English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Lord Bach Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Willis of Summertown (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 51A and 52A in my name. I respect and agree with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, about having some flexibility in the appointment of these different commissioners.

My amendment looks specifically at the commissioners for climate and nature. In particular, it seeks that these two topics do not just become a political football at the mercy of the political leanings of the mayor that is put in place. It is not enough to say that a mayor merely can appoint a person to oversee the delivery of one of the authority’s competencies; the mayor needs to appoint someone to oversee the delivery of the competencies outlined in Clause 2. That is especially important when we consider nature and climate, since both the 2008 Climate Change Act and the 2021 Environment Act have clear, unambiguous delivery targets, many of which are spatially constrained and require strategic oversight and consideration of competing land uses. We need someone in place who is able to oversee the delivery of these competencies strategically. The problem is that, currently, the duties in these Acts apply only to the Secretary of State, so there is an incredibly high risk that one of our most important delivery arms is under-deployed or at least deployed very unevenly, depending on the political swing or leanings of that mayoral authority.

Why is this so important? I calculated—on the back of an envelope, I admit—the amount of land the six new mayoral districts and the combined areas will be responsible for. It is 75% of the English landscape. This is not a small amount: we are talking about the biggest part of our landscape. Therefore, this should really make us stop and think whether we have the right safeguards in place to ensure the delivery of climate and nature targets if the political leanings of the mayor are not that way inclined.

Of course, it should be for the mayors to appoint whom they wish as commissioners, but it is also important to note that we need them to appoint commissioners in certain areas where they have relevant experience or expertise. Although I accept that it would be the responsibility of the mayor of an area to decide how to develop an action policy, we need to put in place some safeguards to ensure that central government’s policy priorities and legal responsibilities are delivered.

I am going to give a few examples of the importance of a commissioner for nature and climate. The first, as we heard about before in the previous discussion, is local nature recovery strategies. These are full of potential, but now, as they reach implementation stage, there is a risk they will sit on the shelf, for two reasons: first, because of the challenge of integrating decision-making in local government; and secondly, because of the need to organise co-ordinated action at scale.

Environmental skills is another issue. They are commonly and widely recognised as a bottleneck; we do not have the people who are able to help our planning officers to make the decisions needed in the planning system. Lack of skills in planning control and enforcement is a really big risk to delivering on things such as biodiversity net gain right now; only 5% of local authorities say that they have adequate resources properly to manage biodiversity net gain. To deliver and fill those gaps, we need skills and education programmes that are co-ordinated and have oversight at the strategic levels. It is highly unlikely that any of these areas of competence for strategic authorities would see the skills gap as part of their portfolio. I cannot see any of those competences thinking that they should focus on employing people or on education programmes; I would see this sitting under a commissioner for climate and nature.

Finally comes the issue of green infrastructure planning, which many of us discussed in the passage of the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, and the delivery of nature-based solutions and protecting and restoring the UK’s natural capital assets. This requires some large-scale spatial co-ordination actions—for example, the Environment Act targets to reduce nitrogen and phosphorous pollution, and ambitions for nature-based solutions for flood defence. All of that will require strategic interventions and top-down leadership, and to be under a dedicated, named person. Who is going to do it if, within a mayoral system, there is no one with that title who can oversee and manage nature and climate?

At the same time, these large-scale conventional infrastructure projects—I know that one of our noble friends works in the Oxford–Cambridge Arc—require large-scale nature plans to ensure that they do not destroy large swathes of nature and critical natural capital assets. That is something we often forget about when we think about nature recovery.

I would like to zoom out a bit on this one. It is worth remembering that in a report last year about the role of natural capital in the UK’s green economy, the Environmental Audit Committee found that while natural capital assets are an essential foundation of the UK and global economy, there is little evidence of that being considered in decision-making. So, while the amendment does not specifically deal with natural capital, it would ensure that somebody at the top was considering and responsible for oversight of this in the new authority.

I make one more point about natural capital. It is not just a “nice to have”. In November, the ONS released its reports, valuing natural capital assets in the UK at £1.6 trillion. This is not just about the pretty flowers somewhere—this is serious infrastructure. Natural infrastructure underpins so many things we rely on. The annual value of £41 billion in natural capital assets was largely driven by health benefits gained from recreation. So, it comes back to us needing a commissioner at the top who looks at these figures and at what we need to do to deliver on the ground. Devolved government is a fantastic idea, and I am a huge supporter of it, but we need the right people in the right place to deliver what I believe they can deliver.

