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Lord Bishop of St Albans
Main Page: Lord Bishop of St Albans (Bishops - Bishops)Department Debates - View all Lord Bishop of St Albans's debates with the Cabinet Office
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is right to underline the importance of the financial services sector in our country and the huge contribution it makes. There are many laudable things in this Bill: the strengthening of money laundering regulations; encouraging saving; and the creation of parity between white collar crimes, such as market manipulation, and general fraud by extending the maximum sentence.
I was disappointed, however, to hear that the Commons amendment exploring the whole issue of ethical investment with reference to genocide did not make it into the Bill. I understand the Government’s reservation—they do not want to politicise the FCA. Nevertheless, I hope that “global Britain”, as laid out by the intentions of the Bill, will also be very much “ethical Britain” as we place ourselves in the world under the new freedoms that we have. I also note, with other noble Lords, the concern that there seems to be so little clarity on the question of parliamentary scrutiny. I am sure we will return to this as the Bill passes through your Lordships’ House. Of course, fundamental to this whole future is that the FCA is adequately resourced to fulfil its task.
I touch on just one major issue, which takes up a major part of the Bill: the Gibraltar authorisation regime. The issue of Gibraltar’s lower corporation tax rate of 10% was raised during the Commons Report stage as a significant issue, and it is one that warrants raising again. During his evidence session, the Minister said that corporation tax rate was not a factor in relocation to Gibraltar. While I recognise that relocation can be costly and that operating in London has many benefits not offered by Gibraltar, nevertheless there are significant tax advantages.
This has become all too clear in another area of work that I have raised repeatedly in your Lordships’ House—the issue of the tax avoidance of many companies, including gambling firms, which are a particular focus I have had. For example, in 2019, the Daily Mail revealed that 32Red, based in Gibraltar, paid just £812,000 in corporation tax over a 10-year period—an effective UK tax rate of 3%. William Hill, with its six subsidiaries in Gibraltar, is expected to pay 12% in corporation tax in 2020. Ladbrokes Coral is not required to disclose its tax rate, but one of its two licences to operate in the UK is registered in Gibraltar. While these relate particularly to a very focused area of my interests, of course this mechanism applies equally to financial firms.
These arrangements predate our departure from the EU and, given the likelihood that Gibraltar continues to be used in this matter, I am not placing the blame on this new Financial Services Bill. However, during the progress of this Bill, there will be an opportunity to examine again what the appropriate rules would be, particularly within the financial sector, to prevent Gibraltar being simply a place where firms and companies are reducing their tax bill. Will the UK Government commit to publishing an annual report assessing the consequences of the Gibraltar authorisation regime on tax receipts from the financial industry, as well as outlining how they intend to work with the Gibraltarian authorities to ensure there is a fair tax settlement for both territories?
Lord Bishop of St Albans
Main Page: Lord Bishop of St Albans (Bishops - Bishops)Department Debates - View all Lord Bishop of St Albans's debates with the Leader of the House
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, Amendment 46, in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, probes whether the reporting requirements on financial firms operating from Gibraltar in the UK market are sufficiently robust, and it questions whether we might find a way to make them more transparent. The Gibraltar authorisation regime continues the established practice of companies operating from Gibraltar in the UK, which is why it is important to review whether the UK taxpayer receives a fair deal from this arrangement. The Companies Act 2006 already mandates foreign companies to register and file accounts to Companies House, yet some Gibraltar-based companies with registered subsidiaries in the UK have successfully used this system to reduce their tax bill.
Transfer pricing plays a major role in switching money between jurisdictions so that the costs are burdened on the area with the highest tax rates, with the profits channelled to the areas with the lowest tax. This is of course a global issue that requires global tax co-operation, but that does not mean that where possible we as a nation should not take measures to remedy the situation where we can. Financial services are one of Gibraltar’s primary industries, which is why I have tabled the amendment. Ideally, through stricter and more thorough reporting standards between Gibraltar and the UK, these should apply to all sectors. For example, in the online services and gaming industry, transactions are often placed in the UK by customers but processed by servers in Gibraltar, a technicality that allows what in reality is taxable income in the UK to be taxed in Gibraltar.
If such practices are well documented among the online gambling sector, I do not doubt that they extend to the financial sector as well. Without public country-by-country reporting, identifying dubious transfer pricing will continue to remain difficult. However, that should not deter us from strengthening reporting between Gibraltar and the UK, particularly given our official links. Surely it simply cannot be right that some of the major UK gambling firms pay an actual corporation tax in the UK of between 3% and 13% by either headquartering or using subsidiaries based in Gibraltar. Incidentally, we only know this because the size of these firms has brought them under the scrutiny of journalists who have investigated them. Given the commonality of these methods among larger corporations, financial firms of the SME variety could, and possibly do, engage in similar methods.
The fact that companies have been able to rather openly reduce their corporation tax bill by incorporating some of their operations in Gibraltar calls into question the current mechanisms for the effective and proper exchange of information between the two jurisdictions in relation to profits subject to tax. During his evidence session, the Minister said that corporation tax rate was not a factor in relocation to Gibraltar. No doubt, the Mediterranean climate and lifestyle make it a very attractive place to reside. Indeed, I have thought of little else over the recent cold days. However, for the purposes of reducing your corporation tax bill, only a partial relocation is required. Furthermore, Gibraltar provides a unique service in the “non-resident company”, a simple and cheap offshore corporate tax entity that even the most cursory search online will see marketed as an international investment and tax-planning vehicle, with all the usual connotations that this implies.
I do not want the many good people of Gibraltar to confuse my concerns as an attack on their territory, but the continuation of access to UK financial markets by permitted Gibraltar-based persons without a review into the effectiveness of the information exchange and the transparency of reporting requirements between the two jurisdictions will leave open avenues and incentives for businesses to reduce their actual UK tax obligations through Gibraltar-based tax planning. I hope that the Minister will be able to reflect on some of these issues and perhaps help me understand what we can do to improve the situation because we might need to revisit this later on. I beg to move.
