National Insurance Contributions (Employer Pensions Contributions) Bill

Lord Altrincham Excerpts

Wednesday 4th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

I thank the Minister for leading this debate and for his customary courtesy in listening to all the observations of noble Lords. There is a common observation that there is nothing new in tax. Maybe this Bill is a small Bill; the noble Lord, Lord Davies, says it is a trivial matter that does not really need our scrutiny. Nevertheless, it is a moment in taxation when we are taxing savings—

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I actually said that I was looking forward to discussing it further in Committee. It certainly does require our attention.

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

I stand corrected.

This is a moment in taxation when we move towards taxing savings. It is against a backdrop in which policy has been relatively settled in this area in recent years. There was an understanding that we need to provide private sector pensions. Quite broadly, there was cross-party support for auto-enrolment; it has been quite successful. Against this background of a degree of consensus, we are now introducing—in a small but nevertheless important way—the taxation of savings. We made the changes towards auto-enrolment not just for social benefit reasons but to protect the state. It is important to remember that we are doing this also because the liability for retirement is falling on the state, and it became urgent to do something about this and to make sure that there was private provision to offset this rising cost.

With this Bill, we find ourselves at a moment when the tax system begins to eat itself. It would be illusory to suggest that there will be any gains from taxing savings, because the liability that will accrue to the state will likely be greater. That is because the returns to invested pensions over time will, in almost all cases, exceed the growth of the state, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, knows from his time in pensions, and it is the growth of the state that provides the tax income that can support people. So the gap will be very wide if people do not save in private sector pensions.

That is the unfunded liability that stands behind this tax change. That liability could be very wide for the cohorts who are affected by this: middle-income earners who might have 30 more years of saving. Quite small amounts accumulating over 30 years can make an enormous difference to their retirement: it is enormously important. But, in the absence of those savings, regrettably, the state will be exposed. Therefore, the Government need to tread very carefully when making these changes, because the credit of the Government rests on securing some stability to future liabilities. Growth in this area of future liability is extremely important for investors in our bond market, and we need to make sure that they do not feel that there is a rebalancing here towards current taxation income against liabilities in the future.

I turn to the themes that have been raised so far, starting with fairness. As my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe explained, the Bill is, in practice, aimed not at higher earners but at earners around the middle of the income distribution. Among this group will be a large number of younger workers, already taxed quite heavily, and among them graduates required to repay the student loan. This initiative is a quite specific transfer from the young to the old. These groups are being encouraged to behave responsibly—as the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, mentioned—and to put aside savings.

For employees, the Bill raises fundamental questions of fairness and coherence. Two individuals may arrive at precisely the same level of pension saving yet be treated very differently for national insurance purposes, depending solely on how that saving is structured. Direct employer contributions remain exempt, while salary-sacrificed contributions above the threshold do not. This difference undermines neutrality in the tax system and distorts incentives away from arrangements that many workers actively rely on to manage affordability and long-term planning.

Quite a few noble Lords mentioned complexity. We should also consider the burden on employers, particularly those operating within tight margins and employing large workforces. Professional advisers in the pensions and benefits sector have warned that increased payroll costs and added administrative complexity may prompt businesses to reconsider pension enhancements and lead to a contraction of workplace pension ambition itself. That was mentioned by my noble friend Lady Altmann.

Businesses that have structured remuneration packages in good faith around existing rules now face not only higher contribution costs but a new layer of administrative complexity. The introduction of a £2,000 cliff edge creates a compliance burden that is wholly disproportionate to the revenue that it is said to raise. For many firms, this is a material increase in payroll expenditure. There is good evidence that employer costs could account for a substantial share of the projected yield.

We have already seen the dampening effect of recent national insurance increases on recruitment and wage growth. To compound that pressure risks discouraging the forms of workplace pension generosity that public policy has long sought to encourage.

The distributional effects further complicate matters. For those earning above the higher earnings threshold, portions of what is, in essence, deferred income are drawn back into the national insurance net at marginal rates aligned with current earnings. The result is a reclassification of pension saving itself. Contributions made today attract national insurance, while withdrawals in retirement continue to attract income tax. Although these are different fiscal instruments, the policy makes pension saving resemble present consumption rather than deferred provision, creating the perception and often the reality of taxation both on entry and exit. This matters because the architecture of pension policy rests upon encouraging individuals to defer consumption, to assume responsibility for the later years. The messaging around this is sensitive, as my noble friend Lord Leigh mentioned.

The Government keep changing pension policy, so we might expect taxpayers to become better at adjusting behaviour. In this case, we have heard that some employers are encouraging employees to increase salary sacrifice now, which will of course reduce tax receipts in the short term and may reduce student loan repayments. The younger cohorts have learned to adjust their student loan repayments using the salary sacrifice scheme. Taxpayers may be hoping for a policy change later and would be rational in expecting some adjustment here, particularly for graduates. Given this uncertainty, we are asking for an independent assessment of the policy.

We have already witnessed the economic cost of uncertainty generated by repeated speculation and late clarification in fiscal policy. To proceed now with a measure that introduces fresh complexity and perceived inequity risks compounding that loss of confidence at precisely the moment long-term saving most requires reassurance.