I would be grateful if the Minister could say what the Government’s intention is here. Do they think there should be a commissioner for each of the competences? Given that there are seven competences and seven commissioners, I would think that the answer is yes, although I am not sure any more—maybe it should be more. If they do not think they should state that in statute, why? What situation are they allowing for if we get in a political situation whereby the mayor does not support nature and climate as part of our infrastructure? That is a very big risk that we should look at in this Bill now.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to six amendments, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59 and 171. As this is my first and may even be my last contribution, I want to express straightaway that I welcome the Bill very warmly. It gives mayors new powers to appoint commissioners, to increase capacity and to maximise the benefits of devolution. Obviously, mayors will have to consider carefully how best to use these directly appointed roles, drawing on the right expertise and ensuring value for money.

I also welcome the Government’s approach to entrusting directly elected mayors to make decisions on commissioner appointments tailored to local needs. However, these amendments seek to make some pragmatic changes that would improve the Bill by giving—vitally—greater flexibility on shaping commissioner roles. All my amendments go to that greater flexibility on shaping commissioner roles and appointments so that they are suitable for the specific circumstances of their region.

I will briefly outline three such issues, to which I will ask the Government to consider making changes. First, in relation to my Amendment 171, the Bill could enable greater flexibility for the appointment of deputy mayors for policing and crime under mayors that will be responsible for more than one police force area. As the Committee may know, I speak as a former Leicestershire police and crime commissioner. Although I may have mixed feelings about the Government’s decision to abolish police and crime commissioners, I am enough of a realist to realise that it is a done deal—it will happen—so we have to talk about the future, and I am happy to do so. Speaking as a former PCC, I recognise the importance of effective democratic oversight and accountability for our police forces in this new world that we are undoubtedly moving into.

The integration of police and fire services under mayors will improve democratic accountability and enable better integration of these services with wider mayoral functions. The Bill will enable the transfer of police and crime commissioner functions to mayors whose boundaries are coterminous with one or more PCC areas, and for most PCC functions to be delegated to a deputy mayor for policing and crime. In the east Midlands, this means that Derbyshire PCC and Nottinghamshire PCC functions transferring to the Mayor of the East Midlands, because the boundaries of the two PCC areas are coterminous with the East Midlands Combined County Authority.

Importantly, the Government also intend to transfer fire and rescue authority functions to mayors too. For the east Midlands, the Government have committed to explore merging the Derbyshire FRA and Nottinghamshire FRA, so that the East Midlands Combined County Authority becomes the fire and rescue authority for the area. I will return to that point in a moment.

As drafted, however, the Bill risks limiting the full potential of this integration, where a mayor takes on PCC functions for more than one police force. This means that a deputy mayor for policing and crime must be appointed for each police force area, so there will be two deputy mayors where there are two police forces. There are good reasons why a mayor may want to appoint a deputy mayor for each police force, including to ensure effective oversight and scrutiny of complex organisations. However, in some cases, a single deputy mayor for policing and crime—or a single deputy mayor for public safety, including fire—may enable better integration and join-up across services.

That is particularly the case—this is the main argument for this in this area—where a mayor may be responsible for two police forces and one fire and rescue authority. For example, it would be impracticable to have a deputy mayor responsible for fire across the whole region but for only one of the two police forces. Therefore, my Amendment 171 to Schedule 22 seeks to ensure that, where a mayor may be responsible for more than one police force area, they would have the flexibility to appoint a single deputy mayor or separate deputy mayors for each police force. I invite the Minister to think carefully about whether this is a sensible proposal to make this part of the Bill marginally more flexible.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Lord Bach Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 24th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I will start by thanking noble Lords for their rigorous and detailed representations on the mayoral commissioners model that the Bill introduces. I think it is fair to say that there is a plurality of views on this important area, evidenced by the substance of the amendments tabled and the hours of considered debate in both Houses. The government amendments that I am introducing today follow considerable deliberation on those contributions. They focus on ensuring that we balance the operational flexibility of the commissioner model with appropriate accountability and scrutiny—issues that have been raised repeatedly in this House.