My Lords, the provisions in the Bill dealing with relations with Gibraltar raise a number of intriguing questions. The probing amendment in the names of my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe and myself is really seeking some answers. The Bill in effect creates a single financial market with Gibraltar, even to the extent of offering customers of Gibraltarian entities access to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. In doing so, it forges a single market with a different jurisdiction, a jurisdiction that includes a different regulatory authority and notably—as the wording of the amendment in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans suggests—a fiscal jurisdiction that diverges significantly from that of the UK. I welcome the right reverend Prelate’s amendment.
When this country was a member of the European single market, there was, in essence, a single regulatory regime in the UK and Gibraltar, although the implementation of EU directives was not entirely uniform. In the Bill, the provisions on Gibraltar have been presented as a continuity measure. However, the UK’s new-found ability and declared intention to deviate from EU rules signals a substantial shift in our regulatory framework and potentially in its interplay with that of Gibraltar. The first part of Amendment 47 asks the Treasury to present in detail its assessment of how compatible the regulatory systems in the UK and Gibraltar actually are. It is important that people have confidence in the firms that will be allowed to operate in the UK. The Gibraltar authorisation regime, as it is called, being introduced by the Bill seeks alignment of law and practice in the UK and Gibraltar, but it does not prohibit Gibraltarian divergence.
I turn to the impact assessment. It is pointed out that the Gibraltarian authorisation regime will be established by a mix of primary legislation, secondary legislation, regulators’ rules, MOUs, policy statements and guidance. Given the unique nature of the creation of the single financial market, it is important that Parliament has the opportunity to assess this plethora of measures; hence the need for a Treasury statement in 12 months’ time.
It is further noted in the impact assessment that about 20% of motor insurance policies in the UK are written with Gibraltar-based insurers. When replying to the debate, will the Minister tell the Committee why he thinks that might be? What are the peculiar advantages of Gibraltar that have attracted such an extraordinarily high proportion of this UK business, and will those peculiar advantages continue as a result of the Bill?
At a time when the entire regulatory framework is under review, the Government might consider this to be the time to reassess the financial services relationships with the Crown dependencies as well. I am aware of the very different legal status of the Crown dependencies from that of Gibraltar and the fact that, given that the Crown dependencies were never members of the European Union, the UK’s exit does not pose the same range of new problems. However, the Minister will be aware that the financial services provided in the Crown dependencies are a vital part of the financial infrastructure of the UK, in particular with respect to the flow of liquidity into the London markets. Will the regulatory framework review cover the issue of the financial market relationships between the UK and the Crown dependencies? The regulatory framework review could take note, for example, of the fact that many regulatory practices in some Crown dependencies, such as the registration of beneficial ownership, are significantly superior to current practice in the UK. Given that the UK Government happily promote financial relations with Gibraltar, even though the Gibraltarian fiscal regime is significantly different from that in the UK, are they considering some enhancement of financial relationships with the Crown dependencies by, say, extending access to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme?
I have not received a request from anyone wishing to speak after the Minister, so I call the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister for the points that he has made. I too want to underline my support for Gibraltar. In this new post-Brexit world, I want us as a nation and our neighbouring countries, as well as Gibraltar, to flourish. However, we are also in a time of huge financial stringency, and there are very important issues here about tax justice. As so often when I sit in a debate in your Lordships’ House, I find myself realising that I am in a seminar and learning far more than I am giving. I am grateful to my noble colleagues and friends here for some of their explanations.
I am still unclear how the GAR will be reciprocated in terms of why we are giving these extraordinary benefits. I need time to go away and think about what the Minister has said. I certainly still look at the situation with puzzlement. I was struck by the comment by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, that there are two registered companies for every citizen on the Rock. It sounds as if there are some extraordinary benefits which to some of us do not look to be reciprocated justly.
I will probably return to this on Report, but in the light of the comments and some of the limitations of the amendment as it is currently drawn up, I beg leave to withdraw it.
Lord Bishop of St Albans
Main Page: Lord Bishop of St Albans (Bishops - Bishops)Department Debates - View all Lord Bishop of St Albans's debates with the Cabinet Office
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I remind the Committee of my interests as in the register. I have two amendments in this group, one on facilitation of financial crime, which is also signed by the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Rooker, and my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, and a second amendment relating to whistleblowers.
There is much else of merit in this group. In particular I support the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, concerning catching, and willing the means and money to catch, perpetrators of financial crime. While I have hounded the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, on this issue, I do see the point of pressing the Treasury on funding.
My amendment on the facilitation of financial crime is also about the Treasury willing the means. It is similar to the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. We are not in competition; there are more noble Lords wishing to show interest in this topic than can fit on a single amendment. Unfortunately, we did not get to this amendment on Monday and my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford is unable to speak today. He was deeply engaged in the Bribery Act provisions, so his contribution will be missed.
In addition to the measures outlined by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, my amendment, Amendment 84, has a final paragraph that deals expressly with the conviction of a director or other manager who is proved to be responsible for the systems failure of the corporate body. A facilitation or failure to prevent amendment has a particular resonance in this Bill for two reasons: first, because the FCA has a specific remit to prevent the use of the financial system in financial crime; and secondly, because the Treasury, the sponsor of this Bill, has already availed itself of the mechanism with regard to tax evasion. As a believer in the mechanism, it seems appropriate for Treasury to avail itself of it again in relation to the financial system.
The tightening up of corporate systems against bribery following the Bribery Act is well documented, and what better way is there to enhance the reputation of the UK’s financial system at the point when it must protect and enhance its credibility than forcing similar tightening against financial crime? We already know well the reason for needing such offences. It is the old-fashioned way that criminal law works. Having to establish a directing mind is increasingly impossible given the complex board structures of large firms. Indeed, the principle of requiring a directing mind encourages what has been called “organised irresponsibility” by Pinto and Evans in Corporate Criminal Liability.
