Veterans) Bill, 6 October 2020; c. 35, Q60.]
We also heard from Major Bob Campbell about the unimaginable stresses he faced in a 17-year investigation that eventually did not lead to prosecution. I know the entire Committee will join me in thanking him for his service and offering our condolences for the terrible process he has been put through. Once again, we heard that the Bill does not deal with the key problem of addressing investigations. The specific case of Major Bob Campbell would not be covered by the Bill.
Last week, Dr Jonathan Morgan also stated that Major Bob Campbell’s case would not have been addressed by these proposals. He was prosecuted in 2006 in connection with an alleged offence in 2003, which would have been within the five-year period for bringing a prosecution. It is only in 2020, after 17 years, that he has finally been cleared. Several hon. Members made the point on Second Reading that perhaps the real vice is not so much late prosecutions but the continued investigations by the Ministry of Defence, without necessarily leading to a criminal prosecution at all.
If I have understood the facts of Major Campbell’s case, it rather shows that a five-year soft cut-off for prosecutions will not solve that kind of problem at all. Are the Government really prepared to abandon decorated armed services personnel like Major Bob Campbell? Is that really what the Government have set out to achieve?
In summary, I hope that the Government will listen to the points raised here—including the extensive evidence that we have heard that the five-year limit is at best arbitrary—refocus the Bill on dealing with investigations, not just prosecutions, and work with us to protect our troops and get this Bill right.
I ask the Minister, what evidence or advice have the Government received to change the deadline to five years? Why not six or seven? I ask the Minister to provide evidence on why that specific timeframe was selected. Are the Government really prepared to abandon decorated armed services personnel like Major Bob Campbell? Is that really what the Government have set out to achieve? Why does the Bill not deal with the issues in investigations that the Minister has identified? What is the Government’s reasoning for ignoring the Judge Advocate General in this Bill, raising serious concerns about the problems he raised about the five-year limit on prosecutions?
Thank you for that clarification, Mr Stringer.
With new clauses 8, 6 and 7 we come to the issue of investigation. We will discuss new clauses 6 and 7 later. The new clauses put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South get to the heart of the issue, which has come out in the evidence we have taken over the past few weeks. This Bill puts the cart before the horse. It deals with prosecutions rather than the real issue, which is investigations.
I find that odd. Who was consulted on drafting this Bill? We heard evidence last week that Judge Blackett was not consulted on this Bill, so who drafted it? Anyone looking at the Iraq Historic Allegations Team or the testimony given last week by Major Bob Campbell can see that the issue is investigation. It would interesting to hear the reasons why the limit has gone from 10 years, as recommended in the consultation, down to five.
Personally, I do not agree with the time limit, for the reasons that my hon. Friend has just outlined. It will give no protection to those veterans of the most recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, whom this Bill seems to be focused on, nor will it give protection to veterans in the future, because investigation will still take place from that five-year period. Are they traumatic? I think they must be.
I agree with my hon. Friend, and I pay huge tribute to Major Bob Campbell for his evidence last week, because it must have been very difficult for him. Consider the idea that any of us would have something hanging over us for 17 years. If it was a minor offence, it would be bad enough, but he was accused of horrendous crimes for 17 years, and investigated time and again for the same thing. I cannot imagine how that felt for him as an individual.
What is proposed will not stop investigations. It is clear to me that if we have limitations as outlined in the Bill, we will get cases that go to the International Criminal Court. Its investigations will take into account the lack of action, because there is a five-year limit. We will come later to the presumption of prosecution, which is another huge problem. Do I actually want our servicemen and women to end up in the International Criminal Court? No, I do not. I think it is proud testimony not only to the professionals in our armed forces, but to our legal system and what we have had so far, that we have avoided that because of our robust legal system and the oversight of our military justice system.
The problem with the Bill—the Minister gave this away in his ill-advised winding up on Second Reading—is that it implies that people are either in favour of our brave armed forces or in favour of ambulance-chasing lawyers. As I said on Second Reading, my record of supporting defence and the armed forces speaks for itself. My attacks on ambulance-chasing solicitors, through my work on the miners’ compensation scheme and the formation of the sister regulation body—taking it away from the law side—also speak for themselves. What we need over the Bill is a legal framework that is there not just because it is nice to have, but because society needs a framework that protects individuals—not just individual civilians, but members of our armed forces. As one witness said last week about the unique situation for members of the armed forces, they have few enough rights, and recourse to the law is important. In terms of our standing in the world, we are rightly proud that we have been a beacon of being able to portray good practice both in law and in other areas.
New clause 8 is about how we try to stop the cycle of investigation. As I say, I am just surprised that when the Bill was being drafted, no one thought, “Let’s look at what the problem is.” It is around investigation and the time it takes. Various arguments have been about why investigations have taken so long. Is it a lack of resources? It possibly is in some cases. Has it been the issue around Iraq and Afghanistan? Are we now in a different political climate? Yes, we are. When I was a Minister in the Ministry of Defence, when we were in Iraq and Afghanistan, the will to ensure that accusations were investigated came from all sides. It was not just from the liberal wing of Liberty and others; it was from Conservative Members as well. Mistakes were made.
Not having the issue of investigation in the Bill—
Order. I have been listening carefully to the right hon. Member. The amendments are very tightly drawn. New clause 8 is about the limitation on time for minor offences. I do not want to restrict the debate, but I do want to focus on what the amendments are, rather than wandering all the way through the Bill. If the right hon. Member focused on the new clause and the three amendments that were are debating, that would be helpful.
Yes. I will come back to the new clauses later.
Some serious accusations were made in the IHAT and Northmoor investigations. They took so long because some were very complicated, but some were very minor. The more we can speed up the system for the accused and the quicker it is dealt with, the better. It will be better for armed service personnel, and better for confidence in our system. New clause 8 tries to get a system that deals with minor cases and does not lead to endless investigations into things that really should be dealt with in the first instance.
New clause 8 argues that minor offences should be dealt with through a summary process, which Judge Blackett referred to last week and through which the magistrates court system already deals with cases. One thing that is missing in the entire Bill, which would give us confidence in it, is judicial oversight of the reasons why things are done. That is important. New clause 8 would empower prosecutors to place a six-month time limit on summary matters.
In reality, the right hon. Gentleman wants to remove bureaucracy because justice delayed is justice denied, whether someone is the accuser or the accused. His new clause seeks clarity for minor offences.
It is clarity for the individuals, so that they can be dealt with swiftly. If Judge Blackett had been consulted on this Bill, that might have been included.
I will not try your patience, Mr Stringer, because I might need it when I come to new clauses 6 and 7 on the broader issues around investigation, which I notice the MOD is now moving on and possibly recognising that it has missed a trick in the Bill. The new clause would give the court powers. We are not talking about serious offences or common assault. We did a similar thing in the Armed Forces Act 2006. We gave commanding officers the powers to deal with minor offences, because the old system was taking an inordinate amount of time to deal with them. We are basically setting up a de minimis case. As the hon. Gentleman just said, it would deal with the bureaucracy and make sure that we concentrate on the most serious offences.
People might say, “How does this get into ambulance-chasing solicitors?” With IHAT and Northmoor, some of the cases put forward were to do with such things as slaps and assaults, which would actually meet this criteria. Why did it take years to investigate whether somebody was slapped if it was on a Saturday night in a pub and classed as a common assault? Why did it take years to investigate or in some cases re-investigate? We could argue that it happened in Iraq or Afghanistan or somewhere else and it might be more difficult to gather evidence and witnesses, but it should not be beyond the wit of the legal system to look at the evidence initially and say, “To be honest, the threshold for this would not be very high.” Why were they brought? We know: in some cases, clearly, Phil Shiner was trying to get some compensation out of an alleged fault, but the pressure was put on those individuals who were accused of things that were minor and would have been dealt with normally. The new clause frees up the criminal justice system and the investigators to concentrate on the things that we want to concentrate on, which are the more serious cases.
Would that protect our armed forces? Yes, I think it would, because we would have a sense of fairness for them—they would be getting speedy justice, they would not go through reinvestigation and they would not have to wait an inordinate length of time for things dealt with as a matter of course in a magistrates court. It is a way to give protection to servicemen and women, while also—as the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire said—making the system more effective.
The important thing, however, is the judicial oversight—this is not just deciding to stop prosecution; the evidence is looked at, the de minimis test is applied and only then would that be ended. That would be a huge improvement. The Minister said he was looking for improvement of the Bill and, to me, this is an obvious way to do it.
Amendments 25 to 28 seek to change the time at which the presumption comes into effect from five to 10 years. The proposal in the public consultation that we ran last year was for a 10-year timeframe for the statutory presumption. It was not fixed policy, because we were seeking the public’s views.
In the consultation, we asked the following questions: whether 10 years was appropriate as a qualifying time, and whether the measure should apply regardless of how long ago the relevant events occurred. As we set out in our published response to the consultation, there was support for a 10-year timeframe, but equally there was support for presumption to apply without a timeframe at all. We also considered the written responses, which clearly indicated the concerns that a 10-year timeframe was too long—memories can fade, evidence tends to deteriorate and the context of events changes. There were also concerns that 10 years was too long to have the threat of prosecution hanging over a serviceperson’s head.
Respondents suggested time periods of less than 10 years, with the most popular timeframe being five years. As the issue that we seek to address relates to historical alleged offences, we did not feel able to apply the presumption without a timeframe. However, given the strength of the views expressed, we felt that a timeframe of less than 10 years would be more appropriate, and five years was the most popular alternative.
I am more than happy to write to the right hon. Gentleman with the exact responses. They are in the House of Commons Library, in the impact assessment. The numbers were clear, and I have just outlined the general findings—[Interruption.] I will not give way again. Some people want 10 years and some five years—
Thank you, Mr Stringer.
New clause 8 seeks to limit to six months the period between an offence being committed or discovered and any proceedings being brought, where a number of conditions can be satisfied. First, the offence must be a relevant offence, committed on overseas operations by a serviceperson. Importantly, the bar to proceedings only applies if the offence being prosecuted is subject to summary conviction only, or is one where no serious, permanent or lasting psychological or physical injury has been caused.
During an investigation, it is not always clear what the charge will be, but this is made harder for investigations on overseas operations where the injured person is a local national. It will not always be possible to get information regarding the incident, or on the permanence or lasting nature of an injury, in the timeframe demanded by the amendment.
Investigations on overseas operations inevitably rely to some degree on actions by others in theatre. Delays in such investigations are a fact of the operational environment and placing a time limit on investigations runs the risk that others may be able to affect the outcome of a service police investigation. The service police cannot have any barriers placed in the way that fetter their investigative decision making. A time limit in these circumstances would do just that.
Even the most minor offences take on a greater significance in an operational environment. A minor offence is not necessarily a simple matter that could be dealt with quickly by a commanding officer. Placing a barrier in the way of investigations for minor offences does not take account of the disproportionate effect of poor discipline directed towards local nationals in an operational setting.
The amendment is modelled on the provisions that exist in relation to summary-only matters in the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. That is where the problem lies. That Act codifies the procedures applicable in the magistrates courts of England and Wales. It is not legislation written to accommodate the extraordinary demands made of a system operating in an operational context.
I will not give way.
Delays are inevitable and applying civilian standards to an operational context is inappropriate. If this is something that might be considered for the service justice system, it would seem more appropriate for an armed forces Bill, but with an exemption to account—
On a point of order, Mr Stringer. This is a very strange Committee. Basically, the Minister is reading his civil service brief into the record, rather than actually answering the points. It is going to be very difficult to scrutinise the Bill properly if he will not take interventions, even though I accept he might be at a disadvantage if it is not in his briefing notes.
The right hon. Gentleman knows that is not a point of order. The Minister is entitled to give way as he chooses.
If this measure is something that might be considered for the service justice system, it would be more appropriate for an armed forces Bill, but with an exemption to account for the complexity of overseas operations. This Bill is not the correct legislative vehicle for the measure. I therefore ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
I just find this remarkable, Mr Stringer. We have a Minister who has come in here to read his civil service brief into the record. He is not taking account of anything that is being said, by myself or by other hon. Members. When he wants to be questioned on it, he will not take interventions. It is a strange way of doing this. He possibly thinks that doing a Committee is just about reading the civil service brief the night before and then reading it into the record. I am sorry, but that is not how we do scrutiny in this House.
With regard to the Minister’s comment that this measure would be more appropriate in an armed forces Bill, that may well be the case, but he has an opportunity to put it in here. He can sit there and smile but, frankly, he is doing himself no favours. He has said that he wants co-operation on the Bill, but he is doing nothing. He is going to try to plough through with what he has got, irrespective of whether it damages our armed forces personnel. That makes me very angry.
The Minister said that the Magistrates’ Court Act provisions would not cross over to this Bill. We could draw up a protocol around that, which would fit in the Bill. If the Bill is supposed to be the all-singing, all-dancing, huge protection that we are going to give to our servicemen and servicewomen, then that should have been in the Bill.
Does the right hon. Gentleman recognise that the ranks, as opposed to the chain of command, would be best served by an acceptance of the new clause, because it gives clarity and allows them to move forward on those cases, within the elements that he has discussed?
It does. There is an argument, which some members of the Committee are trying to make, that it is the ranks versus the seniors, but this is designed to protect the ranks.
The Minister says that it would be more appropriate to have this in an armed forces Bill. If that is the case, why was this Bill not held over until next year, when we could incorporate all of this into an armed forces Bill? Having sat on nearly every single armed forces Bill over the past 20 years, I know that there are things in this Bill that would be able to fit into an armed forces Bill. We know that the reason it is in this Bill is because it was a political stunt—it is more about politics than about what it is supposed to do.
New clause 8 should be incorporated in this Bill, because it would get to the root cause, which we discussed last week and which people have continually commented on: namely, that the Bill does not look at investigations. If the Minister got off his phone and listened, he might be able to get to a situation where, after reflecting on this, the Government may well look at how they can codify this and put it into the Bill, because it would then be stronger. As has been said, we want to protect, and that is what we are supposed to be doing with the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 1, page 2, line 2, leave out “the day on which the alleged conduct took place” and insert “the day on which the first investigation relevant to the alleged conduct concluded”.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 2, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—
“(ba) the thoroughness, promptness and efficacy of any ongoing investigation into the alleged conduct or any relevant previous investigation, and the reasons for any delays in such investigations;”
This amendment would ensure that the adequacy of any investigative process to date is given particular weight by a relevant prosecutor.
Amendment 56, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—
“(ba) the quality and duration of relevant investigations.”
This amendment would require prosecutors to give weight to the quality and duration of relevant investigations when deciding whether to bring or continue proceedings against a person relating to alleged conduct during overseas operations.
New clause 6—Judicial oversight of investigations—
“(1) This section applies to any investigation by a police force into alleged conduct as described in subsection 3 of section 1.
(2) The police force investigating the conduct must place their preliminary findings before an allocated judge advocate as soon as possible, but no later than 6 months after the alleged offence was brought to their attention.
(3) The judge advocate shall have the power to determine—
(a) that no serious, permanent or lasting psychological or physical injury has been caused; and order that the investigation should cease;
(b) that the evidence is of a tenuous character because of weakness or vagueness or because of inconsistencies with other evidence, and that it is not in the interests of justice to continue an investigation; and order that the investigation should cease; or
(c) that there is merit in the complaint; and make directions as to the timetable and extent of further investigation.”
This amendment would set a timetable for police investigations into alleged conduct during overseas operations, to ensure they are as short as possible and provide an opportunity for a judge to stop an unmeritorious or vexatious investigation early.
New clause 7—Limitation on reinvestigation—
“(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person has been acquitted of an offence relating to conduct on overseas operations, or
(b) a determination has been made that an investigation into an offence relating to such conduct should cease under section (Judicial oversight of investigations).
(2) No further investigation into the alleged conduct shall be commenced unless—
(a) compelling new evidence has become available, and
(b) an allocated judge advocate determines that the totality of the evidence against the accused is sufficiently strong that there is a real possibility that it would support a conviction.”
I rise to speak to the amendment for a very specific reason. It concerns the word “alleged” in the Bill. The Government, in bringing forward the Bill, have sought to provide clarity to members of the armed forces and veterans against some elements of the legal profession, which is the constant narrative during our debates—although, I have to say that there are many members of the legal profession who are not only members of the armed forces, but veterans too. We need to be very much aware of the rule of law.
The clarity that I and my party require, which is why we have tabled this amendment, is to remove that word “alleged”, because it causes ambiguity, whereas I think the Government’s intention in introducing the Bill is to give clarity. Whether or not I disagree with various parts of it, if not the vast majority, we are seeking to work here in a coherent and collegiate fashion, because I think that, not only for the accused but for the accuser, we need to be clear about the point at which we start, which is the day on which the first investigation takes place.
The word “alleged” creates ambiguity in the law and ambiguity for members of the armed forces and veterans, which is why we have brought forward this specific amendment.
I want to give you the opportunity to comment on amendment 14 and the associated amendments and new clauses.
What is being debated is amendment 14 to clause 1. We are also debating amendments 2 and 56, and new clauses 6 and 7. If hon. Members wish to vote at the end, we will vote on amendment 14. However, it is in order to discuss the other amendments and new clauses.
One of the main purposes of introducing the presumption against prosecution is to provide greater certainty for veterans in relation to the threat of repeat investigations and the possible prosecution for events that happened many years ago. Amendment 14 would undermine that objective by extending the starting point for the presumption and, in some cases, creating even more uncertainty. However, I want to reassure Members that the presumption measure is not an attempt to cover up past events as it does not prevent an investigation to credible allegations of wrongdoing in the past, and neither does it prevent the independent prosecutor from determining that a case should go forward to prosecution.
Does the Minister not accept that the very word “alleged” creates ambiguity within the law and, if anything, creates a barrier? Our amendment would give the clarity that he and his Government are seeking.
I do not accept that. The wording about the “alleged conduct” is clear. We have dealt with a number of allegations: 3,500 from the Iraq Historical Allegations Team alone, and another 1,000 from Afghanistan. They are alleged offences and it is right to leave those in there. I request that the amendment be withdrawn.
I will not be withdrawing the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
On a point of order, Mr Stringer. I would be grateful for your clarification on the next steps. I understood that that was taken as a group, but will we be moving now to the other amendments in the group and asking for them to be moved?
The opportunity to debate the other amendments in this group has gone; that went when that debate finished. We can now, if hon. Members wish, vote on amendment 26, and then we will come to clause stand part. If I can help the hon. Lady, if I think—as I almost certainly will think—that the debate on clause 1 has not been exhausted, we can have a general debate on clause 1. However, the opportunity to debate amendment 26 went when we moved to the vote on the previous amendment. I will now ask whether you want to vote on amendment 26.
I read out at the beginning that they were being debated together. I made that clear.
I will think about that while we are debating. I know that the right hon. Gentleman is not new to the House, but many members of this Committee are. If they listened carefully, I did read through all the areas we were debating at the start of this. I read out the amendments we were debating and what was before the Committee.
It was clarified at the beginning. I cannot go back to that. That has been debated, although Members did not speak to it. If hon. Members wish to have a clause stand part debate, we can have that. You are absolutely right that we will vote later on new clauses, but the opportunity to debate them was then, when I read out the list.
Further to that point of order, Mr Stringer. I do not wish to be difficult in any way, and of course I respect your ruling, but I think there was some misunderstanding at the start about exactly what we were doing. You certainly did say that we were taking these amendments, but I think we were expecting the sequence of people to be able to move them. I wonder whether there is any way that we can resolve that issue so that these amendments can be moved.
I accept that there is a misunderstanding, but the statements were read out clearly from the Chair about what we were debating at the start. The opportunity to debate them was not taken. I cannot think of any way to debate them now. However, I will take the Clerk’s advice later and see whether there is a way.
I will take no further points of order on the matter at this time. Clearly, people have not taken the opportunity to debate the matter. That is unfortunate. I will take the Clerk’s advice to see whether there is any way of doing that, but I cannot think of any way at the present time, because we have passed it. We have now moved on to amendment 26. Does Stephen Morgan wish to move amendment 26 formally?
On a point of order, Mr Stringer. I was under the impression that we voted on amendment 26 as part of the first grouping.
We did not. We debated it. There is a difference between debates on amendments grouped together because they are related and the order in which decisions are taken.
May I ask a question, Mr Stringer? Is it therefore the case that we move now to clause 2?
No. We have to get through the amendments, and then there will be a clause stand part debate on clause 1. We have to agree to clause 1, as amended or not, before moving on to the amendments to clause 2. By the start of this afternoon’s session, which I will chair, I will have clarified with the Clerk whether it is possible to come back to this, because the hon. Member for Blaydon says that there has been a genuine misunderstanding.
If hon. Members will take their place, the Clerk tells me that the issues raised in the amendments and the new clause can be raised in the clause stand part debate on clause 1. If that is not clear to hon. Members, now is the time to ask a question.
It is clear, but I asked the Chair, when he was taking that group of amendments, whether I could move my new clause. I will not go over that. It was strange to me, because I have been here long enough to know that when amendments and new clauses are grouped, they can actually be moved. I did ask the Chair, but I was not allowed to do that.
If the right hon. Member will take his seat, I had already told the Committee what was being debated. There was clearly a misunderstanding. We are going to resolve that issue, and then we can have the clause stand part debate. For clarity, amendment 26 has been moved formally. Does the Front-Bench spokesperson wish to put it to a vote.
Yes, I wish to put that to a vote.
Amendment proposed: 26, in clause 1, page 2, line 4, leave out “5” and insert “10”.—(Stephen Morgan.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Does the Minister wish to say something generally about clause 1? If not, I will open it up to the floor so that the amendments in the previous group, or any other issue relating to the clause, can be debated.
I say again what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer.
On clause 1, we heard last week that one problem the Bill does not address relates to investigations. If that had been included, the Bill would be more effective in stopping the unfair distress of individuals. We heard from Major Campbell, who was quite graphic about his 17 years of investigations. The clause is clear about trying to clear up the system and we have heard about the system being made more efficient, which would not only ensure that armed forces personnel get a fair hearing but speed up the processes where they face distress.
It is not surprising that investigations are not being considered. Let us look at General Nick Parker’s evidence last week. I know him well—he has had a distinguished career—and I certainly know his son, who was injured in Afghanistan. Those of us on the Opposition Benches might say, “It’s yet another general rather than a squaddie,” but I have a huge amount of respect for him. He not only has the Army running through his veins but stands up for the armed forces and the men and women who served under him, having their best interests at heart. He would be supportive of any legislation or anything done to try to improve their lot. Having had a few heated arguments with him over the years—he is no shrinking violet—I know that if he thought the Bill was perfect or would improve things, he would say that. What he says about investigations is therefore important. He said:
“On the effectiveness side, it appears as if part 1 of the Bill focuses entirely on the process of prosecution, whereas for me the big issue here is the process of investigation and, critically in that process, ensuring that the chain of command is deeply connected with what goes on from the very outset. I do not think there is any serviceman or woman who would not accept that bad behaviour on the frontline must be treated quickly and efficiently. Nobody would want anything in the process that somehow allows people who have behaved badly on the frontline to get away with it. But all of us would believe that the process has to be quick, efficient and effective to remove the suspicion of a malicious allegation as quickly as possible. I cannot see how this Bill does that.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 94, Q188.]
The Minister referred to next year’s armed forces Bill as being appropriate for that, but I am aghast. If this Bill is supposed to be the Rolls-Royce legislation to protect our servicemen and women, why on earth does it not include investigation?
I note that, ironically, since we took evidence, a written ministerial statement was made yesterday in which the Defence Secretary announced that investigations will be looked at. He said:
“The Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill currently before this House will provide reassurance to service personnel that we have taken steps to help protect them from the threat of repeated investigations and potential prosecution in connection with historical operations…However, we are also clear that there should be timely consideration of serious and credible allegations and, where appropriate, a swift and effective investigation followed by prosecution, if warranted. In the rare cases of real wrongdoing, the culprits should be swiftly and appropriately dealt with. In doing so, this will provide greater certainty to all parties that the justice system processes will deliver an appropriate outcome without undue delay.”—[Official Report, 13 October 2020; Vol. 682, c. 9WS.]
Even the Defence Secretary recognises that one of the issues is the length of investigations. Could I disagree with any of what he said? No. As I said in speaking to new clause 8, the issue is effectiveness in making sure not only that the service is protected from malicious allegations, but that individuals are. We must always think about that, because at the end of the day the individual is important.
The Defence Secretary’s statement goes on to say:
“I am therefore commissioning a review so that we can be sure that, for those complex and serious allegations of wrongdoing against UK forces which occur overseas on operations, we have the most up to date and future-proof framework, skills and processes in place and can make improvements where necessary. The review will be judge-led and forward looking and, whilst drawing on insights from the handling of allegations from recent operations, will not seek to reconsider past investigative or prosecutorial decisions or reopen historical cases. It will consider processes in the service police and Service Prosecuting Authority as well as considering the extent to which such investigations are hampered by potential barriers in the armed forces, for example, cultural issues or operational processes.”—[Official Report, 13 October 2020; Vol. 682, c. 9WS.]
Is my right hon. Friend a little concerned about the Secretary of State’s comments, as I am? If indeed those comments are true and that is the intention, why has the Minister not tabled amendments today to address that issue?
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. We were told, although I do not believe it, that the Government wanted to improve the Bill and would consider amendments. I accept that Opposition amendments are not always properly drafted to fit into a Bill, but it is quite common for the Government to say that they will look at an amendment and change it, but put the spirit of it into a Bill. There is an opportunity to do that now, but unfortunately we have a Minister who clearly just wants to say, “No, we will get the Bill through as drafted, and that’s it,” which is contrary to his statements about trying to work together with people. There is an opportunity to do that now and I do not understand why we cannot do it, as my hon. Friend says.
The Defence Secretary’s statement goes on to say:
“A key part of the review will be its recommendations for any necessary improvements. It will seek to build upon and not reopen the recommendations of the service justice system review”.—[Official Report, 13 October 2020; Vol. 682, c. 9WS.]
On the justice system review and its relationship to the Bill, in answer to a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North West last week about Major Campbell’s 17 years of dreadful investigation, General Sir Nick Parker said:
“That will not happen if you have a credible system that investigates and you address some of the cultural issues in the chain of command by making it genuinely accountable for what is happening.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 98, Q201.]
Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the Bill does absolutely none of that?
It does not. If somebody like Nick Parker is saying that, we need to take it seriously. As for how the Bill has been born, I would love to know who is claiming paternity for it, because a lot of people seem to have been excluded—certainly the Judge Advocate General has. I would have thought he was the obvious person, as a senior military person in the justice system, to be brought in at an early stage to look at some of the things we shall talk about later—not only the issues of international law, but how the system could be improved.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. The scope of the Bill clearly does not encompass a wide-scale investigation of the present investigation process. Will the right hon. Gentleman explore a little more and explain what he did in his tenure as a Defence Minister to look into the matter?
It is related, because it is related to people who were serving on operations. For the first time ever it brought forward a modern system of lump sum payments, which were never there before, for Falkland veterans or anything else. I actually extended that in 2007 to cover issues to do with mental health provision. Our record was that each year but one of that Labour Government we accepted the finding of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body, as opposed to the Conservative Government’s cutting pay. We maintained our armed forces spending at a level above inflation. The 2010 Conservative Government cut the defence budget by 16%.
We also had the armed forces welfare pathway, which I started in—
Order. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman knows that he is moving way outside the scope of clause 1 and the amendments and new clauses. I ask him to come back to the clause stand part debate.
I am sorry, Mr Stringer. I was going down memory lane to happier times. Just to finish that point, the welfare pathway, which the Government who came to power in 2010 rightly changed and renamed the covenant, was something that I introduced in 2010.
The hon. Member for Derbyshire Dales raised the issue of investigations and what we did. She is the new Member for that beautiful part of the world, and I have huge respect for her predecessor. I spent many a time at Kinder Scout and Hope as a boy walking round that area, so I know her area very well. But I think that she has to recognise the issue in terms of Iraq and Afghanistan. Yes, huge and terrible accusations were made about what was going on. There was pressure not only from what could be called the outriders on the left but from her own party to the effect that some of these accusations should have been investigated. If there was a failure, it was around investigation.
I do not want to try your patience, Mr Stringer, but we also did the Armed Forces Act 2006, which meshed the three service disciplinary systems into one. That was a huge issue, but it actually improved service discipline and investigations. This is an opportunity to get this Bill right. Let me say to the hon. Lady that I just want to get the Bill right. I think that if we had an approach from the Minister whereby he would take on board some of this, we could do these things, both here and in the other place, but there is a tendency, which I do not like, to think that somehow we in this place scrutinise legislation, and the Government know that they are going to change things but they change things in the House of Lords, giving the public the impression that somehow the House of Lords is this all-singing, all-seeing, body when actually those things should be done here. I am already talking, as I am sure others are, to Members of the House of Lords, including, I have to say to the Minister, some of his noble Friends who I think also have concerns about the Bill.
There is an opportunity here to do that with investigations. The issue with the amendments that we were talking about is really this. We had the debate about investigation of de minimis things, but what I think everyone wants is that investigations can be done quickly—not be done quickly and dismissed, because we have to get the balance right in terms of people making serious allegations that are investigated properly. Let us remember that we are talking here about allegations from civilians against members of the armed forces, but remember also that there are often cases between servicemen and women, who are making accusations against themselves—against individuals. There has to be a sense of fairness, and it cannot be right that it goes on for a very long time, so it does need judicial oversight. If someone is accused of something, that should be investigated properly and quickly, but that should also be done in a legal process that cannot be challenged—well, I am sure that everything can be challenged if someone pays a lawyer enough, but we must ensure that we have a situation whereby it is as judicially robust as possible.
In response to a question asked by the hon. Member for Blaydon last week, General Sir Nick Parker stated:
“Nobody would want anything in the process that somehow allows people who have behaved badly on the frontline to get away with it. But all of us would believe that the process has to be quick, efficient and effective to remove the suspicion of a malicious allegation as quickly as possible. I cannot see how this Bill does that.”–[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 94, Q188.]
Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that legitimacy and effectiveness are not an element of this Bill and that we need to see structural change before we can go forward?
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI hope everyone had an enjoyable lunch. When we left off, I was still talking about investigations and what came through in the evidence we took. Mr Stringer, you and I are old enough to remember when Public Bill Committees did not hold evidence sessions. The process is far better now, because it informs the debate and our progress. Certainly, our witnesses gave valuable evidence, and from a variety of different positions. The one thing that did come through, however, was the lack of any reference in the Bill to investigation.
This morning I referred to Nick Parker’s comment that
“part 1 of the Bill focuses entirely on the process of prosecution, whereas for me the big issue here is the process of investigation”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 94, Q188.]—
and of reinvestigation. Major Campbell gave some very good evidence—I think everyone had sympathy—about how he had spent 17 years under investigation and reinvestigation.
Last Thursday we had the Judge Advocate General before us. I was amazed that he had not even been consulted on the Bill before it was introduced. I would have thought that he, as the leading judge in the service justice system, would be a good starting point to run things by. He said in evidence:
“My concern relates to investigations, not prosecutions; but there are a number of issues”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 115, Q231.]—
that need addressing. He also accused the Government of
“looking at the wrong end of the telescope”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 116, Q246.],
which is a good analogy for how they have approached the subject. We have been blindsided by the disgraceful case of Phil Shiner, which concentrated on the number of vexatious claims. I will put on the record again that I thoroughly condemn that individual, but I think that the process that we had did deal with him, in terms of regulation.
I will now turn to the two amendments that stand in my name, amendment 2 and new clause 6. We did not get a chance to talk about amendment 2, which is also about investigations. It seeks to insert into clause 3:
“the thoroughness, promptness and efficacy of any ongoing investigation into the alleged conduct or any relevant previous investigation, and the reasons for any delays in such investigations”.
The purpose of that is to ensure that we get timely investigation. I will move on shortly to new clause 6, which talks about judicial oversight, because that is important, but we do not want to get into a situation in which the service military police or other people simply say, “Well, we’re not going to investigate because it’s too difficult.” We need oversight, but amendment 2 puts the focus on looking at the investigation, not only to ensure an adequate investigational process, but to give particular weight to the prosecution. In considering a case, therefore, a prosecutor should be able to consider the efficiency of the process and previous investigations that have taken place.
