Supreme Court Dillon Judgment

Lindsay Hoyle Excerpts

Thursday 14th May 2026 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Hilary Benn)]

With permission, I will make a statement on the recent Supreme Court judgment in the case of Dillon and others. It is a complex judgment, but I thought it right to come to the House at the first available opportunity to summarise its main findings.

The case was originally brought against the previous Government following the passage of the legacy Act—the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act—in 2023. The applicants, a group of families who lost loved ones during the troubles, argued that various provisions of the legacy Act undermined rights protected by article 2 of the Windsor framework and by the Human Rights Act 1998, which gives effect to the European convention on human rights.

In February 2024, the High Court of Northern Ireland found the conditional immunity scheme and other provisions of the legacy Act to be incompatible with our obligations under articles 2 and 3 of the European convention on human rights. Those findings were endorsed in September 2024 by the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal. It also made judgments that two additional matters with regard to investigations by the Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery—namely, next-of-kin participation in investigations and the role of the Secretary of State in decisions about the disclosure of sensitive information—did not meet the standard required to be compatible with the ECHR.

This Government have been clear that we are opposed to aspects of the legacy Act, including immunity. That scheme, which would have offered immunity to terrorists, had no support in Northern Ireland or from victims and their families. It was wrong in principle and provided no effective protections for veterans, not least because the provisions were never commenced by the previous Government. That is why, when we came into government, we immediately withdrew the appeal on immunity. However, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of article 2 of the Windsor framework and its findings on next-of-kin participation and disclosure had wider implications for the Government’s ability to legislate effectively across the UK and protect national security. It was for those reasons that the Government appealed against that judgment to the Supreme Court. I am pleased to report that last week the Supreme Court upheld our appeal, finding wholly in the Government’s favour.

Article 2 of the Windsor framework ensures that there is no diminution of rights, safeguards or equality of opportunity in Northern Ireland as a result of the UK leaving the European Union. The Government are firmly committed to those human rights and equalities provisions but felt that article 2 had been interpreted too broadly by the lower courts. The Supreme Court’s judgment has provided important clarity on this question and confirmed the Government’s long-standing position that the rights protected by article 2 of the Windsor framework are those concerned with ending the sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland. While reaffirming the Government’s position on this matter, the Supreme Court found that the relevant provisions of the legacy Act should not have been disapplied by article 2 of the Windsor framework. The purpose of bringing the appeal was to obtain clarity on how article 2 should be interpreted in the future, not to defend immunity.

On next-of-kin participation and disclosure of information, the Supreme Court found that the commission is currently capable of conducting investigations that are compliant with our obligations under the European convention on human rights. The Supreme Court also concluded that the provision of legal aid for the cross-examination of witnesses is not always necessary for an investigation to be fully compliant with human rights. However, the Government recognise the importance of next-of-kin involvement in the reformed Legacy Commission’s inquisitorial proceedings, and we are providing for that in the troubles Bill.

On disclosure, the Supreme Court was unequivocal, saying that

“there must be a system restricting disclosure in circumstances where disclosure may or would risk prejudicing the national security interests of the United Kingdom”,

but it went on to say that

“the Secretary of State does not have an unrestrained power to ‘veto’ the disclosure of information”

and that

“any decision to do so is subject to challenge by way of judicial review.”

This Government are committed to ensuring the maximum possible disclosure of information while protecting life and national security, hence the changes I am bringing forward in the troubles Bill to create a fairer disclosure regime with greater transparency in how decisions are made.

I now turn to what this means for the question of immunity. Contrary to what has been claimed by some, the UK Supreme Court has not endorsed the immunity scheme—it remains incompatible with our human rights obligations. It is also important to dispel the suggestion that the Government do not have the power to make the remedial order. As I have previously made clear, the conditions for laying a remedial order under the Human Rights Act are that:

“An appeal brought within that time has been determined or abandoned.”

The Government’s appeal regarding the immunity scheme in the legacy Act had already been abandoned. The Supreme Court recognised that, and therefore that was not an issue before it, but it did state very clearly that no exceptions in case law exist to justify the granting of immunity for breaches of articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR.

Finally, I want to make clear why, although we welcome the Supreme Court’s determination of certain aspects of the legacy Act, we cannot leave the statute book as it is. The central underpinning of the legacy Act, which was the immunity scheme, was wrong and has failed, so we need a new system. The troubles Bill is essential for a number of reasons. First, while we know that the commission is capable of doing investigations, it has not delivered so far and it must be reformed. The Bill will implement various changes to address these matters, including reformed governance and enhanced investigatory functions.

Secondly, we need the Bill to avoid endless legal disputes in future—for example, the clauses on interim custody orders will put beyond doubt that the Carltona principle applied in the context of those orders. The Bill will also ensure that all troubles-related cases can be investigated, one way or another.