I know there is some reluctance in the Ministry of Justice, which sat on its hands for ages after its call for evidence on corporate liability, to which I made a submission, and then said there is no new evidence. That was really a bit rich, given that the call for evidence background document itself gave a good exposition of how bad matters are and of many of the reasons why evidence of failures in prosecutions is relatively scant. That is exactly why there is no new evidence—because prosecutors know they cannot succeed against large companies and give up.
Nevertheless, the issue has been sent off to the Law Commission, which has already said in its 2010 paper, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts, that
“the identification doctrine can make it impossibly difficult for prosecutors to find companies guilty of some … crimes, especially large companies”.
In its 2019 paper on suspicious activity reports, it said:
“The identification doctrine can provide an incentive for companies to operate with devolved structures in order to protect directors and senior management from liability.”
The current common law “directing mind” principle is also unfairly discriminating to small businesses. The Crown Prosecution Service’s legal guidance, under “Further Evidential Considerations”, states:
“The smaller the corporation, the more likely it will be that guilty knowledge can be attributed to the controlling officer and therefore to the company itself.”
Given the general guidance for prosecution that there must be a “realistic prospect of conviction”, it is no wonder that prosecution evidence is scant and statistics show a preponderance of prosecutions against small companies. In its response to the MoJ call for evidence, the SFO said:
“In its current form, the law relating to corporate misconduct is both unjust and unfair and in need of urgent reform.”
Note the use of “urgent”, not “kick down the road”.
It is time for the Treasury to be less selfish and to help those other than the Revenue who are defrauded by expanding the use of this mechanism beyond tax collection, and to catch those threatening the integrity of the financial system by using it to commit financial crime.
My whilstleblower amendment suggests that regulators be obliged to give evidence when it is relevant to a whistleblower seeking redress in an employment tribunal. I have tabled it to probe the present state of play, which I understand is that they do not give evidence, indeed decline to do so, even when the whistleblowing has been important and valuable to them. This gives entirely the wrong message and looks like the regulators again being too cosy with the companies they regulate. If they are too frightened to be seen to disturb that cosiness, perhaps it should be made mandatory so that they cannot shy away.
The second part of the amendment suggests making it a behaviour that is not fit and proper for a person in authority to seek to identify, dismiss or penalise a whistleblower. We all know the case of Barclays CEO Jes Staley trying to identify a whistleblower and being let off with a fine that was insignificant for him, while the industry had thought it was an action bad enough to merit removal under the new senior managers regime. The net consequence is that the senior managers regime has been undermined and the regulator has again shown its fear of regulating behaviour in large banks. It would be interesting to know what special pleading went on to achieve that result. Was the PRA involved, rather like its special pleading to US regulators on HSBC? Was the Treasury involved? Whether it was or not, it was certainly a disaster. It is now time to make amends and show that the balance of protection lies with the whistleblower and not with bank executives.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 136, which is in my name. I tabled the amendment because of concerns about the lower levels of responsibility placed on appointed representatives and the increased risk of poor financial advice that this poses.
The objective of the senior managers and certification regime to influence an individual’s behaviour by making them personally accountable to the regulator is one that I agree with and it was the correct response to the culture that had arisen in the City of London prior to the financial crash in 2008. I know that some Members of this House have criticised the application of the senior managers and certification regime, or lack of it, by the FCA, and I agree that it is worrying. However, I do not want to comment on the effectiveness of the SMCR but to remedy an anomaly that exists within the current framework.
The SMCR currently applies to directly regulated financial advisers, yet it does not extend to those who are appointed representatives. This anomaly means that, while a directly regulated adviser carries a personal responsibility for the quality of the advice they provide to their customer, no such responsibility is incumbent upon the adviser who is an appointed representative. This is despite the reality that a customer seeking financial advice is unlikely to know the difference between the two types of adviser and the possible effects that this might have on the quality of the advice they receive.
The requirements of the SMCR mean that a directly regulated adviser faces higher costs and carries greater personal responsibility for their actions than they would if they were an appointed representative, despite doing the same job. I want to be clear that this is not to say that those advisers who are appointed fail to provide sound advice. As with most instances of malpractice within the financial advisory sector, the activity of a minority will, by virtue of their actions, tarnish the reputations of the majority of diligent advisers—whether directly regulated or appointed representatives. However, it is self-evident that lower levels of regulatory responsibility increase the risk of poor advice.
This amendment corrects that anomaly by giving the FCA the power to extend the SMCR requirements and responsibilities to appointed representatives. Currently, an appointed representative is regulated through a principal firm which carries the relevant responsibilities and is directly regulated by the FCA. Transferring responsibility from the principal firm to the appointed representative extends the current framework to this overlooked anomaly and places responsibility on the appointed representative. Rather than adding an additional regulatory burden on to the principal firms, this change would be to their benefit. Extending the SMCR to appointed representatives and making them personally responsible for their actions will significantly reduce the principal firm’s own regulatory risk.
Furthermore, it will reduce the risk of poor or reckless advice being given to consumers within the appointed representative regime and level the playing field between directly regulated advisers and those who are operating as appointed representatives. This amendment would remove the distinction—largely invisible to customers—in the regulations that oversee directly regulated advisers and appointed representatives and increase regulatory confidence in the diligence of financial advice given by all advisers.
From my conversations with individuals within the financial services, it is understood that the current regulator—the FCA—would welcome the ability to extend the SMCR to appointed representatives but currently lacks the power to do so. Although I obviously cannot speak for the FCA on this matter, or on the validity of the conversations I have had, similarly I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of its comments or concerns about the increased risk that the current anomaly poses.
This amendment would be a small but positive change to the Financial Services Bill by ensuring that robust and responsible regulation applies to all those who provide consumers with financial advice. Extending the SMCR to appointed representatives would directly benefit customers, by ensuring that all advisers have a personal responsibility for the advice provided, level the playing field between all financial advisers and reduce the risk to the customers and the relevant principal firms.
