Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill [HL]

Lord Adonis Excerpts

Wednesday 24th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, I support the main aim of Amendment 18, and will speak in particular to Amendments 19 and 37 in this group. As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, the Bill proposes a massive concentration of power in the hands of the mayor. In the context of the appointment of a deputy mayor, there has to be an appointments process that is understood publicly and has public consent. We cannot have a decision just emerging from a set of private decisions. Our Amendment 19 is designed to make the process more transparent. We do that by saying that the appointment by a mayor of a deputy mayor should be,

“subject to approval by the overview and scrutiny committee”,

and that approval can be secured,

“by a simple majority of members of the oversight and scrutiny committee”,

agreeing that the appointment should be made. We also say in proposed new subsection 1(D):

“An overview and scrutiny committee may”—

at its discretion—

“in pursuit of making a determination … hold a confirmation hearing for the deputy mayor”.

That is clearly defined in proposed new subsection 1(E) as meaning,

“a public meeting at which members of the overview and scrutiny committee may question witnesses and where the committee can compel—

(a) the mayor;

(b) the proposed deputy mayor; and

(c) any other persons that the committee considers relevant to attend”.

This is a much better way of proceeding. There are a number of examples around the world where such confirmation hearings are held, and it seems to me that it would be justifiable in this case, given the dangers that we addressed on Monday during our first day in Committee about the creation of a one-party state. So Amendment 37 would require the approval of the appointment of the deputy mayor by the overview and scrutiny committee.

This is an important issue of principle for us, and I hope that the Government will give due weight to the need to ensure that in a Bill which is proposing such a massive concentration of power, some protection of the public interest can be secured by means of our amendment.

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

Perhaps I may ask the noble Lord to reflect on the clear problem that could arise, which is that you might well have a mayor and a deputy mayor who do not get on. The mayor of course is elected with a popular mandate and so has a clear mandate to take office under the provisions of the Bill. It is important that the executive of the combined authority should operate smoothly, efficiently and with a sense of common purpose. Given the limited number of members of a combined authority, how does the noble Lord propose that a mayor should seek to build relations with a deputy with whom they may have little in common?

[Lord Shipley]

It is possible that the mayor would not get on with the deputy mayor, but what the amendments are trying to secure is the approval of an overview and scrutiny committee of the mayor’s nomination. If the members of the committee refused, other people could be nominated by the mayor. It does not say much for local government if, among all the leaders of the councils which are members of the combined authority, there is not one who can get on with the elected mayor.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, I would have sympathy with my noble friend Lord Grocott if the mayor were able to act in an untrammelled way. Coming back to the reality of the Bill rather than grand constitutional fears about what might happen if circumstances took a different course, new Section 107C says:

“The mayor for the area of a combined authority must appoint one of the members of the authority to be the mayor’s deputy”.

In fact, the choice of deputy is very severely constrained. The deputy must be a member of the combined authority, which will limit the choice to a small number of people.

The issue before us is not a great constitutional principle of whether the choice of deputy should be constrained in a way that acknowledges the representative credentials of the combined authority—it is so constrained under the Bill—but whether there should be a further process, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, of consent by the scrutiny committee to the choice of one of those members as deputy. This is a practical issue, in my view, not a constitutional issue. The practical issue is that it is important that the mayor, who comes with a mandate, appoints a deputy with whom he or she gets on.

Those of us who have been engaged in these relationships all know that in practice a deputy mayor will not be appointed who significantly constrains the authority of the mayor, because the mayor is sitting there with a large mandate. There are checks and balances. The combined authority has significant powers to constrain the mayor and to agree the mayor’s actions. If the mayor does not get on with or have confidence in the deputy, what will happen in practice is that the mayor will rely on advisers rather than the deputy mayor. That is not a healthy state of affairs. The mayor has a mandate. The mayor is constrained in the choice of deputy to appoint only a member of the combined authority. It seems a constraint too far to require that choice to be agreed by the scrutiny committee. Of course, in the nature of the political relationship between the mayor and the scrutiny committee, the scrutiny committee itself may well be fairly hostile to the mayor. It is perfectly possible that that will be the position that the scrutiny committee takes.

[Lord Shipley]

My Lords, the noble Lord is referring to Amendment 19 but what does he think about his own party’s Amendment 18, which requires the combined authority to agree the appointment of the deputy?

[Lord Adonis]

I would have more sympathy with that because of course that will be the colleagues from the executive of the combined authority agreeing. But there will still be an issue if it is not possible to appoint a member of the combined authority in whom the mayor has confidence. There are some practical issues here. The choice is already constrained. If you constrain it still further, that will not enhance accountability and democracy but may just oblige the mayor to rely on informal rather than formal officeholders.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Communities and Local Government (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I will deal first with Amendments 18, 20, 21 and 22.