As a statement of principle, I would like the Bill to consider more effectively the way in which the investigation function in the military justice system can be amended. I am sorry that the Government do not seem to accept that that should be part of the Bill. I think I referred to it this morning. At least I know why the civil servants are not accepting that. The obvious thing to have done with the Bill would have been to have put it with the armed forces Bill that will be coming through next year. If there is one thing that I know from my experience of civil servants, it is that they like tidiness, and this process is not tidy. That would have been a better way of doing it.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that witness after witness in the evidence sessions pointed to the centrality of good-quality investigation in removing the problem of vexatious and pluralistic claims?
Yes, and in a moment or two I will cover the important point that my hon. Friend raises. It is about efficiency in dealing with claims through an early process, so that when the evidence is not going to go anywhere, a claim can be dropped. As the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire said this morning, that is good for the efficiency of the system as well as for the individual. As Lieutenant Colonel Parker said, it is not just the prosecution case, but the mental torture that people go through when waiting for that. It would help servicemen and women going through that process to have an early resolution.
We did not get to discuss new clauses 6 and 7, so I will speak to them now. I understand, Mr Stringer, that they will be voted on at the end of this process. Is that correct?
We are debating clause 1 stand part and we will vote on clause 1 stand part at the end of the debate.
One of the important things about the process is that we have judicial oversight of whatever happens. That is important for making the system robust and fair, both for those complaining and for those accused, as well as in relation to our international obligations. We have been a beacon of light in ensuring that we have an independent judiciary in this country, and it is important that we have oversight of that. Judge Blackett suggested things that could do that, and that could also make the system more efficient.
New clause 6 proposes to bring in judicial oversight of investigations. It would allow the judge advocate, once an investigation has come to its preliminary conclusions, to look at the evidence in the allegation as soon as possible, but no later than 6 months, and the judge, not the Ministry of Defence or the chain of command, would then make an assessment. It is important that the assessment is made by the judge advocate, who is part of the judiciary. The judge advocate would have
“the power to determine—
(a) that no serious, permanent or lasting psychological or physical injury has been caused; and order that the investigation should cease”.
If, at that stage, an indication was taken that the case was going nowhere, that would knock out all the vexatious cases, which is what we are trying to get at here. It would allow the individual who has been accused to move on. It would have the strength of having a judge make that decision. The clause moved this morning takes away more minor offences, allowing us to get down to the serious cases that need to be investigated and prosecuted.
My right hon. Friend is rightly seen as an expert on defence matters, having been in this House for a number of years. I wonder whether we could have the benefit of his experience. In his experience, both as a Minister and as a member of the Bill Committee, is he open to the suggestion that a number of these investigations are taking so long because of failures within the Ministry of Defence, and that that is why we have arrived where we are?
Yes. That is the problem. How do we get at it? Is it about a lack of resource? I think it is. Going back to Iraq and Afghanistan, as I said this morning, there was huge pressure from all sides, including the Conservative Opposition at the time, that these things had to be seen to be investigated to the nth degree. There was a culture, which led to a resistance to say in some cases, “There is no evidence to stand those.” If that was done politically, I understand why people have issues with that.
However, if there were a judicial process, which new clause 6 provides for, overseen by a judge, that would give confidence to the public and the international community, in relation to our obligations, that this was being done not for political reasons but because a judge had determined independently what the facts are. It would certainly help.
In response to a question the right hon. Gentleman raised last week, Judge Blackett said, in relation to the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980, that
“a great raft of those allegations in IHAT and Northmoor would have gone with that.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 122, Q254.]
Is that not the right hon. Gentleman’s point? Much of what the Bill seeks to do could easily have been dealt with through existing legislation.
Well it could, but I am a defender of the service justice system, because I think it is unique. There are those who want to abolish the service justice system, who ask, “Why aren’t these tried in the civil courts?” I am against that, and I always have been, because of the unique nature of the circumstances and the way the system works. It is an independent judiciary, not part of the MOD, so it has respect. Courts martial understand not only the special nature of service, but the circumstances that people are in.
My fear is that this Bill will strengthen those who want to sweep away what they see as giving special privilege to the armed forces. I do not see it that way at all. It gives those men and women who go before it the chance to be judged by an informed judiciary, which deals with certain cases. That is the important point. Again, it comes back to judicial oversight.
New clause 6 states, in subsection (3)(b), that a judge can determine
“that the evidence is of a tenuous character because of weakness or vagueness or because of inconsistencies with other evidence, and that it is not in the interests of justice to continue an investigation”.
The judge would look at the evidence and make a judgment about the validity of the original claim, as well as what the investigation has thrown up. If the judge were subsequently to decide that the case should go no further, that is defendable, because it would be the judge’s decision.
Subsection (3)(c) presents the other side, where the judge may decide
“that there is merit in the complaint; and make directions as to the timetable and extent of further investigation.”
Clearly, if the judge looks at the evidence after six months and says, “Actually, there is a case here, and further leads from the investigation need to be taken forward,” it is important that that is allowed to happen. That is not stopping prosecutions or interfering in any way with the investigative process; it is reviewing the evidence and whether it will go forward. It would also give directions to set a timescale for that investigation to be completed.
Again, the hon. Member asked Judge Blackett question last week in relation to Marine A. Judge Blackett responded that
“a number of the issues here were raised by Marine A subsequently through the Criminal Cases Review Commission and back to the Court of Appeal, and they were never raised at first instance. Had he”—
Marine A—
“raised them at first instance—had all the psychiatric evidence that came out eventually appeared at the start—he probably would have been charged with manslaughter rather than murder”, ––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 124, Q262.]
which is what he was charged with. It was actually on the second appeal that it was overturned and the prosecution was for manslaughter. Does the right hon. Member agree that the process is at fault and that, to improve that, the Government need to make substantial changes and investments in the process, rather than with the Bill?
It is the process. I am glad that the hon. Member has mentioned the case of Marine A, because the way it was dealt with worries me. People might not be familiar with it. It was an individual who was on operations in Afghanistan and shot, on camera, a wounded Taliban fighter. That case did not come about through an ambulance-chasing lawyer; it came about because somebody filmed the shooting and was so horrified by it that they handed in the video. That was not an ambulance-chasing lawyer saying, “This man’s killed somebody in cold blood.” That case is important.
The process being adopted concerns me for two reasons. My first concern, on the point we raised last week, is about the support that servicemen and women are getting while they are going through the process. Clearly, in that case, the individual did something that goes against everything that members of the armed forces are trained to do. But when we look at the overall envelope of what he had been up to—the psychological trauma and the other things he had been through—we could explain it not as murder, but as manslaughter. Again, if that case had gone through this type of system, it would have led to those issues around the individual’s mental health, which do not excuse his actions but obviously had an impact on what happened, and to the first issue being seen as manslaughter, which would have been a fairer way of dealing with it.
My second concern about the Bill is that if that happened more than five years after that case, the presumption would have been not to prosecute. There would then have been a political decision, because the Attorney General would be deciding on prosecution. That individual could then end up before the International Criminal Court, because we would deem that we had not prosecuted.
There was a media maelstrom around the case. As with many such cases that we have all dealt with, it got a nice headline in the Daily Mail or The Sun, but there were obviously more details to it. If we have a similar case in future on which there is to be a political decision, it will be a strong politician or Attorney General who will turn around and say, “Yes, I want to prosecute this person.” There would then be the danger of the International Criminal Court picking up the case. Whereas in the process that I am proposing in new clause 6, the judge would review all the evidence, including, in that case, whether he should have been charged with murder in the first place when it went to court or to appeal—and no, he should not have been.
As many Committee members have said, and certainly, having spoken to members of the armed forces and veterans, they do not want to be above the law; they want to be treated fairly. That is what we are here to ensure. I have spoken to the individuals involved in the Marine A case, who explained the reasons why it happened, which I understand. It did not fulfil the high standards that are expected of the armed forces. In that case, it is about being fair to members of our armed forces, and ensuring that we are doing the right thing. Again, the combination of new clause 8, which we debated this morning, and new clause 6 would start to reduce that pile of potential litigants, even if they came from vexatious lawyers or elsewhere.
The other issue, which I can never get my head around, is the idea that the same case can be reinvestigated, as in the Campbell case. That is just ridiculous. There must come a time when we have to say, “Well, it has been looked at in detail. There has been evidence.” There might be a delay to trawl for witnesses and other evidence, but in effect what that says is, “Basically, we will do a fishing exercise until we get the answers that we want.” That cannot be right.
My new clause 7 addresses some of the limitations around investigations. I think we on this Committee all want thorough investigations, and so do members of the armed forces; what they do not want is endless reinvestigations that go on for, in the Campbell case, 17 years. New clause 7 would put limitations on reinvestigation. The section applies where
“(a) a person has been acquitted of an offence relating to conduct on overseas operations,”
so it would apply to those individuals.
I know this is not within the scope of this Bill, and I am sure you would pull me up, Mr Stringer, if I mentioned other areas, but that is the problem with the title of the Bill: some of the things in here should apply to members of the armed forces if the offence was committed on the UK mainland, but they do not. That is why I come back to the point that it would be better to do these things in the Armed Forces Bill next year and to take a holistic approach. Obviously, there are political reasons why this Bill is being rushed forward, to meet a manifesto 100-day commitment. However, I think some of these things should apply in the UK, but they will not with this Bill, and no doubt they will have to be picked up in the Armed Forces Bill.
The section also applies where
“(b) a determination has been made that an investigation into an offence relating to such conduct should cease under section (Judicial oversight of investigations).
(2) No further investigation into the alleged conduct shall be commenced unless—
(a) compelling new evidence has become available”.
Again, this is about trying to stop that reinvestigation, but having judicial oversight. The judge advocate determines
“the totality of the evidence against the accused”,
and sees whether it is strong enough such that
“there is a real possibility that it would support a conviction.”
Let us go to the Campbell case: if that case came forward again, the judge would have to look at the evidence and see whether the material circumstances had changed since the last time the offence was looked at. The strength of doing it this way, rather than as proposed in this Bill, is that it is not about limitations of time and the presumption against prosecution; a judge will look at the evidence and there will be a process. That would avoid the reinvestigation of such complaints.
If there is compelling new evidence, I think we would all agree—not just in the military justice system, but in a civil case—that we would want it to be looked at again. That links to the time limits on investigations, which for the individual concerned would not then stretch out for an indeterminate length of time.
Regarding proposed new subsection (a) on new evidence, in evidence to the Committee last Thursday, in response to the hon. Member for Wrexham, the judge advocate gave as an example the six Royal Military Police who were sadly killed at Majar al-Kabir in 2003. Would this not allow us parity of esteem in the international judicial system? If new evidence came out in Iraq, we would demand that the Iraqi Government prosecute the individuals responsible for the murder of those six Royal Military Police.
Yes, I remember that case—it was awful, if you read the background to it. The Bill is basically saying, “We are going to do something different from what we expect of other people.” I am sorry, but that is just not acceptable. We have a high standard in this country of judicial law and the rule of law and, as I said earlier, we should be a beacon. We should say, “This is something we are proud of.” Anything that changes that would be detrimental, and not only to the armed forces, for the reasons that have been raised. It is just logic that, if new evidence comes forward in a case, it must be looked at; just to say that the reason it cannot be looked at is that it has gone past a certain time period is wrong. If we dismiss new evidence without looking at it and having any judicial oversight of it, that would be a mistake.
Let’s not be personal, Kevan.
I am not being personal, but a Minister usually does more than read what is in front of him; he takes notes and engages. My proposals should be looked at seriously, because they would improve the Bill. The Minister says he wants to work with everybody, but he seems to have deaf ears when people make suggestions that would not harm but improve the Bill. It is not just me saying that, as someone who is passionate about protecting the armed forces; that is the evidence we have taken through this process. As I said earlier, that is the good thing about the process.
What would be the argument against accepting the new clauses? The only one I can see is that the Government want to deal with this next year in the Armed Forces Bill. Fair enough, but put them in now. They can be done now. We will not end up with any additional costs of process—in fact, that will save money. I know we do not have a money resolution with this Bill, so we cannot propose things that cost money, but I doubt whether those proposals will. As the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire said this morning, it is about making things efficient, and there are two wins here: one win with the process being slicker and quicker; and another win with the accused individual being dealt with fairly and robustly.
Turning to other parts of the clause, this morning we asked why five years, rather than 10, 15, 20 or whatever. I asked the Minister to justify that and I also asked about the numbers for who said what. He said they were in the impact assessment, but I could not find them when I looked at it at lunchtime in the Library, or where they are referred to. I would like the Minister to do what I thought he would do when he responded to my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South, which is to say, “Well, five years has been put forward for X reasons and 10 years was seen as too long”—or something like that—“and these were the people who argued for each.”
On balance, I agree, that some such things are at the end of the day political decisions, but we did not get that sort of response. I would still like an explanation for the decision of five years. I do not think that is in the impact assessment, on which, likewise—I have raised this with the Minister on the Floor of the House—there is confusion on the number of claims and the potential of those claims. The figures vary from 900 to 1,000, but there is no breakdown at all of whether those claims are from civilians or from members of the armed forces making claims against the MOD.
The other thing that concerns me is the presumption not to prosecute. I know of no other system where the presumption is written into a Bill to state, before anything is done, that someone will not be prosecuted. Again, my fear about that is that it will be seen as interfering with process. I am sure some people in Committee are old enough to remember the time before the Crown Prosecution Service, many years ago—this is the reason why we had that in this country—when police investigated and did the prosecution as well. Anyone who wants to know the reasons why that system failed—for example, in the Horizon case to which I referred earlier—should read last week’s excellent report of the Justice Committee, which criticised the arrangement whereby someone was both investigator and prosecutor.
The presumption in this Bill is worse than that, because we are saying, “We will presume that we are not going to prosecute.” I know that Ministers have said, “This does not mean that cases will not be prosecuted”, and I accept that, but the decision on whether a case should be prosecuted should be down to an independent judicial process; it should not be in the hands of the Attorney General, a Minister or anyone else to decide whether a case goes forward.
My right hon. Friend has touched on this before. The issue is not prosecutions but the actual investigations. The question to ask is, how do we square proper and prompt investigations, where there is justice at the end, with this limitation on prosecution? Do the Government have this the wrong way around?
I agree with Judge Blackett and General Nick Parker. What the Government have done is looked at the prosecution end of it, rather than at the investigation end of it. As I have said, Blackett referred to it as looking through the wrong end of a telescope. We all know what happened when we were kids—we looked through telescopes, which were quite good for seeing things that were far away. It is as though somehow we would not pick up on the detail of what can be seen. With the Bill, however, we can see the detail.
As I have just outlined, what is needed is proper investigation. No one is suggesting shortcuts in investigations. We need a proper system that has judicial oversight, which will ensure that it is fair on all sides, and that it is efficient. The next bit of it is prosecution, which has to be independent of Government. I have never seen it written into a Bill that, before there is an investigation, there is a presumption in law that there will be no prosecution. How would we do that? What is the purpose of investigating a case and going through details if, from the outset, there is a presumption that it will not be prosecuted? That is very difficult. It would be like you, Mr Stringer, burgling somebody’s house—I am not suggesting for one minute that you would do that. The authorities would then say, “We are going to investigate you, but the presumption”—not the decision, because I accept that you could still get prosecuted—“is that you are innocent and that you haven’t done it.” That is just nonsense and will not stand up. It will end up with judicial reviews, so we will not be free from the ambulance-chasing lawyers or the legal aid system, because if they can see that there is a buck to be made in that way, they will do it.
Likewise, on international comparisons, it comes down to the point that the Judge Advocate General made in his excellent letter to the Defence Secretary, to which I referred last week in evidence: he was not consulted on the Bill. When these cases go to the International Criminal Court for investigation, it will say, “Wait a minute. At the outset you had a presumption that you were not going to prosecute in these cases.” If we had a situation in which a case went forward, there would be a presumption against prosecution and there would be an investigation. If the Attorney General were to decide that the case did not go to prosecution, the International Criminal Court would have a field day. It would say, “Well, wait a minute. You’ve had a presumption against prosecution. You’ve had political interference, with the Attorney General making the final decision about whether a prosecution should take place.” I do not think that is compatible with our treaty obligations to the ICC.
I know that reference is often made to the Human Rights Act 1998 and that there is a tendency—not with you, Mr Stringer, because I know you are an expert on European matters—to think that somehow it is something to do with the European Union. It has nothing at all to do with the EU. It has a proud history, and we should be proud to have helped develop the idea of human rights after the second world war in order to ensure that we have the highest standards. My fear is that we will end up with servicemen and women before the International Criminal Court. I am sorry, but I do not want to see that. What I want to see is their being dealt with in our judicial legal system, which will end up with their getting better justice. It will be very difficult to explain to the public why servicemen and women end up in the International Criminal Court. If that happens, the next step is that we withdraw from the International Criminal Court and everything else. If we do that, it will affect our reputation in the world as a country that wants to uphold the rule of law and to tell China and other nations, “Look, these are the basic standards that you should adhere to.” It will be a godsend to them.
There are serious issues to do with clause 1, which I do not think the Minister has addressed. If we end up with fairness and justice for our servicemen and women but we do not have an efficient system, that needs to be changed. I repeat to the Minister that the Bill can be changed on Report in this place, and I am happy to work on the investigation issues with him. If new clauses to that effect were not perfectly written according to the Ministry of Defence, I would be quite happy to work on getting a form of words that we could all accept. I am a mild-mannered individual, as many people know, and I would quite happily let the Government table them and claim the credit. I am not looking for plaudits. What I want above everything is a good Bill, and the Bill as it stands is not a good one.
I thank my right hon. Friend for a rather long, in-depth speech. I am sure that I will repeat some of the points that he raised, but I want to focus particularly on the measures that apply to events that occurred more than five years ago. The starting point for covering that time period is the date that the alleged conduct occurred. When an alleged offence continued over more than one day, the starting point for the five-year time period would be the last day on which the alleged conduct occurred. I believe that that needs a bit more probing and explanation.
As we know, the Defence Committee report “Protecting veterans by a Statute of Limitations” was supported on the presumption against prosecution for allegations that were more than 10 years old. I was extremely concerned that the proposals would not cover soldiers who had served in Northern Ireland through the troubles. It is said that the Ministry of Defence should ensure that sufficient resources are made available for educating the armed forces more regularly about their legal obligations.
Far be it from me to be personal, but when the Minister replies, I would like him to give further explanation of why he moved from the 10-year period agreed by the Defence Committee to the five-year period. The real issue here, as my hon. Friend said—sorry, my right hon. Friend; he is a member of the Privy Council and I should acknowledge that—is not so much the prosecution but the investigation. All soldiers who make the great commitment to serve our country in the armed forces need a prompt, fair, efficient and effective investigation before we reach prosecution.
I would like to cite the example of how alleged crimes in Iraq were investigated and how we have arrived at the current position. As many of us know, UK military operations in Iraq lasted from the start of the invasion on 20 March 2003 to the withdrawal of the last remaining British forces on 22 May 2011—an eight-year period. Alleged crimes by UK forces in Iraq have formed the subject of two public inquiries initiated by the Ministry of Defence between 2008 and 2009 to examine the death in custody of an Iraqi civilian, Baha Mousa, in September 2003, and allegations of unlawful killings in a street arising from the so-called battle of Danny Boy in May 2004.
In March 2010, the MOD established the Iraq Historic Allegations Team, to ensure that credible claims were properly investigated. The IHAT received a total of around 3,400 allegations of unlawful killings and ill treatment between 2010 and 2017—a period of seven years. However, in February 2017, the Defence Committee published its IHAT inquiry report, which notably criticised the team for alleged inefficiency and lack of professionalism. It called on the MOD to close it down and to provide financial and other support to UK servicemen under investigation. On the same day as the release of the inquiry’s report, the Defence Secretary announced the closure of the IHAT, ahead of the original schedule, citing IHAT’s own forecasts that the team’s caseload was expected to reduce to about 20 investigations by the summer of 2017. The IHAT was permanently shut down on 30 June.
The MOD said that military operations in Iraq have resulted in nearly 1,000 compensation claims for unlawful detention, personal injury and death, and about 1,400 judicial review claims, seeking investigations and compensation for alleged human rights violations. An investigation by the BBC “Panorama” programme and The Sunday Times found that the UK Government and the armed forces might have covered up the killing of civilians by British troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. The MOD has strongly rejected the allegations of cover-ups. I bring that up because it was a MOD investigation into a conflict that lasted eight years, and then seven years into that investigation it was shut down because of what it was doing.
The real problem we have is that the Bill does not stop the cycle of investigations. Restrictions apply solely to prosecutions. If we were to ask most people who have been investigated time and again, they would say it is the investigation that has caused the problems. Unless we resolve that, the Bill does not ensure that allegations are properly investigated and resolved—this is the point, Mr Stringer—within a reasonable period. As I have said, service personnel would benefit from a focus on prompt and thorough investigations, rather than simply a limitation on prosecutions. That is why the amendments are so important. The investigations have to be judge led.
I agree that we have to resolve concerns about uncertainty and the delay for soldiers and litigants. On the other side, there are the victims. Some claims may have to go over five years for sound reasons. Injury may become problematic only after five years of post-traumatic stress disorder. Luckily, we live in a world where we have a better understanding of mental health and we are far more sympathetic to problems. In another life—14 years ago—I worked for Lord Touhig, who was involved when he was a Defence Minister with the shot-at-dawns. I am very proud that the last Labour Government granted them a pardon. I hope we never see a return to the bad old days when people were shot for alleged cowardice, when really they were suffering from terrible mental health problems.
That is what we have to guide ourselves with in this Bill. We face a mental health crisis. I was encouraged earlier when I moved the motion about UAVs, as the Minister accepted there was an issue of post-traumatic stress disorder and the need for more research. I know he has worked very hard in that area and I look forward to some of the outcomes of the work he is doing. I pay tribute to him for his work on that.
We have to accept that many of these claims will take longer. In some of these cases, it may take a long time for evidence to be gathered and to come to light, especially when we are dealing with complicated areas of law or complicated parts of operations in theatre. The Minister should look again at the five-year rule and make it 10 years, but it is more important that, alongside that, we look at how the investigations are conducted.
We should consider any time limit on prosecutions to be an intolerable barrier to justice. It is notable that the proposed five-year period halves the time period for prosecutions from the proposal of 10 years consulted on by the Ministry of Defence last year. A five-year limit makes it likely that the relevant overseas operation will still be in progress—I used the example of Iraq and Afghanistan at the beginning of my speech. That means investigations may have to be limited to while we are active in hostilities. That, again, is a barrier to justice.
The Judge Advocate General of the armed forces, Jeff Blackett, warned the Defence Secretary that this provision
“would encourage an accused person to frustrate the progress of investigation past the five-year point to engage a high bar for prosecution”.
When the Minister responds, I hope that he can lay out some guidelines on how we can stop anybody frustrating justice in that way.
I alluded earlier to our good friend Lord Touhig, who advised me to always be careful of taking interventions, because they can ruin the end of your speech. I feel that that has happened here.
It is important to remember that the overwhelming majority of repeat investigations or delayed prosecutions in recent years have, as my right hon. Friend said, been the direct result of failures by the MOD itself. It is an issue within the MOD that needs to be resolved—whether it is a cultural issue or a rules-based issue, it needs to be resolved. I agree with what the Minister is trying to do because there are too many veterans, ex-servicemen and women, who are living in fear of repeat investigations. If they are living in fear of that, we must ask why these investigations are repeated over and over again, causing not only stress to their mental health but putting intolerable strain on their families.
Rather than measures that tackle the real reason behind the investigations that delay prosecutions, the Bill proposes unprecedented legal protections that will create a legal regime that mandates impunity for serious offences and, above all, inequality in law for the victims of abuse in our forces. Severely restricting the application of criminal law for certain categories of people accused of having committed offences including international crimes would violate the principle of equal application of the law, which is what our legal system is based on.
A multitude of sources suggest that crimes were committed on a large scale in Afghanistan and Iraq. That happened at least partly due to systemic issues—for instance, in 2013, in R. v. the Secretary of State for Defence, the UK High Court held that
“there might have been systemic abuses and that such abuses may have been attributable to a lack of appropriate training.”
If the problem is appropriate training, it is not a legislative solution that we need but a systemic solution from within the Ministry of Defence. In its 2018 report, the Ministry of Defence working group on systemic issues said that it considered:
“there was sufficient evidence to conclude that assaults in detention had occurred, and may have been systemic.”
International law imposes certain obligations on the UK, including the obligation not to put in place a legal framework that severely restricts or makes impossible the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes under international law committed in armed conflict, irrespective of where those crimes were committed. The proposed legislation severely limits the possibility of opening a full investigation in respect of Iraq or Afghanistan. Any measure that significantly limits the possibility of prosecuting international crimes, whether referred to as a statute of limitations or a statute of presumption against prosecution, risks undermining the UK’s hard-won role as a champion of the international rule of law and hence its ability to advance its agenda.
The hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West made the point, in respect of the lack of training, that the real pressure is not on the chain of command but on the men and women in the frontline. Does my hon. Friend agree that, unfortunately, it is they who find themselves in these cases rather than those higher up in the chain of command who have equal responsibility for some of the actions?
I agree; it is often ordinary squaddies or ratings who find themselves in these circumstances simply because they were following orders. If we are talking about training, we do live in a different world, a modern world. I have already spoken about our shot-at-dawn campaign, which my right hon. Friend is involved in. We have to realise that our modern armed forces are constantly evolving in a changing world, and our training should reflect that, whether it is for an ordinary rating or top brass in the armed forces. It is important that we focus on training. The Government have the numbers and they will pass the Bill, but the way to change the culture of ongoing prosecutions is to start with the training of our troops, whether in command or on the front line.
To return to the point I was making, the code for Crown prosecutors already has ample criteria to provide guidance on whether prosecution should take place. This includes an evidential stage, followed by a public interest stage. The evidential stage concerns an independent prosecutor’s assessment of whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction. The public interest stage guidance involves considerations such as the seriousness of the alleged offence, the level of capability of the offender, the circumstances of and the harm caused to the victim, the suspect’s age and maturity at the time of the offence, the impact of the offending on the community, whether prosecution is a proportionate response and whether sources of information require protecting.
I am delighted to answer some of the questions that have been laid out. I have spoken at length about the “five to 10 years” issue in dealing with previous amendments, but I will look to answer some of the questions raised and then speak to clause 1 in general.
We ask a huge amount of our service police. Investigations on overseas operations are inherently dangerous, and the risk of gathering evidence on operations must always be balanced with the risk to the lives of our investigators. To suggest that the service police pursue unmeritorious or vexatious investigations in those circumstances is to do a huge injustice to those brave men and women who do this dangerous work, and we do not.
To understand new clause 6, it is necessary to go through it line by line. Proposed new subsection (1) seeks to apply the clause to,
“any investigation by a police force into alleged conduct as described in subsection 3 of section 1.”
Clause 1(3) applies—
Order. I asked hon. Members at the beginning of the meeting to respect social distancing. I am sorry, Minister; please continue.
Clause 1(3) applies where,
“the alleged conduct took place (outside the British Islands)”,
at a time when the person was “subject to service law” under the Armed Forces Act 2006, and “deployed on overseas operations.” There is no further limit on the remaining provisions of the proposed new clause, which means they must therefore apply to all investigations on overseas operations committed by service personnel. For context, there were in the region of 3,000 service police investigations in Iraq and 1,000 in Afghanistan. The majority of those will have been committed by persons subject to service law. It is not considered feasible for such numbers of investigations to be brought in front of a judge, and to do so would undoubtedly add further delays to the process.
Proposed new subsection (2) states:
“The police force investigating the conduct must place their preliminary findings before an allocated judge advocate as soon as possible, but no later than 6 months after the alleged offence was brought to their attention.”
The service police are independent. That independence is enshrined in law in section 115A of the Armed Forces Act 2006. It is common practice for them to consult prosecutors in the course of an investigation and for that discourse to shape an investigation, but this is discourse, not direction. Any obligation on the service police to police their investigation before a person who has control over the final determination of that matter seriously compromises the independence and is therefore contrary to section 115A.
New clause 6 states that the allocated judge advocate may order an investigation to cease should it be determined,
“that no serious, permanent or lasting psychological or physical injury has been caused”—
presumably by the alleged conduct. Again, it would be hard to determine whether that was the case without investigation, a matter complicated by being on overseas operations. Proposed new subsection (3)(b) gives the judge advocate the power to order that an investigation should cease if it is determined,
“that the evidence is of a tenuous character because of weakness or vagueness or because of inconsistencies with other evidence, and that it is not in the interests of justice to continue an investigation”.
That proposed new paragraph is equally problematic; only in the most clear-cut cases can the police produce evidence entirely without some area of weakness or vagueness. Difficult operational investigations are particularly prone to those problems, but the relationship with the prosecutor will allow them to be explored and the progression of the investigation adapted accordingly. Furthermore, inconsistency with other evidence is a factor in all investigations and is what the trial process is created to explore. For a judge advocate to be placed into such a process, rather than relying on the relationship between police and prosecutor, risks adding delay to the investigation, and for a judge to order the cessation of an investigation risks cutting it short where evidence has not yet been gathered due to the complex nature of operational inquiries.
Finally, proposed new subsection (3)(c) seeks to give the judge advocate the power to direct the timetable and extent of further investigation if it is determined that there is merit in the complaint. However, the clause does not specify whether the judge advocate would have continued oversight, or some ability to enforce the timetable and direction. Again, that would place an additional burden on police who, in an operational theatre, responding to operational events, would now have an added layer of bureaucracy placed on them by someone who is not deployed and cannot possibly understand the unique pressures experienced by the deployed police officer. That would remove the discretion that all police officers must have to carry out prompt, independent and effective investigations, and hamper their decision making. That is not the same as the police relationship with the prosecutor, and here I return to my point about discourse versus direction. Discourse allows the police to retain the discretion so vital to acting in response to events; direction fetters their decision making.
The proposed clause is based on the false premise that police carry out unmeritorious or vexatious investigations. It would undermine the relationship between the police and prosecutors and fetter the police in the conduct of investigations in difficult circumstances. It would place an additional and unnecessary cog in a system that does not need it.
New clause 7 fails to take account of the processes involved in investigations. It fails to make clear the difference between an investigation and a reinvestigation and it fails to understand the processes involved in gathering evidence. The proposed clause applies where a person has been acquitted of an offence relating to conduct on overseas operations. It is assumed that this envisages a situation in which a person is acquitted at court martial, but it should be noted that it could also apply to a matter that is heard at a summary hearing in front of a commanding officer, following on from an investigation that did not involve the police. It also applies where a determination has been made by a judge advocate that an investigation into an offence should cease, which, as I have already stated, risks prematurely cutting short an investigation whose progress is impacted by its being an operational investigation.
The new clause proposes that there be no further investigation into the alleged conduct unless compelling new evidence becomes available and an allocated judge advocate determines that the totality of the evidence against the accused is sufficiently strong that there is a real possibility that it would support a conviction. I will take this step by step.
An investigation is a hard thing to define in law. It starts when inquiries begin, and its purpose is to determine whether what little information there is to start with is credible, and to gather more evidence in support of that. The process of finding out whether evidence is compelling is called an “investigation”. It is hard to see how, people having been told to cease an investigation, no further investigation—whether new or a continuation of the earlier investigation—can be commenced unless some form of compelling new evidence becomes available. The only way the police can determine whether the new evidence is compelling is by carrying out the investigation that they are not allowed to carry out. This becomes a circular issue.
Additionally, no further investigation into the alleged conduct may be carried out unless the allocated judge advocate determines that the totality of the evidence against an accused, which presumably has had to come from some sort of investigation that the police are not allowed to conduct, is sufficiently strong that there is a real possibility that it would support a conviction.
Not at this stage.
Where a person has been acquitted and new evidence comes to light, it would be necessary for there to be a further investigation before a prosecutor could determine whether a new prosecution could and should be brought. That is not a decision for the police; it is a decision for the prosecutor. To prevent the investigation would prevent a prosecutor from having the information that they need to make that determination.
Unfortunately, new clause 7 is not clear enough to allow a real debate on what it is seeking to achieve. The only way the police can determine whether new information is “compelling” or “sufficiently strong” to “support a conviction” is to carry out an investigation. A thorough investigation is important. As I said earlier, it can serve to exculpate, which is a good thing for the reputation of our armed forces, as well as to incriminate. The Bill should not, and does not, seek to fetter the police from carrying out investigations. It seeks to ensure that prosecutors are in a position to make prosecutorial decisions based on information that can be gleaned only through thorough investigations.
With the discourse between prosecutor and investigator, a balance must be struck between further investigation and the realistic prospect of conviction, and this includes the measures in the Bill that the prosecutor must take account of.
Not at this stage.