Finally—I have to confess that I am not quite sure of the proper process here—I had hoped to explore the possibility of tabling an amendment for this stage that would mandate the providers of deposit or credit accounts to provide voluntary debit card and credit gambling blockers. Unfortunately, I have simply not been able to get it ready for Committee, and I apologise for that, but I would be glad to speak with the authorities and the Minister on this amendment that I hope to bring later on.
My Lords, I am glad to speak to Amendment 55 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. I placed my name to this amendment because of my concerns over indebtedness and particularly over the huge growth of household debt that has occurred during the Covid pandemic. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, I thank the Centre for Responsible Credit for the work it has undertaken on this amendment.
Last year, four Christian denominations and Church Action on Poverty published Reset the Debt. It documented the astonishing growth in indebtedness that occurred during the first lockdown and the summer. At that time, there was a hope that the economy would begin to reopen and bounce back, bringing a return to normality which would allow many people to get a handle on their growing debts. Unfortunately, the second spike in infections and increases in death meant that that economic reopening failed to materialise in the way we had hoped, causing conditions to worsen for many of those in debt. Furlough has been a lifesaver for many, and I congratulate Her Majesty’s Government on that policy, but there is a well-placed fear that once the economy opens redundancies will increase further, creating extra pressures on those who are already struggling. To quote the report:
“The lockdown continues to have profoundly unequal and poverty-increasing effects”.
At the time when the report was published, 6 million people had fallen behind on rent, council tax and other household bills because of coronavirus, with low-income families particularly turning to credit cards and overdrafts simply to survive. Covid debts, although particularly damaging for the poor, have significantly affected a variety of lower to middle-income households. This is on top of the existing debt that some of these households had incurred.
Over these past months, I have been struck by the many reports that I have received from churches, chaplaincies and charities across Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire in my diocese. They all describe the huge increase in demand from foodbanks and parish pantries, along with many more people seeking advice and relief from our of services and charities. In most cases, debt is not the consequence of a single factor but has slowly built up. However, Covid has speeded things up in a terrifying way. For the absolute poorest, debt relief orders may provide a lasting reprieve after a one-year period but many other households will be much less fortunate. Those households with a disposable income level of more than £100 per month, when compared with the lowest-income quintile, face difficult decisions and may end up being placed on a statutory debt-repayment plan and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, pointed out, may endure 10 years of full debt repayment. This can be egregious when that debt has been partially or even substantially written off and sold on to the secondary market.
Debt financing plays an important role in our economy and, despite my reservations about debt recovery practices, allows firms to profit from debt, which remains an unfortunate but perhaps necessary part of our economy. However, at the same time, there needs to be a balance. When debt has been partially written off, discounted and sold on to the secondary market, there is a strong moral case to pass on some of this discount to the debtor. It would be wrong to force an individual into misery and penury for the purpose of a full debt repayment when the original creditor readily discounted the debt to shift it on to a secondary buyer.
The amendment does not bar the purchaser of secondary debt from making a profit but merely places a limitation on how much can be reclaimed, and rightfully passes on a portion of the discount to the debtor. Limiting the potential return to more than 20% could even reduce the financial risk associated with purchasing secondary debt and may produce a more co-operative and less fearful environment for debtors and the recovery of debt.
Finally, it is worth reiterating the positive financial impacts that this would have on the Treasury. Allowing the full amount to be reclaimed may enrich the owners of the debt but will certainly cost the Treasury. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, points out, debt leads to horrifying social consequences, all of which cost the taxpayer. In not allowing the discounts from partially written-off debts to be given to the debtor, we would, in effect, be partially subsidising the social cost of debt, potentially to the tune of millions or perhaps even billions of pounds per annum. Given the increased debt resulting from the Covid crisis, morally it makes sense—there is also a strong economic case—to pass on the discounted price of the debt to people in severe financial difficulties and provide them with a fair debt write-down.
My Lords, I am delighted to follow the right reverend Prelate. We both sit on the rural action group of the Church of England. I should also declare that as a Bar apprentice in Edinburgh, one of my first duties was as a debt collector. I cannot claim that I had any particular training in that regard, and I was probably the least sympathetic at the time, given my youth and inexperience. I therefore congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, on the research that she has carried out in preparing for the amendment and bringing it forward. I also thank the Reset The Debt campaign for what they have achieved, as well as the Church Action on Poverty campaign in bringing these issues to the fore.
It may be that my noble friend the Minister is not minded to look sympathetically on the amendment but, at the very least, I ask him whether he accepts that there is a problem that needs to be addressed in this regard, for the simple reason that there will be an uplift in council tax of some 5% in some areas. It would also seem that, as yet, we have failed to address the issue of zero-hour contracts, which remains vexatious.
In moving the amendment, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, referred to food banks. My experience is not that recent but occurred between 2010 and 2015, when I had cause to visit them in my area. What impressed me most is that it was often not people on benefits who used them but those in work but who did not work sufficient hours to make ends meet. This is a category of people to whom we owe something, and is an issue that should be addressed.
In particular, I ask my noble friend what instruction is given to IVAs and others that administer debt relief orders on the power they have to be more sympathetic to and imaginative about the circumstances in which debtors find themselves. Given the rather modest remit set out in Amendment 55, I hope that my noble friend might look at it fairly sympathetically. If he feels unable to support it, perhaps he will bring forward something along these lines at the next stage.
Lord Bishop of St Albans
Main Page: Lord Bishop of St Albans (Bishops - Bishops)Department Debates - View all Lord Bishop of St Albans's debates with the Leader of the House
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI call the next speaker, the Lord Bishop of St Albans, but I cannot hear anything. I wonder whether he might be on mute.
My Lords, I apologise; I am so sorry.