Amendment 18 would require the mayor to obtain the consent of the combined authority before appointing the deputy mayor. As the Bill stands, the deputy mayor is appointed by the mayor from the members of the combined authority, as the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said. The mayor may, if she or he thinks fit, remove the deputy mayor from office and appoint a new deputy mayor. The Bill’s provisions align with a local authority mayor’s current powers to appoint a deputy mayor. In practice, a mayor will consult some or all of the members of a combined authority about a deputy mayor appointment. At the very least, the mayor will consult the person she or he is minded to appoint, and may well take the views of other members of the authority about this.

For mayoral governance to be effective the mayor and the deputy mayor must be able to work together and the mayor must have confidence in her or his deputy, as again the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said. More significantly, the mayor has been directly elected by the people of the combined authority area and has a clear mandate, a mandate which the deputy mayor will have a role in helping the mayor to fulfil. It would be wrong in both principle and practice for the members of the combined authority to have an ultimate say over who is the deputy mayor, which would be the case if this amendment were made. It is wrong in principle since the mayor, with his or her mandate, needs to be able to have a say over who is the deputy who will assist the mayor to deliver what he or she has promised the voters. It is wrong in practice, since giving the members of a combined authority the ultimate say as to whether a person can or cannot be deputy opens up the possibility of appointments being made which would frustrate or hinder the mayor and create division almost from the outset, as the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said.

We need to remember the purpose of all this. It is not about forms of governance for their own sake. It is about putting in place the governance needed to support that devolution of powers which is now so urgently needed, as my noble friend Lord Deben said, if this country is to achieve the economic competitiveness and productivity on which the prosperity of all depends. Requiring the combined authority to consent to the deputy mayor’s appointment is not a sensible check or balance on the exercise of executive functions. It risks creating arrangements which frustrate the exercise of these powers, and hence I invite noble Lords not to press this amendment.

Amendments 21 and 22 would likewise simply risk frustrating the exercise of the mayor’s executive functions, and hence frustrate the very purpose of a devolution deal. These amendments would require a mayor to consult the combined authority whenever the mayor wishes to delegate a general function to the deputy mayor, another member or, indeed, an officer. As the Bill stands, the provisions relating to delegation align with the policy for a local authority mayor or leader, who may arrange for the discharge of functions by members of the executive or officers of the authority. Although the mayor may delegate functions, the mayor remains accountable for any actions taken. The mayor is accountable directly to the electorate.

I understand the motivation behind these amendments, which is to ensure that a mayor is indeed effectively held to account, that the executive actions of the mayor are transparent and that people can have confidence that the mayor will properly exercise his or her functions; in short, that while there is the capacity and scope for strong executive action, there are equally the right checks and balances to give that confidence, to ensure accountability and to deliver transparency. However, confusing executive and non-executive actions by involving members of the combined authority in decisions such as how the mayor decides to do his or her job is not providing these checks and balances. These are provided by strong and effective scrutiny, as we will discuss.

I turn back to Amendment 20, which would require the Secretary of State to obtain the consent of the combined authority before making an order providing for a function to be exercisable only by the mayor. I must make clear again that a devolution deal will be agreed only where there is consent from the combined authority or, in the case where the deal also creates the combined authority, the constituent councils. The devolution deal would set out the functions to be exercised by the mayor—the mayoral functions—and those that are to be exercised by the combined authority. The details of the deal will be implemented through an affirmative order, so the arrangements regarding the scope of the mayoral functions will also be fully scrutinised and approved by each House of Parliament, and any order creating or modifying a combined authority is made with the consent of the constituent councils. Hence, we are very clear that the combined authority and/or its constituent councils must agree which functions are mayoral functions and which functions are to be exercised by the combined authority. I am ready to look to ensure that the Bill makes this clear in every circumstance that can arise.

I turn to Amendments 19 and 37. As the Bill stands, the mayor appoints a deputy mayor from the members of the combined authority. This is an action that properly belongs to the mayor and aligns with a local authority mayor’s power to appoint a deputy. The mayor has been directly appointed by the electors, with clear responsibilities and the accountability that goes along with them, and a deputy mayor will have a role in supporting the mayor to fulfil these responsibilities. For an effective partnership and the successful devolution of powers, the relationship between the mayor and deputy needs to work. The requirement for an overview and scrutiny committee to approve the appointment, and to have the power to void it, may frustrate and very much damage this relationship. In practice, a mayor will consult some or all of the members of a combined authority about a deputy mayor appointment, and may well take the views of other members of the authority about this. Adding an extra requirement of consent for a deputy mayor’s appointment is to add an extra layer of bureaucracy, which we are so keen to avoid, and may obstruct the successful devolution of powers that we are trying to achieve.

The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, asked about confirmatory hearings. Those hearings are used but their place is usually where the executive is making an appointment to a public office. The appointment of a deputy mayor is not in this process; rather, it is part of the process for creating the executive.

My noble friend Lord Deben made the point about the clarity of the Bill, on which I commend the Government, and the need for individual areas to do exactly what fits their area; hence the bespoke nature of each deal. With these assurances and the explanations that I have given, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, will agree to withdraw the amendment.