However, this does not need further clauses that seek to fetter that discourse. It needs the lightest touch, which is achieved through the balanced and established relationship between police and prosecutor.
Obviously, the Minister is probably more familiar with the Bill than I am. I just getting a little bit lost on his comments here. Is he saying that the only time that new evidence comes to light is through an investigation? That is just not the case. Sometimes evidence appears when there is not an ongoing investigation. Also, is he saying that, in that case, when new evidence comes to light, an investigation should not happen? For my benefit and perhaps that of other members of the Committee who are not as familiar with the Bill as he is, could he please explain where in the Bill there is a limit on reinvestigation at this moment?
I am happy to address the point about reinvestigation, because there are no circumstances in which anybody could arrive at the Ministry of Defence with an allegation of criminality or whatever it might be and we could not investigate it. There is a difference between investigations and where those investigations start impacting the lives of veterans, which is what the Bill seeks to deal with and which is why we have drawn the line where we have. We are not saying that new evidence comes only from investigation, but, as I have outlined, new clause 7 introduces an element of oversight that is simply not practicable to what we are trying to do. I have outlined that the 3,500 cases in Iraq and 1,000 in Afghanistan, and it is not practicable to do that and to ensure there is a speedy resolution, that evidence is preserved, that if people have done wrong we can prosecute them in a timely manner and so on. I am happy to have a further conversation with the hon. Lady about that later.
I fully appreciate what the Minister says about being bound by criminal law in England and Wales. However, having gone through the process himself, is he confident that when someone is recruited into the armed forces, they are fully aware of their legal obligations and that the training meets those needs?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that pertinent question. Extensive efforts have gone down over the years to make sure our people understand the rules within which they should operate. There clearly have been challenges in some of the training regarding detentions and so on, as has been found out through various court cases. I have always talked, on Second Reading and even before the legislation came to the House, about how the it is one of a series of measures. One such measure is about investigatory standards, another is about education and how individuals’ lives are affected, because it is not in anybody’s interests for us to do the legislation and for people not to understand. I am more than happy to share with the hon. Gentleman how much work we have done in that space.
I will not. Repeat investigations of alleged historical offences or the emergence of new allegations of criminal offences relating to operations many years ago can make the delivery of timely justice extremely difficult. It can also leave our service personnel with the stress and mental strain of the threat of potential prosecution hanging over them for far too long. The measures in part 1 of the Bill are key to providing reassurance to our service personnel and veterans about the threat of repeated criminal investigations and potential prosecution for alleged offences occurring many years ago on overseas operations. The purpose and effect of clause 1 is to set the conditions for when the measures in clause 2 and 3 must be applied by a prosecutor in deciding whether to prosecute a criminal case or to continue with the proceedings in a case. It should be noted with reference to clause 1(2) that the measures do not affect the prosecutor’s decision as to whether there is sufficient evidence to justify prosecution. The first stage of the prosecutorial test will therefore remain unchanged. Clause 1 therefore details to whom and in what circumstances the measures will apply.
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. When we consider his summing up, critically with reference to new clause 7(2)(a), does he not recognise that some of the evidence given by Judge Becket in response to his hon Friend the Member for Wrexham creates an ambiguity in terms of our partners in military activity? For example, Judge Becket referred to the murder of six Royal Military Police in Iraq and noted that if new evidence was brought forward, and the Government of Iraq had the same legislation, there is every possibility that the people responsible would not be prosecuted.
I assume that the hon. Gentleman is talking about Judge Blackett, who is the Judge Advocate General. He made some keen points. I have met Judge Blackett and we have tried to incorporate his work in the Bill, where appropriate. The idea that new evidence is presented and we do not prosecute is simply not the case. With reference to the six individuals killed at Majar al-Kabir in 2003, if new evidence is presented in that case, we would expect the Iraqis to prosecute. If new evidence emerges in cases against servicemen and women, they can still be prosecuted beyond these timelines. The legislation is simply bringing integrity and rigour to the process.
No, I am going to make some progress.
Under the Bill, the first condition establishes that the measures will only apply to members of the armed forces, both regulars and reserves, and to members of British overseas territory forces operating as part of UK forces when deployed on operations outside the British Islands, as defined in clause 7. Although we do deploy other Crown servants and contractors on overseas operations, those individuals are not deployed on front-line military operations and are not ordinarily exposed to the same risks and dangers as service personnel. It is not therefore appropriate to extend the protection provided by the measures in part 1 for our service personnel and veterans to other Crown servants or contractors.
The first condition in the legislation also requires that the alleged conduct occurred while the person was deployed on an overseas operation during which personnel came under attack or faced the threat of attack or violent resistance. Operations conducted outside the UK are vastly different from those conducted inside the UK. Within the UK, the military only ever operate in support of the civil authorities. With the exception of Operation Banner, which was an absolutely unique circumstance, UK operations rarely, if ever, require our personnel to operate in the same sort of hostile, high-threat environments they face on overseas operations. Excluding Northern Ireland, there are no outstanding historical allegations relating to operations in the UK.
Be assured that we have not forgotten our Northern Ireland veterans. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will be bringing forward separate legislation to address the legacy of the past in a manner that focuses on reconciliation, delivers for victims and ends the cycle of re-investigations into the troubles in Northern Ireland, which has failed victims and veterans alike. That will deliver on our commitment to Northern Ireland veterans.
The second condition for the measures to apply is that the alleged offence must have occurred over five years ago, with the start date being the date of the offence. Where an alleged offence occurred over a period of days, the start date will be the last day of that period. It is vital that investigations into historical allegations are brought to resolution without undue delay. To provide greater assurance to our brave servicemen and women, we consider five years to be the most appropriate start point for the presumption.
Just before I collect the voices of Members as they vote, if the clause is voted for, it means that the first clause is agreed to and then becomes part of the Bill to report to the House. The other new clauses and amendments that were grouped with it will be voted on when they are reached. I hope that is clear.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
It is not an important point—it is a difference without real meaning—but the normal procedure is not to abstain but to have no vote.
Clause 2
Presumption against prosecution
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 1—Ability to conduct a fair trial—
“The principle referred to in section 1(1) is that a relevant prosecutor making a decision to which that section applies may determine that proceedings should be brought against the person for the offence, or, as the case may be, that the proceedings against the person for the offence should be continued, only if the prosecutor has reasonable grounds for believing that the fair trial of the person has not been materially prejudiced by the time elapsed since the alleged conduct took place.”
This new clause replaces the presumption against prosecution with a requirement on a prosecutor deciding whether to bring or continue a prosecution to consider whether the passage of time has materially prejudiced the prospective defendant’s chance of a fair trial.
Both clause 2 and new clause 1 can be debated. We will not vote on new clause 1 until the end of the Bill when the new clauses are considered. At the end of this debate, I will collect voices for a vote on clause 2. The Minister has moved clause 2 formally. If there is any debate, he can respond. The new clauses will be moved formally when we get to them, but they can be debated now.
Clause 2 is quite an important part of the Bill. I am sorry that the Minister did not allow me to ask him about his investigation point, because it has an impact on this clause. He said that there is no similar system of judicial oversight for investigations, but I have to say that there is. For example, the police will often refer cases to the Crown Prosecution Service prior to the conclusion of an investigation for advice on whether more information is needed to meet the threshold for a prosecution. That is one of the points that I was going to make if he had allowed me to intervene. Whatever his civil servants have written to him, I suggest that they look at that comparison and what that would have done.
It is interesting that the Minister said that he met the Judge Advocate General and tried to incorporate things. I would like to know what in the Bill was changed after his meeting with Judge Blackett. I cannot see anything, but if the Minister wants to give us that, either now or later, that would be fine.
The presumption in clause 2 is for it to be exceptional for a prosecutor to determine that proceedings should be brought in relation to an offence committed by members of the armed forces when deployed on operations abroad. On that presumption against prosecution, I think we will have real problems, as we have referred to already, with regard to our international standing. I ask for your guidance, Mr Stringer: am I allowed to speak to new clause 1, even though it is not being moved?
New clause 1 is before us for debate. The Shadow Minister may or may not wish to press it when we get to the new clauses, but it is before us for debate now.
New clause 1 states:
“The principle referred to in section 1(1) is that a relevant prosecutor makes a decision to which that section applies may determine that proceedings should be brought against the person for the offence or, as the case may be, that the proceedings against the person for the offence should be continued, only if the prosecutor has reasonable grounds for believing that the fair trial of the person has not been materially prejudiced by the time elapsed since the alleged conduct took place.”
We have already discussed this, but if a material time difference were to prevent someone from getting a fair trial, I do not think that anyone would deem it fair to prosecute them for a crime. That has been an issue in civil law. For instance, certain historical sexual abuse cases have been very difficult to determine. There is a balance between the case for the prosecution to, quite rightly, get justice for the victim, and for the accused to receive a fair trial given the lapse in time. The new clause makes a fair suggestion.
In the case of Major Campbell, the circumstances were very difficult. The differences between service justice and civilian life include the unique circumstances in which individuals operate and, as I have said, the fact that they serve overseas, where evidence and witnesses must be gathered. We must ensure that the accused gets a fair trial. I want this Bill to make the process fairer and more just for accused individuals in those unique circumstances. I keep coming back to that point: the circumstances are unique and very different.
I support new clause 1. I accept that it might not be expertly drafted, but if the Minister is sympathetic towards it, I urge him to at least ask a civil servant to redraft it so that it can be brought back as a Government amendment, or to suggest another way in which the proposal can be brought into effect. Judging by his attitude, I doubt he will do that for any of the proposed amendments.
I am not bad, actually. I am just trying to be helpful and to improve the Bill, but the Minister seems determined to push it through unamended. He might not like it, but this is the purpose of Parliament: it is about scrutinising legislation. I have tabled amendments that I do not necessarily agree with, but I have done so because we need to demonstrate to the public that all opinions have been aired in Committee. That is an important part of our democracy. Even with a Government majority of 80, a Minister cannot simply determine that their proposals go through on the nod. Likewise, just because something comes out of his lips, that does not necessarily make it right. Perhaps I can give the Minister some advice: he might be in a stronger position if he was prepared to stand up and argue, in a friendly way, some of the points made in the Bill. All he seems to be doing, however, is reading out a pre-prepared civil service brief. This is the first time I have seen that done in a Bill Committee.
On the presumption against prosecution, we have got things the wrong way around. As Judge Blackett said, by looking at prosecutions we are looking through the wrong end of the telescope. I think there are ways in which we can ensure that people do not have to face lengthy reinvestigations or an inordinately long wait before being taken trial, and, if they meet the threshold for prosecution, that they are not disadvantaged by the passage of time. It is worth exploring those issues. My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South asks, through the new clause, a reasonable question about time limits. If this is not the way to do it, what is?
I rise to support new clause 1. I have said many times throughout this process that the Opposition will work constructively with the Government to get the Bill right, to protect armed forces personnel and their families. We believe that the intent of the Bill is well placed, but it has been poorly executed to achieve what Members on both sides of the House want—an end to vexatious claims that are misplaced, that are drawn out for years longer than they should be, and that place our troops and their families under incredible amounts of stress and pressure that they simply should not have to expect.
Our world-class personnel and their families deserve so much better. That is why it is so important that we get the Bill right. However, the presumption against prosecution does not resolve the issue that we all recognise. It does not afford our armed forces personnel the protection that they deserve. That is why, where the Opposition see an opportunity to improve the Bill, we will seek to highlight it. It is why we have tabled new clause 1, which we believe is fair. Crucially, it tackles the key issues of bringing to an end many of the vexatious claims against our armed services personnel—we want to make that commonplace—and of ensuring that decisions to prosecute are brought to a swifter conclusion. For that to happen, clause 2 in part 1 of the Bill must be removed and replaced by a new clause that replaces the presumption against prosecution with a requirement for a prosecutor who is deciding whether to bring or to continue a prosecution to consider whether the passage of time has materially prejudiced the prospective defendant’s chance of a fair trial.
The principle of a fair trial and consideration of the length of time that has passed during an investigation of our armed forces personnel is important for two reasons. First, it focuses on fairness. It ensures that our world-renowned legal system’s reputation remains intact. It does not undermine our international reputation and avoids the potential repercussions of our armed forces personnel being dragged to The Hague for violating international law. Secondly, it tackles the issue of lengthy investigations, which, sadly, some of our armed forces personnel have experienced and still are experiencing. More specifically, it requires the prosecutor to consider whether the passage of time in such investigations has materially prejudiced the chance of a fair trial for our armed forces service personnel and veterans.
It is not just the Opposition who have identified the flaws in clause 2 and where it could be improved. The International Committee of the Red Cross has raised these concerns, submitting them in written evidence. For context, and for those who are not aware, the ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation whose mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and others in situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC is also the origin of the Geneva conventions, an international agreement of which our country is a proud original signatory.
In its evidence, the ICRC acknowledges that there are occasions on which discretion has developed to address cases in which prosecutions are not taken forward. At international level, article 53 of the International Criminal Court statute sets out a procedure to follow if,
“upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution because…A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime”.
The written evidence goes on to say, however, that the ICC Office of the Prosecutor said that
“only in exceptional circumstances will the Prosecutor of the ICC conclude that an investigation or a prosecution may not serve the interests of justice”.
Finally, under the heading, “The presumption in favour of investigation or prosecution”, the OTP notes:
“Many developments in the last ten or fifteen years point to a consistent trend imposing a duty on States to prosecute crimes of international concern committed within their jurisdiction”.
The written evidence gives rise to a number of considerations. Clause 2 states that there should be exceptional circumstances for a prosecutor to determine whether proceedings should be taken against armed forces personnel. However, as outlined in the ICRC submission, does the prosecution in the interests of justice, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age and infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, sound like an exception to the rule of when proceedings should be brought forward? Indeed, it seems more likely to be exceptional for such a case to not be progressed and brought forward. The OTP compounds that point by stating that
“only in exceptional circumstances will the Prosecutor of the ICC conclude that an investigation or a prosecution may not serve the interests of justice.”
Under the Bill as drafted, it will not be exceptional to not prosecute such cases. Indeed, it risks undermining our international reputation and legal obligations, and, as a consequence, risks our armed forces personnel being tried at the International Criminal Court instead of in British courts. That gives rise to the question: why are the Government so intent on taking this risk, undermining our reputation and legal obligations, and leaving our armed forces personnel exposed? Why have the Government included a clause that risks undermining a historic, momentous international convention in which our country played a key role and of which it is an original signatory? That is something that our country and armed forces are proud of, and it is a reason for the high regard in which we are held across the world. Why risk breaching it, particularly when this clause could put our armed forces personnel at greater risk of vexatious claims? The Bill would not protect them, as it intends to do.
Furthermore, according to the evidence submitted by ICRC, the OTP also notes that many developments
“in the last ten or fifteen years point to a consistent trend imposing a duty on States to prosecute crimes of international concern committed within their jurisdiction”.
Why would we wish to deviate from our colleagues and international security partners on such an important issue? What is the Government’s reasoning for this?
That is not the only evidence received by the Committee that underlines the issue of clause 2. During last week’s evidence sessions, we heard from Judge Blackett, the former Judge Advocate General, the most senior military judge in the country, who said:
“I have three concerns about the Bill. One is the presumption against prosecution”.—[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 116-17, Q234.]
He went on to say:
“I do not think that there should be a presumption against prosecution”.––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 121, Q248.]
Quite simply, if the most senior military judge in the country has clearly outlined that there should not be a presumption against prosecution in the Bill, what more do the Government need to understand that clause 2 should be removed? What advice and evidence have the Government taken to support their approach? Was the Judge Advocate General consulted? If not, why not? In summary, I hope the Government will listen to the points raised, remove clause 2, uphold our international reputation and obligations, and work with us to protect our troops and get this Bill right.
Finally, I ask the Minister to clarify what advice and evidence have the Government taken to support clause 2? Why do the Government wish to deviate from our colleagues and international security partners on such an important issue? What is the Government’s reasoning for this? Why have they included a clause that risks undermining a historic and momentous international convention in which our country played a key role and of which it is a key signatory? Why are the Government so intent on risking undermining our reputation and legal obligations and leaving our armed forces personnel exposed? I hope the Committee will get some answers from the Minister.
I rise to speak briefly to new clause 1. As a new Member, I find the quality of the new clause disappointing. It does a disservice to the intentions of those who tabled it, so I invite them to withdraw it. The wording is far too vague and subjective. It is without guidelines and substance. Its incredible vagueness would make for a very unworkable piece of legislation. I believe in proper scrutiny in Committee, and the quality of the new clause is not good. It is a lawyer’s gift and would be subject to countless legal challenges and much litigation, which is exactly what the Bill is meant to stop.
I am just finishing. I respectfully ask for the new clause to be withdrawn.
I will answer the point about the Judge Advocate General first. He is able to comment on all areas of policy that have a direct impact on his role within the service justice system and the management of the military court system, but the measures in part 1 of the Bill impact on the prosecutorial process. As such, we felt it was more important to focus on engagement with the independent prosecutors, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Service Prosecuting Authority, which were all engaged in the process.
As I have said already, I have met the JAG and have looked at his recommendations, and we continue to look at how we can take forward his suggestions in order to improve the process of service justice. More will come on that in due course.
We have already published a response to our consultation, which was widely available for everybody to see. We have also published a response that contains a lot of the conversations around this. As I have indicated, we have engaged with a number of different parties and have arrived at the decision that this was a fair and proportionate line to tread in order to achieve the effects that we are trying to achieve.
I am going to speak to new clause 1, and then I will happily give way.
Our intention with the measures that we have introduced in part 1 of the Bill was to ensure that we could provide the utmost reassurance to our service personnel and veterans in relation to the threat of repeated scrutiny and potential prosecution for alleged offences occurring many years ago on overseas operations. This has meant seeking to have a balance in introducing protective measures that would set a high threshold for a prosecutor to determine that a case should be prosecuted, as well as ensuring that the adverse impact of overseas operations would be given particular weight in favour of the service person or veteran, but which would not act as an amnesty or statute of limitations, would not fetter the prosecutor’s discretion in making a decision to prosecute, and would be compliant with international law. We have achieved that balance in the combination of clauses 2 and 3. We are providing the additional protection that our service personnel and veterans so greatly deserve, while ensuring that, in exceptional circumstances, individuals can still be prosecuted for alleged offences.
New clause 1 would effectively replace the presumption against prosecution with a requirement in clause 1 that the prosecutor should consider only whether the passage of time has materially prejudiced the prospective defendant’s chance of a fair trial when coming to a decision on whether to prosecute. This not only removes the high threshold of the presumption, but seeks to replace it with a consideration—whether the passage of time would prejudice the chance of a fair trial—which is likely to already be considered by the prosecutor when applying the existing public interest test. We have never suggested that service personnel or veterans have been subject to unfair trials. We have sought instead to highlight not only the difficulties, but the adverse impacts on our personnel, of pursuing allegations of historical criminal offences. Justice delayed is often justice denied, for defendants and for victims. I believe that clauses 2 and 3 provide the appropriate balance between victims’ rights and access to justice, and the requirement to provide a fair and deserved level of protection for our service personnel and veterans. Removing the presumption in the way the new clause proposes would simply remove that balance.
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister’s flow, but clearly, ensuring that justice and fairness are done is crucial. We heard a number of comments from Judge Blackett on the process. I know the Minister has met Judge Blackett, but was that before or after the legislation was prepared?
I did not meet Judge Blackett before the legislation was prepared, for the reasons I have outlined. We thought it far more important to focus on engagement with the independent prosecutors, the Service Prosecuting Authority and the Crown Prosecution Service. Like I said, I have met him and heard what he has to say, and we heard his evidence last week.
No, because that would be to pre-empt the judge-led review of how we protect the Department, configure ourselves and develop the capability to deal with lawfare. Judge Blackett gave his view, but in our judgment it was better to engage the independent prosecutors, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Service Prosecuting Authority. That is what we have done—we engaged in a wide public consultation—and I believe that where we have arrived is fair and proportionate.
If the Bill were not legislation relating to the armed forces, it would have been given prior oversight by either the Attorney General for England and Wales, the Attorney General for Northern Ireland or, for Scotland, the Lord Advocate or the Advocate General. Will the Minister tell the Committee why the Judge Advocate General was excluded from that process for this legislation?
The Secretary of State wrote to the Judge Advocate General on 14 May 2020 acknowledging that, because of the 100-day election commitment to introduce the Bill, it was not possible for the legal protections team to complete the usual level of stakeholder engagement that we would usually seek to undertake post-public consultation.
I am answering the hon. Gentleman’s question. However, we welcomed the Judge Advocate General’s interest in the Bill: an offer was made for the project team to engage with him at a convenient time, and I subsequently met him. I respect the hon. Gentleman’s views on who would be consulted if the Bill were drafted in a civilian context, but I am entirely comfortable that the Department spoke to the right people to gauge their views on how we should deal with the current system, which is difficult and ultimately unfair to veterans.
I respect all the views that we heard last week—of course I do—but I am allowed to disagree with them. Having worked on this for seven years, it is possible to hear other people’s views on the matter and disagree with them. The Department has taken a balanced and proportionate view, and indeed, it has incorporated a lot of views from other stakeholders throughout the process.
I will not give way at the moment, because I have addressed that point a number of times.
Clause 2, which the new clause would replace, sets out the principle of the presumption against prosecution, but it is to be exceptional for a prosecutor to determine that proceedings should be brought for an alleged offence that occurred in operations more than five years ago, as set out in clause 1. We have not sought to define “exceptional”, as we do not think it necessary or possible to provide an exhaustive definition. We intend, however, that the effect of clause 2 will be that when a prosecutor considers whether criminal proceedings should be brought or continued in relevant cases, there will be a presumption against prosecution, and that the threshold for rebutting that presumption will be high.
We also expect that the concept of “exceptional” will develop over time as cases are considered by prosecutors. I reinforce the point in clause 1(2): the presumption against prosecution does not impact on the prosecutor’s assessment as to whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution. It focuses instead on setting a high threshold for a prosecutor to determine that it is in the public interest to bring or to continue criminal proceedings in respect of offences committed by service personnel on operations more than five years ago.
Although the presumption will not directly impact on investigations, allegations of wrongdoing must, and will, continue to be investigated. We accept that, over time, this is likely to have an indirect impact. As prosecutors become familiar with the presumption, they should be able to advise investigators earlier in the process on whether the higher threshold of the new statutory requirement would be met in a particular case.
Not at the moment. Although that should therefore help to reduce the likelihood of investigations being reopened without new and compelling evidence, it does not create an absolute bar to investigations or prosecutions, as a statute of limitations or an amnesty would. Rather, the presumption is rebuttal, with the prosecutor retaining the discretion to prosecute where they determine that it would be appropriate to do so. That may include cases in which there is evidence that a serious offence has been committed.
In contrast, an amnesty or a statute of limitations for service personnel would be a breach of our international legal obligations and would pose significant challenges and risks. That includes the risk that, in the absence of a domestic system for the prosecution of international criminal offences, the International Criminal Court would assert its jurisdiction and bring prosecutions against members of the UK armed forces. The presumption against prosecution, however, is consistent with our international legal obligations, as it would not affect the UK’s willingness or ability to investigate or prosecute alleged offences committed by our service personnel.
Finally, the statutory presumption and the measures in clauses 3 and 5 will apply only to proceedings that start after the Bill has become law. Although alleged criminal offences relating to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan occurred more than five years ago, meaning that the presumption could be applied in any relevant prosecutorial decisions, it is likely that any remaining investigations of those allegations will be complete before the Bill becomes law. If any new credible allegations relating to Iraq and Afghanistan should arise, however, they will obviously be subject to investigation and, where appropriate, consideration by a prosecutor. Any decision to prosecute such a case after the Bill has become law must, in accordance with the presumption, be exceptional.
It was remiss of me not to mention what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. It has been a pleasure all day, and hopefully all week.
Has clause 2 been given approval by the CPS? The Minister mentioned that it does not breach international humanitarian law. Can he explain which organisations and professionals have said that? I give him some gentle advice, which I hope he will take in the way that it is intended: legislation made purely on one’s own views, against the advice of experts and others who know exactly what they are talking about, is not the right way to go. It is playing fast and loose with our armed forces and is going to have serious, unintended consequences.
On the idea that the Department does anything other than seek the views of experts to bring through this difficult legislation, in evidence the hon. Lady has seen a set of views given by campaign groups, but those are not the only views available. This is difficult legislation that, of course, will be contested, but the idea that we have just come up with some idea after a public consultation lasting many months—[Interruption.]
Order.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Matters to be given particular weight
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 3, page 2, line 20, leave out
“(so far as they tend to reduce the person’s culpability or otherwise tend against prosecution)”.
This amendment would ensure that, in giving particular weight to the matters in subsection (2), a prosecutor may consider whether any matter tends to reduce or increase culpability, tending against or in favour of prosecution respectively.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 3, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—
“(bb) the public interest in maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the Armed Forces;”
This amendment would ensure that a relevant prosecutor gives particular weight to maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the Armed Forces.
Amendment 4, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—
“(bc) the nature of the alleged conduct, in particular whether it engaged the obligations of the United Kingdom under Articles 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights;”
This amendment would ensure that particular weight is given by a prosecutor where the alleged conduct engages the UK’s obligations under Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, Article 4 (prohibition of slavery and forced labour) or Article 5 (prohibition of arbitrary detention) ECHR.
Amendment 5, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—
“(bd) whether the person had command responsibility for the alleged conduct, and to what extent;”
This amendment would ensure that particular weight is given by a relevant prosecutor where the person had command responsibility for the alleged conduct.
Amendment 13, in clause 6, page 4, line 13, at end insert—
“(3A) A service offence is not a ‘relevant offence’ if it is an offence whose prosecution is required under the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations.”
This amendment would exclude the prosecution of serious international crimes (such as torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain war crimes) from the limitations otherwise imposed by the Bill.
Amendment 58, in schedule 1, page 12, line 6, at end insert—
“13A An offence under section 1 of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).
13B An offence under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (torture).”
This amendment adds to Schedule 1 specific reference to existing domestic offences in relation to torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, in a similar way to the treatment of sexual offences.
Amendment 6, in schedule 1, page 12, line 38, leave out paragraph 17 and insert—
“17 An offence under Part 5 (Offences under domestic law) of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 as it relates to the law of England and Wales.”
This amendment would mean that all offences listed in Part 1 of the International Criminal Courts Act 2001 as they related to the law of England and Wales would be excluded offences, without restriction.
Amendment 59, in schedule 1, page 12, line 39, at end insert—
“(za) an act of genocide under article 6, or”
This amendment would ensure that acts of genocide are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 60, in schedule 1, page 12, line 40, leave out
“a crime against humanity within article 7.1(g)”
and insert
“a crime against humanity within article 7.1(a)-(k)”.
This amendment would ensure that crimes against humanity are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 61, in schedule 1, page 12, line 41, leave out from beginning to end of line 2 on page 13 and insert—
“(b) a war crime within article 8.2(a) (which relates to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).”
This amendment would ensure that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 7, in schedule 1, page 13, line 12, leave out paragraph 20 and insert—
“20 An offence under Part 5 (Offences under domestic law) of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 as it relates to the law of Northern Ireland.”
This amendment would mean that all offences listed in Part 1 of the International Criminal Courts Act 2001 as they related to the law of Northern Ireland would be excluded offences, without restriction.
Amendment 62, in schedule 1, page 13, line 13, at end insert—
“(za) an act of genocide under article 6, or”
This amendment would ensure that acts of genocide are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 63, in schedule 1, page 13, line 14, leave out
“a crime against humanity within article 7.1(g)”
and insert
“a crime against humanity within article 7.1(a)-(k)”.
This amendment would ensure that crimes against humanity are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 64, in schedule 1, page 13, leave out lines 15 to 18 and insert—
“(b) a war crime within article 8.2(a) (which relates to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).”
This amendment would ensure that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 8, in schedule 1, page 13, line 28, leave out paragraph 23.
This amendment is consequential on amendments 6 and 7.
Amendment 9, in schedule 1, page 14, line 5, leave out paragraphs 27 to 30 and insert—
“27 An offence under Part 1 (Offences) of the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001.”
This amendment would mean that all offences listed in Part 1 of the International Criminal Courts Act (Scotland) 2001 would be excluded offences, without restriction.
Amendment 65, in schedule 1, page 14, line 7, at end insert—
“(za) an act of genocide under article 6, or”
This amendment would ensure that acts of genocide are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 66, in schedule 1, page 14, line 8, leave out
“a crime against humanity within article 7.1(g)”
and insert
“a crime against humanity within article 7.1(a)-(k)”.
This amendment would ensure that crimes against humanity are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 67, in schedule 1, page 14, leave out lines 9 to 12 and insert—
“(b) a war crime within article 8.2(a) (which relates to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).”
This amendment would ensure that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 12, in schedule 1, clause 15, page 9, line 21, at end insert
“subject to subsection (2A).
(2A) Before making regulations under subsection (2), the Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament the report of an independent review confirming that the Act is in full compliance with the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations with respect to the prosecution of war crimes and other crimes committed during overseas operations.
(2B) This Act shall cease to have effect at the end of the period of five years beginning with the day on which it is brought into force, unless the Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor has, not fewer than four years after this Act has come into force, laid before Parliament the report of a further independent review confirming that the Act remains in full compliance with the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations with respect to the prosecution of war crimes and other crimes committed during overseas operations.”
The amendments we are debating relate to clause 3. I will first refer to amendment 3, which stands in my name. At the outset, I make clear that these are probing amendments; I am not going to push them to a vote, but they mean that the issues are at least going to get some scrutiny by the Committee, although based on the answers we have had so far, I am not sure we are going to get much response.
Particularly during the last bit on prosecutions, it would have been interesting to know whether, for example, the Crown Prosecution Service had agreed to clause 2 and what its thoughts on it were, because even though the Minister said it was consulted, I very much doubt it would agree with clause 2.
There is a difference between being consulted and agreeing with what comes out of the sausage machine at the end of the consultation. We want the public to have confidence not only in the Bill, but in the process. The Minister is right: the Government can consult who they like, but at the end of the day, they have to make decisions. What if those decisions fly in the face of what the Minister referred to as “campaign groups”? I do not consider the International Criminal Court and others “campaign groups”. These are obligations under international treaty, and, like my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South, I am concerned about our international reputation.
Amendment 3, which would amend page 2, line 33 of the Bill, relates to the public interest test in maintaining trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the armed forces. I have no problem with the accountability of the armed forces, because as I say, I am a supporter of the service justice system. I have no problem with the oversight we have in Parliament and the way that system operates. However, there was a time when many families had direct connections to the armed forces: going back to the second world war or national service, people knew people in the armed forces, so they understood the culture. That is becoming increasingly distant. We no longer have national service, so we do not have a culture where most citizens go through that system. It is therefore important that we work extra hard to maintain public confidence in the principle of accountability of the armed forces.
Again, I am a supporter of our armed forces, and have been for the 19 years I have been in this House. I am not uncritical if they get things wrong, and I am pleased that I played my part, for example, in the activities of the Select Committee on Defence back in 2005, which led to the creation of the office of the Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces, now the Service Complaints Ombudsman. We are asking people to do unique things, and we do need to protect them, but this probing amendment is to see whether we can get the weight of public trust when it comes to prosecutions—in other words, if we are going to take forward a prosecution, that is taken into account.
I know for certain that our service prosecution system is fair, and it is one that I support. It is also one that includes the test of whether a prosecution is in the public interest, which is in civil law as well. That is controversial in civil law because there are cases in which you and I, Mr Stringer, and the average person on the famous Clapham omnibus, might think someone should be prosecuted. There is the evidential test and then there is the question of whether prosecution would be in the public interest, and sometimes it is difficult to explain that to the public.
I see no purpose whatsoever in prosecuting an 80-year-old veteran in Northern Ireland. I accept that the legislation does not cover Northern Ireland, but the Government have made huge promises about what they are going to do to replicate the Bill to cover Northern Ireland—having dealt with Northern Ireland as a Minister, I would say, “Best of luck with that, mate.” There are ways of translating the Bill to do that, but this goes to the heart of it, because the issue in Northern Ireland is public trust on both sides of the community divide.
This probing amendment is trying to see whether the prosecution can take some account of the perception of our armed forces in the public eye. As I said earlier, many people do not understand the service justice system. Indeed, some people campaign against it, saying that members of the armed forces should not have a separate judicial system. I am sorry, but I disagree, because we ask unique things of them. I think that what we have at the moment strikes the right balance, having judicial oversight while also ensuring that the unique circumstances in which they serve are considered.