I am glad to speak in support of Amendment 107 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. Throughout the course of this debate, there have been a number of comments on the current functioning of the FCA, the scope of its remit and whether it is properly undertaking its duties.
As the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, pointed out, there have been occasions when financial misconduct has not been fully disclosed, and it is worrying that this may have been due to interventions from those within government. As we establish our new position in the world following Brexit and seek to build on our financial services sector, it is vital that we are known for our honesty and transparency throughout the world. Our future will depend on this. So surely the amendment is entirely uncontroversial. The FCA is meant to be an independent regulator, not a direct arm of the Government. Hence, if Ministers have sought to intervene in any sort of FCA work or investigation, it should be a matter of transparency and disclosed.
Recently, the FCA dropped its investigation into Lookers, arguing it had instead made its concerns clear relating to the
“historic culture, systems and controls”
of the group. Why the investigation was not carried out to the full remains unclear—certainly to me, despite trying to find out. I imagine that many, including me, find the FCA’s answer unsatisfactory. It does not give us the assurances that we would hope an independent regulator would give.
Some commentators have noted that the dropping of this investigation seemed to coincide rather conveniently with the FCA’s new rules relating to car finance, brought in at the end of January 2021. Yet even these changes fell short of a mis-sell, which would undoubtedly have cost the providers of finance billions—strongly hinted at by the FCA’s 2019 report into car finance.
How the FCA came to its decision was in-house, even if it was sometimes perplexing to those of us outside. Nevertheless, in this instance, for example—and in many others—what we do not know is whether there has been any direct ministerial intervention to steer the FCA into any specific course of action. Many people would like reassurances that any intervention should be made in the interests of all and for the common good, particularly in customers’ best interests.
The amendment, in shining a light on what happens behind the FCA’s closed doors, would be a valuable addition to the Financial Services Bill. It would help in a mission that I know many in this House share to create a more transparent, robust and, dare I even say, moral financial system that in the long run will benefit all of us. I hope that the Government will look closely at either the amendment or something similar as we return to the matter later during the passage of the Bill through your Lordships’ House.
My Lords, I need to spend more time, frankly, trying to understand the amendment. I would be genuinely shocked if Ministers interfered with an investigation of any of the regulators—certainly the FCA, the body at the centre of the amendment. I am not sufficiently familiar, I confess, with the Ministerial Code, but if the code does not make that clear, it would seem absolutely necessary that it does.
I perfectly understand concerns about the effectiveness of the FCA as a regulator in dealing with wrongful behaviour. It needs to be much more aggressive and transparent. We have talked earlier in Grand Committee about the HBOS Reading fraud scandal. The FCA was finally pressured into commissioning a report from Promontory, then did not publish it—only a summary that did not reflect in any significant way the actual conclusions of the report. That was extremely disturbing. We have also talked about the FCA’s actions under the senior managers and certification regime against Jes Staley, chief executive of Barclays—
Lord Bishop of St Albans
Main Page: Lord Bishop of St Albans (Bishops - Bishops)Department Debates - View all Lord Bishop of St Albans's debates with the Cabinet Office
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I congratulate my noble friend the Minister on Amendment 14, as I raised that issue at Second Reading and it was very good to see it today. It shows that the Government are listening, which is very welcome. I thank him for his kind opening remarks on a number of Peers’ appearances: it was very perceptive of him. I will not repeat the sorry tale that he heard last time around, which is the reason for this amendment. He will recall that it was in response to an attempt to commit a fraud by sending me a credit card I had not requested, and that I was unable to progress matters with FOS because I was not a customer of the credit card company concerned. I had a letter from FOS, which says the following:
“The Financial Ombudsman Service must follow the rules stipulated by the Financial Conduct Authority handbook. The relevant section concerns dispute resolution—DISP—and DISP states that there are limitations to when FOS may investigate a complaint.”
This is the rule that stipulates that FOS may look at complaints only from “an eligible complainant”, and DISP 2.7.3 states:
“An eligible complainant must be a person that is … a consumer”.
The regulations go on to say that FOS may investigate a complaint from a consumer or “a potential consumer”, and that this consumer or potential consumer must have a relationship with the regulated busines. There is a full explanation set out in DISP 2.7.3 and 2.7.6 of the FCA handbook. As I did not genuinely attempt to make a credit application, I did not fit the description of consumer or potential consumer in the handbook. In his reply to me at Second Reading, the Minister said that
“it is already the case that potential customers of a firm can seek redress through the FOS scheme under the FCA’s existing rules, notably the FCA dispute resolution handbook rule. The relevant rule states that, to be an eligible complainant, a consumer must be, or have previously been, a potential customer, payment service user or electronic money holder of the firm that they are raising a complaint against”.—[Official Report, 8/3/21; col. GC 552.]
This is completely contrary to the email sent by FOS, and there is clearly misunderstanding and confusion.
My noble friend the Minister was kind enough to suggest that I could report this matter to Action Fraud, and reports received by Action Fraud are then considered by the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau. Frankly, none of that need have been necessary or would be necessary in future if my Amendment 26, the only amendment I will speak to, were adopted. I seek for it to be adopted so that, from here on in, FOS can take action against credit card companies which do not seek to verify recipients of credit cards before they are sent out. At the moment, there is no redress for anyone who receives a credit card and no one for them to complain to. I do not think they can complain to Action Fraud because the fraud was never consummated, as it were. I very much look forward to listening to his remarks at the Dispatch Box later this afternoon, given that the Government are in listening and action mode.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 16 and then address my own Amendment 27. The introduction of a regulatory body to oversee the rules governing the behaviour of bailiffs would greatly strengthen complaints handling for the victims of practices that fall outside the national guidelines. The FCA reported in its Financial Lives 2020 Survey that 3.8 million people in the UK are currently experiencing “financial difficulty”. It is a terrible situation that takes a significant toll on people’s health and relationships. This amendment seeks to address an important concern: the fair treatment of people by enforcement agents who collect debts, often from vulnerable people who are in grave financial distress.