Thirdly, there is the issue of Irish co-operation. Currently, no information is being shared by the Irish authorities with the commission; the Bill will enable that to happen for the first time, helping to find answers for the relatives of those who were murdered, including service personnel who served our country.

Fourthly, the Bill will enable information to be provided to families through the new Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery. Fifthly, we need new and effective safeguards for our veterans and other former service personnel. Crucially, the legacy Act did not provide those protections, and we have developed them for veterans and others who served. As I have made clear, we will be bringing forward more provisions in Committee in response to veterans’ concerns. Simply returning to the legacy Act would leave veterans without immunity or any protections whatsoever.

I am grateful to the Supreme Court for its careful consideration of these matters, and I welcome its judgment. I hope that the combination of this ruling and legislative progress on the troubles Bill will mean that all communities affected in Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom can have confidence that a reformed legacy commission will be able, where possible, to provide answers to those who have waited far too long to find out what happened to their loved ones.

I commend this statement to the House.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Hilary Benn]

Well, I am afraid it is not a question of nuance. The reason why—[Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order. Shadow Minister, you asked the questions; please allow the Secretary of State to answer them without interruption.

[Hilary Benn]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. The right hon. Gentleman knows that the reason why the immunity provisions had no support from any of the political parties in Northern Ireland and no support from victims and survivors’ organisations in Northern Ireland was that people were outraged by the suggestion that terrorists who committed appalling crimes should be able to walk away scot-free because of those immunity provisions. He also has to recognise that immunity remains incompatible with our human rights obligations.

I turn to the three specific questions that the right hon. Gentleman asked. The first was about the interrelationship between the Dillon judgment and the Windsor framework. Clearly a very important part of the judgment is to do with the Windsor framework. In essence, the issue before the Supreme Court was this: was article 2 of the Windsor framework correctly interpreted by the courts in Northern Ireland when they decided to disapply the immunity provisions and in effect struck them down? The Court said clearly that that was incorrect.

The Government brought the appeal because, although we disagree with immunity as a matter of principle and believe that it never existed, that judgment of the courts in Northern Ireland raised a much bigger question, which could be interpreted in other ways in respect of other policies; hon. Members will have seen some of the issues to do with immigration. That is why the Government brought the appeal, and we now have clarity that article 2 applies to certain things, but it is not capable of the broad interpretation that the Northern Ireland courts had given to it.

Secondly, legal aid is a matter for the Northern Ireland Executive as it is their responsibility.

On the troubles Bill, as the right hon. Gentleman will know, it is a carry-over Bill, and its Committee stage will come early in this new Session. I do not accept what he said about the Bill for the very simple reason that, as he well knows, the basis on which any decisions are taken about prosecutions has not changed and will not change under the legislation that the Government are bringing before the House.

Everybody recognises that with the passage of time, for reasons that all of us understand—and the facts demonstrate it—the chance of further, future prosecutions is rapidly diminishing. I also remind the right hon. Gentleman that any decisions about prosecutions are taken independently by independent prosecuting authorities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Hilary Benn]

I very much agree with my hon. Friend. In the end, the legacy Act failed because it did not command support across all communities in Northern Ireland. How can we hope to make progress if that is the case? What we are trying to do, with the support and scrutiny of the House, is to come up with a system that is fair and reasonable but that enables those many families who are still searching for answers to find them. I hope that what I have said today provides some reassurance, in particular to those representing victims who were crestfallen on seeing parts of the Dillon judgment. I have tried to set out the Government’s commitment to ensuring that we have a system that can command confidence from all.

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

[Mr Paul Kohler (Wimbledon) (LD)]

I thank the Secretary of State for advance sight of his statement.

The Supreme Court judgment lays bare the consequences of the previous Government’s catastrophic approach to legacy, which drew a wholly unjustifiable moral equivalence between terrorists and those who serve the Crown. That scheme was declared unlawful and incompatible with our human rights obligations by every court that considered it, and has now been repudiated by this Government. Those on the Conservative Benches who championed it in this House did our veterans no favours, and neither has their ill-disguised and cynical party political mischief-making regarding the remedial order and today’s statement. The Liberal Democrats have opposed the granting of immunity from the outset and maintained throughout that removing it was a legal necessity, not a political choice, and this judgment confirms that we were right.

The Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeal’s declarations that the ICRIR was incapable of discharging its article 2 investigative obligations. However, that was not an endorsement of the ICRIR’s design. The Court held that the challenges to the absence of legal aid, the absence of provision for next-of-kin questioning of witnesses, and the Secretary of State’s power to restrict disclosure could not succeed as abstract prospective challenges; rather, each of those questions would need to be assessed on the facts of individual cases. That “wait and see” approach is part of the uncertainty that our veterans and their families fear. Will the Secretary of State tell the House what concrete steps he will take in Committee to ensure that genuine, independent protections for veterans are built into the Bill, rather than leaving those safeguards to be resolved on a case-by-case basis?