The public interest test—whether it is in the public interest to sue somebody—is already there. The question is whether we can have a system in which some weight is given to how it will look and how the armed forces would be perceived. I am not quite sure how that would be done in practice. The prosecutors and members of the armed forces who I have met have this in their DNA, because they are all conscious of the importance of maintaining public trust. We are a democracy and it is important that public trust is maintained in all aspects of Government and the armed forces. I think that the current Government are trying the public’s patience in relation to that trust element, but I will not go down that route now.
Am I proud of our armed forces? Yes, I am. It is important to say that. My constituency is a recruiting ground for many young servicemen and women, and the armed forces give them opportunities that they would never get in civilian life. We often concentrate on the negative aspects of service life, but I have always advocated that service life is not only positive for those young people but good for the nation, because those life experiences and skills are transferable once those individuals return to civilian life. We should be proud of that and celebrate it more than we do.
I am not sure how amendment 3 would reflect that, but it is worth putting it to the Committee, so that Members understand that public trust in our armed forces is going to be important. My fear is that the Bill will do a lot to undermine that trust. As I told the Committee last week, I am also concerned that the Bill will give weight to those people who want to do away with the service justice system, which I certainly do not want to see.
Amendment 4, which stands in my name, is about the alleged conduct, with particular reference to our obligations under articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the European convention on human rights. I know that, for some Conservative Members, any mention of Europe has a Pavlov’s dog effect—it sets them off. However, it is important to remember that the European convention on human rights is nothing to do with the EU or those nasty foreigners who, in the eyes of certain people, have been persecuting us from Brussels. It was set up after the second world war so that there would be a basic, decent standard.
I am proud that this country was part of that convention. I am also proud that we have been seen as a force for good around the world, because we have argued for basic human rights—rights that we take for granted in this country, but that many people do not. We have seen recently in Ukraine and Belarus what happens when those rights are not maintained. Under amendment 4, the prosecution would give weight to whether the alleged conduct would engage the UK’s obligations under article 2, on the right to life, or under the articles prohibiting torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, slavery and forced labour, and arbitrary detention.
There is something that I find strange about the Bill. The Government specified certain categories of crimes that will not be covered by it—murder and sexual offences—and I totally agree about that. What I have difficulty with, however, despite the assertion of compliance with the Human Rights Act, is the issue of torture. I do not think that anyone in the Committee Room would condone torture. It was a given after the second world war that torture was something that we would not engage in, that was not acceptable, and that would lead to the condemnation of any nation that participated in it. Credit is due to the Foreign Office, under all Governments, including the present one, because it does a lot to raise the issue when torture is instigated against countries’ citizens, and to push back and argue against it. I do not know why the issue is not specified in the Bill. It might help to reassure people who do not understand the justice system. People ask why it is needed, so I shall explain.
I did not think that we would get to a point where nations from which we would expect better would engage in torture. As a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I saw a lot of intelligence during the investigation of rendition. It is a fact that the United States, under the Bush Administration, engaged in state torture, which is not acceptable. Did that put members of our security services and some of our armed forces personnel in a difficult position? Yes, I think it did.
As to being open to prosecution, although I have seen no evidence that members of the British armed forces or security services took part in any type of torture, there is credible evidence to show that they were present when it was taking place. That is not acceptable, either. It would be helpful if the Bill took into account and gave the weight in prosecutions to the European convention on human rights, and explicitly included reference to torture and inhumane treatment, to ensure that people can take comfort in the Bill. Let me dispel the myth that members of our armed forces or our Government would want to be involved in torture—they would not. To ensure we can have that protection, it should be in the Bill.
The right hon. Gentleman gets to a point that many of us find disconcerting, especially when reflecting on the second part of the Bill. The chain of command needs to take responsibility for its decision making. I know this is only a probing amendment, but the Government need to consider the fact that the chain of command has responsibility within the decision-making process.
That is important. It is about taking responsibility of the chain of command. I remember when we first introduced the Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces, there was a huge fear, as there was when we introduced the armed forces ombudsman, that they would interfere with the chain of command. I do not want for one minute to do that, and neither should a prosecutor, but the actions and freedoms that someone has is a relevant factor that needs to be taken into consideration. As we discussed this morning, these people are in very difficult situations—I am sure that neither you, Mr Stringer, nor I could imagine what it would be like, although I am sure that the Minister can—and that needs to be taken into account.
Having made those comments, I shall leave it there.
I want to speak to amendment 3, the probing amendment tabled by the right hon. Member for North Durham, and to reflect on several issues that he has raised about trust and accountability. That is because there is a sense, at least among Scottish National party Members, that if this type of amendment were to be considered at a future time by the Government, it would allow the criminal justice system, and specifically the military judicial system, to retain some element of trust within civilian oversight.
I recognise that the Minister and the Government have a passion for this issue, and that there is a commitment to do this within 100 days. I hear that, but I have some concerns that need to be answered. First, to enable accountability and trust, can the Minister tell us whether the Crown Prosecution Service for England and Wales gave a positive response to the Bill? Secondly, in relation to the 100 days, there is also a commitment to have a similar Bill for Northern Ireland, so would he consider it appropriate for the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland to be engaged in any future Bill-building on that Bill, given the fact that he excluded from this process the Judge Advocate General, who is a coherent part of the military judicial system, and engagement with whom enables trust to be built across the House?
I wonder whether the Minister can answer those questions: did the Crown Prosecution Service for England and Wales say that the Bill was a good piece of legislation; and will he instigate discussions with the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland if he is going to introduce another piece of legislation for Northern Ireland, and again exclude the Judge Advocate General?
I rise to speak in support of the amendments to clause 3. When I became a Member of Parliament, in the nation regarded as the birthplace of modern parliamentary democracy, I never once thought that I would have to argue the case for retaining Great Britain’s commitments against war crimes. This country was built upon principles of fairness, equality and justice. We have stood against torture and other war crimes, with a proud tradition of taking direct action when we see violations against human rights being committed. From world war two and the Nuremberg trials to Bosnia and The Hague, this country has a reputation for standing against torture and crimes against humanity. It is part of our identity and is part of what makes us British, which is why it is so concerning that this Bill in its current form, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham said earlier, puts all of that at risk.
Schedule 1 to the Bill sets out what constitutes excluded offences for the purposes of presumption against prosecution. Torture is not included and neither are other war crimes listed in article 7 of the Rome statute, apart from sexual crimes. That is morally wrong. It breaks our commitments to international law, it risks dragging our troops in front of the International Criminal Court, and it is entirely avoidable with some common-sense amendments to the Bill.
Let us consider that first point. I know that everyone in this room would agree that it is morally wrong in any situation to commit an act of torture—it is the most serious of crimes and has no moral justification in any circumstances. When we look at schedule 1, we see that the offences excluded from legal protection are sexual offences. Labour agrees that these offences should be utterly condemned and are inexcusable, and that they should be excluded from any presumption against prosecution. However, schedule 1 fails to exclude terrible crimes such as torture and genocide. The Government have provided no good explanation or justification whatever for excluding only sexual offences from the scope of protection under the Bill, particularly as no service personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan have been accused of genocide, yet it is not excluded as an offence in the Bill. As a former Attorney General, Dominic Grieve, put it:
“This could create the bizarre outcome that an allegation of torture or murder would not be prosecuted when a sexual offence arising out of the same incident could be.”
As the Minister wrote the Bill, can he take us through sub-paragraphs (a) to (k) of article 7(1) of the Rome statute and explain why each provision is legally needed? What is the legal necessity of including each of those provisions?
That brings me to Labour’s second ground for objection to the Bill’s exclusion of torture and other war crimes. Britain has always had an unwavering commitment to the law of armed conflict. The Geneva conventions are known in most households in Britain, and the Bill tramples on our commitments to them. We have heard from judges and generals, witnesses who have trained our armed forces and provided them with independent legal advice, and ex-service personnel. We have received written evidence from the International Committee of the Red Cross. All those individuals and organisations have said two things in common. First, they are clear in their duty to uphold the law of armed conflict and instruct others to do so. Secondly, they are clear that the Bill risks eroding our commitment to those laws and have expressed grave warnings on the consequences. First, it would irreparably damage the moral credibility and authority of the UK to call out human rights abuses worldwide. Secondly, it would undermine the hard-won reputation of UK forces as responsible and reliable actors. Thirdly, it risks reprisals against British troops, particularly service personnel who may be captured and detained on operations.
I am reminded of the evidence last week of the Judge Advocate General, who said:
“You will remember that six Royal Military Police were killed…in 2003. If those responsible were identified today, would we accept that there would be a presumption against their prosecution? Would we expect the factors in clause 3(2)(a) to be taken into account? Would we be content that a member of the Iraqi Government’s consent would be needed to prosecute? Would we accept a decision by that person not to prosecute? In my view, there would be outrage in this country if that occurred. In all areas of law, you have to be even-handed.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 128, Q278.]
It is hard to disagree with those words. To demand justice from others when our men and women on the frontline need it, Britain must be at the forefront of defending that system, underpinned by international laws and the principle of equality under the law.
Labour is deeply concerned that the Bill sets the UK on a collision course with the International Criminal Court and that the Bill risks our troops being dragged to The Hague. Last week, we heard from a witness who represents and is the voice for thousands of veterans, who said that
“there is without a doubt greater fear of a non-British legal action coming against people than of anything British.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 110, Q219.]
Going back on our commitments to the Geneva conventions risks our forces personnel being dragged in front of the International Criminal Court, only confirming the worst fears among veterans discussed by Lieutenant Colonel Parker. Why would the Minister not prefer to have trials for British troops in British courts rather than The Hague?
The Bill as it stands is flawed. It is fundamentally at odds with British values by failing to offer an absolute rejection of torture. It tramples on our commitments to international doctrines that we helped to write, and it fails our troops by risking action by the international courts.
There is a way out. Protecting troops from vexatious claims does not need to be at odds with our commitments to international humanitarian law. There does not need to be a trade-off between safeguarding our armed forces and standing against torture. That is why we have tabled these amendments, which will address those imbalances.
First, the amendments would ensure that, under schedule 1, the forms of crime listed in the Rome statute, such as torture, genocide and crimes against humanity, were—alongside sexual offences—excluded from the presumption against prosecution. Further amendments would ensure that any breach of the Geneva conventions and other international laws also fell outside the scope of that. Labour’s amendments, by bringing the Bill in line with international law and doubling down on our commitments against torture, would protect our troops from international courts and protect our nation’s reputation.
The Minister said at the witness stage, “Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good.”
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. I hope that the Minister has heard our commitment to get the Bill right. It can be better for our armed forces, if he is willing to engage in the arguments being made.
I put it to the Minister, do not let party politics get in the way of making this Bill worthy of the troops it is set to serve. There is still time for him to work with the Opposition to get this right. He has made half of the argument for me. By already excluding sexual crimes, he recognises that some crimes are so serious they should be excluded from the Bill. He should now go the full way and exclude war crimes.
Labour stand four-square behind our troops, and we want to work with the Government to build the broadest consensus possible on the Bill, tailored to supporting our forces and safeguarding human rights. I urge the Minister to work with us and vote in favour of amendments that would strengthen the Bill for our troops and for our commitments to human rights.
Finally, I ask the Minister to clarify, on the case of those responsible for the six Royal Military Police who were killed in 2003—raised by the former Judge Advocate General last week—would he accept presumption against prosecution? Would we expect the factors in clause 3(2)(a) to be taken into account? Would we be content for a member of the Iraqi Government’s consent to be needed to prosecute, and would he accept a decision not to prosecute? Why would the Minister not prefer to have trials for British troops in British courts, rather than in The Hague? Finally, will he take us through paragraph 1(a) to (k) of article 7 the Rome statute and explain the legal need of those sub-paragraphs within the Bill? What is the legal necessity of including each of those sub-paragraphs?
I want to speak briefly on torture, which is one of the issues that my constituents have brought to me. That is relevant, because it is about public perception of the legislation proposed.
Britain has a fine history with our armed forces of acting legally, morally and in the best interests and traditions of the armed forces. I believe that the Minister should consider the amendment that ensures that torture, war crimes and crimes against humanity are excluded from the Bill. Last Thursday, a number of witnesses said to us that they could see no reason why torture and war crimes should not be excluded too, as sexual offences rightly are. I urge the Government to consider the good name of our country and put those elements outside the scope of the Bill.
We ask a huge amount of our service personnel. We send them to undertake high-threat and high-risk operations in defence of our country and its people. They do their duty in the clear knowledge that they may be injured, maimed or even killed.
This Government believe, therefore, that it is absolutely right and reasonable to require that in return we ensure that, in addition to the existing public interest test, a prosecutor has to give particular weight to the unique circumstances of overseas operations and the adverse impacts that those may have on a serviceperson’s capacity to make sound judgments and on their mental health at the time of an alleged offence when coming to a decision on whether to prosecute. That is not intended to excuse bad behaviour by service personnel, but to ensure that prosecutors give full recognition to the significant difference in the circumstances surrounding an alleged offence committed on operations overseas as compared, for example, to situations where the alleged criminal conduct occurs in a domestic civilian setting.
The prosecutor must consider the presumption against prosecution under clause 2 to determine whether a case meets the exceptional threshold. The prosecutor, as required by clause 3, must also give particular weight to matters that may, in effect, tip the balance in favour of not prosecuting. Clause 3 is therefore integral to supporting the high threshold set in clause 2 for a prosecutor to make a decision to prosecute.
There was a lot of discussion last week about the concerns over the impact on our personnel of repeated scrutiny and the mental burden placed on them by the threat of criminal prosecution occurring long after the events in question, particularly where there is no compelling new evidence to be considered. Clause 3 requires that prosecutors must also consider where there has been a previous investigation in relation to the alleged criminal conduct and no compelling new evidence has arisen. The public interest is in cases coming to a timely and final resolution.
In the responses to our public consultation, many service personnel expressed a lack of trust in prosecutors and others in the justice system. They were particularly concerned about whether prosecutors are able to understand the operational context in which the offence occurred and to adequately reflect this in determining the public interest. We fully accept that prosecutors may already take such matters into account. However, making that a statutory requirement provides greater certainty for service personnel that the unique context of overseas operations will be given particular and appropriate weight in the prosecutor’s deliberation.
By seeking to remove the benefit of the matters in clause 3 that tend towards reducing the culpability of a serviceperson and tend against prosecution, the amendments are designed to ensure that the prosecutor can also consider whether such matters increase the culpability of an individual and support a prosecution. The amendments undermine our reassurance to our service personnel that the operational context of an alleged offence will be taken into account, and in their favour, by the prosecutor. It would be a slap in the face for our armed forces personnel to suggest that the context of an overseas operation will be considered as a factor in support of their prosecution.
At present, the service justice system understands the context and the public interest test is already there—whether it is in the public interest to prosecute. The service justice system is designed to take into account special circumstances, so what is the need for clause 3?
The need is very clear. The fact is that the service justice system as it stands has facilitated an industrial level of claims against our people that has absolutely destroyed their lives.
The right hon. Gentleman can sit there and say no, this did not happen and that did not happen. The rest of us live in the factual world, where these things actually did happen. They destroyed some of our finest people, which is why we are introducing this legislation. I have heard a lot from the right hon. Gentleman, and the vast majority is not correct. I respect him immensely, but it is not correct. I will therefore push on at this stage.
Amendments 3 to 5 seek to add additional factors to clause 3. In the light of amendment 1, I can assume only that the intention is somehow to bring in factors that would be seen by the prosecutor to increase a serviceperson’s culpability and make a prosecution more likely. I have already set out my arguments as to why amendment 1 should be withdrawn. Furthermore, I do not believe that amendments 3 to 5 are appropriate or needed.
Amendment 3 is designed to
“ensure that a relevant prosecutor gives particular weight to maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the Armed Forces.”
The independent prosecutor’s responsibility is to follow the principle set out in the code for crown prosecutors. That includes the principle that they will work
“to maintain public trust and to provide an efficient criminal justice system.”
The Bill does not place service personnel above the law or make them somehow less accountable. Allegations of offences must and will continue to be investigated. Where appropriate, a prosecutor can still make a decision to prosecute. On that basis, I do not believe that amendment 3 is warranted.
Amendment 4 is designed to
“ensure that particular weight is given by a prosecutor where the alleged conduct engages the UK’s obligations”
under articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the European convention on human rights. The prosecutor already has to apply the principles of the ECHR, in accordance with the Human Rights Act 1998, at each stage of the case, so amendment 4’s additional requirement would be totally unnecessary.
Amendment 5 is designed to
“ensure that particular weight is given by a relevant prosecutor where the person had command responsibility for the alleged conduct.”
I can assume only that the amendment is meant to address the concerns raised last week about the chain of command being held accountable as well as individuals, but it misses the point. A decision taken by a serviceperson to use force during an overseas operation is an individual decision for which they, and not their commanding officer, may then be held personally accountable if their decision is deemed to have been in breach of criminal law. The circumstances of an incident would determine whether the involvement of a commander in the activities of their subordinates also merited a criminal prosecution. Separately, it should be noted that under the Armed Forces Act 2006, commanding officers may be investigated and prosecuted, including at court martial, for non-criminal conduct offences in relation to serious allegations of wrongdoing by personnel under their command. Non-criminal conduct offences are not covered by the Overseas Operations Bill.
On the proposed amendments to schedule 1, the Government are committed to providing reassurance to service personnel and veterans in relation to the threat of prosecution for alleged offences on overseas operations more than five years ago. The measures in part 1 of the Bill are key to delivering that reassurance. The fact that we have only excluded sexual offences in schedule 1 does not mean that we will not continue to take other offences, such as war crimes and torture, extremely seriously.
The presumption against prosecution will allow the prosecutor to continue to take decisions to prosecute these offences, and the severity of the crime and the circumstances in which it was allegedly committed will always be factors in their considerations. On a case-by-case basis, a prosecutor can determine that a case against an individual in relation to war crimes, torture or genocide is “exceptional”, and that a prosecution is therefore appropriate, subject to the approval of the Attorney General or the Advocate General in Northern Ireland. The decision to exclude only sexual offences reflects the Government’s strong stated belief that the use of sexual violence or sexual exploitation during overseas operations is never acceptable in any circumstances.
We have not excluded other offences, including torture, because in the course of their duties on overseas operations, we expect our service personnel to undertake activities that are intrinsically violent in nature. These activities can expose service personnel to the possibility that their actions may result in allegations of torture war crimes. By contrast, although allegations of sexual offences can still arise, the activities that we expect our service personnel to undertake on operations cannot possibly include those of a sexual nature.
We do not therefore believe it is appropriate to afford personnel the additional protection of the presumption in relation to allegations of sexual offences after five years. I am aware that many people have misinterpreted this decision, and have suggested that it somehow undermines the UK’s continuing commitment to upholding international humanitarian and human rights law, including the UN convention against torture. That is completely untrue. The UK does not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone the use of torture for any purpose, and we remain committed to maintaining our leading role in the promotion and protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
I will not, as I do not have time.
These amendments seek to ensure that all offences contained within the International Criminal Court Act 2001, as it applies in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, should be excluded offences in schedule 1. Amendment 8 is consequential on amendments 6 and 7. These amendments would amount to such a comprehensive list of offences that they would considerably undermine the effectiveness and value of the measures in part 1 of the Bill. In doing so, they would prevent the Government from delivering on their commitment to provide reassurance to our service personnel and veterans in relation to the threat of prosecution for alleged historical offences, something that they so greatly deserve.
I will not. Amendment 12 seeks to introduce a sunset clause where the Act will cease to have effect after five years unless the Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor lays before Parliament a report of an independent review confirming that the Act complies with the UK’s international obligations. I can assure the Committee that such a review is not required, as the measures in this Bill are consistent with our international legal obligations and do not undermine international humanitarian law as set out in the Geneva conventions.
I will not give way.
I therefore ask that these amendments be withdrawn.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Leo Docherty.)
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesBefore we begin, I remind members of the Committee that I expect social distancing to be respected; I will stop proceedings if I see people breaking the social distancing rules. Members must remember to switch electronic devices off or to silent. If colleagues have prepared speaking notes, it would be helpful to our colleagues at Hansard if you emailed them to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
We will continue our line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available on the table.
Clause 3
Matters to be given particular weight
Amendment proposed (14 October): 1, in clause 3, page 2, line 20, leave out
‘(so far as they tend to reduce the person’s culpability or otherwise tend against prosecution)’.—(Mr Kevan Jones.)
This amendment would ensure that, in giving particular weight to the matters in subsection (2), a prosecutor may consider whether any matter tends to reduce or increase culpability, tending against or in favour of prosecution respectively.
Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 3, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—
‘(bb) the public interest in maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the Armed Forces;’.
This amendment would ensure that a relevant prosecutor gives particular weight to maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the Armed Forces.
Amendment 4, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—
‘(bc) the nature of the alleged conduct, in particular whether it engaged the obligations of the United Kingdom under Articles 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights;’.
This amendment would ensure that particular weight is given by a prosecutor where the alleged conduct engages the UK’s obligations under Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, Article 4 (prohibition of slavery and forced labour) or Article 5 (prohibition of arbitrary detention) ECHR.
Amendment 5, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—
‘(bd) whether the person had command responsibility for the alleged conduct, and to what extent;’.
This amendment would ensure that particular weight is given by a relevant prosecutor where the person had command responsibility for the alleged conduct.
Amendment 13, in clause 6, page 4, line 13, at end insert—
‘(3A) A service offence is not a “relevant offence” if it is an offence whose prosecution is required under the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations.’.
This amendment would exclude the prosecution of serious international crimes (such as torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain war crimes) from the limitations otherwise imposed by the Bill.
Amendment 58, in schedule 1, page 12, line 6, at end insert—
‘13A An offence under section 1 of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).
13B An offence under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (torture).’.
This amendment adds to Schedule 1 specific reference to existing domestic offences in relation to torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, in a similar way to the treatment of sexual offences.
Amendment 6, in schedule 1, page 12, line 38, leave out paragraph 17 and insert—
‘17 An offence under Part 5 (Offences under domestic law) of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 as it relates to the law of England and Wales.’.
This amendment would mean that all offences listed in Part 1 of the International Criminal Courts Act 2001 as they related to the law of England and Wales would be excluded offences, without restriction.
Amendment 59, in schedule 1, page 12, line 39, at end insert—
‘(za) an act of genocide under article 6, or’.
This amendment would ensure that acts of genocide are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 60, in schedule 1, page 12, line 40, leave out
‘a crime against humanity within article 7.1(g)’
and insert
‘a crime against humanity within article 7.1(a)-(k)’.
This amendment would ensure that crimes against humanity are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 61, in schedule 1,page 12, line 41, leave out from beginning to end of line 2 on page 13 and insert—
‘(b) a war crime within article 8.2(a) (which relates to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).’.
This amendment would ensure that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 7, in schedule 1, page 13, line 12, leave out paragraph 20 and insert–
‘20 An offence under Part 5 (Offences under domestic law) of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 as it relates to the law of Northern Ireland.’.
This amendment would mean that all offences listed in Part 1 of the International Criminal Courts Act 2001 as they related to the law of Northern Ireland would be excluded offences, without restriction.
Amendment 62, in schedule 1, page 13, line 13, at end insert—
‘(za) an act of genocide under article 6, or’.
This amendment would ensure that acts of genocide are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 63, in schedule 1, page 13, line 14, leave out
‘a crime against humanity within article 7.1(g)’
and insert
‘a crime against humanity within article 7.1(a)-(k)’.
This amendment would ensure that crimes against humanity are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 64, page 13 [Schedule 1], leave out lines 15 to 18 and insert—
‘(b) a war crime within article 8.2(a) (which relates to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).’.
This amendment would ensure that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 8, in schedule 1, page 13, line 28, leave out paragraph 23.
This amendment is consequential on amendments 6 and 7.
Amendment 9, in schedule 1, page 14, line 5, leave out paragraphs 27 to 30 and insert—
‘27 An offence under Part 1 (Offences) of the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001.’.
This amendment would mean that all offences listed in Part 1 of the International Criminal Courts Act (Scotland) 2001 would be excluded offences, without restriction.
Amendment 65, in schedule 1, page 14, line 7, at end insert—
‘(za) an act of genocide under article 6, or’.
This amendment would ensure that acts of genocide are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 66, in schedule 1, page 14, line 8, leave out
‘a crime against humanity within article 7.1(g)’
and insert
‘a crime against humanity within article 7.1(a)-(k)’.
This amendment would ensure that crimes against humanity are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 67, in schedule 1, page 14, leave out lines 9 to 12 and insert—
‘(b) a war crime within article 8.2(a) (which relates to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).’.
This amendment would ensure that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.
Amendment 12, in clause 15, page 9, line 21, at end insert—
‘subject to subsection (2A).
(2A) Before making regulations under subsection (2), the Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament the report of an independent review confirming that the Act is in full compliance with the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations with respect to the prosecution of war crimes and other crimes committed during overseas operations.
(2B) This Act shall cease to have effect at the end of the period of five years beginning with the day on which it is brought into force, unless the Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor has, not fewer than four years after this Act has come into force, laid before Parliament the report of a further independent review confirming that the Act remains in full compliance with the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations with respect to the prosecution of war crimes and other crimes committed during overseas operations.’.
I have nothing further to add, Mr Stringer, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Section 3: supplementary
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
This clause goes to what we heard in the evidence session is the missing part of the Bill: investigation and what warrants particular types of investigation. We heard from numerous witnesses, including Judge Blackett and General Nick Parker, that what is missing from the Bill is any scope of investigation. I have tabled new clauses to limit and have control over investigations, because, as Judge Blackett said, the problem with the Bill is that it looks at the process from
“the wrong end of the telescope.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 120, Q246.]
It looks at the prosecution end, rather than the investigation end.
As my right hon. Friend was speaking, I thought of an anomaly. The Bill now strikes out claims on the Ministry of Defence after six years. However, if new evidence comes to light and there is a criminal conviction for the same offence, there could be a situation in which a criminal court imposes compensation when the MOD has already struck the claims out. How does my right hon. Friend see clause 4 squaring that circle?
It does not, and that comes to one of the other problems with the Bill: it combines both criminal and civil. As I think Ms Meredith said, that is the problem, in terms of what we are trying to achieve. If we keep the longstop for six years on civil claims, a situation would arise whereby they would not go forward, although potentially they could even after six years under clause 4.
The other thing put forward by the Bill’s supporters is that it will somehow stop investigation of our servicemen and women for cases that they do not think have substance. However, it does nothing of the sort. I learned a long time ago in politics that the worst thing we can do is promise things and then not deliver after raising people’s hopes. The problem with the entire Bill, especially on investigations, is that people will think that we could never get another case like Major Campbell’s. I am sorry, but we can. A lot of the veterans believe what is being said—that the Bill will stop investigations—but it will not. It will not stop investigations within the six-year period. It will not even do so afterwards, because, as we have already heard, cases will go to the International Criminal Court and others.
Clause 4(1) states:
“For the purposes of section 3(2)(b), where there has been at least one relevant previous investigation in relation to the alleged conduct, evidence—
(a) is not “new” if it has been taken into account in the relevant previous investigation (or in any of them);
(b) otherwise, is “new”.”
Again, we get to dancing on the head of a pin about what is new evidence. There have been some complex cases, certainly from Iraq. If a witness comes forward many years later with a piece of evidence saying that they were there, who makes the determination on what is new evidence? That will make the investigation more difficult, because what will be deemed as new evidence? Who makes that judgment call?
We are not dealing with house burglars, are we? We are dealing with very complex cases in other countries, where there are cultural and language difficulties. Sometimes, six years might have passed. The passage of time can not only affect the securing of evidence; it would also affect judgments about people’s memory, which has always been the case with civil cases in this country, let alone in a war zone.
I understand what clause 4 is trying to do, but, like a lot of things in the Bill, it leaves a lot of loose ends. As I said, it will lead to a lot of disappointment on the part of veterans who think that somehow reinvestigation will not happen. Likewise, victims will perhaps feel that new evidence or evidence that they have put forward is not being taken seriously.
Thank you, Mr Stringer, for chairing the Committee so well.
Again, there were a lot of inaccuracies in what the right hon. Member for North Durham said. The Department can never be in a position whereby, if allegations were made, it could not investigate them. That is not a lawful position, so the idea that we can legislate to stop investigations is entirely false. We have heard Bob Campbell give evidence in this Committee: his case, in the worst-case scenario, would have ended in 2009.
I will in a minute, because both I and Bob Campbell have really got into the weeds of this legislation. I am interested in how the right hon. Gentleman has a different view and thinks that it would not have helped Bob Campbell in any way. I would love him to explain how he arrives at that position.
Major Campbell is in a very different situation. He has lost all faith in the system and actually wants cases to go direct to the International Criminal Court, which I do not agree with. But I did suggest, if the Minister was listening on the new clauses that I tabled for the last sitting—new clauses 6 and 7—that we need a system of both case management and judicial oversight. That would actually speed up the process and ensure that justice was being done. This is not about stopping investigation; it is about timely investigation.
Order. Before I call the Minister, it now seems timely to remind people that interventions should be short and to the point.
Again, it is not true to say that Major Bob Campbell wants all cases to go to the International Criminal Court; that is simply not true. He tried that to demonstrate a point, but it is not his view that everyone should just go to the ICC.
I saw in the newspapers over the weekend, again, a lot of absolute garbage about this Bill. I have made my position clear from the beginning. I have come in for a lot of criticism from the right hon. Gentleman about not working together on the Bill. I have been very clear that where there are places where we can improve the Bill—within the art of the possible, working within what is factually true—I will do that, but that is yet to happen.
The Minister states that he wants to improve the Bill and work with others. Why is it, then, that we have yet to see any amendments at all come forward from the Minister to the Bill?
That is very simply because there is no way, at the moment, that I have been presented with anything that is legal, within the art of the possible or within the strategic aims of the Bill that would actually improve it. It is as simple as that.
But that is not the case, is it? One issue that has come out, both in evidence and in amendments that I have tabled, is about investigations, and that is not covered in the Bill. I accept that the amendments that I tabled may not have been perfect, but if the Minister had at least given an indication that the issue would be looked at, that would have been a movement forward. But he has completely deaf ears on this.
Again, that is completely untrue, because I have repeatedly spoken, years before anybody else in this House, about the standard of investigations—investigations that were going on under the right hon. Gentleman’s watch when he was an Armed Forces Minister. Those investigations, I said—this has been quoted to me time and again—had not been up to standard, but that is not part of this legislation; it is part of an armed forces Bill that is coming forward next year. I have been absolutely ruthless in terms of dealing with the Department on its standard of investigations, which I reiterate were under the right hon. Gentleman’s watch.
I will not give way again. I cannot take in people saying, “We would like to see these pieces in the legislation,” when the whole point of this legislation is dealing with the abuses that we have seen over the years; it is not about investigations. People saw an announcement last week that we are having a judge-led review of how the Department does that. We will get the investigations right, but this Bill is very clearly about overseas operations and the situations in which we found ourselves, which actually resulted from when the right hon. Gentleman was a Minister in the Department.
That is nonsense. Ours really started in 2009. [Interruption.] We can keep this going all day, Mr Stringer. There is so much fake news coming out, I can just bat it back at every opportunity. We will move on to clause 4 before we get out of hand.
Clause 4 provides the meaning of “relevant previous investigation” and “new” evidence as used in clause 3(2)(b). This is to ensure that when considering the matters to be given particular weight, the prosecutor understands the circumstances in which they must give particular weight to the public interest in a case coming to a timely and final resolution: in other words, finality. Subsection (1) provides the definition for “relevant previous investigation”. A relevant previous investigation is one that was carried out by an investigating authority—that term is defined in clause 7—or is no longer an active investigation. It has ended, and is an investigation at the end of which the individual was not charged. That is all set out in subsection (1)(a) to (c).
Subsection (2) defines “new” evidence as that which has not been taken into account in a relevant previous investigation. This definition is intended to provide for situations such as when new witnesses or new information emerges after an investigation has been completed, and where evidence becomes available that could not have been available at the time of a previous investigation, where subsequent developments in forensic techniques bring to light evidence that is genuinely new.
The Minister is being very generous in giving way. I want to revisit a previous point. He stated that it is not possible to address investigations in the Bill. I am at a loss as to why not. It is in our gift in Committee to change the Bill and improve it. Why won’t he?