The absence of an independent regulator means that, when breaches of national standards occur, any complaints will be dealt with through the company or a trade association, before possibly being passed on to an ombudsman. This is an arduous process that prevents complaints from being adequately actioned. Furthermore, these national standards are not legally binding, which obscures the extent to which an individual can seek redress. No industry is exempt from poor practice. While most enforcement agents will probably abide by national standards, nevertheless we need to make sure that they are properly regulated.
Breaches do occur, and I will quote one example provided by the charity Christians Against Poverty of a single mother of two children. This woman was living under police protection and was a regular at a food bank, and her abusive former partner had taken out £20,000-worth of debt in her name. All of this was compounded by the fact that she was caring for her critically ill mother. When visited by a bailiff on account of a parking fine that had escalated, she attempted to contact CAP so that it could explain the situation to the bailiff. At this point the bailiff became intimidating, aggressive and threatening. That is a breach of rule 21 of the national guidelines, which states:
“Enforcement agents must not act in a threatening manner when visiting the debtor”.
We need to get a balance of powers that allows enforcement officers to undertake their tasks while also protecting debtors and ensuring they have significant mechanisms to air complaints impartially and without fear.
Debt charities are already reporting rising numbers of people in financial crisis and behind on household bills such as rent and council tax because of the Covid pandemic. Given the possible upturn in the number of individuals being referred to bailiffs in the near future, now is a suitable time to explore how we can introduce a regulatory body. I hope the Government will look closely at the content of this amendment and work to correct the current imbalance.
I now turn to Amendment 27 in my name. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, who have also signed it. I tabled this amendment because I believe in the positive difference that gambling blockers can make in reducing gambling harms and empowering individuals to control their own addictions. The amendment would mandate the providers of debit and credit accounts to offer opt-in gambling blockers to block gambling transactions.
As things stand, gambling blockers have widened coverage over the past three years, currently reaching around 90% of current accounts and 40% of credit card accounts. This is an achievement in its own right and should be welcomed as a positive technological aid to reduce problem gambling. While there is a still a need to close that 10% in debit card coverage, the majority of which will come from smaller banks and building societies, it is of secondary concern to the far larger gap that exists in the credit account market, where 60% of accounts are not covered by blocking options.
In April 2020, the Gambling Commission banned the use of credit cards for gambling purposes, but this is only enforceable on licensed operators. The lack of gambling blockers on credit accounts is particularly problematic as it can provide a back door for individuals suffering from gambling-related harms to use credit cards on unlicensed sites. This undermines the Gambling Commission’s own rules and unfairly benefits unlicensed operators. Even more worryingly, this blind spot provides a direct avenue for the expansion of harmful and addictive behaviour, and the accumulation of gambling debt that would not ordinarily be allowed.
With the Government’s gambling review ongoing, the emphasis should be on preventing harm, and provisions for gambling blockers would be a welcome aid in achieving this goal. Admittedly, they are not perfect; they rely on accurate merchant categorisation codes to identify gambling transactions. But this should not discount the positive part they can play. Furthermore, through greater co-operation between account providers and payment processors, a robust and data-driven system of reporting could be developed to identify unlicensed operators hiding behind incorrect merchant categorisation codes to block future transactions. With no legal requirement to provide blockers and no obligation on payment processors to diligently review the merchant categorisation codes of unlicensed operators, gambling blockers will suffer from pitfalls that could be effectively remedied through either a legislative or regulatory approach.
There are also issues this amendment does not directly deal with but deserve highlighting. Due to the entirely optional provision of blockers, there are currently no minimum standards for functionality. This is an issue when it comes to the so-called “cooling-off” or “friction” period—the time between deactivating the blocker and once again being allowed to transact for gambling purposes. As a tool that assists those suffering from gambling addiction, the ability to activate and deactivate at will renders a blocker redundant.
Of the gambling blockers currently on offer, friction periods range from instant reactivation to 48 hours. The results offered by Monzo highlight the success of stricter cooling-off periods. Its blocker, with a 48-hour cooling-off period, block around 585,000 gambling transactions per month and is active on nearly 300,000 accounts. According to its data, once it is activated, fewer than 10% of customers deactivate it. Monzo, driven by its own success, has called upon the Government to mandate that banks provide blockers and would no doubt support this amendment. However, as I have shown, it is not merely their provision that renders them successful but their architecture. A minimum cooling-off period of 24 hours would make them far more effective tools to deal with addictions.
Finally, I will add that, in a data-driven world fuelled by digital payment systems rather than the cash we used in the past, individuals should have more autonomy over how they spend their money. Aside from their benefits in combating addiction and containing the unlicensed market, gambling blockers are an example of giving customers control over their own transactions. Actions and decisions are increasingly dictated by data that is controlled, analysed and dissected by global corporations and increasingly removed from the individual. Optional transaction blockers such as those related to gambling re-empower individuals and give them a stake in this new data-driven environment.
I thank the Government for their helpful work in encouraging the major banks to introduce gambling blockers—an endeavour that has been very successful in relation to debit cards. I know from discussions I have had with the Government that they see the benefits of blockers and continue to support a voluntary rollout. This is very encouraging and I hope that as they move forward with these efforts they will take on board some of the comments made here and find ways to promote greater data sharing between payment service providers and processors to tackle the unlicensed market. However, I remain of the opinion that for products as potentially harmful as gambling there should be not only a statutory obligation to provide opt-in blockers, as stated in this amendment, but minimum design requirements so that the positive results provided by Monzo can be emulated by other account providers.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley made a powerful case for his amendment, as did the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans for the two amendments to which he spoke.
I will speak to amendment 37C, in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett. It seeks to release child trust funds worth less than £5,000 held by children with learning disabilities, without the need to go through the daunting, lengthy and at times cumbersome Court of Protection process, while at the same time offering strict safeguards to prevent abuse.