I will take these amendments in five groupings. First, government Amendments 42 and 46 increase the maximum number of commissioners the mayor may appoint from seven to 10. Secondly, government Amendments 50, 53, 55, 59, 62 and 64 allow multiple commissioners to operate in a single area of competence. Thirdly, government Amendments 51 and 60 ensure that commissioners can operate in one or more aspects of an area, rather than only the area as a whole. Fourthly, government Amendments 54 and 63 clarify that a commissioner must not carry out work in cases where a mayor ceases to hold office early, with the exception of winding down their office. Finally, government Amendments 56 and 65 clarify that an appointment can end in accordance with contract law if not otherwise provided for in the terms and conditions of their appointments.

These changes will increase the overall flexibility of the model, enabling mayors to appoint commissioners with local cross-cutting briefs related to an area of competence, and allowing them to enlist additional support within a given area. This could mean, for instance, two commissioners operating within the transport and local infrastructure area of competence, with one focused on rural connectivity and the other on active travel. I emphasise that the ability to appoint up to 10 commissioners recognises that we expect the devolution framework to grow over time, thereby providing a contingency as mayoral duties and powers expand. It does not mean mayors frivolously appointing people based on patronage. We know that mayors want high-calibre individuals whom they can trust to help them deliver for their regions. Therefore, to bring in people with a track record of success, these appointments should be on merit.

While combined authorities and combined county authorities will have the ability to remunerate commissioners, that does not give mayors carte blanche to pay them what they want. Commissioners may only be remunerated in line with the recommendations and maximum amount specified in a report from an independent remuneration panel.

To be clear, no additional funding is being provided for these appointments. We expect combined authorities and combined county authorities to make appointments prudently on the basis of where they determine that a commissioner will add value to achieving public outcomes. Part of that success relies on commissioners being accountable and their performance being open to scrutiny. That is why, alongside the mayor being able to terminate appointments, the overview and scrutiny committee may also recommend a termination. The decision on whether to accept that recommendation must then be put to a vote of the authority’s board.

Commissioners will also be subject to the strengthened accountability measures being introduced through local scrutiny committees. This includes removal from post for failing to attend six consecutive meetings of a local scrutiny committee, and financial penalties for failing to answer questions or provide information, or for misleading a local scrutiny committee. I beg to move government Amendment 42, and I commend government Amendments 46, 50, 51, 53 to 56, 59, 60 and 62 to 65. I reserve my right to speak later in response to other noble Lords’ amendments.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, this is going to be the shortest speech I have ever made in the Chamber, but it is really meant. I thank the Government and the Minister for the three amendments that I moved at an earlier stage, which are now tabled as government Amendments 42, 46, 51 and 62. These make three excellent changes that will very much assist the flexibility that will be enjoyed under the new devolution principles. Again, I thank the Minister very much for her and the department’s assistance with these three very good amendments—I think that is now probably the unanimous view—that will add to the Bill.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, I can see that this is a very important group. We have moved on, and I am happy for us to have moved on. So, while in Committee I said that I wanted to see the abolition of the principle of unelected commissioners—it is the unelected bit that has really bothered me—they will not have powers to vote or make decisions. You can therefore make the case for the expertise that is required—certainly in some of the areas of competence that the Government are proposing. We can debate whether there should be five, seven, 10, or some other number, but I would devolve it and let people make their own decisions at a more local level.

I got concerned last week as I began thinking about the Government’s changes to overview and scrutiny. I welcome them very much: a lot of progress is being made. The question for me was: who appoints a commissioner, and to what test and what level? If a mayor can appoint a commissioner, what criteria are used for that appointment? I thought that the overview and scrutiny committee could be used, before somebody was appointed, to assess whether the person being appointed would be satisfactory in the role. I have come to the conclusion that Amendment 45, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, and the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, is a better amendment.

We need an appointments process that is public: a fair and open selection process where the criteria and the process are publicly understood, as are levels of remuneration. As the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, and the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, have said, this will be in order to ensure transparency and accountability. This really matters: the public will not have confidence in some of these appointments if they think that someone has been appointed without the right qualifications or experience to undertake the job. When you give power that is too great to an individual—a mayor—there is a danger that, in some places, at some times and on some occasions, that could happen, and we do not want it to. I want the Bill to succeed; we are in favour of driving the devolution agenda.

I am not planning to move Amendments 48, 66, 57 and 58 in this group, but I hope very much that, if the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, decides to press Amendment 45, she will have our support.