Of course, anyone can add an amendment to any piece of legislation, but this Bill clearly deals with lawfare and the vexatious claims that came out of Iraq and Afghanistan. We will see more stuff on investigations in the Armed Forces Bill. People can add anything to any legislation. We all know that, but the place for that particular measure is in the Armed Forces Bill, which will be forthcoming next year.
Time after time we heard from witnesses, and we had further pieces of evidence submitted yesterday, which the Clerk has circulated. Witnesses have pointed to the centrality of the investigation process. Having a robust and timely investigation is absolutely central to the efficacy of what the Minister is trying to achieve in the Bill. Will he reconsider looking at the investigation? It is good that we have the inquiry, which was announced in the written ministerial statement last week, but will he commit to looking at investigations?
I have already said in Committee that I will not do it this way round, and I said that before I came to the Department. The reality of politics is that we have this time allocated to get through the Bill. It is my job to make sure that the investigatory processes are watertight and that the end state results in good investigations, but a non-abuse of the system.
That inquiry started in 2010, but the al-Sweady inquiry and others started before then. I am not blaming any Government. I am just pointing out the hypocrisy of the right hon. Gentleman’s intervention. Anyway, I beg to move that clause 4 stand part of the Bill.
I was just coming to that. Minister, will you withdraw the accusation of hypocrisy?
I am grateful. Thank you.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Requirement of consent to prosecute
I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 5, page 3, line 23, leave out “Attorney General” and insert “Director of Public Prosecutions”.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 11, in clause 5, page 3, line 26, leave out “Attorney General” and insert “Director of Public Prosecutions”.
Amendment 22, in clause 5, page 3, line 29, at end insert—
“(c) where the offence is punishable with a criminal penalty by the law of Scotland, except with the consent of the Lord Advocate.”
Amendment 24, in clause 5, page 3, line 29, at end insert—
“(3A) Where the consent of the Attorney General is sought under subsection (2) or (3) above, the Attorney General must prepare a report containing his reasons for granting or withholding consent, as the case may be, with reference to sections 1 to 3 of this Act, and must lay a copy of this report before Parliament.”
I will speak to all three of the amendments in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for West Dunbartonshire. Amendments 10, 11 and 22 address the issue of the independence of the decision to grant or withhold consent to prosecution. The Attorney General is, by the nature of the position, a political appointment. Therefore, tying in the prosecution of potentially serious incidents to a politically motivated individual is at least unethical and at worst dangerous.
If we are the healthy democracy that we boast of being, there has to be independent oversight of these investigations. To maintain justice and continue to uphold the rule of law, those decisions cannot be made by the Attorney General. That role should be carried out in England by the Director of Public Prosecutions and in Scotland by the Lord Advocate.
In effect, with these amendments, we are asking the Minister to decide whether the actions of the MOD itself require further investigation. To give an example, that would be like asking the Health Secretary to decide whether a patient had grounds to seek redress for cases of medical negligence. Are the Government really in the business of marking their own homework?
Of course, we all understand why the Government have chosen to press ahead with this Bill. I think we all, regardless of the robust debate that has taken place, have sympathy with the purpose of this Bill, but the manner in which it is progressing is concerning a lot of us. Many parts of this Bill would not address the issues faced by our service personnel. However, having the Attorney General preside over decisions to prosecute will potentially leave a shadow of doubt hanging over some service personnel. Is that really what we want?
I watched the previous exchange; for anybody watching Parliament just now, it was rather unedifying, to say the least. At the start of this process, the Minister said he wanted—[Interruption.] Even as I am saying that, and trying to say it in a generous spirit, the Minister mumbles to himself and makes comments. I was a teacher by profession, and I can tell hon. Members that I would be taking the Minister to task if he behaved like that in my class. He could at least have the decency to listen while a point is being made.
At the start of this process, the Minister said he wanted to listen and that he was happy to take on good ideas. I have yet to see any evidence of that. I am at a loss as to how we actually improve this Bill. Is the Minister so confident in the absolute perfection of this Bill that not only will he not accept any amendments from the Opposition, but he has not tabled any amendments from his own colleagues? I have never seen this in a Bill before. It is unheard of.
Going back to my amendments, there must be independence in the decision-making process. That would give clarity and increase public confidence in the process that is undertaken. Surely, if this Bill is so good, the Minister has nothing to fear from a politically unbiased head considering the evidence and making decisions on whether to prosecute.
I thank the hon. Member for Glasgow North West for the amendment. I am not sure that I totally agree with it, although I agree with the spirt of it. The hon. Lady is trying to ensure judicial oversight of these decisions. Her recommended route is the Crown Prosecution Service, and she is right, in that that is at least a judicial process that is separate from the Attorney General, who is a political figure.
Coming back to my remarks about clause 4, the reason the CPS was set up in the first place is because it was the police who investigated and then also took the decision to prosecute, so the CPS was brought in, quite rightly. Has it improved the system? Yes, it has. Do we always agree with what the CPS comes up with? No, we do not, and I doubt whether we always would in every legal case. However, as the hon. Lady said, that does not mean that the process is weak in any way. It means that it is legally robust.
The hon. Lady is suggesting the CPS, but my concern relates to the service justice system. I would rather the Advocate General decided, although I say that in the same spirit as the amendment. The other concern, which a number of witnesses raised, is about the role of the Attorney General as a political appointee. I think Judge Blackett mentioned that in its recent judicial reforms Kenya has made its Attorney General politically independent for that exact reason: so that the position is seen as being above politics.
That is important, because in the case Marine A, which has been raised before, there was a lot of publicity at the time in the newspapers and campaigning about why that person was being prosecuted, often without knowing what had occurred or having seen the video or other evidence that was put forward. If the Attorney General had been the final arbiter of whether to prosecute in that case, they would have come under huge political pressure not to prosecute, and that would not be right.
The other side to this is our standing in the world. If we are to have a system where we properly investigate alleged crimes and have a fair process to decide who to prosecute, then ultimately, although there are other issues in the Bill that raise problems, if it is down to a political appointee whether someone is prosecuted, the International Criminal Court and others would take a dim of that, in the sense that it would be a political decision, not a judicial decision.
It is interesting to look at it from the angle of someone who has been through the process. When Major Campbell gave evidence to the Committee, the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West asked him:
“Thank you, Major Campbell. It is an absolute disgrace…Will you confirm whether you welcome the Bill or whether you are against it?”
Major Campbell went on to say:
“I fully welcome the Bill, both in its intent and in its content. Again, in my amateur legal opinion, there may be a legitimate argument to be had over whether the Attorney General is the correct address in terms of being the final arbiter of further prosecutions, due to the advice he gives to the armed forces on the legality of a conflict.”
He then went on to be quite disparaging, because of his frustration, which I think we all understand:
“My other slight concern is that previous Attorneys General have done us no favours...Lord Goldsmith had a lot on his shoulders…When I appealed to Jeremy Wright, and when he gave evidence to the Defence Sub-Committee…he took the view that this was an entirely fair process”.––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 24, Q54.]
He was concerned about the role of the Attorney General.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. After the events of your beloved Manchester United’s visit to the north-east, I hope you had a very happy weekend—although I notice that we have a number of Members from the north-east here, so it probably upset them.
I rise to speak in support of amendment 24 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South. The amendment asks that any decisions to prosecute or not prosecute service personnel who are under investigation be explained by the Attorney General, by her presenting her reasoning in a report to Parliament. If the Government are unwilling to allow decisions to be made by the director of public prosecutions and insist on adding a political element to decisions, they must be scrutinised.
On several occasions, this Government have been charged with attempting to avoid necessary scrutiny and having a habit of waving things through. Amendment 24 simply asks them to do the right thing and allow Parliament to do its duty. In our constitution, Parliament has to play a full part in any legislative initiatives and any investigations. The former Attorney General for Northern Ireland says that the Attorney General is accountable to Parliament. If the Government agree that that is correct, they have a duty to explain decisions that the Attorney General makes on prosecution in order that Parliament fulfils its constitutional duty to scrutinise. If those decisions are to be politicised, let us do it properly. As the amendment suggests, it would be most appropriate that the decisions be explained by a report presented to Parliament, which should set out the full reasoning and rationale behind the decision that the Attorney General makes. That would ensure transparency of the entire process.
Legal academics and experts in the field, as well as previous Attorneys General, have voiced concerns over the role of the Attorney General in the Bill. They are worried that it is adding a political element to a judicial process in an entirely unnecessary way. The former Member for Beaconsfield, Dominic Grieve—I see his successor over there; I welcome the hon. Member for Beaconsfield to the Committee—who was the coalition’s Attorney General, has raised concerns over the Bill. He criticised the Bill for being
“an exercise in public relations rather than reasoned change”.
He gave a multifaceted critique of the Bill, including the role of the Attorney General. In his opinion, the way in which the role of the Attorney General has been written into the Bill is a politicised safeguard. It is hugely important that the Attorney General always acts independently of any political consideration and has only one thing in mind: the public interest.
I am sure that you, Mr Stringer, would call me to order if I began to debate the role of the Attorney General in the past, but, simply put, the Attorney General provides legal advice to the Government. If, however, the Government are reluctant to publish the advice, that is a huge concern to the public.
The decision not to present the rationale, what advice was taken and how the Government arrived at their decision have eroded trust in politics and have been a problem for as long as I have been in the House. We have an opportunity with the Bill to start to rebuild trust in the decisions that the Government make. I hope that that Government will take that on board.
The Attorney General should be required to publish a report on the findings to reassure Parliament and the public that a decision has not been a political one. Many of the issues we have had in the past few years—the north-south divide and Brexit and remain—would have been avoided if the advice had been published and made transparent and fair. When we are making decisions, especially about our service personnel—some of the bravest people in this country—we must ensure that the public interest is at the heart of decision making. Dominic Grieve believes that the fact that the courts can review a decision by the Attorney General may create more litigation rather than reduce it and simplify the process. There is already a backlog of court cases, and we do not want to add to it.
Would the hon. Gentleman advocate the next Labour Government making the Attorney General’s position independent? Would he be convinced that any report produced by the Attorney General in Parliament and scrutinised by Parliament would not be looked at in a party political way by the Opposition?
The hon. Gentleman has a lot of experience in this area. If I was Chair of the Backbench Business Committee, he would just have talked himself into a debate on the Floor of the House. If he will forgive me, I shall stick to the amendment, because as I said earlier, we should have at least a 90-minute debate in Westminster Hall on that point.
The concerns expressed by Dominic Grieve have been echoed by His Honour Judge Jeffrey Blackett, who stated that
“the decision of the Attorney General to prosecute or not prosecute certain cases is likely to lead to judicial reviews and, as Mr Grieve stated, more litigation.”
In the Bill’s evidence sessions we heard from the most recent Advocate General of the Armed Forces. He expressed deep concern that this decision should be taken away from the Director of Public Prosecutions:
“My concern about the Attorney General’s consent is that it undermines the Director Service Prosecutions. If I were he, I would be most upset that I could not make a decision in these circumstances.” ––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 125, Q267.]
It is quite clear that by taking this responsibility away from the Director Service Prosecutions the Government intend to assert a certain level of political control over these decisions. I hope that when the Minister responds he will give us a full explanation.
This is a risky decision from the Government. If they do not comply with the Geneva convention in making such decisions, that could add to the reputation, which they appear to be determined to establish around the world, that the UK no longer respects international law.
That goes back to my earlier point. As my right hon. Friend says, inserting a politician would mean only more cases where the courts are asked to review the decision of the Attorney General, which would have the knock-on effect of clogging up the courts when we do not need that. It could be nipped in the bud simply by producing a report.
Disregard for international law is not only wrong but sends the wrong message to the British public and the rest of the world. Some have argued that it will even put our service personnel in more danger. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, QC, an ex-Defence Secretary, warned that the Bill will put soldiers at greater risk if Britain is seen to ignore international law. In a letter to Downing Street, he wrote:
“It would increase the danger to British soldiers if Britain is perceived as reluctant to act in accordance with long established international law.”
Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Mercer, who was a senior military adviser, said that the Bill
“undermines international humanitarian law while shielding the government”.
While the Government may be able to shield themselves from blame, soldiers may find themselves in the International Criminal Court, whose jurisdiction will be triggered if the Government chooses to avoid prosecuting. In fact, Judge Blackett raised that concern with the Committee. He said that
“the Attorney General has to consent to prosecuting any International Criminal Court Act 2001 offence—that is, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. Under section 1A(3) of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957, he has to consent to prosecuting any grave breaches of that Act, and under section 61 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, he has to consent if a prosecution is to be brought outside of time limits.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 125, Q267.]
If the Attorney General must consent in those circumstances, what is the need for a political appointee to be involved in the decision making? Why not allow the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Advocate General in Scotland to make the decision?
That leads to concerns that the Government intend to break international law and politicise prosecutions. If that is the Government’s plan, it must be scrutinised by the House so that we can understand the reasoning. Ultimately, the public deserve to know why the Government would deem it fit to break international law and damage the reputation of our troops serving abroad.
Another voice we were grateful to hear from in our evidence sessions was that of General Sir Nick Parker. He added a further concern about the damage to Britain’s reputation if we are not seen as a country that respects international law, which will not only damage the reputation of and endanger our troops serving abroad but have more complex results. He said:
“If there is some doubt about this—”
the willingness of the UK to break international law and the Geneva convention—
“and we are viewed in the international community as being prepared to operate outside norms, there is an implication for the people who will have to command in the international community.”— [Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 99, Q203.]
He expressed concern about not knowing whether that would affect the willingness of other countries to work with the UK armed forces. If other countries are less willing to work with our forces, that creates additional problems for our troops. He later said
“I believe that we need to be consistent with our coalition partners. All I would add is that you cannot predict who your coalition partner will be, because we do not know whom we will be fighting with in the future.” [Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 100, Q206.]
Today’s friend is quickly tomorrow’s enemy. Therefore, there must be that certain consistency provided by international norms.
Order. I did say in the introduction that if Members breached the social distancing rules, I would stop proceedings.
It is important that we set an example, Mr Stringer.
The title and role of the Attorney General is often entwined with politics, which complicates the matters of transparency. By its very nature, the role of the Attorney General is controversial, and has been in the legal world for a long time. The Attorney General has a role both as a professional lawyer and as a political advisor. Although many Attorneys General have taken the view that political distance gave their legal advice more credibility, others have been involved in party politics. From the scrutiny of Attorneys General in the 1920s to our current Attorney General, the role has always been controversial. Our current Attorney General generated a lot of debate over advice given to the Government on Brexit, as did her predecessor over the proroguing of Parliament. Further back, it is not just a party political issue. I do not have to go into the whys and wherefores of what the Labour Government went through with the legal advice over Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, before anybody wants to intervene, that is a debate for another time.
I am glad the Minister nods in assent.
The present Attorney General has been accused of advising on legal matters from a political standpoint. The Scottish National party’s Attorney General spokesman, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald), has accused our Attorney General of putting her political loyalties ahead of her loyalty to the rule of law when it should be the other way round. If the role of the Attorney General is seen as a political one, involving them in this Bill politicises—
Does my hon. Friend agree that if we have the Attorney General involved in this, matters will end up in the courts? Again, it raises a false flag to servicemen and women that somehow this will stop prosecutions. If something is overturned by the Supreme Court or whatever, the prosecution will still go ahead, so the longstop is not achieved.
It is not. I would like the Minister to answer this conundrum that I came up with when I was listening to my right hon. Friend’s very good speech earlier. The trouble that I see with the Attorney General being involved is that if we have a civil case that is ruled out after six years, according to the Bill, and we have new evidence that emerges from the previous case—this is an important point—the Attorney General then decides to prosecute. That person is then found guilty of a crime and damages are given out. We have a situation where we have a criminal court giving compensation for a case that has already been struck out. That is an anomaly in the Bill that I hope the Minister will address because it is a concern. Given the mixed opinions on the role of the Attorney General, and the general cloudiness of what their role and priorities ought to be, the requirement to produce reports on their decisions to prosecute or not seems entirely sensible.
Would it not also be the case that we would not know how the Attorney General made a decision in terms of legal thresholds and suchlike? There will be a political decision, and there is no guidance in the Bill on what the important factors would be for an Attorney General to make his or her decisions.
From a legal perspective, it is really important that when an Attorney General gives their advice, they do that through the process of legal precedent, statutory interpretation or whatever we want to call it. It is extremely important that when the Attorney General arrives at Parliament with their advice, they have a very strong legal argument. They have consulted academics or leading lawyers, presumably in the area of human rights, and they have crossed all the t’s and dotted all the i’s, and when they come before Parliament, they are confident in their decision. That is why it is extremely important that a report is presented, because at least they can cross-reference how they arrived at the decision. It also gives confidence in the decision. If the case does end up in court, they are standing in a stronger legal position than they would be if they had not released that advice.
As there is a long-standing worry about the balance between law and politics in the role of the Attorney General, it surely makes sense that the Attorney General, if they are to be involved in this Bill at all, is required to publicise the decision. That would ensure that prosecutions covered by the Bill continued to be legal matters or could be at least scrutinised by other bodies to regulate them. It would ensure that party politics was not placed above the law.
It is a judicial process that the Government are concerned with. It should not be politicised or manipulated by party politics in any way, shape or form. If the Government feel the need to grant the power of decision over prosecution to the Attorney General rather than an independent legal body such as the Director of Public Prosecutions, the process must be entirely transparent, so that all those involved can clearly see the thinking behind the decisions. There is no reason why that information cannot be shared. It should and must be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
I thank the hon. Member for Islwyn for his very thoughtful contribution. I will address some of those points.
First, let me come to the points raised by the SNP. I will not call it “hypocritical”, because that would be out of order, but the irony of being lectured about behaviour in debates by the hon. Member for Glasgow North West, who has repeatedly screamed at me at the Dispatch Box, is not lost on me in any way. I have no ribs left from laughing at the SNP’s position on defence matters. The idea that it is possible to have a constructive debate from such a false position is ridiculous, but I will address some of those points in my comments.
Dominic Grieve and Nicholas Mercer are people who have contributed. I do not know whether Members expected those who had overseen the disaster of things such as IHAT, who had overseen those processes, to come in and say, “This was a good idea.” I never expected that. Nicholas Mercer was not some senior legal adviser; he was a brigade LEGAD, and there were many brigades in Iraq. His evidence, a number of times, has been called into question. Dominic Grieve was a Member of this House. I have huge respect for him. But he, as Attorney General, oversaw some of these horrendous experiences that some of our people went through. Of course they are not going to be supportive of changing that scenario, because they did not do that when they were in charge. I respect that that was their decision, but we have come in on a very clear promise to end the unfair nature of this process.
I understand that it is combative; I understand that it is contested, but it is about time that someone came here with the voice of those who actually go through the process and was at the head of this debate, rather than those who are managing it and ultimately, in my view, have no real idea what it is like to walk in the shoes of those who serve on operations or who are dragged through these investigations.
When it comes to the Attorney General’s consent—
I accept what the Minister is saying, but let us be honest: it was not just Dominic Grieve as Attorney General; the Government oversaw the IHAT system. As for the point the Minister makes, I do not for one minute question his intent in trying to do the right thing, and I support him in that. The only problem I have is that, in proposing what he does, he has a deaf ear to things that could actually improve the situation and get the Bill right so that it does what he is trying to achieve.
It is not a deaf ear if I disagree. I am allowed to disagree.
That is a matter for debate, and that is the whole point of why we are here.
Clause 5 requires the consent of the Attorney General for England and Wales or the Attorney General for Northern Ireland before a case of an alleged offence committed by a serviceperson more than five years prior on an overseas operation can proceed to prosecution. We introduced the consent function because we believe it is important for service personnel and veterans to be confident that their case will be considered at the highest levels of our justice system. In relation to amendment 22, the consent function does not need to extend to Scotland, as all prosecution decisions in Scotland are already taken in the public interest by, or on behalf of, the Lord Advocate.
Requiring the consent of the Attorney General for a prosecution is not unusual. The Attorney General already has to give consent to prosecute war crimes, as has been said, and for veterans to be prosecuted more than six months after they left service. Who introduced that legislation? The Labour party, in 2001. The Attorney General already has numerous other consent functions, but that does not mean that the Government have any role to play in decisions on consent; it is simply a safety check on fairness.
On amendments 10 and 11, in deciding whether to grant consent to prosecutions, the Attorney General acts quasi-judicially and independently of Government, applying the well-established prosecution principles of evidential sufficiency and public interest. This means that the Government will play no role in the decision taken by the Attorney General or Attorney General of Northern Ireland on consent—no role. Amendment 24 seeks to require the Attorney General to report to Parliament with the reasons for granting or withholding consent. There is no statutory requirement anywhere else for the AG report on individual casework decisions, and we do not believe that it would be appropriate to introduce such a requirement in the Bill. I therefore ask that the amendments be withdrawn.
First, I will respond to the comments the Minister made at the start. There is a huge difference between debating in the Chamber, with comments being passed to and fro, and making a speech in a room such as this and having somebody mumbling under their breath while doing it. It is disrespectful and it should not happen. The Minister is a military man. I would love to have seen him behave like that when one of his superiors was addressing him in his former career. I have no intention of withdrawing the amendments. Nothing the Minister said assured me that there would be an unbiased situation when considering prosecutions, so I will push them to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Paragraph 46 of the explanatory notes states:
“Schedule 1 details the sexual offences excluded from the scope of the requirements of clauses 2, 3 and 5”.
We have touched already on the fact that sexual offences are not included in the Bill. I have not yet had a good explanation of why that category is the only one identified in the Bill. I think we all agree, and there is no dispute, that sexual offences play no part whatever of the conduct of our armed forces. If they are committed, they should be investigated and prosecuted and the perpetrator taken before court. The problem is how to separate sexual offences from other criminal activity. There are situations in which the sexual offence is committed along with other crimes, such as torture, that are not on the face of this Bill. Why exclude sexual offences?
The argument could be, as has been said, that this should never be part of the conduct of forces personnel—I agree, but that should not mean it is singled out. The problem I have with this is that when cases come forward, if there is a sexual offence as part of the accusations then this will be prosecuted, but something else of equal severity might not be prosecuted despite being part of the same event.
The obvious way around this is to leave it in and add other items as well, but I have yet to understand why sexual offences have been singled out, and I think we need an explanation because it draws attention to the fact that other things are not also mentioned. If there were clear-cut, one-off sexual offences then it is understandable, but I can imagine situations that may include other offences. If you look at some of the accusations, not necessarily against UK service personnel, but others such as those involved in peacekeeping operations, sexual offence was part of other crimes that were committed against individuals. It says in the schedule that we will exclude the sexual offence but the rest, frankly, is not part of it. I do not think it is as simple as to divide the two as clearly as this. I would like an explanation as to why and how sexual offences would be separated from other offences.
It is a fair argument from the right hon. Member for North Durham; there is a difference of opinion on this issue. We are very clear as to why sexual offences are on there—schedule 1lists the offences that are not relevant for the purposes of clause 6. The only offences contained in schedule 1 are sexual offences. This means that in cases involving alleged sexual offences on overseas operations more than five years ago, a prosecutor does not need to apply the statutory presumption and the matter is to be given particular weight when considering whether to prosecute.
Further, the prosecutor does not need the consent of the Attorney General for a case to get a prosecution; they will simply follow the usual procedures for determining whether or not to prosecute. For clarity, it should be noted that conflict-related sexual violence is classified as a war crime and is recognised as torture, a crime against humanity and genocide in international criminal law. These offences are referenced in paragraph 13 of part 1 and are listed in parts 2 and 3 of schedule 1.
Part 1 of schedule 1 lists sexual offences as criminal conduct offences under armed forces legislation, the Armed Forces Act 2006, and the corresponding offences under the law of England and Wales, including repeals provision. Part 2 of schedule 1 lists the sexual offences contained in the International Criminal Court Act 2001, under the law of England and Wales and the law of Northern Ireland. Part 3 of schedule 1 lists the sexual offences contained in the International Criminal Court Act 2001 under the law of Scotland. Part 4 of schedule 1 contains the provisions extending jurisdiction in respect of certain sexual offences. I reiterate to the Committee the reason for the exclusion of sexual offences.
To reflect on the words of my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, this schedule includes, as we know, only the exclusion of sexual offences. Given the concern raised by many people during our evidence sessions and more generally in debate, why are torture and war crimes not included in the section? I would like to see that, because it is an important issue in the debate.
The reality is that the word “torture” and allegations of torture have been used as a vehicle to generate thousands of claims against our service personnel. There have been arguments around why we have not packed investigations and so on into the Bill, but the Bill is trying to deal with very specific problems, which are the ones we have faced over the last 15 or 20 years relating to claims of this nature. In the discharge of your military duties, you can expect to be accused of assault, unlawful killing, murder and torture when using violence. There is no scenario in which our people will be asked to operate in which they can legitimately commit sexual offences. This country has a strong commitment against the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, and that is why it is in the Bill.
I agree that it should play no part whatever, and it does not in terms of the ethos of our armed forces. Will the Minister answer the point that there will not, in many cases, be a situation in which sexual violence takes place by itself? What happens if it involves violence and other things? How can the other issues be looked at if it is taken out? He is saying that the only reason for it is because torture is seen as a reason for a lot of the claims coming forward. Is that the only justification?
Putting sexual offences in the Bill in no way denigrates our commitments against torture. We have to deal with the world as we find it, not as we would like it to be. When allegations of torture are mass-generated, as they have been, to produce these claims we have a duty to act to protect our service men and women from that.
I understand the point the Minister is making about protecting service people and about spurious claims, but there are also genuine claims of torture that really deserve to be properly investigated, looked at, and not excluded. I am not saying they are against our forces in particular. I wonder if not writing that into the schedule is a step too far. It is such an important issue for the good name of the country, and also for that of our troops.
No one disputes the seriousness of torture. I reiterate that our commitments against that are not diluted in any way. All we are seeking to do is to restore the primacy of things like the Geneva convention and the law of armed conflict, and to protect our service men and women from the nature of lawfare that has been so pernicious over the years. I understand people’s views on it, and at first inspection I understand why people have concerns, but the reality is that we have to deal with the situation with which we have been presented. If we are going to protect our people, this is a difficult part of it. As I have outlined, nobody can in any way be legitimately accused of sexual offences in the discharge of their duties, and that is why it is in the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 1 accordingly agreed to.
Before we move on to clause 7, I do not like to interrupt the debate, but there have been references to “you” in a number of speeches, and I am sure that on those occasions you do not really mean me.
Could people try to use the normal parliamentary protocol in debate? Members of the Committee will not have any problem catching my eye, but some of the interventions have been more akin to speeches than sharp interventions. I hope we can continue on the basis that interventions should not be speeches.
Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Restrictions on time limits to bring actions: England and Wales
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 9 and 10 stand part.
New clause 2—Restrictions on time limits: actions brought against the Crown by service personnel—
“Nothing in this Part applies to any action brought against the Crown by a person who is a member or former member of the regular or reserve forces, or of a British overseas territory force to whom section 369(2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (persons subject to service law) applies.”
This new clause amends Part 2 of the Bill so that it explicitly excludes actions brought against the Crown by serving or former service personnel from the limitations on courts’ discretion that the Part imposes in respect of actions relating to overseas operations.
For the avoidance of doubt, and so that we do not end up in the previous situation, I should say that if right hon. and hon. Members wish to speak to new clause 2, clauses 9 and 10, or part 2 of the Bill, now is the time to do so, although we will vote on them later.
The fact that new clause 2 has to be tabled underlines one of the key problems in the Bill. As my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham said, this Bill does not do what it says on the tin: it does not help to protect our armed forces personnel, but does the exact opposite. It limits our troops’ right to justice. It does not benefit them—in fact, it actively discriminates against them.
Unfortunately, this has been a long-running theme of the debate as the Bill has passed through the House. The intention of the Bill is one the Opposition are willing to work with, but the Government have got parts of it badly wrong; this part of the Bill, unfortunately, is a prime example of that. The Government cannot claim that the Bill benefits our personnel while legislating to limit the courts’ discretion to disapply time limits for actions in respect of personal injuries or deaths that relate to overseas operations of the armed forces. That is why this part of the Bill must be amended and improved.
New clause 2 would amend part 2 of the Bill so that it explicitly excludes actions brought against the Crown by serving or former service personnel from the limitations on courts’ discretion imposed by part 2 in respect of actions relating to overseas operations. The question must be asked: why are the Government explicitly trying to mitigate the ability of our service personnel to access a route to justice? Is that really in line with the spirit of the Bill? In the lead-up to Remembrance Sunday, are the Government really comfortable passing a Bill that will clearly limit service personnel’s rights?
In the evidence sessions, we heard a great number of warnings about this part of the Bill. More specifically, points were raised about the Government’s own impact assessment of service personnel privately claiming for their injuries. As the witness from the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers said,
“I think it will definitely have an impact. I do not think that the impact statement that has been released really explores it fully, because it ignores a large proportion of civil claims brought against the Ministry of Defence, which may include elements of overseas operations.
If I can give you just a quick example, the impact study does not take into account noise-induced hearing loss claims. These are complex claims that may involve exposure to harmful noise at any point of the serviceperson’s service, and at different points of overseas operations in different countries. The impact study that has been released ignores all of those claims. In the last year alone, I think the figures released by the Ministry of Defence suggested that 1,810 claims relating to noise-induced hearing loss were brought against the MOD.
My answer to your question is that I think there will be an impact, but we do not know the extent of that impact, and that needs to be explored further.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 54.]
That is a real point of serious concern. If the Government’s own impact assessment is flawed and has not fully taken into account the scope of the legislation’s impact, it is imperative that the Government take another look at this part of the Bill, to ensure that they have been fully and properly informed by their own impact assessments.
I repeat once again that Labour wants to work with the Government to get the Bill right, but at this stage there are enormous concerns that it is far from that. In addition, there are real, specific cases in which the Bill would clearly disadvantage our troops—not simply numbers on a page. Those include types of case such as the noise-induced hearing loss that the witness a fortnight ago referred to. That witness referred to a former marine who received £500,000 for noise-induced hearing loss on the claim that his hearing loss and tinnitus were caused by a negligent exposure to noise. He served in Northern Ireland, the Gulf and Afghanistan and was exposed to noise from thousands of rounds of ammunition, thunderflash stun grenades, helicopters and other aircraft, and explosive devices, and left the Royal Marines in 2012.
The marine was unable to make a claim for compensation until 2014, seven years after he first became aware that he had problems with his hearing. The MOD admitted liability and made no argument about the case’s being brought out of time. The time limit in the Bill, however, would have eliminated all aspects of the claim relating to the marine’s extensive service overseas. It is exactly examples of that nature that raise questions over the depth and quality of the Government’s impact assessment, as well as whether this part of the Bill is really in line with the spirit of the Government’s supposed intent.
The Bill clearly needs fixing, and the Government need to go back and look at whether they really are delivering on what they claim they want to achieve. I ask the Minister: is it the Government’s intention to allow cases such as the said case of noise-induced hearing loss to be ignored by the Bill? What steps were taken both to ensure the Government’s impact assessment was comprehensive and to mitigate any confirmation bias of the Government’s intent on the Bill?
This part of the Bill also has another clear issue: it risks breaching the armed forces covenant. Let us take a look at what part 2 of this Bill really means. The Limitation Act 1980 currently results in the armed forces community and civilians being treated equally when it comes to seeking a claim for personal injury. As it stands, there is a three-year cut-off point in place, but the courts retain the right to grant an extension to forces personnel.
Section 33 of the Limitation Act provides the court discretion to override the current three-year limit, but this Bill deliberately moves away from that and snatches away the ability of courts to show discretion if the case relates to an overseas forces action. It makes a deliberate change to the Limitation Act. That makes no sense. There are already structures in place to ensure that only appropriate claims are brought forward. Courts routinely manage out-of-time proceedings and frequently throw out cases where the delay is unjustified. The detailed criteria set out in the Limitation Act already address cases that do not have reasonable grounds or are unjustified. I put it to the Minister: why is he actively removing the aspect of the Limitation Act that offers courts the right to grant an extension in cases relating to armed forces personnel?
The Bill removes the ability of members of the forces community to bring forward a civil claim at all after six years, even where it would have passed judicial scrutiny. Under the Government’s proposed changes, civilians will retain the right to pursue a civil claim against their employer, but armed forces personnel will not. That clearly risks breaching the armed forces covenant. With that in mind, I am concerned that the Royal British Legion has said that the Bill constitutes a potential breach of the armed forces covenant—a deeply worrying conclusion from the largest armed forces charity in the UK. Are Ministers not concerned that the very Bill that they claim is devised to help our troops is said to be doing the opposite by such a distinguished organisation?