Child trust funds were launched in January 2005, and 6.3 million children in the UK born between September 2002 and January 2011 were eligible to receive vouchers from the Government to invest in the scheme. Families with children who had a disability were offered additional payments to make it more attractive for them to join the scheme and to compensate them for the additional costs that they would face.
Lord Bishop of St Albans
Main Page: Lord Bishop of St Albans (Bishops - Bishops)Department Debates - View all Lord Bishop of St Albans's debates with the Leader of the House
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to speak on Amendment 33 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, having studied the comments made in Committee and repeated today. I can understand his frustration with history in this area. In particular, I would highlight the long delay and prevarication by Lloyds and the then regulator in dealing with the HBOS scam, which led to the demise of a number of small businesses banking with HBOS’s corporate division in Reading. Maybe more transparency would have helped there but it was actually a failure by the bank itself and by the regulator, which I very much hope would not happen again today. I am still not entirely sure what eventually happened; I know that there were some high-profile convictions. Perhaps my noble friend the Minister could update us on that sorry tale. I share everyone’s wish to see a system where it could never happen again.
However, I always worry that bad cases make bad law. The cases being quoted are generally old, while the FCA’s powers have been strengthened over the years and the culture has changed so that it is now very pro-consumer. Moreover, as my noble friend the Deputy Leader of the House explained on 10 March, the FCA is an independent body and the power of Ministers to intervene is very circumscribed. I suspect we will come back to these issues in the next financial services Bill, so I would like to make two points today.
First, reports from the United States have to be treated with some care. It is a sad fact that, unlike our own regulatory authorities, the US ones are more than a little protectionist. They come down harder on foreign entities than their domestic ones and like to levy huge fines whenever they can. It is not a level playing field, unlike the UK, which is of course one of the reasons why investors like it here. Secondly, in the sort of cases we are talking about, Ministers—I speak from experience, first as a civil servant and secondly as a Minister at BEIS, DCMS and HM Treasury—act on advice, not as free-talking politicians. If they make a direction in an investigation, it will reflect a public policy need and that could be a confidential matter, such as security or a government interest. Once that is made public it might be difficult for those being investigated to get a fair hearing, which is unfortunate in itself and likely to lead to aborted prosecutions. Whichever party is in power, this would not be in the public interest. For all these reasons, I encourage those involved to withdraw their amendment today.
My Lords, I will be brief in my support for this amendment. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for speaking at great length. I therefore do not need to add a huge amount more, not least as I intend to go into a bit more detail on my concerns about transparency when speaking in support of Amendment 34, which touches on similar issues of accountability.
I am a little puzzled why the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, thinks that this is a case of bad cases making bad laws. It seems to me that there have been very considerable concerns in the past. Surely those ought to be investigated.
We are facing a real crisis of trust in public bodies at the moment, and I believe that this amendment will be a beneficial addition to this Financial Services Bill. In making provisions for an additional layer of transparency, it will act as an incentive against any possible interference; whether done formally or informally, it will still have that effect. The truth is that we do not know whether ministerial interference in FCA investigations has occurred, and positively stating either way is speculative.
Although I was not privy to the written response from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, which he promised to send to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, confirming whether there were provisions within the Ministerial Code to allow for interventions in FCA investigations, the assumption in Committee was that any attempt to steer an FCA investigation would constitute a breach of the Ministerial Code. That would require breaches of the Ministerial Code or other offences to be taken seriously, and not treated lightly or even dismissed. Last year, an inquiry found evidence that the Home Secretary had breached the Ministerial Code, yet the consequences extended little further than an apology. In February, it was revealed that the Health Secretary had acted unlawfully when his department failed to reveal details of contracts signed during the Covid-19 period. Just before Easter, we all started reading about allegations surrounding conflicts of interest in a former Prime Minister’s dealings with the financial services firm Greensill, and there have been concerns about the current Prime Minister’s dealings during his time at City Hall. It is vital that, if we are to rely on breaches of the Ministerial Code, they are given some teeth and have some effect.
I have no evidence, but it may be that no Minister has ever interfered in any FCA investigation, in any way. I sincerely hope that that is the case, but we cannot rule it out. If interferences have occurred, it would be doubtful to assume that investigations are always steered in the interests of consumers. Although provisions are in place to prevent misconduct, they should not discount the contribution that this important amendment can make in strengthening those rules and further disincentivising any possible ministerial interferences in FCA investigations. If Her Majesty’s Government have concerns about small parts of the wording here, I hope they come back with some improvements to ensure that the levels of transparency are clear to everybody, in every part of the system.
My Lords, unfortunately, I did not bring with me a copy of the letter that the noble Earl, Lord Howe, kindly sent me in response to my question about the Ministerial Code. I expect that a copy is in the Library and available to everyone, but I am sure that the Minister will follow through. While reading the content was reassuring, I do not want it to be a distraction—it is one of the reasons that I have not signed this amendment—from the underlying issue of whether there is adequate transparency to act as the cleansing light that we need in an industry sector that will always be subject to misbehaviour. There is just too much money and opportunity, and an awful lot of power, washing through this industry. Insight, clarity and visibility are probably more important than in almost any other sector of our economy.
The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, talked as if all the misbehaviour was in the past, but we are talking about Greensill today and I have questions. I know that there are many task forces and investigations going on, but I still have no understanding of how a company with as many red flags against it as Greensill got through the accreditation process to enable it to participate in the CBILS. Other than writing to the British Business Bank—and I doubt that I will get an adequate answer—I am not sure what mechanism I can possibly use to get to the bottom of that. We do not have transparency in the areas where we need it.
I remember many conversations, in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequently, with regulators that were anxious not to rock the boat. The economy and industry were fragile enough, and they were disinclined to investigate. It is to that which I have always attributed the FCA’s inaction with regard to HBOS. I support the description of the HBOS crisis given by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. It was purely by chance that the fraud—it was literally fraud that sent people to jail for 10 years—at HBOS was exposed. Thames Valley Police decided to investigate when all the regulators, the Serious Fraud Office and the most relevant and obvious police forces had refused. Part of that was due to a lack of resources, from the police forces’ perspective.