In addition, we heard from the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers that the Bill leaves our veterans with fewer rights than prisoners. That is a damning verdict, delivered by lawyers who devote their lives to representing our armed forces personnel. Our armed forces serve the nation with distinction; they deserve more than to have their rights stripped away. I take this opportunity to say to the Minister, “Do not dismiss the warnings of the Legion and APIL. Work with us to address them.”
I ask the Minister to clarify whether Ministers are concerned that the Bill they claim was devised to help our troops is said to be doing the complete opposite by such distinguished organisations as the Royal British Legion. Why is the Minister actively removing the aspects of the Limitation Act that offers courts the right to grant an extension in cases relating to the armed forces personnel?
Why are the Government willing to introduce a six-year longstop for troops but not civilians? Why are some medical conditions worthy of justice and not others? Are the Government really comfortable with passing a Bill that will clearly limit service personnel’s rights in the lead-up to Remembrance Day? Is the Minister content to allow cases of noise-induced hearing loss to be ignored by the Bill? Finally, what steps were taken to ensure that the Government’s impact assessment was comprehensive and to mitigate any confirmation bias to the Government’s intent with the Bill?
I want to speak to clause 8 and my new clause 9. Does the Minister want to do the right thing by our armed forces personnel? I think he does. I have never questioned his determination to do that. Again, the problem with the Bill is its unintended consequences.
Part 2 is a key part of the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South said, it cannot be right that we will pass legislation that will mean that our servicemen, women and veterans have fewer rights than prisoners. The Limitation Act 1980 is there for a good reason. In the Minister’s comments in The Sun newspaper on Sunday, he said he will give a guarantee that servicemen and women will not lose out in part 2. I would be interested to know how he will do that, given the six-year longstop.
I do not doubt the Minister’s commitment to what he said in that newspaper article, but—to use the old Robin Day quote from his famous interview with John Nott—the Minister, like us all, is a “here today, gone tomorrow” politician. It is important to ensure this legislation is future-proofed. Irrespective of what the Minister says in his article, which is well intentioned, he cannot give that guarantee. Again, I do not question his motives for saying what he did.
The Minister has a higher trust in the MOD than I do when it comes to protecting servicemen and women. The Limitation Act, section 33, is very clear: it sets out the exceptional circumstances. In our evidence, we heard that although they are exceptional circumstances, they are not uncommon.
The Committee heard evidence of one example; I will give another, which, having spoken to a friend of mine who deals with personal injury, I think falls within the scope of this, too—of the Snatch Land Rovers in Iraq. The families of the individuals killed in the Snatch Land Rovers were not aware of the failings—not failings of the chain of command, but of the procurement—until the Iraq inquiry took place. They then sought legal redress against the MOD, because they thought a decision had been taken that had put their loved-ones in jeopardy. It was many years later, so it was outside of time, but they were able to use section 33 of the Limitation Act to bring a case, which, according to the evidence we heard, they then settled.
My other concern with the MOD—again, referred to in the evidence sessions—is that it employs clever lawyers. It will use the provision as a way of stopping any case that comes forward, as a first hurdle for the claimant to get over. That means that there will be no right of appeal for those individuals. If the Bill had been in force during the case of the Snatch Land Rovers, those families would have had no redress at all. At the end of the day, the measures protect only the MOD; they do not protect our servicemen and women, as the Minister would like. Again, we come back to the Bill’s problem of conflating civil and criminal cases.
As my right hon. Friend has been speaking, I have been thinking in particular of the people serving in the Royal Navy who were affected by asbestos. In the 1950s and 1960s, asbestos was this magic formula—used everywhere from schools to garden sheds. Then, years later, it was found to cause tumours in the lungs. That caused serious problems to our servicepeople, but the evidence did not emerge for 30 years. People may be using chemicals now that we do not understand. How would the MOD be held responsible, and families be properly compensated?
I will come back to asbestos. The aircraftman could not walk because the paint had attacked his nervous system, and his case was able to be taken forward only because of scientific evidence about exposure to that paint. However, if the Bill goes through, such an individual would not be able to make a case because it would be way out of the six-year limit. A lawyer friend of mine took that case to court and argued successfully before a judge that the individual was only able to bring the case then because of the scientific evidence, and that allowed them to take the case forward.
A series of examples have been given where the Bill would not prevent action from being taken. On the Snatch Land Rover incident, the inquiry findings is the point of knowledge from which people had six years to make a claim. On the paint issue, when a connection is made with service and evidence can be produced, that is the point of knowledge from which there are six years. I do not know whether the point of knowledge piece is clearly understood, but when evidence comes together that clearly shows what has happened, that is when the six years begin. The Bill would not prevent such cases.
I have heard the Minister say that before. I accept what he is saying, but he is wrong. I will come to asbestos, because in a previous life I used to press asbestos cases, but I will first address the Minister’s point and why he is wrong. I would agree with him about the date of knowledge if it were he and I dealing with the Bill. However, the dealings will be with MOD lawyers and not with the Minister or with me. If it said in the Bill that the date of knowledge were that date, that would be fine, but it does not. The Minister is putting an awful lot of trust in MOD lawyers. I would not do that, because they will argue straight away in such a case that it is time barred because of the legislation. They use that now, for example in the paint case I just mentioned. I hear what the Minister says and he might be technically right, but we heard in evidence that the MOD lawyers are experienced and will use that in their armoury as a way of stopping claims going forward.
This is exposing an ambiguity right here, right now. Up until this point, the Minister has talked about the point of knowledge of the injury or the disablement. Now, he is talking about the point of knowledge of the issue with the equipment. What are we talking about and where in the Bill is that differentiated? If there is no clarity, we will have a situation with lawyers because of that ambiguity.
Yes, and the lawyers will use it to protect the MOD. Like I say, if the Minister and I had to judge, we both would say “Yes, give the benefit of the doubt to the veteran.” I certainly would. However, neither he nor I will be there. It will be down to some Minister in the future and some lawyer to do that.
Coming on to asbestos, let me give an example. The issue in the early test cases on asbestos that I dealt with was about the date of knowledge. As my hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn just said, the issue with asbestos and asbestos-related diseases is that they can lie dormant for 20 or 30 years. It is an indiscriminate issue. I have met men who worked with asbestos and have what they call asbestos scars—asbestos in their skin—with no symptoms whatsoever and no health effects at all. I have also dealt with cases where a doctor and a nurse, who were just walking through a tunnel where an asbestos pipe was broken and were being covered in asbestos every day, developed mesothelioma, which we all know is a death sentence within 18 months to two years.
The MOD used to have a get-out because of Crown immunity; it could not be sued. As such, we are bringing back time-barred Crown immunity and saying to people that they cannot take cases against the MOD. Would cases around asbestos be time barred? I do not know. Again, why change it? I accept what the Minister is saying—we do not want frivolous and vexatious cases—but if they are time barred, there is a perfectly legitimate system in place at the moment called the Limitation Act, which allows people to take a case forward, if they wish to or their legal representatives feel there is a case.
My right hon. Friend has, like me, worked with many constituents on this issue. Plural plaques may or may not develop into full-on asbestosis, but if someone develops the plaques within six years and then goes on to develop—God forbid—the worst kind of asbestosis, how does he see the MOD addressing that anomaly with the Bill?
That is the point. I do not want to go off piste and explain the issues around pleural plaques, but I am a little bit of a sceptic on this. Although pleural plaques are lung scarring, I have not yet been convinced of any evidence that every case turns into something asbestos-related. It can be an indicator but it does not always go on to that.
Again, the MOD used to have Crown immunity, which used to mean that a case could not be brought against the MOD; that is what we are doing. Certainly in cases involving submariners who worked in submarines—as my hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn said, they threw asbestos around like confetti, as it was the great wonder material at the time—they would be time barred under the Bill. Again, coming back to what the Minister said, were it he and I then yes, I would agree, but lawyers will use that.
I do not understand why part 2 is there. Why would the Government want to put veterans and servicemen and women at a disadvantage? The Limitation Act is there for a perfectly good reason; it acts as a sieve because the person involved has to go before a judge and argue an exceptional reason as to why that case has not been brought within that period of time. From my experience in dealing with limitation cases for industrial diseases, for example, they are hard to prove, so it does act as a sieve.
If the Government are wanting to ensure that we are not getting huge amounts of unwarranted claims, the Limitation Act, as it stands at the moment, acts as that protection because the bar is high. In the cases where it does apply—with Snatch Land Rovers for example, the paint case I mentioned, or other cases, including those on hearing loss—it is very important, and I cannot support anything which means that our servicemen and women will be at a disadvantage.
In the evidence we took, Hilary Meredith said:
“I think that part 2, on the time limit, should be taken out and scrapped completely. It is the time limit for the procedure. It went on too long”.––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 19.]
She then referred back to investigations, which we come back to all the time. The other issue that she and a few other witnesses raised was the Human Rights Act 1998. I know that a lot of people start frothing at the mouth and gnashing their teeth whenever we mention the Human Rights Act, because it always applies to those that do not deserve justice—the ne’er do wells, asylum seekers and everyone else—but it is actually there to protect us all.
There are cases where servicemen and women will bring cases against the MOD under the Human Rights Act. One of the arguments—and I think the reason why, in this Bill, the Human Rights Act is a bit of a bogeyman—is that somehow the Act will impinge on the ability of servicemen and women to do their work. I do not accept that because, looking at the Smith case, the Human Rights Act was not an impediment; it clearly separated out combat immunity—that is, that lethal force must be used on occasions. Putting a time limit on the ability for servicemen and women to bring a case under the Human Rights Act would be a disadvantage to them.
Hilary Meredith says in her evidence that:
“There is a difficulty putting a time limit on the Human Rights Act…For civil claims against the Ministry when people are injured or killed in service overseas, I do not think a longstop should be applied. There are tremendous difficulties in placing people in a worse position than civilians. In latent disease cases—diseases that do not come to light until much further down the line, such as asbestosis, PTSD, hearing loss—it is not just about the diagnosis. Many people are diagnosed at death.”—[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 06 October 2020; c. 18, Q30.]
Again, that is something that I dealt with when I dealt with asbestos cases. The only time that a lot of people knew about them was when there was a death certificate. On more than one occasion, I stopped funerals to ensure that we had done the proper post-mortems.
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMembers will be aware of the need to respect social distancing guidance. I will intervene if necessary to remind everyone. We will now continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill.
Clause 8
Restrictions on time limits to bring actions: England and Wales
Question (this day) again proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 9 and 10 stand part
New clause 2—Restrictions on time limits: actions brought against the Crown by service personnel—
“Nothing in this Part applies to any action brought against the Crown by a person who is a member or former member of the regular or reserve forces, or of a British overseas territory force to whom section 369(2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (persons subject to service law) applies.”
This new clause amends Part 2 of the Bill so that it explicitly excludes actions brought against the Crown by serving or former service personnel from the limitations on courts’ discretion that the Part imposes in respect of actions relating to overseas operations.
It is a pleasure to have you in the Chair, Mr Mundell. I trust that everyone has had a nice lunch. I hope the Minister has not had too much raw red meat and that he has been able to have a lie-down after his exertions this morning. He will certainly not be eating haggis for his dinner or lunch, or at any time soon, after his comments about Scotland this morning. I shall let him enlighten you later on those points, Mr Mundell.
We were talking about the rights of veterans. My hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn raised the issue of asbestos and how asbestosis is one of a number of diseases that limits the serviceman or woman from bringing claims within the six-year period. As I said this morning, the Minister and I agree on one thing: we understand the limitation and the date of knowledge. The bit where we have a problem is where the Bill takes out veterans, apart from anyone else, from section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980. We heard evidence last week from the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers. I accept that there are certain people in the room who perhaps do not like lawyers—criminal, civil or whatever. The association told us that the Bill strips service personnel and veterans of certain rights in relation to civil claims. I will come back to this later, but we were told that if the Bill is enacted, prisoners will have more rights than veterans or servicemen and women.
On the claims brought before the Ministry of Defence, clearly this Bill has its origins in what its promotors argue is a tsunami of unfounded civil claims that then led to criminal investigations, which then took many years. We have demonstrated in Committee that the actual number of prosecutions have been very small, but in terms of civilian claims there is also a very important set of claims that we should protect: the claims that allow servicemen and women and veterans to bring claims against the Ministry of Defence. That is done in two ways: via a civil claim or under the Human Rights Act. As I said this morning, some people in this place suddenly start frothing at the mouth as soon as the Human Rights Act is mentioned, but as I have said, it protects us all by giving us basic human rights.
The problem with part 2 of the Bill is that it will not only stop the straightforward civil claims, where people ask for compensation for injuries and other things; it would limit claims under the Human Rights Act. Such claims are important. I referred this morning to the Smith case involving Snatch Land Rovers, which was around the right to life and human rights. Hilary Meredith, who I thought had very good, detailed knowledge in the claims area, said in her evidence:
“There is a difficulty putting a time limit on the Human Rights Act—I do not even know whether we can do that constitutionally, because it is a European convention.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 18, Q30.]
I said that I would not question the Minister’s motives for what he is trying to achieve, but again, we are the seeing the huge implications that this Bill could have. We have already discussed criminal cases and possible trials before the International Criminal Court, but it would be interesting to know how the longstop—which is stopping the rights we all have under the Human Rights Act for veterans and armed force personnel—will be put into practice legally if, as Hilary Meredith said in her evidence, the UK has certain rights that are not just governed by what we agree as a country, but are part of an international convention on human rights. How does that square with part 2 of the Bill? That needs some explanation, because I do not want veterans and armed services personnel not to be covered by the Limitation Act 1980 or the rights that we all get from the Human Rights Act.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the nub of the problem that he is driving at is that clause 8 and schedule 2 take away the court’s discretion under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the time limit if
“it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed”?
That is being taken away from our service personnel, and it is the same under the Human Rights Act. Is not the nub of the problem with clause 8 that it is removing the court’s discretion to allow these actions to go ahead?
It is. Again, this is about the rights of veterans and armed services personnel, which I thought this Bill was trying to protect. If we are taking away rights that everyone else has access to, that is a retrograde step. We need an explanation of why that is being done and why it is necessary, because I certainly do not think it is proportional. Again, that is one of the things this debate has thrown up, in that the Bill is about protecting the MOD from litigation, whether by armed forces personnel or veterans, and that cannot be right.
Coming back to investigations, Hilary Meredith raised another important thing that does not apply:
“That is a really interesting point, actually. I had not thought of a time limit on investigations. Certainly under the Human Rights Act, there is a right to have a speedy trial, and that did not happen in these cases.”—[Official Report, Overseas Operations Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c.19, Q31.]
This issue therefore cuts into investigations, another central point that we have been considering in this Bill.
When the Minister replies, I would be interested to know whether that has been cleared. I am not sure whether things still work this way, but when I was a Minister, the usual process for bringing forward a Bill involved sending a write-round to all Departments to get their agreement before it was sanctioned to come before the House. I do not know whether that still applies, because I know that, for a lot of things that this Government do now, they do not accept the usual common-sense conventions, which are there for very good reasons—to stop this type of thing—but how will the MOD be separate from the Human Rights Act?
My right hon. Friend was a member of the Defence Committee, which wrote to the Secretary of State in July 2020 saying that
“the Bill may not be an effective way of achieving”
the aim of protecting personnel and veterans against
“vexatious and unnecessary investigations and prosecutions”.
My right hon. Friend was a member of that Committee. Does he agree with its finding that the Bill would have been better served by scrutiny from an ad hoc Select Committee before it came before Parliament?
I am a big defender of pre-legislative scrutiny. I think I said a couple of sittings ago that our current system of pre-legislative scrutiny as part of the Bill Committee process is important. However, an important Bill such as this should have been road-tested a little more than just what we are able to do here, in terms of not only scrutiny, but the process that we are going through today.
I come back to the point that I do not understand why the Bill is now before us—well, I do understand, because the Minister gave it away the other day; it is an election commitment to bring it within 100 days of taking office—rather than what would have been a better place for it, the armed forces quadrennial review next year, which could have covered those issues. Now we are going to have a strange process: we will have this Bill and then the Armed Forces Bill next year, which we are now told will cover investigations, because the Secretary of State has now set up a commission to look at that. The best thing would have been to do those two things together, but that would not have met the political commitment that was put forward.
I do not think it is too late to make some changes to the Bill to improve it on investigations. Deleting part 2 would certainly be an important part of that, because part 2 changes the status of veterans and armed forces personnel. I genuinely believe what the Minister said in a Sunday newspaper over the weekend: that he does not want this in any way to affect our armed forces personnel. As I said, if it were left to both of us, we would guarantee that this type of limitation would not apply to individuals, but eventually none of us will be here and it will be the law that takes it forward. That is the weakness.
I do not understand why the Government want to reduce the role of veterans, and certainly not this Minister, who has prided himself on trying to be a champion for veterans. It is not just me saying this, or some lawyers or anyone else; we only have to look at the transcripts of the evidence put before us by the Royal British Legion. On 8 October, we took evidence from Charles Byrne from the Royal British Legion and General Sir John McColl from Cobseo. My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South asked whether this was a breach of the covenant. The covenant should be about not only protecting the rights of veterans and armed forces personnel, but, where it can, enhancing them. Charles Byrne from the RBL spoke in response to the Minister, when the Minister said:
“No, because what we are looking to do is to protect, and to ensure that our servicemen are not disadvantaged.”
Mr Byrne replied:
“I think it is protecting the MOD, rather than the service personnel—that is the debate that we have had.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 86, Q163.]
I think it is clear, as we have heard from other witnesses as well, that this goes against the armed forces covenant. I fully support the covenant, and not just in ensuring that the armed forces have no disadvantage and are treated the same. I take a very clear view on this. If people have served their country, they should be given certainly the same rights as everyone else, and in some cases better ones to recognise that service. That is important.
On that point about the exchange between the Minister and the Committee, and the evidence sessions, is my right hon. Friend aware that the figure of 94% was based on an extrapolation of a sample of cases, and not on all post-six-year cases?
It was, and that is where the disagreement about the figures comes from, and not for the first time in this Bill. Early on, we asked for the number of litigation cases, which was the reason why the Bill was introduced. We got various arguments, and one figure was 900 and another 1,000. If we want to act in the best interests of veterans, we need to know the extent of the problem, so my hon. Friend makes a good point. Again, even if we accept the figure of 94%, then 6% of people will not be able to take claims against the Ministry of Defence—including, as was argued by the personal injury lawyers, in those like the Snatch Land Rover cases and the ones that I outlined this morning. That cannot be right. I do not understand what the Government think is to be gained from taking away the rights of veterans and service personnel.
We are dealing with small numbers here, but this is important. If I was in prison—perhaps some on the Committee wish I was—and I made a claim against the Ministry of Justice, there would be certain time limits. But there are always cases under the Limitation Act that fall outside those limits. Prisoners have the right to take those cases out of time and stand before a judge, or have legal representation, to argue that they need their case considered out of time. They can do that because of section 33.
Asylum seekers can do the same. A claimant against the Ministry of Justice, whether on housing or anything else, can argue successfully to a judge that they had not brought the claim because of various circumstances, such as a refugee’s trauma from being in a war zone, and that they need a chance to bring their case, although there is no guarantee that their case will be accepted. That is the case with veterans, too. The representative from the personal injury lawyers said that the numbers of such cases are small, but when the application does work and a judge says that the time limit does not apply, it is very important. Snatch Land Rover is a great example of a case against the MOD.
Would that be a case against the armed forces? No, it would be against the MOD. No disrespect to the MOD lawyers—they are just doing their job—but if this provision is introduced, they will use that six-year backstop as a way of arguing that a case cannot go forward. The individual will have no rights whatever to go before a judge and argue that their case, for certain reasons, should be made an exception. The MOD is protected, rather than the veteran or serviceman or woman. That cannot be right.
We are brought back to the point of what is missing throughout the Bill. I accept what the Minister says: that he is passionate about these issues, and if it were down to him—if it were down to me and some others in this room, too, to be honest—veterans and servicemen and women would get first dibs every time, and quite rightly. But it will not be down to us; it will be down to officials in the Ministry of Defence.
Having worked with them, I have huge respect for officials in the Ministry of Defence, but they are in civil service mode. If they can protect the organisation, they will. That is not to be discredited. I remember dealing with lawyers in the MOD when I was there over the nuclear tests veterans cases, where, frankly, we were going to spend millions of pounds on a case that should have been settled. I successfully argued for a settlement proposal to be put forward; unfortunately, it was rejected by the other side. Again, the natural reaction was to defend the indefensible. I said, “Wait a minute—how much do you want to spend in lawyers’ fees to do this?” That is what will happen here. It will be an easy get-out for the MOD, because it will have the protection of a backstop of six years in law. The individual will no longer have the right.
Judicial oversight is a problem throughout the entire Bill. Having employed lawyers in a previous life and dealt with them over many years, am I a great fan? I am a fan of some of them, because some are very good. Some are also very bad, as the hon. Member for Darlington will attest. The point is that they do their best on behalf of their client. They are not making things up; they are using the laws that we pass in this place to advance the case that someone has presented before them. We should not be putting obstacles in their way, in terms of servicemen and women and veterans.
This is really a probing amendment. Someone asked, “Is it a bit of fun?” No, it is actually a serious point. When the average person on the famous Clapham omnibus realises that we are taking rights away from veterans and that prisoners and asylum seekers will have more rights than veterans, they will rightly be appalled.
Even if the Minister cannot accept the amendments today, I urge him to reflect on part 2 to see whether we can remove it from the Bill. We should at least ensure that the disadvantage to servicemen and women and veterans is not enshrined in law. If that happens, it will be a travesty. It would actually be a disappointment to the Minister, because he is trying to protect victims—instead, he will have done something that makes their lot in life worse. As a number of people said in the evidence sessions, servicemen and women and veterans have too few rights as it is. Taking away more of them cannot be right.
First, I thank the right hon. Member for North Durham. I agree with everything he has said. Of course, I raised part 2 of the Bill on Second Reading—I have major issues with it. One of the SNP’s amendments, which unfortunately was not selected, was about removing time limits completely. Perhaps a better idea would be to remove part 2 of the Bill.
Having sat through Second Reading, four sessions of oral evidence and this morning’s session, I still cannot see how a six-year limit on claims benefits veterans. I know the Minister has tried to explain the measure by saying it will allow them to make claims more easily, but the reasons why veterans are not claiming are very complex. Frankly, I have serious doubts about the time limit, as does the organisation that has arguably done more for veterans than any other: the Royal British Legion, which stated its concerns about part 2 of the Bill. It has said that, as currently drafted, part 2 introduces a time limit for civil claims from veterans, serving personnel and their families where one does not currently exist, and it risks a breach of the armed forces covenant, as there will continue to be no limit for civilians in relation to their employer.
During the evidence sessions, the Minister said it is a disadvantage to have to go and serve and put one’s life at risk. We understand that—none of us is disputing that—but we are talking about whenever we are comparing like for like, claim for claim. Does the Bill put veterans at a disadvantage? It absolutely does. The Royal British Legion has said that part 2 of the Bill should be improved to ensure that no member of the armed forces community is left subject to a time limit when pursuing a civil claim against the Ministry of Defence as an employer, and to avoid a breach of the armed forces covenant.
Personal injury awards can be substantial, so we understand why the MOD wants to minimise the opportunity for such claims, but if harm has been done to individuals that is due to negligence, why are we making it more difficult for them to seek recompense?
We have also heard examples of veterans who have served in multiple conflicts or operations where they have been exposed to loud noises, explosions and all sorts—which one caused the hearing loss? Could it otherwise have been caused at a firing range in the UK? That is a real difficulty, and it causes problems.
If overseas operations will be excluded after six years while for cases in this country a case could be made under the Limitation Act 1980, does the hon. Member not think that will also complicate hearing loss cases, if it must be determined where the hearing loss took place? It will be difficult to disaggregate these points.
In such situations, we know that the person who will benefit is not the veteran. That is the problem with part 2 of the Bill and the six-year limit. There must be protections in place to ensure that veterans who have served and suffered personal injury can seek justice for those injuries.
There are other examples, such as the nuclear test veterans. It was good to hear about the work done by the right hon. Member for North Durham on that. I have had interactions with those veterans, including a constituent of my own who, sadly, died. Many have waited decades and decades for compensation and have had nothing—not even any medals to recognise the service they undertook. There are still ongoing issues, and again the MOD has denied that the cancers that those veterans have suffered are related to their service, despite a number of them having similar cancers and there being no links other than the Christmas Island testing.
I could also mention Lariam, an anti-malarial drug that can cause real issues for individuals’ mental health, but not always instantly—it can happen on a much later date. My own husband was given Lariam and suffered as a result. Thankfully, he has not had any long-term issues, but many individuals’ mental health is affected many, many years beyond that.
I really enjoyed the hon. Member’s speech this morning— I did not agree with most of it, but it was well presented, with a good argument made. Is she saying that there should be no time limit at all for actions being brought?
I thank the hon. Member for his kind comments. There is already a limit, but that limit can be looked at and overridden in certain circumstances. That should remain in place; there is no reason to take that away. We are not saying, “We encourage all veterans to wait 30 or 40 years”, but there must be some protections. There cannot be a hard stop that prevents them from taking any action.
We all understand the Bill’s purpose and why it has been brought forward, even though we might not agree with all of it and we might have issues with some of it, but part 2 of the Bill makes no sense whatever. The Bill has been sold to veterans as protecting them and looking after them, with the Government having their back. Actually, part 2 does the opposite. Why do the Government want to prevent between 19 and 50 veterans from seeking justice? I would like to know that from the Minister, because we have not yet had a decent answer on that point.
It is always a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Mundell. I rise to speak briefly about part 2 of the Bill. I will try not to detain the Committee by repeating the comments of other hon. Members.
Time and again, concerns have been expressed in written and oral submissions to this Committee—they were mentioned again today by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham—about the civil litigation longstop. If this part of the Bill is unamended, there is a high risk that the Ministry of Defence will not be held accountable for violations of soldiers’ and civilians’ rights—the largest proportion of claims made against the MOD are claims of negligence and of breaches of the MOD’s duty of care towards its soldiers. Between 2014 and 2019, the available data shows that such claims amounted to more than 75% of all claims.
Part 2 of the Bill will benefit only the Ministry of Defence, and yet the Ministry of Defence is the defendant in all those claims. That is a clear conflict. The Minister and the Department have created a policy that protects them from legitimate legal claims. I am unaware of any other instance of our legislation being drafted in such a way as to protect the defendant over the claimant. I find it astonishing that the Minister wants to treat our forces and veterans in that way, placing them as such gross disadvantage.
As my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham said, there remains a lack of clarity about the number of people who would be disadvantaged by the longstop. It would be helpful if, in summing up, the Minister provided some transparent and accurate figures to clear the issue up, once and for all. We are making legislation without proper knowledge and without a proper basis.
In oral evidence, we heard over and over again that the Bill protects the MOD, but not our forces. It breaches the armed forces covenant. It gives our forces less protection than civilians and, in some cases, even prisoners. We heard that from not one or two witnesses, but a broad and wide-ranging group of organisations, some of which, traditionally, would not necessarily agree with each other: the Royal British Legion, the Centre for Military Justice, the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, Liberty and Human Rights Watch. Written evidence struck the same chords. When the Minister gave evidence, he appeared unable to find literally anyone at all who supports the longstop. If someone does, I hope that the Minister will share that fact with us.
The whole point of Bill Committees, as I have said repeatedly, is to improve and amend legislation, so that it emerges better than it was when it arrived with us. Indeed, the Minister has stated many times on the record that he wants to work with people in and outside this place to make the Bill the very best it can be, so that it meets its intended aims. I sincerely hope that that commitment was not an empty gesture. A good way to prove that it was not is to consider our amendments, listen to our comments and take them on board, and ensure that so many people are not disadvantaged when making claims against the MOD.
I, too, will not occupy too much of the Committee’s time, but I want to raise the issue of the impact on the ability of veterans and serving personnel to bring claims.
Yesterday, additional written evidence was circulated to us from a number of people, including Dr Jonathan Morgan of the University of Cambridge, in document OOB09, which refers to the impact of part 2 of the Bill on the ability of people to bring a claim; their rights will be restricted.
We also had evidence yesterday from Professor James Sweeney; I am afraid I do not have the reference number. He clearly points out deficiencies, and tackles head on, in paragraph 11 of his evidence, the Minister’s assertions that we are reading the provisions incorrectly. I ask the Minister and his advisers to look at that closely. We had evidence from the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, too. We have heard comments about people’s views on personal injury lawyers and in whose interests thing are, but to me that evidence is clear and well set out.
The hon. Member for Glasgow North West, who speaks on behalf of the SNP, raised the issue of nuclear test veterans. In 2009, when they brought their case against the MOD, it was a limitations case, because the injuries happened in the 1950s. They won it because new evidence came forward and Mr Justice Foskett argued that the limitation case could go forward. Is it not clear that if that happened now, that case would not even have been heard?
My right hon. Friend is absolutely correct. That is why it is important that this part of the Bill be either substantially amended to protect the rights of veterans, or perhaps taken away altogether.
The Royal British Legion, talking about disadvantage under the Covenant, says:
“The Armed Forces Covenant states: ‘those who serve in the armed forces, whether regular or reserve, those who have served in the past, and their families should face no disadvantage compared to other citizens in the provision of public and commercial services…in accessing services, former members of the Armed Forces should expect the same level of support as any other citizen in society’”.
We all need to take very seriously the concerns raised by the Royal British Legion about claims and the breach of the armed forces covenant. I have no doubt that it is not the Minister’s intention to disadvantage people, but the Bill as drafted will do so. I ask him to look at this very seriously, and to consider amendments to the Bill.
It is good to see you back in the Chair, Mr Mundell.
I appreciate the opportunity to address some of the points raised. My intention is not to disparage Members’ intentions, because I get it: people want to support our armed forces and do not want to disadvantage them. I do not want to disadvantage them. However, some things—the data is a good example—are being totally misused to promote these points. For example, on the statement that from 2014 to 2019 there were however many thousand claims, that number includes claims in the UK that people would bring under tort or civilian law against an employer. This Bill does not apply to that; it is called the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill. In no way are those comparisons being made in a fair manner. This Bill applies only to those allegations and claims that affect our service personnel overseas.
I will get to my point. There were 552 employer liability claims from what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today’s Daily Mirror had sounded familiar to a couple of the speeches: it mentioned “21,000 claims”. It is total nonsense. That is the total number of claims that people have made against the MOD in the period from 2004 to 2017. They are claims in a civilian workplace environment, where there are civil liabilities claims, claims regarding exercises and so on in the UK, and breach of contract claims. In the Bill, we are talking specifically about overseas operations. Whoever is providing these figures is demonstrating a pretty basic misunderstanding of what is going on—or it is a deliberate attempt to mislead, but I am sure it is not. The two things are not comparable in any way.
To me, that does not matter. Why should armed forces personnel be treated differently when something happens in this country, as opposed to overseas? It might not be in combat; it might be on a training mission, or something like that. As I said, if one veteran is disadvantaged, that is one veteran too many.
It does matter. Facts do matter in this debate; figures do, too.
Where can we find the figures that the Minister is quoting to us?
The figures have been published in the impact assessment a number of times. The hon. Lady can shake her head, but again, we are in a space of alternative facts. The figures are in the impact assessment, which is before the House.
The Minister is talking about overseas operations. We all understand that, and that the Bill applies to those serving overseas. However, if my employer sends me overseas, and I suffer an injury there due to the negligence of my employer here in the UK, I can sue the employer for the injury. The same should be the case for veterans. It is not about whether it is overseas or here; it is about having the same rights as civilian employees.
I disagree, and this is why. Operational service overseas is fundamentally different from life in the UK, and from what we ask our people to do. The hon. Lady is absolutely right: we have a duty in this country to protect those overseas, whether it is against improvised explosive devices, bombs, electronic warfare, or indeed legal systems used to bring warfare by another means. That is what this Bill is trying to do.
I understand the assertion that if someone from the Royal British Legion was deployed on an operation, the six-year limit comes down. Viewed on its own, that is something that will happen to serviceperson, but not a civilian. Disadvantage is a comparable term. Disadvantage to who? The Government argue—this I am clear on—that these people are seriously disadvantaged by having no legal protection against these thousands of claims that we have seen come in over the last 15 or 20 years. What the Royal British Legion would like us to do is to put that to one side—[Interruption.] No, it is, because I have engaged with it extensively. It would like us to apply that to one side of the argument, which, again, is not legal. Under European human rights law, people are being disadvantaged and discriminated against based on the claimant, which is not legal. This cannot be brought in on one side.
The Minister is taking rights away from servicemen and women. He talked about overseas operations, but let us say, for example, someone is in British Army Training Unit Suffield in northern Canada on a training exercise. If that is classed as an overseas operation, or a peacekeeping operation—
Because what the right hon. Gentleman says—I have a lot of respect for him—is simply not true. BATUS is not an operational environment. It is not a peacekeeping mission. It is a training unit mission. As I said this morning, and speaking from a point of knowledge, when it came out in the inquiry about the Snatch Land Rover cases, that is when the six-year thing started. That would not have been affected by this legislation.
We could keep raising these points, but I am not going to change my view, because it is based on the truth. I cannot suddenly say, “Yes, BATUS is a war-fighting operation, so this stuff applies.” I cannot say, “These people would be affected in the Snatch Land Rover case,” because that is simply not the case.
I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman in a minute. He talks about taking rights away from our service personnel. They have a right to be protected on the battlefield in all these areas. One area where they have a right to be protected is the use of lawfare to progress, and change the outcome of, a conflict through other means.
There were lots of wild sentiments thrown around—“lawyers don’t make things up,” and all the rest of it. Again, that does not collide with reality. Phil Shiner has been struck off. The reality—the world as we find it—is what this Bill is designed to deal with.
On a point of clarification, would a deployment in Cyprus or Estonia be covered by the Bill?
We are talking about overseas operations, wherever they take place outside the UK. UK operations and operations outside the UK are defined in the Bill.
I think the Minister is falling foul of something that a lot of witnesses in the oral session said he would: he is confusing the criminal law with the civil law. Largely, our concerns around part 2 are about the civil aspect.
What is being confused here is the difference between tort and human rights claims; that was being confused a lot in the comments made just now. Regarding the evidence sessions, I accept that there are aspects of this legislation that some of the people who came in—public interest lawyers, the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, Hilary Meredith and others—do not like. I do not dispute that for a minute, but my job is to protect those who serve on operations from all those different threats, including lawfare, which has not been done before. Other nations do it, and we have a duty to protect these people as well.
I can understand the Minister’s concerns about some of the comments, but the Royal British Legion exists to protect people who have served in the forces. That is one of their key aims. If they are saying to us that the provisions present an issue, is it not right that we take note of that, address it, and deal with it clearly?
Absolutely; it is right to take note of it, and I have engaged with it extensively on this issue, but the legion does not own the covenant—nobody does. It belongs to the nation. The covenant was designed to ensure that when a service person and a civilian are in a comparable situation, the service person is at no disadvantage. It was never designed to ensure no disadvantage whatsoever. We send our people away from their families for six or seven months of a year—that is a disadvantage. We send them away to undertake dangerous work—that is a disadvantage.
The covenant was meant to mean that when two people are in the same situation, the service person is not disadvantaged, and that is why the Bill says that it applies to a civilian in these environments in exactly the same way. I heard the right hon. Member for North Durham say again this morning that civilians were not covered by this Bill. Well, they are. It is in the Bill.
The Minister said these rights protect people, but the covenant is not about taking rights away from people. I know we fixate on the date of knowledge, but when he is no longer a Minister and none of us are here anymore, the Ministry of Defence lawyers will not use this provision to say that a case is time-barred. There is nothing in this Bill that says that. That is the problem he has. I do not for one minute think that he is suggesting otherwise, and he is perhaps well intentioned, but he is just wrong on this, and is trusting the MOD too much.
I accept the right hon. Gentleman’s point. He will not find many Ministers who will say that half is the Department’s problem in terms of how it has investigated and so on. I have a healthy interrogation of any advice I am given. I accept his point that there is a danger of abuse, but we have written into the Bill that point of knowledge. I am not fixated on it; it is just there in black and white.
I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman. I want to finish what I am saying—I do not want to repeat myself and bore everybody—and then I will take more interventions.
Clause 8, in conjunction with schedule 2, introduces new factors that the courts must consider when deciding whether to allow certain claims relating to overseas military operations to be brought after the normal time limit, and sets the maximum time limit for such claims at six years. The Government intend to ensure that claims for compensation for personal injuries or deaths arising from overseas military operations are assessed fairly and achieve a fair outcome for victims, for the service personnel and veterans called upon to give evidence, and for the taxpayer.
Section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980 sets an absolute time limit of six years for compensation in claims relating to most types of tort. Although sections 11 and 12 set a three-year limit for claims for personal injury or death, the three-year limit is not absolute. Section 33 of the Act gives the court discretion to allow claims to be brought beyond the time limit if it considers it fair to do so. Section 33 identifies six factors to which the court must have a particular regard when assessing fairness. In broad terms, those relate to the steps taken by the claimant to bring the claim, the reasons for delay and the effect of delay on the quality of the evidence. Those factors do not adequately recognise or reflect the uniquely challenging context of overseas military operations. The Government are concerned that unless the court is directed to consider relevant factors, it might wrongly conclude that it is fair to allow older claims to proceed. The clause, in conjunction with schedule 2, introduces three new factors that the Government consider properly reflect the operational context to which the court must have particular regard.
Is it not for a lawyer, when they are arguing a limitations case, to make the case for special circumstances? They can do that now in law. If the measure goes through unamended—I accept that this is not the Minister’s intention—the MOD will use it as a way of blocking cases. We only have to look at the nuclear test veterans case of 2009 and Judge Foskett’s summing up. The MOD’s argument in the limitations hearing was that the case was out of time, but it was successfully argued that new evidence had come forward. That was possible because it was before a court of law. This measure stops that.
I will address that point in my final remarks on the clause. The factors that have to be considered are the extent to which assessment of the claim will depend on the memories of service personnel and veterans, the impact of the operational context on their ability to recall the specific incident, and the impact of doing so on their mental health. The new factors reflect the reality of overseas military operations—the fact that opportunities to make detailed records at the time might be limited; that increased reliance might have to be placed on the memories of the personnel involved; and that as some of them might be suffering from mental health illnesses owing to their service, there is a human cost in doing so. The human cost obviously goes beyond that of the service person and will be felt just as much by their families and friends. Families of the military community are a core aspect of the armed forces covenant and must not be overlooked when we consider the measures in the Bill.
Clause 8, in conjunction with schedule 2, also introduces an absolute limit of six years for claims for personal injury or death arising from overseas military operations. This change brings the absolute time limit for personal injury or death claims in line with other claims for other torts that might occur on operations, such as false imprisonment. It also gives service personnel and veterans certainty that they will not be called upon indefinitely to recall often traumatic incidents that they have understandably sought to put behind them.
Finally, this clause, in conjunction with schedule 2, amends the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984, so that claimants cannot benefit from more generous time limits under foreign law. This change is needed for consistency and will ensure that no claim is brought after six years. I must emphasise that the Government are not seeking to stop meritorious claims or to avoid judicial scrutiny, nor are we seeking to put the armed forces or the Government generally in a more favourable position compared with their position as regards other defendants.
The changes that this clause and schedule 2 introduce go only as far as is necessary to ensure a fair outcome. They do not affect the way in which the time period is calculated or those provisions that suspend time in appropriate circumstances. They are also consistent with court rulings that claimants do not need to be provided with an indefinite opportunity to obtain a remedy. The courts have recognised that limitation periods have an important role to play in ensuring legal certainty and finality and in preventing injustice. The changes that this clause, in conjunction with schedule 2, introduces are a reasonable and proportionate solution to the problem of historical claims.
I will not repeat the same arguments for clauses 9 and 10, which amend the legislation in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but I will just add that the Limitation Act 1980 only covers claims brought in England and Wales. It is therefore necessary to extend similar provisions across the whole of the UK to prevent forum shopping. It would be deeply unsatisfactory if changes that the Government are introducing to achieve a fairer outcome in relation to claims brought in England and Wales could be circumvented by a claimant’s bringing their claim in Scotland or Northern Ireland instead.
Turning our attention to new clause 2, none of the measures in part 2 of the Bill will prevent service personnel, veterans or their families from bringing claims against the MOD in connection with overseas operations within a reasonable timeframe, as historically most have done anyway. The purpose of the limitation longstops is to stop historical and often vexatious claims being brought against the military on overseas operations, which put our service personnel at the mercy of being called to provide evidence long after the alleged events in question, with all the harm and anxiety that might cause them.
To ensure fairness between claimants, we have not excluded service personnel from those provisions. They will apply equally to service personnel and veterans as they will to any other person bringing a claim against the MOD in connection with overseas operations. I am confident that these measures do not break the armed forces covenant. The new factors and limitation longstops only apply to claims in connection with overseas operations and will apply to all claimants in the same way. The court’s discretion to extend the three-year time limit for death or personal injury claims and the one-year time limit for human rights claims remains unchanged in respect of any other claims, that is, those not connected to overseas operations brought against the MOD.
Additionally, our evidence suggests that 94% of those claims from service personnel are already brought within six years. We would expect that figure to rise in future, as we ensure that the armed forces community is made aware of the new measures and the relevant dates for bringing claims, including what is meant by the date of knowledge. That should encourage personnel to bring claims within six years, or earlier if possible, as after the primary time limit of three years for personal injury and death and one year for human rights claims expires, claimants must rely on persuading the courts to exercise their discretion to extend the time limit.
In summary, clauses 8 to 10, as they stand, do not breach the armed forces covenant and do not disadvantage service personnel or veterans. Let me make this clear point: on operations and in the area of modern warfare, we cannot lift human rights legislation and apply it to the battlefield. I accept that some people want to do that and think that is the right thing to do, but I respectfully disagree. The idea that people can go to court and argue for an extension produces exactly the position we find ourselves in now, where individuals such as Phil Shiner, who the right hon. Member for North Durham mentioned, have sought extensions under those situations, in order to bring thousands and thousands of claims against the MOD.
We are stuck in a position where we have to do something. In that scenario, I cannot apply something to one side, as I have indicated already, although the Legion would like me to. Similarly, we cannot take away all time limits, because that would defeat the entire purpose of the Bill, which is to provide some certainty for veterans. I accept what some hon. Members have said about people’s ability to sue within that timeframe if they are serving overseas. If they were in the UK on exercise or in Canada, it would be different, but that is because the unique nature of operations is different.
We have a duty to protect those people, as I said, both physically, from what is on the battlefield, and in the court of law. We have seen some horrendous experiences over the years. We can say, “It’s all too difficult”, and that we need to walk away—the reason why, for 40 years, no Government have done this is that it is really difficult—but we are in a position where we have to make choices: either we choose to leave the situation as it is now, letting it continue with no time limit, or we bring forward legislation to give certainty to our veterans.
I am sorry—I do not agree with that. There is a way to improve the Bill, as with the issue of investigations raised earlier. We have talked about the Human Rights Act 1998, but if the Minister reads the judgment in the Smith case, he will see that the Supreme Court was clear about the Act’s limitations. Will the Minister explain the proposal to have a one-year time limit on human rights cases? Will he explain how he will limit appeal if section 33 does not apply to human rights cases, which it will not if the Bill goes through? How does that fit with our obligations under the convention?
Our obligations under the European convention on human rights are not changed in any way. We have to design an investigative framework that is resilient and robust in the face of challenge under the convention. I have to disagree with the right hon. Gentleman—clearly, there is a difference of opinion here. That is allowed, that is what this place is all about, but the reality is that those on the Government Benches have a different view, which is that we cannot let the situation that has persisted for the past 40 years continue ad infinitum. We have to bring in fair and proportionate legislation to go beyond saying nice things about our people, or, “Isn’t it terrible that these people get dragged through the courts?”, while being prepared to do absolutely nothing about it. I am afraid that those days have come to an end. We have to legislate to protect our people. I will give way once more, and then I will finish.
There is nothing fair about taking rights away from veterans. On the Human Rights Act, the one-year limit to bring a claim is clearly still there, but at present someone could bring a late claim under section 33 if at the time they thought it was not there. The Minister said that we would be abiding by the convention. Will he point to where in the convention—on our side, in the Human Rights Act—it says that time limits and out-of-time claims are applicable? I cannot see that.
As the right hon. Gentleman will remember from his time in government, all legislation has to be signed off as ECHR compliant. The Department has done that, recognising our responsibilities under the legislation and meeting its requirements. He talks about rights, but people such as Bob Campbell have a right to be protected from experiences such as his over the past 17 years, and the soldiers who went through al-Sweady have a right to be protected as well. This is not all in one direction—it is not a one-way street—and we are clear that those people have a right to be protected in the jobs that we asked them to do. That is what the clause is all about, so I ask that it stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
International Criminal Court Act 2001
I beg to move amendment 29, in schedule 2, page 16, line 4, leave out “six” and insert “ten”.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 30, in schedule 2, page 16, line 35, leave out “six” and insert “ten”.
Amendment 31, in schedule 2, page 17, line 16, leave out “six” and insert “ten”.
Amendment 32, in schedule 2, page 18, line 34, leave out “six” and insert “ten”.
Amendment 33, in schedule 2, page 19, line 18, leave out “six” and insert “ten”.
Amendment 34, in schedule 2, page 19, line 26, leave out “six” and insert “ten”.
Amendment 35, in schedule 3, page 20, line 40, leave out “6” and insert “10”.
Amendment 36, in schedule 3, page 21, line 3, leave out “6” and insert “10”.
Amendment 37, in schedule 3, page 21, line 8, leave out “6” and insert “10”.
Amendment 38, in schedule 3, page 21, line 14, leave out “6” and insert “10”.
Amendment 39, in schedule 3, page 21, line 15, leave out “6” and insert “10”.
Amendment 40, in schedule 3, page 21, line 19, leave out “6” and insert “10”.
Amendment 41, in schedule 3, page 21, line 20, leave out “6” and insert “10”.
Amendment 42, in schedule 3, page 21, line 26, leave out “6” and insert “10”.
Amendment 43, in schedule 3, page 21, line 27, leave out “6” and insert “10”.
Amendment 44, in schedule 3, page 23, line 6, leave out “6” and insert “10”.
Amendment 45, in schedule 3, page 23, line 35, leave out “6” and insert “10”.
Amendment 46, in schedule 3, page 23, line 36, leave out “6” and insert “10”.
Amendment 47, in schedule 4, page 24, line 4, leave out “six” and insert “ten”.
Amendment 48, in schedule 4, page 24, line 28, leave out “six” and insert “ten”.
Amendment 49, in schedule 4, page 24, line 34, leave out “six” and insert “ten”.
Amendment 50, in schedule 4, page 25, leave out line 16 and insert—
“ten years is to be treated as a reference to the period of ten years”.
Amendment 51, in schedule 4, page 26, line 36, leave out “6” and insert “10”.
Amendment 52, in schedule 4, page 27, line 20, leave out “6” and insert “10”.
Amendment 53, in schedule 4, page 27, line 21, leave out “6” and insert “10”.
Amendment 54, in schedule 4, page 27, leave out line 27 and insert—
“10 years is to be treated as a reference to the period of 10 years plus –”.
Ministers have said that the purpose of the Bill is to protect service personnel, but part 2 as drafted does the exact opposite. We are not here to score points or to play politics; we are here to work constructively with the Government and to highlight the areas of the Bill that must be improved. That does not need to be a binary choice. By moving the amendment, our objectives could not be simpler—to protect our personnel’s access to justice and to redress the Bill’s negative implications for our forces’ welfare. Are those concepts that Ministers cannot get behind?
In the Committee’s witness sessions, there was consensus among the specialists from whom we heard. From decorated soldiers to human rights groups and from lawyers to armed forces charities, there was agreement. Consensus on the Bill in its current form may erode rather than enhance the rights of personnel. Most notably, we heard comments from the Royal British Legion, and I am sure that no one would question its age-old, unwavering commitment to the welfare of our troops.
With that in mind, I am concerned about what the Royal British Legion has said, which is that the Bill constitutes a potential breach of the armed forces covenant—a deeply worrying conclusion from the UK’s largest armed forces charity.
The hon. Gentleman mentions the Royal British Legion. When my hon. Friend the Member for Wrexham asked Charles Byrne whether the Royal British Legion opposes the Bill, did he not say that it does not?
It was clear that the Royal British Legion is in favour of the intent of the Bill but has concerns about part 2, which it believes breaches the armed forces covenant. Charles Byrne was very clear on that point.
I make this point again. I have heard it said a number of times, “We support the intent of the Bill.” Over 40 years Members have spoken of supporting the intent of looking after our veterans and protecting them from vexatious claims. No one has done anything about it. Lots of people gave evidence and said they supported the intent of the Bill. It does not mean anything unless we get into the detail of the Bill. The Royal British Legion did not oppose the Bill; it said it had concerns about the armed forces covenant, which we addressed, but it did not oppose the Bill.
I am looking at the transcript of the evidence given by the Royal British Legion, in which it said:
“‘Can we achieve those aims without disadvantaging service personnel?’ If we can do both, both should be done.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 89, Q168.]
It welcomed the intent behind the Bill and believed that it could “be improved.” No Labour Member is against the Bill per se; we are against part 2. We are trying to improve the Bill as the Royal British Legion suggested. I do not understand why the Minister does not grasp that.
I thank my hon. Friend for the intervention. She hits the nail on the head: we want to work constructively with the Government to get the Bill right. Sadly, we are not seeing that engagement, and that concerns us. Are Ministers not concerned that the very Bill they claim is devised to help our armed forces is said to be doing the very opposite by an organisation as distinguished as the Royal British Legion?
We heard from other important witnesses. The Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, a not-for-profit organisation representing injured serving and ex-service personnel, said:
“This Bill leaves our veterans with less rights than prisoners.”
I will repeat that because it is so important:
“This Bill leaves our veterans with less rights than prisoners.”
That is a damning verdict delivered by lawyers who devote their lives to representing our troops. Our armed forces serve the nation with distinction. They deserve more than to have their rights stripped away.
I say to the Minister: do not dismiss the warnings of the legion and APIL; work with us to address them.
Let us take a closer look at what part 2 means. The Limitation Act 1980 results in the armed forces community and civilians being treated equally in seeking a claim for personal injury. A three-year cut-off point is in place. The courts retain the right to grant an extension to forces personnel. Section 33 provides the court with discretion to override the current three-year limit, but this Bill deliberately snatches courts’ ability to show discretion if the case relates to an overseas armed forces action. It makes a deliberate change to the Limitation Act. That makes no sense. There are already structures in place to ensure that only appropriate claims are brought. Courts routinely manage out-of-time proceedings and frequently throw out cases where delay is unjustified. The detailed criteria set out in the Limitation Act 1980 already address cases that do not have reasonable grounds or are unjustified. Why is the Minister actively removing an aspect of the Limitation Act that offers courts the right to grant an extension in cases relating to armed forces personnel?
As I said earlier in an intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon, the nuclear test veterans case is a good example. There was a limitations hearing in which the MOD argued that the case was out of time because the incident took place so long ago. In that case, Judge Foskett argued that new evidence meant the date of knowledge was current and he allowed it to be admitted. I accept that the numbers are not huge, but it is the exceptional cases that are important.
I thank my right hon. Friend for his remarks. I hope the Minister addresses the points that he makes so eloquently later on, in his summing up.
The Bill removes the ability of our armed forces personnel to bring forward a civil claim at all after six years, even where it would have passed judicial scrutiny. Under the Government’s proposed changes, civilians will retain the right to pursue a civil claim against their employer. Armed forces personnel will not, which clearly breaches the armed forces covenant. Non-discretionary time limits undermine justice and arbitrarily prevent legitimate claims from proceeding. We must hear the Minister’s business case for setting that time limit.
We have established that part 2 of the Bill is flawed. It introduces a six-year time limit for any claimant or bereaved family in bringing civil claims against the Ministry of Defence. That means that if someone suffers personal injury or even death owing to employer negligence and in connection with overseas operations, they can take no action after a six-year time limit. That is deeply concerning because a great many conditions might not come to light until after the time limit: for example, post-traumatic stress disorder.
Last year, The Times reported the case of Mark Bradshaw, aged 44, who had suffered from PTSD since being involved in a friendly-fire attack in 2010 while serving in the Royal Artillery. Despite the immediate onset of the condition, the veteran, who lives in Newcastle, was not given a diagnosis until 2016. By then he was drinking heavily and had suicidal thoughts. He had left the service and become alienated from his family. He was awarded £230,000 in a settlement, but feared that the proposed legislation could discriminate against those who do not develop PTSD or receive a diagnosis until many years later. He called the plan to impose a time limit on claims “horrendous”.
I have another example.
Another issue concerns human rights cases. The impression being given is that they are always brought by people against the MOD and include litigants and people in foreign countries and so on, but Human Rights Act cases are also brought against the MOD by armed forces personnel. When Hilary Meredith gave evidence, she said:
“There is a difficulty putting a time limit on the Human Rights Act—I do not even know whether we can do that constitutionally”.––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 18, Q30.]
The Minister seemed to brush aside the fact that section 33 will be ignored in terms of time limits. Does he also think that that constrains the rights of veterans and service personnel from bringing cases against the MOD, which they can, under the Human Rights Act?
We could spend all afternoon on different cases. That is why the amendment is so important. I have another example. It is about how legislation would have denied justice to a former royal marine with noise-induced hearing loss, according to the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers. The former marine received nearly half a million pounds for a noise-induced hearing claim on the grounds that his hearing loss and tinnitus was caused by a negligent exposure to noise. During his career the marine served in Northern Ireland, the Gulf and Afghanistan, and he was exposed to noise from thousands of rounds of ammunition, thunderflash stun grenades, helicopters and other aircraft and explosive devices. His claim related to his entire service.
When he left the Royal Marines in 2012 because of problems with his hearing, he was unaware that he was able to make a claim for compensation. He eventually spoke to a solicitor in late 2014, seven years after he was first aware that he had problems with his hearing. The MOD admitted liability and made no argument about his case being brought out of time. The time limit in this Bill, however, would have eliminated all aspects of the claim relating to the Marine’s extensive service overseas.
I totally respect the manner and intent of the hon. Member’s remarks, but, again, the Mark Bradshaw case and the case of the royal marine, which we have looked at, would not be affected by this legislation. When Bradshaw became aware of his PTSD being service-related, it would have been dealt with within six years. The same detail applies to the royal marine.
I do not know what else to say, but the stuff that is coming forward—I have to be honest and say that I have heard it before, because I know it comes from a campaign group—is just simply not true. I do not know what to do with the cases being presented to me, which are simply incorrect.
The claim could have been made only in relation to negligent exposure in the UK. It might not have been possible to isolate the extent and the effect of negligent exposure in the UK, making it very difficult to claim any redress at all. Why are some medical conditions worthy of justice, and not others? Many other medical conditions are likely to fall outside the cut-off point, and there are conditions such as long-term deterioration of joints resulting from carrying heavy equipment.
Does my hon. Friend agree that what the Minister is saying cannot be the case? He cannot give any guarantee that such cases will not be resisted by the MOD. He cannot direct the MOD, because he will not be there when he leaves the MOD, and no one else can do it either. It is about protecting future cases. In the two cases referred to, the Bill would allow the MOD to legitimately turn those cases down because they were out of time. Those two individuals would have no recourse to law in order to enforce their rights.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely correct. We are saying it time and again, but the Bill protects the MOD; it does not protect our troops. I hope the Minister will take that point on board.
Does the hon. Gentleman share my concern that the Minister is suggesting that we are raising concerns because of a campaign group? Personally, I am not raising concerns because of a campaign group; I am raising concerns because of the protections being taken away from armed forces personnel and veterans. When an individual gets a diagnosis of PTSD, I cannot imagine anybody thinking, “The first thing I am going to do is lodge a claim against the MOD.” When a condition gets progressively worse, they might think about doing so over time, but not necessarily within six years.
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. We are not here just to speak up for campaign groups and emails; we are here to speak up for our armed forces. That is why we are absolutely keen to see the Bill improved. I really hope the Minister engages with these points in his summing up.
Is the Minister satisfied that the Bill in its current form will prevent troops who are suffering from these conditions from receiving justice? As we heard from APIL in evidence sessions last week, many troops are not aware that they can bring a claim against the MOD. They are directed to the armed forces compensation scheme, which pays out much lower sums. Why is it that the MOD has scrapped the proposed better compensation scheme, which would have seen payments that are closer to those offered in court settlements? Why is it that the Government are willing to introduce a six-year longstop for troops, but not for civilians? It puts troops at a patently clear disadvantage by comparison with civilians. As we heard last week from the director general of the largest armed forces charity in the UK—the Royal British Legion—it risks breaching our armed forces covenant.
Part 2 of the Bill in its current form protects the MOD; it does not protect our troops. Despite all this, it is not too late. The Opposition have proposed solutions today, and we can work together to address this issue. Protecting service personnel’s access to justice acts on the concerns voiced by friends such as the Royal British Legion.
They do not—I am reading it wrongly as one big group, but they are two separate groups.
My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South made a point about the backstop. I am sorry, I just cannot accept that backstop. The Minister seems to be misunderstanding the issue to do with the date of knowledge. The date of knowledge is clearly not only as laid out in the law of cases against the MOD, but as in civil law as well. As I said this morning, I used to deal all the time with the date of knowledge in asbestos cases. Some of those test cases were to do with ensuring that individuals—sometimes many years after they had left the industry in which they had contracted their disease—were able to take action. They were able to do so because of the Limitation Act.
The other thing that we need to knock on the head is the idea that bringing a section 33 case is easy. It is not easy; it is very difficult, and the threshold to meet is very high—rightly. As the Minister said, time limits rightly have to be fair in two ways: first, to give individuals enough time to ensure that they can bring a case; and, secondly, because evidence gets lost, whether in a civilian case or, more so, in such a case as we are addressing now. There is therefore a good reason for time limits, but there is also a good reason to have circumstances and exceptions in which those time limits should not apply.
My hon. Friend mentioned two cases, which the Minister said would be covered—but I am sorry, they would not. If they fell outside the six years, under the Bill as drafted those individuals would not be able to argue before a judge why limitations should not apply in their cases, and their case would just be dismissed. The Minister seems to have a lot of faith that the MOD’s lawyers of the future—and now—would not use that measure to reduce and stop such claims. They would not be doing their job if they did not use it to stop those claims.
The important thing is that such an individual would then have no rights whatever—unlike you, me or anyone else: even a prisoner—to bring a case under section 33 of the Limitation Act. I understand what the Minister says about his trust and belief in the MOD now and in the future. I do not disparage what the MOD is doing. There was a reference in the evidence session that the Department employs good lawyers and that will be their job, and they will use this provision. As such, what the Minister said will not be the case.
My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South raises the issue around the 94%, or whatever the figure is. I do not care, to be honest, because as I said earlier one case is a case too many. Like my hon. Friend, I want to ensure that armed forces personnel and veterans are treated on the same basis as everyone else in this country. If that does not happen, the armed forces covenant will protect their rights but the Bill will take their rights away. That cannot be right.
There is also the point, which I had hoped the Minister would answer, about the Human Rights Act. He said the one-year time period is still in there, which is fine, but as Hilary Meredith said, how do you then disapply the Limitation Act to the Human Rights Act? As she said, it is very difficult to see how you would do that in practice because we are part of an international convention.
The only response the Minister gave—he might want to write to me if he does not have it with him; I accept that on occasions he does not have all the facts to hand—is that it has been cleared as being Human Rights Act-compliant. Are we suggesting that for this group of veterans there will be a new thing—a time limit for out-of-time human rights cases? If that is so, it is very interesting. How has that been squared in terms of the convention we have signed? Again—and likewise—everybody else will be able to use the Limitation Act to take a case forward outside that time.
The Minister said he is listening, but he is not. He has a fixated view of what goes forward in the Bill and that is what he is going to put forward. We have made attempts. I have said that I accept that amendments written by mere amateurs such as myself and others are not necessarily legally correct. However, what often happens on these occasions is that a Minister will say, “Yes, we agree. There is a point there. We will take it away, look at it and try to frame it in terms of how it fits into the Bill and the legal parameters.” That way, when we get to Report and Third Reading, they can be introduced, usually as Government amendments. However, that has not happened. We have had, “This is how it is going to be and that’s it.”
The situation is rather sad because there are things that can be done even at this stage—I am discussing one of them—that could improve the Bill. I accept that the Minister has already committed to look at investigations in the Armed Forces Bill next year, but he should stick the provisions in the damn Bill now. He could do it. The fact that the civil service might not want to do it—well, tough. He should just say, “You are going to do it” and put it in. Putting those investigation measures into the Bill will improve it immensely and do more than where the Minister has come from so far in the Bill. As Judge Blackett said, he has been
“looking at the wrong end of the telescope”—[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 120, Q246.]
The Minister is concentrating on prosecutions, but that ain’t the problem: the problem is investigations and how the MOD operates. I will not support a Bill that is going to take away rights from our servicemen and women. That would be an absolute tragedy. I know that is not the Minister’s intention, but unfortunately the Bill, as it is written, is going to do exactly that.
To confirm, we are debating amendments 30 to 54, with amendment 29. If no other Members wish to speak to any of those amendments, I call the Minister.
I wanted to address a couple of points about the limitation period. In the Stubbings ruling that we looked at, limitation periods are okay under ECHR regulation as long as there is compatibility with article 6, the right to a fair trial. That is the test that has been undertaken in this exercise and that is the advice that the Government have received. The right hon. Member for North Durham may well disagree with that, and is well entitled to.
Not at the moment. I have literally just stood up. I will get through a couple of points, if I may.
As to the idea that I have not engaged in the process, and that it is just “head down, drive on”, I should like to know whether there has been a Bill that has gone through this place in the past five years when the Minister has been more ready to say a number of times that he was willing to work cross-party to improve the Bill; but I have to deal—[Interruption.]
Thank you, Mr Mundell. I have to deal in the real world. I have to deal with real facts and figures—not made-up stuff—and how they apply to the battlefield. There is clearly a difference of opinion between the Government and the Opposition about whether the ECHR should be applied on the battlefield. I accept that. That is the point—that ability to continue these extensions is part of ECHR compliance. The Government do not agree that the battlefield is the right place, or that retrospective application of the ECHR to the battlefield is appropriate.
I have seen comparisons with convicted criminals a number of times in a lot of campaign items. Hon. Members are comparing convicted criminals to armed forces veterans. That comparison—prisoners to veterans—has been made a number of times. I can tell Members that that goes down like a cup of cold sick in the veterans community. It is not comparing the same things.
I will give way in a moment.
The Bill has clearly been introduced to protect our servicemen and women when they conduct overseas operations. The purpose of the limitations is to stop large-scale out-of-time and often vexatious claims being brought against the military on overseas operations. I urge Members to think a bit more about comparing veterans with convicted criminals.
On a point of order, Mr Mundell. The Minister keeps repeating something that is blatantly incorrect. No one at all on the Opposition Benches has compared prisoners to veterans or our armed forces. We have said that in the Bill the rights of veterans and members of our forces are less than those of prisoners. That is an important distinction and I ask the Minister to be correct when he makes accusations.
I do not think that that is a point of order, but at least you have got your point on the record.
As for the idea that we must withdraw part 2, the whole point of the Bill is to bring in time limits to provide certainty for veterans, so if colleagues take it away, what is the point of the Bill? Why are we here in the first place, if we will just continue as we currently are?
Not at the moment.
The six-year longstop for personal injury and death claims is an important part of the Bill. The measure will help to provide greater certainty for service personnel and veterans by requiring civil claims arising from overseas operations to be brought promptly. Effectively, service personnel will not have to worry about having to give evidence on what would have been very distressing events many years in the future.
The public consultation launched in 2019 sought views on the length of time for such a longstop, and asked whether 10 years was appropriate. Many respondents supported a period of less than 10 years, so we decided to reduce the time limit for the longstop. Six years was chosen because it aligns with the limitation period for some other tort claims. That decision was further informed by the case of Stubbings v. the UK, in a judgment that has been repeatedly confirmed. The European Court of Human Rights upheld an absolute six-year limitation period. The Court noted the need in civil litigation for limitation periods because they ensure legal certainty and finality and the avoidance of stale claims, and prevent injustice where adjudication upon the events in the distant past involves unreliable and incomplete evidence due to the passage of time.
Is there going to be a new point? I have given way a lot and we seem to be repeating the same points.