I do not think I have ever forgiven the Treasury for its actions in this regard. It cost £7 million for Thames Valley Police to investigate that fraud and it was never reimbursed that money. The fine, of about £45 million, went to the Treasury and was deliberately not shared with the police force. Had it been, it would have encouraged and enabled police forces around the country to be more acutely aware and engaged when there was evidence of fraudulent behaviour. Even today, the various companies that were defrauded have not yet been fully compensated. Nearly 14 years on, it has not been resolved. We have two more bodies now involved in trying to clean up that mess.
The other area that leaves me with great concern is that the response I always get when I raise issues around transparency and enforcement in financial services is: “We now have the senior managers regime.” I was on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which drove a lot of the thinking that led to that regime, but, as we have often discussed in this House, it has been holed below the waterline by decisions of the FCA not to pursue senior executives. We know mostly about Barclays and Jes Staley—who had hired private investigators to track down a whistleblower—being fined but not declared unfit to hold his position. The fine was of a size that was more than made up by the bonuses he received in the following years, so it was pointless.
We have an underlying problem. It is not that the senior managers regime does not do some good—it establishes some procedures and processes—but it focuses on more junior people and does not hold people accountable at the senior level. With Greensill coming into the picture now and triggering a much wider discussion, I very much hope that the Government will take back the message that they have to sit the regulators and the various enforcement bodies down, and work out a way to make this system more effective. They are up against powerful forces and there is inequality of arms, but this industry has to be kept under oversight and control because, when it goes wrong, it takes a large part of our economy with it, as well as creating many individual victims.
My Lords, I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, will not be surprised to find that I do not support his Amendment 34. In particular, as a former director of a supervised bank, I do not recognise the regulatory capture that he majored on in Committee and again today. In my experience, the relationships are always challenging and, sometimes, worse than that.
I have two main reasons for opposing the amendment. First, a supervisory board sitting over the top of the existing regulators undermines a fundamental characteristic of regulation in the UK—namely, that regulators are independent. That means that they are independent of government, certainly, and of Parliament and anyone else who thinks that they might have an interest in what they do. They are certainly accountable for delivering against their objectives and expect to be scrutinised by Parliament, but they are autonomous bodies. This amendment runs against that.
Secondly, the regulators already have governance structures that oversee the work that the executives undertake. In the FCA, it is the FCA’s own board, which has a chairman and a majority of non-executive directors. I believe that the only executive on the FCA board is, in fact, its chief executive. In the case of the PRA, there is a Prudential Regulation Committee, which has Bank of England executives and outside members, and is chaired by the Governor of the Bank of England. More importantly, in governance terms, as the PRA is part of the Bank of England it is overseen by the Court of the Bank of England, which, again, is a largely non-executive body chaired by a non-executive, although it does have the governor and the deputy governors, including the head of the PRA.
Governance of the regulators is carried out in the way in which governance in the UK is normally done. It covers the very things mentioned in proposed new subsection (8), which is therefore duplicative. If there are concerns, they should be dealt with within the organisations concerned, without writing reports to Parliament. I believe in transparency, but there is a point at which transparency becomes counterproductive, and I am sure that this amendment is way beyond that point.
Accountability to Parliament takes many forms, a key one being the annual reports that are laid before Parliament, setting out the regulators’ performance against their objectives, which is required by existing statute. It really is difficult to see what added value this amendment would create.
The amendment is also deficient in a number of respects. Perhaps the most glaring is the reference to the “Executive Board” of the PRA and of the FCA. As far as I am aware, there is no such thing specified in legislation or the governance arrangements of either body. I believe that each regulator has an executive committee or equivalent, but they do not have an “Executive Board”, with a capital “E” and a capital “B”.
The amendment would require the exclusion from the supervisory board of anyone who might actually understand what the PRA and the FCA actually do. Proposed new subsection (5) would disqualify “current and past employees” not just of the FCA and the PRA but of any organisation that they supervise. I have never thought that ignorance was a good qualification to be a member of a board.
Proposed new subsection (10) talks about “open meetings” but does not explain what that means in practice. Proposed new subsection (11) says that all the supervisory boards papers must “be made publicly available”, but it seems to pay no heed to the need for confidentiality or data protection. I could go on. These are unnecessary and ill-thought-out proposals, and I hope that my noble friend the Minister will not accept them.
My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendment 34, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, which is an interesting contribution to the question of governance. I am keen that we find any ways that we can to speak into those organisational cultures that every industry adopts and promotes, and which sometimes lead to groupthink.
There are times when it takes someone from the outside to ask intelligent questions. I am reminded of Her Majesty the Queen asking the Bank of England why there had been a financial crash back in 2008, when many people in the industry, who were paid extraordinary amounts of money because of their supposed expertise, had not spotted that it was coming. I do not think that this is about inviting people who are ignorant to come on to boards; this is a question about whether there is a wider contribution that might be very useful and of help to thinking about issues of governance responsibility.
I will comment briefly on a further development in the FCA’s investigation into car finance, which I have referred to in the House in the past. Since the FCA introduced its new rules banning discretionary commission models in January 2021 and subsequently closed its investigations into Lookers, the car dealership firm, for possible mis-selling, it was revealed that the UK’s accounting watchdog, the Financial Reporting Council, was investigating accounting giant Deloitte for its role in auditing the very same Lookers that the FCA had only just ended its investigation into a few weeks earlier. The FCA never confirmed or dismissed whether there had been any mis-selling, remarking that it had made its concerns clear and did not intend to impose penalties on this FTSE 250 firm. However, the opening of a new investigation relating to Lookers raises questions about the thoroughness of the original FCA investigation: were all aspects investigated?