The Minister is going backwards and forwards just reading out what he has in front of him—[Interruption.] I am sorry, but he is. He is not answering any questions at all. Can I ask the Minister this? He says the reason for the longstop, which disadvantages veterans, is to stop all these vexatious claims. In terms of the Shiner case, for example, how many of those cases were actually time-limited cases and argued in terms of this limitation? If that is the case and there were thousands of them—I would be very surprised if there were—I would imagine in most cases the Limitation Act would weed out most of those that were vexatious. To actually introduce this to solve that part of the problem is going to have a massive impact on servicemen and women who wish to bring claims against the MOD.
Of Phil Shiner’s claims through Public Interest Lawyers, 62% were brought more than six years after the date of the incident. The Bill imposes a six-year limit, meaning that 62% of those claims would have been out of time. This legislation is designed to redress the balance. We are operating in a very difficult area, I accept that. Doing nothing has been the easy option that this House has pursued for 40 years and it is an approach I disagree with.
I am not going to give way again, there will be plenty of opportunity for the right hon. Gentleman to speak further. I recommend that the amendment be withdrawn.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 76, in schedule 2, page 16, line 5, leave out
“the section 11 relevant date”
and insert “the date of knowledge”.
This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 77, in schedule 2, page 16, line 30, leave out
“the section 11 relevant date (ignoring, for this purpose, the reference to section 11 (5) in paragraph (a) of the definition of that term)”
and insert “the date of knowledge”.
This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.
Amendment 78, in schedule 2, page 16, line 35, leave out
“the section 12 relevant date”
and insert “the date of knowledge”.
This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.
Amendment 79, in schedule 2, page 17, leave out from the beginning of line 35 to end of line 5 on page 18, and insert—
““the date of knowledge” means the date on which the person bringing the proceedings first knew, or first ought to have known—
(a) of the act complained of;
(b) that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence or the Secretary of State for Defence;
(c) of the manifestation of the injury resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim, and
(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”
This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.
Amendment 80, in schedule 3, page 20, line 41, leave out
“the section 17 relevant date”
and insert
“the date of knowledge (see subsection (13))”.
This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.
Amendment 81, in schedule 3, page 21, line 4, leave out
“the section 18 relevant date”
and insert
“the date of knowledge (see subsection (13))”.
This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.
Amendment 82, in schedule 3, page 21, line 9, leave out
“the section 17 relevant date”
and insert
“the date of knowledge (see subsection (13))”.
This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.
Amendment 83, in schedule 3, page 22, leave out lines 12 to 17 and insert—
““the date of knowledge” means the date on which the person bringing the proceedings first knew, or first ought to have known—
(a) of the act complained of;
(b) that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence or the Secretary of State for Defence;
(c) of the manifestation of the injury resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim, and
(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”
This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.
Amendment 84, in schedule 4, page 24, line 5, leave out
“the Article 7 relevant date”
and insert “the date of knowledge”.
This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.
Amendment 85, in schedule 4, page 24, line 29, leave out
“the Article 7 relevant date (ignoring, for this purpose, the reference to Article 7(5) in paragraph (a) of the definition of that term)”
and insert “the date of knowledge”.
This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury out of overseas operations.
Amendment 86, in schedule 4, page 24, line 34, leave out
“the Article 9 relevant date”
and insert “the date of knowledge”.
This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.
Amendment 87, in schedule 4, page 25, leave out lines 25 to 43 and insert—
““the date of knowledge” means the date on which the person bringing the proceedings first knew, or first ought to have known—
(a) of the act complained of;
(b) that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence or the Secretary of State for Defence;
(c) of the manifestation of the injury resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim, and
(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”
This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.
Amendment 73, in clause 11, page 7, line 30, leave out from “before” to the end of line 34, and insert
“the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date of knowledge.”
This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing claims under the HRA arising out of overseas operations.
Amendment 92, in clause 11, page 7, line 36, leave out
“or first ought to have known”.
Amendment 74, in clause 11, page 7, line 37, leave out “both”.
Amendment 75, in clause 11, page 7, line 40, at end insert—
“(c) of the manifestation of the harm resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim; and
(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim under the Human Rights Act 1998 against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”
This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing claims under the HRA arising out of overseas operations.
The amendments allow the Bill to account for all legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations. The Minister recently said in The Daily Telegraph:
“Our analysis suggests 94 per cent of claims from service personnel and veterans are already brought within six years.”
He has repeated that today. He goes on:
“Critically, for conditions like PTSD, this limit will start from the date of knowledge or diagnosis.”
If that provision can be applied for certain conditions, which of course I agree with, let us take this opportunity to apply it fairly to all service personnel. That would allow those 6% who do not make claims within six years, according to the Minister’s own figures, to be given a chance to explain why. If the court’s criteria were met, they could then claim any compensation they are entitled to. On Sunday, I happened to chance upon the article that the Minister wrote for The Sun on Sunday, where he said that he would make it his personal mission to carry the can for those who fall outside the six-year rule. It would be helpful, given those comments, if he expanded on what he meant by that.
The court will still take the passage of time into account, just as it would normally, but to block claims being brought after six years does not take into account the true complexities of civil claims linked to overseas operations. Courts should retain their discretion and should consider the large periods of time that can pass before knowledge comes to light of the true extent of an injury, acts of negligence, or the right to other civil claims. The point of knowledge of a claim may be many years after the event or series of events. This may be because claimants did not know that they had a right to claim, or because they did not link their circumstances to overseas operations for some years.
The Bill is meant to protect our armed service personnel, but leaving this part unamended only protects the Ministry of Defence. I want to bring to the Committee’s attention a particular case, or group of cases I should say, that causes me great concern in the event of the amendment not being made. It is the case of the nuclear test veterans.
This case is particularly close to my heart, and I raised it with the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) when she was the Prime Minister. When I first became the Member of Parliament for Islwyn, we used to hold a parade through Risca to honour those veterans. In my second year as an MP, because of the number who had passed away, it was decided that their standard would stay in the local church in Risca until it turned to dust.
What was so sad about this case was that those veterans were fighting for justice for so long. Many of them endured horrific medical conditions, and the families left behind only had their memories of those who were incapacitated by their nuclear service during those times in Easter Island. What was really hard to bear was, first, that they did not have compensation; secondly, though—if I step out of the Bill and say this to the Minister, who is the Minister for Veterans—these people have suffered enough. As he will know, I have made appeals to other Ministers to ensure that these veterans have a medal and some recognition. I want to use this opportunity to ask the Minister to take that up with the Honours and Decorations Committee, and to ensure that they do get some recognition, especially as we approach a very different Remembrance Sunday this year. I have digressed. Thank you, Mr Mundell, for allowing me to indulge in that.
For the vast majority of nuclear test veterans, their injuries did not manifest for decades. The nature of radiation injury means that it invisibly alters cellular DNA.
Had the Bill been in place in 2009, that would have been it for those veterans—there would have been no case at all. The 2009 case, which I know well, was a limitation case, and they brought it before Justice Foskett because they argued that new evidence—medical evidence from New Zealand—had emerged about what my hon. Friend is referring to. If this Bill had been in place then, they would not have even been able to go to court to argue why their case should have had consideration, because of the time that had elapsed since the 1950s, when the exposure took place.
I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend for his service during that time. I know that as a Minister he dealt with the case with sympathy and respect. My direct predecessor, Lord Touhig, also dealt with the case when he was a Minister. I know that everybody who served during that period was wrestling with it, but my right hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that it would not have been possible to bring the case.
If radioactive particles are ingested, the harm might occur at a slow but steady rate for many years, with minor ailments leading to a dramatic diagnosis, and eventually to death. There was no way for the veterans to know that their minor ailments were linked to the nuclear tests that they were involved in. As the Minister knows, however, it often prevented them from gaining the compensation they deserved.
How can we ask young men and women to serve and not guarantee their rights in the same way as civilians are guaranteed theirs? Should the Bill progress, I worry for the next generation of service personnel who are affected by the equivalent of nuclear tests. We do not yet know what might happen in the future that could cause problems further down the line. That is just one example of why someone might need to extend the six-year limitation as currently set out.
I must raise concerns from specialist members of the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, a not-for-profit firm that specialises in military claims. It has voiced concerns that injured personnel can be misinformed of their right to make a legal claim. They might not even know that they have a right to a claim. According to a report by the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, it is unfortunately not unusual for service personnel to be misinformed about their right to bring a civil claim.
Does my hon. Friend agree that it would also limit families? In some cases—especially those involving asbestos, but also some involving cancers—the claim is generated only after the person passes away. Even though somebody might have known earlier that they had cancer, it is only once they pass away that the family might think that it was related to service. I know of some cases that were the result of submarine service. The Bill would actually stop families getting any redress in such cases.
I agree. I will come to an example that my right hon. Friend probably knows as well, but I first will say something about service families. When servicepeople are away, their families are left with the worry, the childcare and other needs. When a serviceman suffers from cancer, it is the family who have to watch their loved one wither away. It is vital that they have a chance to make a claim.
It is interesting that my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham intervened in my speech. When we talk about personal injury, those of us who come from mining communities will remember the example of the miners’ compensation scheme and how miners were left behind. I am not comparing miners to veterans, but it is a similar principle.
The hon. Gentleman, for whom I have a lot of respect, has now spoken for about 10 minutes on nuclear test veterans. I trust that he is aware that nuclear test veterans are not covered by the Bill. It was not an overseas operation, and they are not covered by the Bill. The legislation that we are debating does not affect them in any way.
I am looking for clarity. Why would the overseas nuclear test veterans not be considered to have been on an overseas operation?
I should ask the Minister to reply to that—I am just the post box here.
Nuclear tests were not classified as operations. There is a lot of conversation about what Operation Banner was in Northern Ireland, but nuclear test veterans are not classified as having been on an operation. They are not subject to the Bill.
Service personnel might have knowledge of the event or series of events that the claim relates to, but many are under the impression that they cannot bring a claim while they are serving, or that their only route to redress is through the armed forces compensation scheme. This means that the date of knowledge should encompass not only the date of knowledge of the injury or the subject of the claim but the date of the knowledge that they had a right to claim—the date when they knew they had a case. That can be many years later and must therefore be taken into account if the Government insist on introducing a time limit.
The 2009 High Court case of 1,000 veterans of nuclear testing was fought and eventually lost on precisely this issue. The MOD argued that some veterans knew they were ill when they joined the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association in the 1980s, when it began campaigning. That was not the case. They knew they were ill at the time, but they wondered only if there was a link. The true point of knowledge can only come when a doctor confirms a possible link, which for many does not happen until years later. To me, that is the point of understanding.
The problem with the nuclear test veterans—it could apply to other examples—is that there is actually a clear date of incident, many decades before. Although their point of knowledge of harm might have been much later, there was a clear date of incident, which the MOD could use to its advantage.
That raises the actual point. When someone is ill, they know something is wrong, but they do not know what caused it; a doctor or medical researcher has not confirmed a link.
I think it will be helpful if I make it clear that service personnel cannot bring claims for service pre 1987. Nuclear test veterans have access to the war pension instead, which has no time limit, so issues around nuclear test veterans and the Bill are not comparable.
Every training exercise in the UK or overseas is given an operational name, even though it is not an operation overseas, as per the Bill.
I was about to say—as we spoke about earlier when I moved the amendment about the Attorney General—that we could have a huge debate about this. I have made a plea to the Minister about the nuclear test veterans. I know he is a good man and that his heart is in the right place when it comes to veterans, and I hope he will recommend to the HD committee that they receive some recognition for their service.
I will move on to the meat of the Bill and the amendment, otherwise we could be here all day. Simon Ellis, a senior partner at the law firm Hugh James, argues from experience that the point of knowledge of the injury, especially in cases of post-traumatic stress disorder or deafness, as the hon. Member for Glasgow North West said, is difficult to define. For illnesses such as PTSD, the sufferer may take a long time to understand what they are suffering from—similar to what the hon. Lady mentioned about her father—long after healthcare professionals or friends or family have this knowledge. Therefore, although there is knowledge of the injury, the victims themselves do not fully know or are not willing to admit that they are suffering. It can then take even longer for them to accept that they have post-traumatic stress disorder, to link that to an overseas operation or a series of operations and to realise that they therefore have a right to a civil claim. The point of knowledge, therefore, can be marked only as the point at which the serviceperson has a full understanding of their condition and their right to a civil claim.
I listened with interest to the hon. Member for Glasgow North West when she talked about what her father was going through. As I understand it, he knew he was deaf and those around him knew he was deaf, but it took him a long time to admit to it. Where is the point of knowledge in that? I do not know. I would be interested to learn, maybe afterwards, when he did finally admit that he had a problem.
Even in simpler cases, when the service person is aware of an injury at the point of the event, it would be grossly unfair for the longstop to start on the date of that event, if they had no knowledge that they could even bring a claim if they wished. Will the Minister therefore concede that clause 11 is not comprehensive enough to deal with the intricacies of a process that includes an event occurring, the sufferer fully understanding and accepting the injury, and their knowing that it is something that fulfils the criteria for a civil claim––that the option of a claim is open to them? If the Government insist on placing a time limit on service personnel or their families for bringing a civil claim, surely the clock must start from the point at which the claimant was both fully aware of the content of the claim––be that negligence, injury or death––and aware that they had the right to file a claim.
If that is not taken into account, it becomes even more clear that the Bill is intended to protect not service personnel but the Ministry of Defence. If these clauses relating to the rights of civil claims become law, those injured through negligence during overseas operations will no longer have the benefit of the full discretion of the court to allow a claim to proceed after the limitation period has expired. They will have fewer rights than other employees while the Ministry of Defence will be sheltered behind the longstop.
An employee who frequently works on military claims for Simpson Millar Solicitors said that, from her experience, she expects that Ministry of Defence lawyers
“could use this new Bill to support arguments that personal injury claims are out of time.”
Therefore, it is a bare minimum that the time limit starts ticking only once the claimant has full knowledge of their right to file a civil claim. This strikes back hard in respect of what my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham said. Once the Bill is passed, it will be handed over to MOD lawyers. Now, none of us will be here for ever and we will have our successors. It will be the lawyers who interpret the Bill. It is therefore vital that we get this right. There is no justification for the MOD having special protection in terms of limitations on civil claims. It is vital that service personnel can bring claims to court in accordance with civil law, without fear or favour. It is vital that they are entitled to the same rights and civil considerations as the rest of the population when it comes to employment disputes.
There is a concern that the Bill could put troops at a disadvantage compared with their civilian counterparts. In our first sitting, Mr Young said:
“Imposing an absolute time limit places armed forces personnel claimants themselves at a disadvantage compared with civil claimants in ordinary life, where the court has discretion. Of course, the Minister has made it perfectly clear, absolutely correctly, that the time limit for this particular part of the Bill only starts to run at the point of knowledge. That is completely understood. That point of knowledge, diagnosis or whatever, could be many years later. Nevertheless, I would have a worry about an absolute longstop as proposed.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 9, Q6.]
If as Mr Young says, it is the case that the Minister considers the time limit as beginning from the point of knowledge, let us say so in the Bill. This is too important a matter to be imprecise in our words. We need clarity and we need definition. Let us be clear what the amendment means for our armed forces. Let us be clear that service personnel will not be disadvantaged if a link between actions and events overseas and a particular injury or negligent action comes to light only years later. We have seen time and time again, from asbestos to our test veterans, that these things unfortunately do happen. People get injured and hurt. Let us not use this Bill to protect the Ministry of Defence and disadvantage our service personnel. They deserve our support and, more than anything, our protection.
I thank my hon. Friend for moving amendment 76. He makes a good point: whatever legislation we put in must be future-proofed. There are claims that it will do x, y and z, but we have all seen legislation that goes through Parliament with the best of intentions, but, as things change, still sits on the statute book and disadvantages individuals. Is it ever possible to future-proof legislation completely? No, it is not, but it is certainly possible to ensure that we do not put things in a Bill at the start that discriminate against veterans and armed forces personnel. That should be the starting point for this.
In this group of amendments, I will speak to my amendment 92, which relates to clause 11, page 7, line 36, leave out,
“or first ought to have known”.
It gets to the point that my hon. Friend has just referred to about date of knowledge and the issues surrounding it. Is it straightforward to know when a condition happens? No, it is not, as he eloquently explained, and I will explain some examples in a minute.
Many conditions that arise from service are complex; they first require diagnosis, and that sometimes takes time. If someone has a condition and knows they are suffering from something, that is their date of knowledge, but it might take several years to diagnose exactly what it is. Also, as we heard in the evidence session and has come out again today, it may take time for members of the armed forces to recognise that they might have a claim against the Ministry of Defence anyway. I hear what the Minister said about how we should publicise that, and I welcome the idea that we should make it known to people that they can make claims for injuries or conditions, whether through publicity or just ensuring that people know it, both when they are in service and when they leave. That must be recognised.
The conditions fall into two areas. If we look at industry—I know the Minister will say that is different from the military, and it is in many ways, but in other ways, on key issues such as hearing loss, there are some clear links—over many years litigation has led to improvements in standards and training, and I would argue that that should also be a lever in terms of the MOD.
I remember, when I was in the Ministry of Defence, dealing with the question of hearing loss. To be honest, I accept that in combat operations people are going to be exposed to loud noise. They are, and I do not think we can get away from that fact. But when I think back to the MOD in those days, we were paying out huge claims—quite rightly—for people’s hearing loss caused by training and other things, and it struck me that we were not getting to the root cause. As I said this morning, litigation can be seen, not as ambulance-chasing from the claimant’s point of view, but as a way of informing the MOD that it should change things, and can change things.
Another example, of course, is the Snatch Land Rovers, which we have heard talk of many times. It was only because a claim was brought against the MOD that safer alternatives were put in place.
Yes, it concentrated the minds of people. I will refer to that case in a minute. The important thing is that the Bill shifts the burden of knowledge to the combatant in terms of self-diagnosis. That is completely unfair. A lot of these cases are complex, and it is unclear whether a service man or woman in a war zone could remain resilient with their fellows if they had to keep sight of a self-diagnosis, saying exactly when something actually happened, certainly for mental health cases. I am not one to want to encourage people to sue the MOD or any public body for the sake of it, but if they have been done wrong then they should have the right to do that. I am uncomfortable about the six-year rule protecting the MOD.
I accept what the Minister said. He has introduced the rule because he is looking through the wrong end of the telescope; he is looking at ways of stopping cases like Phil Shiners’. There are other ways of doing that which would not mean introducing a six-year longstop to prevent veterans and service personnel taking cases. It concerns me that the attitude is there. MOD lawyers will use the longstop. They will definitely use it. They are not going to be thinking, “This is a tool in the armoury that we are not going to use to stop claims.” They will use it. Can you blame them? No you cannot, to be honest, but it disadvantages veterans and leads to a grievance.
Issues have already been raised about mental health and PTSD, but other conditions are, again, quite unique in terms of how they are dealt with. Non-freeze injuries are soft tissue injuries that involve nerve damage, and they result from an individual being exposed to long periods of wet and cold weather. That has been a particular issue for Commonwealth service personnel. The MOD have tried to do certain things to mitigate it, but it was only because claims were starting to be initiated that the issue was highlighted. Has that knowledge been around for a long time? Yes it has. If you go back to the first world war, trench foot was that type of injury. It has affected many Commonwealth members who loyally joined our services to serve the UK. Even after an injury is diagnosed, it might not be realised during a career. In terms of delaying a claim, the effects of the cold injury might be there and the initial advice is to keep things warm, which might alleviate the issue. If two or three years down the line the service man or woman is discharged from service because of that—I understand it is a debilitating condition—that individual might not know they had a claim.
Yes it would. That, and doing away with the six-year backstop. My hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon makes a good point. The individual might not know that they were suffering from the condition, in terms that a judge would be able to look at to say they should have known about it and they should have brought a claim. I think the evidence outlined by my hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon is right: there was a reluctance to bring claims, which meant they ended up out of time. Major injury sufferers should know the date of diagnosis, but not necessarily the full impact of the condition on their service—it might not be a showstopper in their career, but in the long term it might affect their career and their ability to find post-career employment.
Another example is non-freezing cold injuries: this is not a surprise to the MOD because it knows about them. There are things that can and should be done, without putting the onus on the individual to self-diagnose the date of knowledge.
The other issue, raised by the hon. Member for Glasgow North West this morning—I mean earlier this afternoon: I am enjoying myself so much I have lost track of time— is hearing loss, the date of which is notoriously difficult to determine. In my previous incarnation, in a case of someone working with loud machinery in a factory all their lives, it is easy to pinpoint what has caused the loss of hearing. The problem for service personnel is that their careers are very varied, and although hopefully the MOD has training in phases 1 and 2 about protecting young ears especially, what is the crucial issue that leads to hearing loss, or hearing impairment? In military life, there will be exposure to loud noises: it nearly as much a fact of life as us having to listen to loud noises every day in the Chamber of the House of Commons.
Just as a point of clarification, not all service personnel are exposed to loud noises: they talk about the silent service.
Yes, but that can lead to other problems, such mental health issues. I think I referred to the 1902 situation when submarines were first invented, and there were issues with pressure that had an effect on people’s bodies, which led to further issues. I accept that it does not affect everyone.
Under the Bill, how can people disaggregate when their hearing loss took place? If a certain proportion of someone’s life was spent in overseas operations, are we saying that that part of the hearing claim cannot go forward as it is exempt, as it is beyond the six years? That is where it gets very complicated, which is why I think the clear system that we have at the moment, in which if people make a claim after the time limit, they have the possibility of taking the claim under section 33 and are able to argue their case. I reiterate the point that that is not an easy process.
When I asked the Minister how many of Phil Shiner’s cases were time-limited—could have been struck out due to the time limits—and how many he actually argued in court—the Minister did not say. It would be interesting to know—
Is the Minister saying that that 62.7% were all cases that went before a judge under the Limitation Act 1980 and were deemed to have enough evidence and special circumstance to take them forward? If he is, I find that remarkable, because in my experience of the Limitation Act, trying to get cases under it is very difficult. That is what was said by the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers—they are unique cases and specialists are needed. I would be surprised if the figure was as high as that, so that of the 4,000 cases, more than half were out of time and went before a judge. If so, why did the MOD not just strike the cases out straight away, so that they were out of time? It would be interesting to know if they all went before a judge, because that suggests that the judge clearly thought that there was enough evidence to progress them. Perhaps the Minister will write to me about that—I am happy to accept that he cannot have all such figures to hand.
I am interested to know the number of those so-called vexatious claims because, I tell the Committee now, in my experience, someone who takes a vexatious case to a limitations hearing will not get very far, because of the high bar. People have to argue not only the reasons why a case should be brought out of time, but the case itself and its possibilities of success later in the litigation. For 60-odd per cent., there must have been a very soft judge allowing cases through under the Limitation Act. But I will wait to hear clarification from the Minister.
Something we have not mentioned is sight loss. I accept that in some cases people wake up and have lost their sight overnight, because of blood clots and so on, but more commonly sight is lost incrementally over time. That can sometimes take up to 10 years. If so, the veteran or serviceman or woman might have thought, “Well, I’m losing my sight”, but did not get a diagnosis, or have thought only after 10 years that they might be able to take a case, because the sight loss was related to service. They might not have thought it was but, if it was, 10 years later the Bill would not allow them to take a case. At present, they can get the diagnosis, the medical evidence, the reasons and the arguments for a limitations hearing on why they need to take a case out of time. That will not be the case if the Bill goes through.
Another example is respiratory issues, some of which may lie dormant for a long time and be the result of a whole host of conditions. I remember that in Iraq and, in particular, in Afghanistan, we had a lot of respiratory problems to do with bacteria, because the air was full of pathogens and other things. People might not have had a hacking cough but, a year or so later when they got home, they started to have such symptoms. Again, they might not have related that to their service straightaway, or with certainty, but it was later shown that, because of the use of animal manure, especially in some rural areas of Afghanistan and Iraq, people breathed in pathogens when the dust got into the air. That got into people’s lungs but did not affect their health until many years later—again it was a direct result of service, because they were there to serve their country.
The other issue, which we have touched on a little bit, is how this affects families. I raised the issue earlier of various cancers and other diseases from which people die. People think, “Why has this cancer appeared?” or “Why has this individual suddenly died?” Usually, the causes can only be identified at death. The individual will not have the date of knowledge, but the family will.
Removing the ability for the courts to extend the six-year period would leave our veterans, ex-service personnel and their families at a disadvantage compared to those who bring normal civil claims against their employers. That is the problem we are facing in the Bill.
It is a right. Okay—it will not be straightforward, because in my experience of asbestos cases, even with a clear diagnosis and an autopsy report, getting someone to admit liability is very difficult. The first thing that insurance companies used to do, which is exactly what the MOD will do, is require date of knowledge and say that it is time barred. If the claimant gets over that hurdle through a limitations hearing, the company usually settles. In this case, the MOD will reach for this straightaway, to say that it is not covered because it was contracted on an overseas operation and, therefore, it cannot go any further. That would give no rights at all to that family or the servicemen and women to take that case forward.
I want to give an example and ask my right hon. Friend about his experience. He knows as well as I do that both our constituencies have large numbers of ex-miners who have had compensation for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and vibration white finger. If these rules were applied to them, would they have got the compensation?
No, because some of those cases, especially with vibration white finger, were taken on limitation hearings, because those things happened a long time ago. That is the fundamental right. To protect the veterans or servicemen and women, they need the right to go to the law, if they wish to—not everyone does and I respect people who do not.
The best example—it is a tragic example—which came up in the evidence session was the Snatch Land Rovers. The events in which people were killed and injured took place in Iraq. Although it was an issue in the MOD when I was there, in terms of the suitability of the vehicles, the real focus on it never came until July 2016 and the Chilcot report. The case that was mentioned in the evidence session was in 2005. A serviceman was killed in a Snatch Land Rover, but his widow did not really know the significance of the vehicle until the Chilcot report in July 2016. At that time, she thought that there had been a failing on behalf of the MOD in its duty care and in the provision of that equipment, so she brought a claim for the loss of her husband, not under civil law but under the Human Rights Act on the basis that her husband had a right to life.
That case was clearly time-limited, because the event took place in 2005 but the case was not brought until after the Chilcot inquiry in 2016. Obviously, a limitation hearing was held and it was successfully argued that the case should go forward, and it was settled, along with—I understand—other cases.
If the Bill goes through unamended, that case would not have been able to go forward, because—I mean, if it was left to me and the Minister, we would both agree that the date of knowledge should have been 2016, and therefore it could go ahead. However, I am not sure that the MOD lawyers would be as generous to veterans as the Minister and I would be. That is the problem when the Minister argues that the date of knowledge somehow protects veterans: it does not. The date of knowledge should not be used as argument to throw such cases out straightaway.
What will that take? If the Bill goes through as planned—especially on the human rights side, there will be a court case and an argument will be made. Let us say that a case similar to the one that I just mentioned was active today in the courts. What will happen is that someone will challenge that. So we will get litigation as a result of that process on whether the Bill is compatible with the Human Rights Act. I accept that the Minister will write to me on these issues, but we will get more litigation than we would if we instead said, “Let us have a judge look at the limitations on whether a case should be brought”, and if the case is deemed to be special circumstances, it should go to trial.
We must recognise that the MOD acts no differently to the insurance companies that I used to deal with when I took personal injury cases and industrial injury cases against employers, and I am sure that the hon. Member for Darlington knows this as well. It is horse trading. If there is a limitations hearing, what someone will do is to try and get it settled—nine times out of 10, an offer will be made. It is only the ones who really want to be stubborn who take the matter all the way through to trial. Very few of those cases go to trial, because people look at the evidence, to see whether it is worth going further in court, and the case is settled.
However, that process will be closed down for the individual if this tight six-year time stop goes ahead. The cases will not get to the second stage after the limitation hearing, which is about negotiating with the other side to say, “Well, come on. Can we make an offer?” It is a difficult judgment call. It is a bit like a game show—take the prize or play on—and I am sure the hon. Member for Darlington has had many sleepless nights about what is being offered. In most cases, there is an agreement and the individual making the claim is content with what is offered. Some will want their day in court, but that is not always a good idea.
What the Minister said about nuclear test veterans was interesting. I accept the point about operations—the MOD loves to give things “operation” names—but in that case, which is one I know well, and I know the medical evidence, having read it as a Minister, the Government argued in 2009 that it was time-limited. In terms of overseas operations, it was overseas.
The Minister said that nuclear veterans would not be classed as having been on overseas operations under the Bill, yet as I read clause 1(6), which defines what “overseas operations” are, my understanding is that nuclear veterans would be included.
The Minister says not. It will be interesting to see whether we can have definite clarification. That case was taken against the MOD in the mid-2000s for events that took place in the 1950s and 1960s, so it was clearly time-expired by anyone’s standards.
I am not arguing that we should not have time limits, which are there for very good reasons, but there need to be exceptions to allow for people who fall outside them. In that case in 2009, the MOD refused the case based on time limits, but it went before Judge Foskett who ruled that it should go forward because of new evidence from a study in New Zealand—I am racking my brains for what the study was, as I read the huge scientific document at the time. Subsequently, it failed, which shows that getting past the Limitation Act does not mean that a case is somehow a dead-cert. The facts of the case must still be argued in court and can be resisted, as they were in this case. However, people were given a right.
If that work had been classed as an overseas operation under the Bill, those people would not have had any right to get their day before a judge to argue the case. That could apply to other similar group litigation—there is such litigation from more than one person or a number of individuals—or to individuals. We have been dancing on the head of a pin about the numbers, with the Minister saying that 94% of cases are brought within time. That is fine, and I have no problem with that, but that leaves 6% that are not. If that affects one person, as I said, that is one person too many. With that brief contribution, I commend the amendment to the Committee.
The amendments propose changing technical parts of the Bill, so I hope hon. Members will bear with me as I try to address them in turn. These amendments are aimed at making changes to the point from which the clock starts running for both personal injury and death claims, as well as Human Rights Act claims relating to overseas operations. The amendments mean that for these types of claims the longstop clock would run from the claimant’s date of knowledge only and will not also run from the date of the relevant incident or act.
Taking amendments 76 to 87 first, in relation to the personal injury longstops contained in schedules 2, 3 and 4, there are several problems with this effect. The longstop is already able to run from the claimant’s date of knowledge under the existing law. This Bill does not change that position. We consider that the definition of the date of knowledge in section 14 of the Limitation Act 1980, and its Scottish and Northern Irish counterparts, is satisfactory and works well in practice. There is no reason why the date of knowledge for overseas operations claims should be defined differently. It is therefore not necessary to replace this definition with a new one.
That is not a point of order, but I am sure that the Minister will accommodate it.
I am more than happy to slow down. The date of knowledge provision in this Bill is new for Human Rights Act claims relating to overseas operations, the primary time limit for which currently runs only from the date of the act. We introduced the date of knowledge to mitigate the risk of any unfairness that might be experienced by claimants as a result of the new absolute longstop.
We chose 12 months for the relevant time period because this aligns with the primary limitation period in the Human Rights Act, which requires claimants to bring their claims within one year of the relevant act. We therefore consider 12 months to be a reasonable period for claimants to gather the necessary evidence to bring their claim.
Amendments 74 and 75 aim to change the definition for the new date of knowledge set out in clause 11. We consider that the definition in clause 11 is comprehensive and fair to both claimants and the MOD. It does not replicate section 14 of the Limitation Act 1980, for example, because parts of that definition do not make sense in the context of Human Rights Act claims. Similarly, amendment 75 proposes new parts for the date of knowledge definition that do not work in the context of Human Rights Act claims.
Lastly, amendment 92 removes an important part of the date of knowledge definition, which adds an objective element to the test. This ensures that claims cannot be brought indefinitely if a victim has failed to take reasonable steps to gain the relevant knowledge.
These amendments are simply not necessary. The existing definitions of the date of knowledge are comprehensive and fair, and there is no good reason why the longstops cannot run from both the date of the incident or the act, as well as the date of knowledge. These amendments will unnecessarily complicate the Bill and cause confusion.
I will address two of the points raised by the hon. Member for Islwyn about education for those who are in the armed forces. Running alongside and in tandem with this Bill, if it becomes law, will be a significant education effort through a series of annual tests that we will give to our service personnel. I am more than happy to write to the hon. Gentleman about that.
I understand the points made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, but they are not within the scope of the Bill. The nuclear test veterans and the other pre-1987 cases that he talked about are not covered by the Bill. A lot of today’s debate has been outside the context of the Bill. I do not know what the point is of continuing to bring up cases that are unaffected by the legislation that we are discussing. I have huge sympathy for nuclear test veterans and for others. Indeed, I lobby hard for the recognition that I think we all want to see for those people, but none of that is covered by this legislation. That is worth remembering.
No, not at this stage. I therefore recommend that these amendments are withdrawn.